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1  INTRODUCTION 
The Human-Systems Integration Requirements (HSIR) in this document drive the 
design of space vehicles, their systems, and equipment with which humans interface in 
the Constellation Program (CxP).  These requirements ensure that the design of 
Constellation (Cx) systems is centered on the needs, capabilities, and limitations of the 
human. 
These requirements embody the collective experience of the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA) in the operation of human spacecraft from Project 
Mercury to the International Space Station (ISS), and were derived from 
NASA-STD-3000, Volume I; Man-Systems Integration Standards (MSIS), Revision B, 
1995; JSC 26882, Space Flight Health Requirements; MIL-STD-1472F, Department of 
Defense Design Criteria Standard, Human Engineering; FAA-HF-STD-001, Federal 
Aviation Administration Human Factors Design Standard; and other sources. 
1.1  PURPOSE 
The HSIR provides requirements to ensure proper integration of human-to-system 
interfaces.  These requirements apply to all mission phases, including pre-launch, 
ascent, Earth orbit, trans-lunar flight, lunar orbit, lunar landing, lunar ascent, Earth 
return, Earth entry, Earth landing, post-landing, and recovery. 
The Constellation Program must meet NASA's Agency-level human rating 
requirements, which are intended to ensure crew survival without permanent disability.  
The HSIR provides a key mechanism for achieving human rating of Constellation 
systems. 
1.2  SCOPE AND PRECEDENCE 
The requirements in this document are applicable to the Constellation Systems, 
including but not limited to Orion, Ares I, Ares V, Altair, Mission Systems (MS), Ground 
Operations (GO), Extravehicular Activity (EVA), and Flight Crew Equipment (FCE); and 
are allocated to each System per Appendix J, Allocation Matrix.  A future version of this 
document will address other Constellation Systems.  The HSIR contains those 
requirements that specifically address the needs and limitations of the human, 
regardless of the vehicle in which they are implemented.  Vehicle-specific and system-
specific requirements that are the implementation of human functional requirements can 
be found in System Requirements Documents (SRDs). 
The requirements in this document address the needs of the flight crew during all 
phases of flight.  These requirements also address the needs of ground personnel 
during pre-flight preparation, maintenance, and post-flight activities on the flight vehicles 
where there is a common interface with the flight crew. 
While this document contains requirements for vehicle interfaces to be used by suited 
crewmembers inside the vehicle, it does not cover those vehicle interfaces to be used 
by suited crewmembers during EVA operations outside the vehicle.  Those 
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requirements may be found in CxP 70130, Constellation Program Extravehicular Activity 
Design and Construction Specification, and the EVA to Systems Interface Requirements 
Documents (IRDs). 
1.3  IMPLEMENTATION 
The convention used in this document to distinguish between requirements and goals is 
as follows:  "shall" is used to indicate requirements that must be implemented and 
verified, and "should" is used to indicate goals that must be addressed by the design but 
do not need to be verified.  Objective stretch requirements are denoted with [HSxxxx-
Objective].  The Objective requirements represent future goals that, in time, may 
replace the existing threshold requirements.  Verification requirements are not required 
for the stretch Objective requirements in this document. 
The purpose of the Rationale statement is to indicate why the requirement is needed, 
the basis for its inclusion in a requirements document, and to provide context and 
examples to stakeholders.  It is important to note that the rationales are not binding and 
only provide supporting information. 
1.4  CHANGE AUTHORITY/RESPONSIBILITY 
Proposed changes to this document shall be submitted by a Constellation Program 
Change Request (CR) to the Constellation Systems Engineering Control Board 
(CxSECB) for consideration and disposition. 
All such requests will adhere to the Constellation Program Configuration Management 
Change Process. 
The appropriate NASA Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) identified for this 
document is Constellation Systems Engineering and Integration (SE&I). 
2 DOCUMENTS 
2.1  APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS 
Document Number 
Document 
Revision 
Document Title 
ANSI S12 65-2006  American National Standard for Rating Noise with 
Respect to Speech Interference 
ANSI S3.2-2009  American National Standard Method for Measuring 
the Intelligibility of Speech Over Communication 
Systems 
ANSI Z136.1 (2007)  American National Standard for Safe Use of Lasers 
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Document Number Document 
Revision 
Document Title 
CxP 70023 Rev A Constellation Program Design Specification for 
Natural Environments 
CxP 70035  Constellation Program Portable Equipment, Payloads, 
and Cargo (PEPC) Interface Requirements Document 
CxP 70080 Rev A CPN-001 Constellation Program Electromagnetic Environmental 
Effects (E3) Requirements Document 
CxP 70135  Constellation Program Structural Design and 
Verification Requirements 
CxP 70136-ANX01 BASELINE  
CPN-001 
Constellation Program Loads Data Book Annex 1: 
System-To-System Interface Loads 
CxP 70137  Constellation Program Loads Control Plan 
CxP 70160-ANX03  Constellation Program Data Architecture 
Implementation Plan, Annex 3: Naming and 
Identification Rules 
CxP 70172-01  Constellation Program Data Architecture 
Specification, Volume 1: Naming and Identification 
Rules 
CxP 72407  Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle Window Optical 
Properties Requirements 
FAA-HF-STD-001  Federal Aviation Administration Human Factors 
Design Standard 
FED-STD-595  Colors Used in Government Procurement 
IEEE C95.1-2005  IEEE Standard for Safety Levels with Respect to 
Human Exposure to Radio Frequency 
Electromagnetic Fields, 3 kHz to 300 GHz 
ISBN 0875530478  Standard Methods for Examination of Water & 
Wastewater 
ISO 2631-1:1997  Mechanical Vibration and Shock - Evaluation of 
Human Exposure to Whole Body Vibration 
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Document Number Document 
Revision 
Document Title 
ISO 3382  Measurement of the Reverberation Time of Rooms 
with Reference to Other Acoustical Parameters 
ISO 6954:2000  Mechanical vibration -- Guidelines for the 
measurement, reporting and evaluation of vibration 
with regard to habitability on passenger and merchant 
ships 
JSC 20584  Spacecraft Maximum Allowable Concentrations for 
Airborne Contaminants 
JSC 63307  Requirements for Optical Properties for Windows 
Used in Crewed Spacecraft 
NASA TND-5153  The use of pilot rating in the evaluation of aircraft 
handling qualities 
NASA-STD-3000  Man-Systems Integration Standards, Volume 1 
NASA-STD-6001  Flammability, Odor, Off-Gassing, and Compatibility 
Requirements and Test Procedures for Materials in 
Environments that Support Combustion 
NATICK/TR-89/044  1988 Anthropometric Survey of U.S. Army Personnel:  
Methods and Summary Statistics 
NCRP Report Number 
132 
 Radiation Protection Ordinance for Activities in Low-
Earth Orbit 
No Number  41-Node man model for calculating stored body heat 
No Number  Wissler model for calculating stored body heat 
No Number  Webster's New World Dictionary of American English 
No Number  "Usability Engineering" (1993) by Jakob Nielsen 
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2.2  REFERENCE DOCUMENTS 
Document Number Document 
Revision 
Document Title 
2005-01-2872  International Conference on Environment Systems 
(ICES) Paper “An Environmental Sensor Technology 
Selection Process for Exploration” 
AATD Development 
Program Phase 1 
Reports 
 AATD System Technical Characteristics, Design 
Concepts, and Trauma Assessment Criteria 
ACGIH  American Conference of Governmental Industrial 
Hygienists (ACGIH) Standards, “Threshold Limit 
Values and Biological Exposure Indices” 
ACGIH TLVs® and 
BEIs®, 2007 
 American Conference of Governmental Industrial 
Hygienists (ACGIH) standard for “Threshold Limit 
Values (TLVs®) and Biological Exposure Indices 
(BEIs®),” 2007, sections Infrasound and Low-
Frequency Sound, Light and Near-Infrared Radiation, 
and Ultraviolet Radiation 
AGARD AR-330  Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and 
Development consensus advisory report AR-330:  
Anthropometric Dummies for Crash and Escape 
Testing. 
AGARD CP-597  Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and 
Development consensus advisory report AR-597:  
Impact Head Injury Responses, Mechanisms, 
Tolerances, Treatment and Countermeasures. 
AGARD-CP-472  Development of Acceleration Exposure Limits for 
Advanced Escape Systems 
ATR-2000  
(2112)-1 
 International Space Station Destiny Module Science 
Window Optical Properties and Wavefront Verification 
Test Results 
ATR-2003  
(7828)-1 
 International Space Station Cupola Scratch Pane 
Window Optical Test Results 
CAIT IDAQ4   Denitrogenation and Decompression Sickness (DCS) 
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Revision 
Document Title 
SIG-05-1034 Task Description Sheet (TDS) 
CFR49 Part 571 and 
572 
 Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, Title 49 
Code of Federal Regulations, Part 571 and 572 
CxP 70000 Rev C Constellation Architecture Requirements Document 
(CARD) 
CxP 70000 Rev C CPN-001 Constellation Architecture Requirements Document 
(CARD) 
CxP 70007  Constellation Design Reference Missions and 
Operational Concepts, Annex 2:  Flight Operations 
Scenarios 
CxP 72000 Rev B Constellation Program System Requirements for the 
Orion System 
DRD T-045  Space Radiation Analysis and Certification Report 
EC-09-154  Bue, Grant; Tolerable limit for hand skin temperatures 
in glove tests, EC-09-154, October 30, 2009 
FAA-HF-STD-001  Federal Aviation Administration Human Factors 
Design Standard 
IEEE C95.1-2005  IEEE Standard for Safety Levels with Respect to 
Human Exposure to Radio Frequency 
Electromagnetic Fields, 3 kHz to 300 GHz 
ISBN 0387988203  Accidental Injury: Biomechanics and Prevention 
ISBN 0879951508  The IESNA lighting handbook 
ISBN 1560910070  Automotive Safety: Anatomy, injury, testing, and 
regulation 
ISO 13732-3  Ergonomics of the thermal environment – Methods for 
the assessment of human responses to contact with 
surfaces, Part 3:  Cold Surfaces 
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Revision 
Document Title 
ISO 2631-1:1997  Mechanical Vibration and Shock - Evaluation of 
Human Exposure to Whole Body Vibration 
ISO 6954:2000  Mechanical vibration -- Guidelines for the 
measurement, reporting and evaluation of vibration 
with regard to habitability on passenger and merchant 
ships 
ISO 7731  Ergonomics - Danger signals for public work areas 
Auditory danger signals 
JSC 20584  Spacecraft Maximum Allowable Concentrations for 
Airborne Contaminants 
JSC 39116  “EMU Phase VI Glove Thermal Vacuum Test and 
Analysis Final Report”, Doc. #CTSD-SS-1621 
JSC 63414  Spacecraft Water Exposure Guidelines (SWEG) 
JSC 63555  Nutrition requirements, Standards, and Operating 
Bands for Exploration Missions 
JSSG-2010-7  Department of Defense Joint Service Specification 
Guide - Crew Systems Crash Protection Handbook 
MIL-S-58095A  Seat System Crash-Resistance, Non-Ejection, 
Aircrew, General Specification for, 31 January 1986 
MIL-S-9479E  Seat System, Upward Ejection, Aircraft, General 
Specification for 
MIL-STD-1472  Department of Defense Design Criteria Standard-
Human Engineering 
MIL-STD-1474D  Department of Defense Design Criteria Standard-
Noise Limits 
NASA-MEMO-5-19-59E  Human Tolerance to Rapidly Applied Accelerations 
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Revision 
Document Title 
NASA-STD-3001  Space Flight Human Systems Standard, Volume 1: 
Crew Health 
NASA-TM-2008-215198  The Use of a Vehicle Acceleration Exposure Limit 
Model and a Finite Element Crash Test Dummy Model 
to Evaluate the Risk of Injuries During Orion Crew 
Module Landings 
NASA-TN-D-6539  Predicting the Dynamic Response of the Apollo 
Command Module to Earth Impact 
NASA-TN-D-7440  Apollo Experience Report – Command Module Crew 
Couch/Restraint and Load-Attenuation Systems 
NASA/TM 108497  Trace Chemical Contaminant Generation Rates for 
Spacecraft Contamination Control System Design 
NASA/ 
TP-1998-207978 
 Elements of Spacecraft Cabin Air Quality Design 
NIOSH Publication No. 
94-110 
 The Applications Manual For the Revised NIOSH 
Lifting Equation 
No Number  Deliberations of the Exploration Atmospheres Working 
Group (EAWG) 
No Number  Russian "State Standard" (referred to as GOST) 
No Number  Space Physiology and Medicine (1994) Thermo-
degradation of materials 
No Number  Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Maximum 
Contamination Level (MCL) 
No Number  M.J. Griffin, “Handbook of Human Vibration” 
No Number  Man’s Short-Time Tolerance to Sinusoidal Vibration 
No Number  Beranek and Ver, Noise and Vibration Control 
Engineering, 1992 
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Document Number Document 
Revision 
Document Title 
No Number  C.M. Harris, “Handbook of Acoustical Measurements 
and Noise Control, 3rd Ed.” 
No Number  Greene, L.C., Alden, J.C. and Hardy, J.D.; Adaptation 
to Pain.  Fed. Proc. 17: 60, 1958. 
No Number  Hatton, A.P. and Halfdanarson. Role of Contact 
Resistance in Skin Burns. J. of Biomed Eng. Volume 
4, April 1982, pp. 97-102 
No Number  Havenith G, van de Linde EJG, Heus R. (1992) Pain, 
thermal sensation and cooling rates of hands while 
touching cold materials. Eur J Appl Physiol; 65: 43–51 
No Number  Lloyd-Smith, D.L. and Mendelssohn, K. Tolerance 
Limits to Radiant Heat.  Brit. Med. J., p. 975, 1948. 
No Number  Moritz, A.R. and Henriques, F.C. Studies in Thermal 
Injury II.  The Relative Importance of Time and Air 
Surface Temperatures in the Causation of Cutaneous 
Burns.  American Journal of Pathology, 23:695-720 
(1947). 
No Number  Provins KA, Morton R. (1960) Tactile Discrimination 
and Skin Temperature. J Appl Physiol;15: 155–60. 
No Number  Stoll, A.M., Chianta, M.A. and Piergallini, J.R. Thermal 
Conduction Effects in Human Skin.  Aviation, Space 
and Environmental Medicine.  50(8):778-787, 1979. 
No Number  Geng, Q., Holmer, I., Hartog, D.E.A, Havenith, G., 
Jay, O., Malchaire, J., Piette, A., Rintamaki, H., 
Rissanen, S.; Temperature Limit Values for Touching 
Cold Surfaces with the Fingertip.  Ann. Occup. Hyg., 
pp.1-12. (2006). 
No Number  Hardy, J.D, Wolff, H.G., Goodel, Williams, H. and 
Wilkins; Pain Sensations and Reactions, Baltimore, 
1952., pg 142. 
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No Number  Scientific and Technical Information Center Vehicle 
Integration and Test Office Window Testing report 
No Number  IENSA Lighting Handbook 
No Number  Overhead and forward reach capability during 
exposure to +1 to +6 Gx loads. 
No Number  Schafer & Bagian, Aviation, Space, and 
Environmental Medicine, 64: 979, 1993 
No Number  U.S. Navy Treatment Table 6 
SAE 1988-12-0013  SAE Automotive Safety: Testing & Evaluation of 
Hybrid III Load Sensing Face 
SAE 983161  SAE Automotive Safety: Biomechanical Analysis of 
Indy Race Car Crashes 
SAE J885  SAE Automotive Safety: Human Tolerances to Impact 
Conditions as Related to Motor Vehicle Design 
SAE PT-43  SAE Automotive Safety: Biomechanics of Impact 
Injury and Injury Tolerances of the Head-Neck 
Complex 
SAE PT-44  SAE Automotive Safety: HYBRID III: The First 
Human-like Crash Test Dummy 
SAE PT-47  SAE Automotive Safety: Biomechanics of Impact 
Injuries and Injury Tolerances of the Abdomen, 
Lumbar Spine and Pelvis Complex 
SAE SP-731  SAE Automotive Safety: Injury Biomechanics 
SID 64-1344C  Apollo launch data for the Command Module couch 
SSP 50260 Revision C ISS Medical Operations Requirements Document 
(MORD) 
SSP 50653-1  Basic Provisions on Crew Actions in the Event of a 
Toxic Release on the ISS 
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SSP 57000  Pressurized Payload Interface Requirements 
Document 
USAAVSCOM  
TR-89-D-22A 
 Aircraft crash survival design guide: Volume I - Design 
criteria and checklists 
 
3 HUMAN-SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS 
3.1 ANTHROPOMETRY, BIOMECHANICS, AND STRENGTH 
This section contains requirements based on the physical size, shape, reach, posture, 
and strength of potential crewmembers.  These data are to be used to design vehicles 
and the hardware and equipment used therein, to accommodate the physical size, 
shape, reach, range of motion, and strength of crewmembers. 
Crewmembers can conduct operations unsuited, pressurized suited, or unpressurized 
suited.  An analysis of operations must be performed to identify all tasks and task 
conditions.  (This list of tasks is referred to in this section as "planned tasks" and 
includes both nominal and off-nominal tasks.)  Some tasks (e.g., personal hygiene) will 
only be conducted by an unsuited crewmember.  Other operations (e.g., pre-launch) 
may never be done in anything more than an unpressurized suit.  The design must 
accommodate worst-case conditions.  For example, if it is feasible that a pressurized 
suited crewmember will be in a location and using equipment, then the design of 
equipment and location must accommodate a pressurized suited crewmember. 
3.1.1 Anthropometry 
3.1.1.1 Anthropometric Dimensions for Unsuited Crewmembers 
[HS2001] The system shall provide fit, access, reach, view, and operation of human-
systems interfaces in crew functional areas for unsuited crewmembers as defined in 
Appendix B, tables Anthropometric Dimensional Data for American Female and Male, 
Vehicle Design Critical Anthropometry Dimensions, and Suit Design Critical 
Anthropometry Dimensions. 
Rationale:  The full size range of an unsuited crewmember must be able to fit, 
reach, view, and operate all required human-systems interfaces in the crew 
functional areas that do not require protective suits.  Because the current and 
future crewmembers' body dimensions could have a wide range, it is necessary 
to use the full range provided in these tables to ensure crew accommodation. 
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3.1.1.2 Anthropometric Dimensions for Suited Crewmembers 
[HS2002] The system shall provide fit, access, reach, view, and operation of human-
systems interfaces in crew functional areas for pressurized suited crewmembers as 
defined in Appendix B, table Vehicle Design Critical Anthropometry Dimensions and 
table Suit Design Critical Anthropometry Dimensions. 
Rationale:  The full size range of suited crewmembers must be able to fit, reach, 
view, and operate required human-systems interfaces involved in planned tasks 
in the crew functional areas that require protective pressurized suits. 
3.1.2 Range of Motion 
3.1.2.1 Range of Motion of an Unsuited Crewmember 
[HS2003] Aspects of the system with which unsuited crewmembers physically interact 
during planned tasks shall be within the ranges of motion provided in Appendix B, table 
Unsuited Joint Mobility. 
Rationale:  All vehicle seats and restraints need to be adjustable to 
accommodate the crewmembers' ranges of motion.  Crew interfaces and controls 
with which the unsuited crew will interact must be located such that they can be 
reached from the restrained positions within the range of motion of the 
crewmember as defined in Appendix B, table Unsuited Joint Mobility.  The range 
of motion numbers present in these tables show the level of mobility that is 
needed to perform a variety of relevant functional tasks.  These numbers do not 
necessarily indicate maximum level of mobility possible in a given configuration. 
3.1.2.2 Range of Motion of a Suited Crewmember 
[HS2004] Aspects of the system with which suited crewmembers physically interact 
during planned tasks shall be within the ranges of motion provided in Appendix B, table 
Unpressurized Suited Joint Mobility and table Pressurized Suited Joint Mobility for 
Nominal Pressure Microgravity Operations. 
Rationale:  Suited crewmembers should not have to reposition themselves each 
time they manually operate and view the vehicle's user interfaces.  All vehicle 
seats and restraints need to be adjustable to accommodate the crewmember's 
ranges of motion.  Crew interfaces and controls with which the suited crew will 
interact must be located such that they can be reached from the restrained 
positions within the range of motion of the crewmember.  Suits can limit the crew 
range of motion below the range of motion of the unsuited crew as specified in 
Appendix B, table Unpressurized Suited Joint Mobility.  Suit pressurization can 
further reduce the range of motion of the crewmember as specified in 
Appendix B, table Pressurized Suited Joint Mobility for Nominal Pressure 
Microgravity Operations.  The range of motion numbers present in these tables 
show the level of mobility that was needed to perform a variety of relevant 
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functional tasks.  These numbers do not necessarily indicate maximum level of 
mobility possible in a given configuration. 
3.1.3 Mass Properties 
3.1.3.1 Total Crew Control Mass 
[HS2010] The system shall accommodate a total crew control mass, as shown in 
HS2010, table Total Crew Control Mass, to mission destination through return. 
TABLE 3.1.3.1-1 - TOTAL CREW CONTROL MASS  
Vehicle Four Crew 
(kg [lb]) 
Orion 327 (720) 
Altair 327 (720) 
 
Rationale:  Total crew mass is based on a statistically derived value established 
to ensure, with high probability, that vehicle performance and mass allocations 
will be sufficient to accommodate crews selected from the astronaut corps 
without consideration of individual crew mass.  Individual crew mass is already a 
criteria of individual crew selection to the corps.  Insufficient total crew mass 
capabilities creates a burden for mission crew selection of larger crewmembers, 
requiring other crewmembers to be smaller and requiring backup crewmembers 
for smaller crewmembers to be similarly small.  Total crew mass numbers are 
derived using a weight-truncated database based on the Natick U.S. Army 
Anthropometric Survey (ANSUR) data trended to show growth through 2015.  
The specification of crew mass uses this weight-truncated database for 
crewmembers using a Monte Carlo simulation to identify the 80th percentile total 
crew mass given a distribution of 18.5% of females in the population for four 
crew.  For simplicity, this requirement assumes an average individual mass of 
82 kg (180 lb).  Individual crew mass is the Max single crew mass per 
Appendix B, table Whole Body Mass of Crewmember.  Crew masses specified 
are for unclothed or lightly clothed crewmembers and should be considered in 
addition to clothing and suit masses. 
3.1.3.2 Mass Properties of an Unsuited Crewmember 
[HS2005] Aspects of the system with which an unsuited crewmember physically 
interacts during acceleration should accommodate crewmember mass properties as 
defined in all tables in Appendix B, Section B3.0 Mass Properties. 
Rationale:  Body support systems (seats, brackets, restraints, etc.) must 
accommodate forces exerted by an unsuited crewmember under all anticipated 
accelerations. 
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3.1.3.3 Mass Properties of a Suited Crewmember 
[HS2006] Aspects of the system with which a suited crewmember may physically 
interact during planned tasks shall accommodate the mass of the suited crewmember 
provided in Appendix B, table Whole-Body Mass of Crewmember. 
Rationale:  All vehicle systems with human-systems interfaces need to be 
designed such that they will not be damaged after being subjected to the forces 
that a large suited crewmember can impart on that interface.  Also, body support 
systems (seats, brackets, restraints, etc.) must accommodate forces exerted by a 
suited crewmember under all anticipated acceleration and gravity environments. 
3.1.4  Strength 
3.1.4.1 Structural Integrity of Hardware for an Unsuited Crewmember 
[HS2007] System components and equipment that are intended to be operated by 
unsuited crew shall withstand the forces in the "Maximum Crew Operational Loads" 
column of Appendix B, table Unsuited Strength Data without sustaining damage. 
Rationale:  Vehicle components and equipment must be designed to withstand 
large forces exerted by a strong crewmember during nominal operation without 
breaking.  These limits are defined by the Maximum Crew Operational Loads. 
3.1.4.2 Structural Integrity of Hardware for a Suited Crewmember 
[HS2007B] System components and equipment that will be operated by the suited crew 
should withstand the forces in the "Maximum Crew Operational Loads" column of 
Appendix B, table Unpressurized Suited Strength Data and table Pressurized Suited 
Strength Data. 
Rationale:  Vehicle components and equipment must be designed to withstand 
large forces exerted by a strong crewmember during nominal operation without 
breaking.  These limits are defined by the Maximum Crew Operational Loads.  
Applicable pressurization cases can be defined by analysis. 
3.1.4.3 Minimum Crew Operational Loads for an Unsuited Crewmember 
[HS2008] System components and equipment that are intended to be operated by 
unsuited crew shall require forces no greater than the Minimum Crew Operational 
Loads as defined in Appendix B, table Unsuited Strength Data. 
Rationale:  A weaker crewmember should be able to perform any requested 
tasks.  These limits are defined by the Minimum Crew Operational Loads.  
Criticality 1 load limits are for activities related to crew safety; Criticality 2 load 
limits are for activities related to Loss of Mission (LOM). 
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3.1.4.4 Minimum Crew Operational Loads for a Suited Crewmember 
[HS2008B] System components and equipment that are intended to be operated by 
suited crew should require forces no greater than the Minimum Crew Operational Loads 
as defined in the appropriate data in Appendix B, table Unpressurized Suited Strength 
Data and table Pressurized Suited Strength Data. 
Rationale:  A weaker crewmember should be able to perform any requested 
tasks. These limits are defined by the Minimum Crew Operational Loads.  
Criticality 1 load limits are for activities related to crew safety; Criticality 2 load 
limits are for activities related to Loss of Mission.  Unpressurized suits can limit 
strength capability as specified in table Unpressurized Suited Strength Data.  Suit 
pressurization can further reduce strength capability as noted in table 
Pressurized Suited Strength Data.  The strength data for suited crew are 
estimates only and are dependent on the final suit configuration.  Applicable 
pressurization cases can be defined by analysis. 
3.1.4.5 Equipment Damage Hazard 
[HS2009] The system shall design hardware that is exposed to crew induced 
inadvertent contact loads per CxP 70135, Constellation Program Structural Design and 
Verification Requirements, Section 3.0, and the loads specified in CxP 70136-ANX01, 
Constellation Program Loads Data Book, Annex 1:  System-to-System Interface Loads, 
Section 3.0. 
Rationale:  System components and hardware with which the crew interacts 
during nominal operations on-orbit must be able to withstand incidental contact 
by crewmembers without creating a hazard. 
3.2 NATURAL AND INDUCED ENVIRONMENTS 
3.2.1 Atmosphere 
This section contains requirements for the design of systems to maintain atmospheric 
composition and pressure limits, to monitor and control the atmosphere, and to limit 
contaminants and toxins. 
3.2.1.1 Atmospheric Quality for Nominal Vehicle Operations 
3.2.1.1.1 Total Pressure for Nominal Vehicle Operations 
[HS3004] The system shall maintain internal pressure to operate within 51.7 kPa 
(7.50 psia) (388 mmHg) and 103 kPa (15.0 psia) (773 mmHg). 
Rationale:  The nominal limits for total pressure are based on deliberations of the 
Exploration Atmospheres Working Group (EAWG), except for maximum total 
pressure where the value is chosen to be high enough not to limit normal 
operations of approximately 101 kPa (14.7 psia) and low enough to prevent 
excessive nitrogen saturation before EVA operations.  The lower pressure limit 
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will enhance operational capability for EVA by reducing prebreathe time without 
impacting Decompression Sickness (DCS) risk and potentially reduce the 
atmospheric consumable burden.  Operating within a narrower total pressure 
range is acceptable as long as it falls within the 51.7 kPa (7.50 psia) to 103 kPa 
(15.0 psia) nominal range of operations.  For Orion flights independent of the 
ISS, structural mass savings are possible with lower loads due to reduced cabin 
pressure.  Transient operations at pressures outside this nominal range are 
tolerated per HS3005, including suited operations which typically fall outside the 
nominal range. 
3.2.1.1.2 O2 Partial Pressure for Nominal Vehicle Operations 
[HS3004B] The system shall maintain the partial pressure of oxygen in the internal 
atmosphere to operate within 18.5 kPa (2.69 psia) (139 mmHg) and 23.7 kPa 
(3.44 psia) (178 mmHg). 
Rationale:  This requirement ensures that the crewmembers will be comfortable 
to perform on-orbit tasks requiring enhanced mental alertness and concentration, 
and will be able to sustain physically demanding cardiopulmonary and muscular 
loading, such as during countermeasure exercises or EVA, without any 
performance decrements or toxicity that could be induced by insufficient or 
excess oxygen partial pressure.  The United States (US) Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration (OSHA) specifies that the minimum oxygen level for 
entry into an enclosed space is 19.5% at sea level pressure (ppO2 148 mmHg, 
equivalent 2,000 ft).  The range of ppO2 available to be breathed by >80% of the 
world's population terrestrially is 145-178 mmHg, which is equivalent to sea level 
to 3,000 feet altitude.  This is the ppO2 recommended for extended nominal 
spaceflight operations by several space biomedical sources.  Joint US and 
Russian biomedical sourcebooks recommend keeping spacecraft ppO2 above 
128 mmHg (below the equivalent flight altitude of 2,000 m or approximately  
6,000 ft level) in order to allow the performance of physical work in the face of 
cardiovascular and vestibular effects due to weightlessness.  Certain mission 
profiles will not allow ppO2 to remain in the nominal physiological range during all 
mission phases.  Excursions from the nominal range of 18.5 kPa (139 mmHg) to 
23.7 kPa (178 mmHg) are allowed provided they meet the time limitations 
presented in HS3005B.  CxP 70000 Constellation Architecture Requirements 
Document (CARD) ppO2 requirement (CA3133-PO) (17 kPa [2.5 psia] to 21 kPa 
[3.1 psia]) accounts for post-acclimatization indefinite exposure to lower oxygen 
ppO2 at the lower limit, and fire hazard controls at the upper limit. 
3.2.1.1.3 CO2 Partial Pressure for Nominal Vehicle Operations 
[HS3004C] The system shall maintain the partial pressure of carbon dioxide in the 
internal atmosphere to less than 0.67 kPa (0.10 psia) (5.0 mmHg) average over any 
1-hour time frame. 
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Rationale:  There is no minimum CO2 atmospheric requirement for human 
existence, as humans produce carbon dioxide with metabolic respiration.  The 
NASA Spacecraft Maximum Allowable Concentration (SMAC) for 30- and 
180-day Time Weighted Average (TWA) is 5.3 mmHg, from JSC 20584, 
Spacecraft Maximum Allowable Concentrations for Airborne Contaminants.  No 
performance decrements during standard operations result with inspired CO2 
levels < 0.67 kPa (0.10 psia) (5.0 mmHg) as an average for a 1-hour time frame. 
3.2.1.1.4 N2 Partial Pressure for Nominal Vehicle Operations 
[HS3004D] The system shall maintain the partial pressure of nitrogen in the internal 
atmosphere between 10.3 kPa (1.50 psia) (77.5 mmHg) and 82.8 kPa (12.0 psia) 
(621 mmHg) for missions greater than 10 days. 
Rationale:  No diluent gas is required for short duration space missions or time 
limited EVAs, as long as the total atmosphere meets fire safety specifications for 
the system and the materials within it.  Diluent gas is required in nominal long 
duration breathable atmospheres to prevent pulmonary alveolar atelectasis in 
addition to reducing the ignition/flammability threshold.  The choice of diluent gas 
is dependent on many factors, but the human is well adapted to the presence of 
nitrogen because it is inert.  However, nitrogen does possess the risk of evolution 
from the tissue and DCS when the individual is exposed to hypobaric conditions.  
Maximum:  For nominal operations, the max limit for nitrogen is set to reduce 
excess nitrogen saturation in the event that a contingency EVA will be performed 
without a prolonged oxygen prebreathe.  Due to its inert nature, nitrogen does 
not cause significant measurable physiological effects in humans until it reaches 
levels equivalent to several atmospheres of depth, and therefore the nitrogen 
narcosis limit is 395 kPa (57.3 psia) (2,960 mmHg). 
3.2.1.2 Atmospheric Quality Limits for Crew Exposure 
3.2.1.2.1 Total Pressure Tolerance Ranges for Crew Exposure 
[HS3005] The system shall maintain the pressure that the crew is exposed to within the 
internal atmosphere during off-nominal operations within the limits shown in HS3005, 
table Physiological Total Pressure Limits for Crew Exposure. 
TABLE 3.2.1.2.1-1 - PHYSIOLOGICAL TOTAL PRESSURE LIMITS FOR CREW EXPOSURE  
Total Pressure (kPa) Total Pressure (psia) Time 
Pressure ≤ 20.7 Pressure ≤ 3.00 0 
20.7 < Pressure ≤ 29.6 3.00 < Pressure ≤ 4.30 12 hours 
29.6 < Pressure ≤ 51.7 4.30 < Pressure ≤ 7.50 14 days 
51.7 < Pressure ≤ 103 7.50 < Pressure ≤ 15.0 Indefinite 
103 < Pressure ≤ 117 15.0 < Pressure ≤ 17.0 12 hours 
Pressure > 117 Pressure > 17.0 Contingency only 
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NOTES: 
1. Kilopascal (kPa) is the International System of Units (SI).  Other units are for 
reference only. 
2. Nominal pressure ranges are included for completeness and denoted by italic font.  
HS3004 is the requirement for nominal pressure. 
 
Rationale:  The nominal and contingency limits for total pressure are based on 
deliberations of the Exploration Atmospheres Working Group (EAWG) for suited 
operations.  Total pressure of 20.7 kPa (3.00 psia) (155 mmHg), assuming that 
the crew is at rest, on 100% O2 and a mask seal without leaks is the lowest 
possible contingency or EVA nominal operations ppO2 to prevent both hypoxia 
and early manifestations of ebullism, as well as excess DCS risk.  The maximum 
limit (contingency only) is based on operational capability (assuming the use of 
nitrogen as a diluent gas) and limits excess nitrogen saturation that would affect 
DCS risk and that would be required to operate at higher pressures without 
exceeding fire limits.  This limit is far below the current maximal pressure 
endurance for humans, based on diving exposure, which is approximately 
3,300 kPa (479 psia) (24,800 mmHg) using Self-Contained Underwater 
Breathing Apparatus (SCUBA) at 318.25 meters (1,044.1 ft) of sea water, June 
13, 2005 for less than  1 hour.  For suited operations (e.g., EVA or contingency 
Intravehicular Activity [IVA] operations), the vehicle must be able to go to 
vacuum, but the pressure the crew is exposed to should not fall outside the 
pressure ranges stated in HS3005, table Physiological Total Pressure Limits for 
Crew Exposure. If there should be a DCS event requiring treatment, then an off-
nominal crew exposure pressure >117 kPa (17.0 psia) (879 mmHg) up to 
157 kPa (22.7 psia) (1,170 mmHg) or higher may be required to treat the DCS 
episode for a transient exposure period and likely will be at enriched oxygen 
concentration.  Discriminate set points for suit pressure within suit operating 
pressure limits are defined in HS11000. 
3.2.1.2.2 O2 Partial Pressure Tolerance Ranges for Crew Exposure 
[HS3005B] The system shall maintain oxygen partial pressure to operate within the 
limits defined in HS3005B, table Partial Pressure Oxygen Physiological Limits for Crew 
Exposure. 
TABLE 3.2.1.2.2-1 - PARTIAL PRESSURE OXYGEN PHYSIOLOGICAL LIMITS 
FOR CREW EXPOSURE  
ppO2 (kPa) ppO2 (mmHg) ppO2 (psia) Maximum Time Allowed 
ppO2  > 82.8 ppO2  > 621 ppO2 > 12.0 ≤ 6 hours 
70.3 < ppO2 ≤ 82.8 527 < ppO2 ≤ 621 10.2 < ppO2 ≤ 12.0 ≤ 18 hours 
62.1 < ppO2 ≤ 70.3 466 < ppO2 ≤ 527 9.01 < ppO2 ≤ 10.2 ≤ 24 hours 
33.5 < ppO2 ≤ 62.1 251 < ppO2 ≤ 466 4.85 < ppO2 ≤ 9.01 ≤ 48 hours 
23.7 < ppO2 ≤ 33.5 178 < ppO2 ≤ 251 3.44 < ppO2 ≤ 4.85 ≤ 14 days 
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18.5 < ppO2 ≤ 23.7 139 < ppO2 ≤ 178 2.69 < ppO2 ≤ 3.44 Nominal physiological range.  
Indefinite with no 
measurable impairments.2 
17.1 < ppO2 ≤ 18.5 128 < ppO2 ≤ 139 2.48 < ppO2 ≤ 2.69 Indefinite with measurable 
performance decrements.3 
14.8 < ppO2 ≤ 17.1 111 < ppO2 ≤ 128 2.15 < ppO2 ≤ 2.48 1 hour if acclimatized to 17.1 
< ppO2 ≤ 18.5 kPa, 
otherwise risk acute 
mountain sickness.4 
ppO2 ≤ 14.8 ppO2 ≤ 111 ppO2 ≤ 2.15 Not allowed.  Supplemental 
O2 is required to perform 
tasks without significant 
impairment. 
NOTE: 
 
1. Kilopascal (kPa) is the International System of Units (SI).  Other units are for reference only. 
 
2. Nominal pressure ranges are included for completeness and denoted by italic font.  HS3004B is 
the requirement for nominal ppO2. 
 
3. The effects of ppO2 between 17.1 kPa and 18.5 kPa include increased respiration and heart rate, 
and decreased mental alertness and capacity for physical work.  After a 3-day crew exposure to 
this range, most effects will no longer be present and nominal human function will resume, 
although capacity for physical work may remain diminished for a longer period. There is no 
mechanism by which crewmembers can be acclimatized without these minor performance 
decrements, but the effects are diminished with slower ppO2 adjustment times. Additionally, 
although the risk of AMS is very low in this ppO2 range, it is not zero; the risk of AMS will be lower 
the more slowly that ppO2 adjustments are made. 
 
4. Rapid decreases in ppO2 from the nominal range (18.5 < ppO2 ≤ 23.7 kPa) to this range should be 
avoided.  The 1-hour limit applies to crews that have acclimatized to the 17.1 < ppO2 ≤ 18.5 kPa 
range for a minimum of 3 days. 
 
Rationale:  The ppO2 minimum acceptable limits defined in HS3005B, table 
Partial Pressure Oxygen Physiological Limits for Crew Exposure are established 
to ensure adequate delivery of oxygen to the pulmonary alveoli from inspired 
oxygen ppO2.  These limits represent the minimum ppO2 required to maintain the 
alveolar pressure of oxygen equivalent to that of breathing air at a range of 
altitudes from approximately 3,000- to 10,000-foot pressure altitude, at which 
degradation in performance is expected to occur with acute changes.  The 
minimum limit of 17.1 kPa (2.48 psia or 128 mmHg) for indefinite O2 partial 
pressure is set at approximately 6,000-ft altitude equivalent.  This level is set 
below the 10,000-ft altitude level where oxygen masks are required per Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) and Department of Defense (DoD) requirements, 
and to reduce the likelihood of development of acute hypoxic symptoms, such as 
Acute Mountain Sickness (AMS).  With continued exposure to less oxygen than 
stated in the table limits, especially with increasing level of activity, AMS may 
result.  The limits are in accordance with international standards.  Variations in 
total cabin pressure will affect the partial pressure of oxygen unless mixture 
adjustments are made.  Russian standards for hypoxia limits allow exposure to 
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16.0 kPa (2.32 psia) (120 mmHg) – 18.7 kPa (2.71 psia) (140 mmHg) O2 for a 
maximum of 3 days.  The lowest ppO2 level in the HS3005B, table Partial 
Pressure Oxygen Physiological Limits for Crew Exposure represents an O2 
equivalent altitude (breathing air) of 10,000 feet.  Rapid ascents to 10,000 feet 
cause a mild to moderate altitude sickness incidence in 20 to 40 percent of those 
ascending.  The risk of altitude sickness is increased principally from the reduced 
alveolar oxygen ppO2 and to a lesser degree from the decrease in the ambient 
air pressure.  The 10,000-ft altitude equivalent (14.8 kPa ppO2) represents the 
maximal altitude that DoD and commercial FAA pilots may fly without 
supplemental oxygen (accepted masking level).  Molecular oxygen (O2) can 
manifest toxic effects at high partial pressures.  The maximum acceptable 
prolonged ppO2 physiological exposure level is 23.7 kPa (3.44 psia) (178 mmHg) 
O2.  However, short-term exposure to elevated ppO2 levels is usually well 
tolerated and should result in no adverse effects on crewmembers if kept within 
the exposure limits in the table.  The exposure limits presented in the HS3005B, 
table Partial Pressure Oxygen Physiological Limits for Crew Exposure represent 
the physiological limitations for human occupants and do not consider 
engineering limitations, which may be imposed upon the system, including 
reduced maximal O2 concentrations for purposes of fire hazard control.  For 
compliance with other requirements, the system may operate at any combination 
of time and ppO2 that does not exceed the limits in the table.  Certain mission 
profiles will not allow ppO2 to remain in the nominal physiological range 
(HS3004B) during all mission phases.  Preparation for prolonged exposure to 
decreased oxygen should include a gradual lowering of ppO2 (hours to days) to 
minimize hypoxic symptoms and allow for acclimatization.  CxP 70000, CARD, 
ppO2 requirement (CA3133-PO) (17 kPa [2.5 psia] to 21 kPa [3.1 psia]) accounts 
for post-acclimatization indefinite exposure to lower oxygen ppO2 at the lower 
limit and fire hazard controls at the upper limit. 
3.2.1.2.3 CO2 Partial Pressure Tolerance Ranges for Crew Exposure 
[HS3005C] The system shall maintain the partial pressure of carbon dioxide in the 
internal atmosphere to operate as defined in HS3005C, table Partial Pressure CO2 
Physiological Limits for Crew Exposure. 
TABLE 3.2.1.2.3-1 - PARTIAL PRESSURE CO2 PHYSIOLOGICAL LIMITS FOR CREW 
EXPOSURE  
ppCO2 (kPa) ppCO2 (mmHg) [1] 
Time Allowed in 
Area Using 
Inspired ppCO2 
[2] 
Time Allowed in 
Module Using 
Module Sensor 
NOMINAL [3] 
0.0–0.67 0.0–5.0 indefinite indefinite 
SUBOPTIMAL 
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0.67–0.71 > 5.0–5.3 30 days 7 days 
0.71–0.80 > 5.3–6.0 7 days 24 hours 
0.80–1.01 > 6.0–7.6 24 hours 8 hours 
1.01–1.33 > 7.6–10 8 hours 4 hours 
OFF-NOMINAL AND EMERGENCY [4] 
1.33–2.00 > 10.0–15 4 Hours 1 hour 
2.00–2.67 > 15.0–20.0 2 hours 30 minutes 
2.67–4.00 > 20.0–30.0 30 minutes Do not exceed 
4.00–5.33 > 30.0–40.0  Do not exceed Do not exceed  
5.33–10.1 > 40.0–76 Danger Zone Danger Zone 
>10.1 >76.0  Emergency Emergency 
NOTES: 
1. Partial Pressure of CO2 (Carbon Dioxide) 
2. Partial Pressure of CO2 (Carbon Dioxide as measured at the point of inspiration) 
3. Nominal pressure ranges are included for completeness and denoted by italic font.  
HS3004C is the requirement for nominal pp CO2. 
4. Return ppCO2 to nominal levels for a minimum of 8 hours to reset the time allowed at off-
nominal levels. Without an 8-hour interval at nominal CO2 levels, count all suboptimal and 
off-nominal exposure as cumulative. 
Rationale:  There is no minimum CO2 requirement for human existence; 
however, blood levels of CO2 may be driven to impaired function levels by 
hyperventilation as observed during states of hypoxia.  Maximum:  The NASA 
SMAC for 24 hours TWA is 1.32 kPa (0.19 psia) (9.9 mmHg), from JSC 20584, 
Spacecraft Maximum Allowable Concentrations for Airborne Contaminants; 
however, it is 2.00 kPa (0.29 psia) (15 mmHg) for 1 hour exposures.  The US 
Navy allows 2.47 kPa (0.36 psia) (18.5 mmHg) up to 24 hours with very mild and 
reversible symptoms beyond this exposure period.  The constraints and actions 
within HS3005C, table Partial Pressure CO2 Physiological Limits for Crew 
Exposure were based on limits established by federal agency and national 
standard documents including the NASA SMACs and the Russian "State 
Standard" (referred to as GOST).  The only sources of CO2 on the ISS are 
human respiration and combustion episodes.  Rates of rise of CO2 will be slow 
and predictable based on calculated respiration rates and number of 
crewmembers on board.  High levels of CO2 are unlikely to be reached acutely 
unless an off-nominal event (e.g., fire) has occurred, which will be associated 
with other more toxic compounds being elaborated into the common atmosphere. 
Humans usually can adapt to slow elevation rates of CO2 exposure, and thereby 
a reduction in the number and severity of symptoms may be observed; however, 
if the level of CO2 reaches the levels listed in HS3005C, table Partial Pressure 
CO2 Physiological Limits for Crew Exposure, then symptoms and/or performance 
decrements will be observed.  There may be increased sensitivity to carbon 
dioxide or other atmospheric pollutants during spaceflight, relative to terrestrial 
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conditions, associated with Space Adaptation Syndrome (SAS) or physiologic 
alterations associated with 0-g adaptation, hence a need to set limits more 
conservatively than those found in terrestrial applications.  The difference 
between the time allowed between the local versus the module sensors is due to 
the local accumulation of CO2 in various regions of the vehicle that occur, and an 
uncertain disparity between what is being measured at the module sensor 
location, versus what the crewmember is actually breathing where they are 
located. The intent for including module sensor values is to provide daily 
averages.  For inspired ppCO2, local sensors are intended to be more time 
sensitive than a 24-hour time weighted average; it is either hourly or, for worst 
case, every 8 hours. 
3.2.1.3 Control, Display and Alerting of Atmospheric Parameters 
3.2.1.3.1 O2 and Total Pressure Control 
[HS3001] The system shall provide for the adjustment of total pressure and ppO2 by the 
crew and Constellation Systems within the ranges described in HS3004 and HS3004B. 
Rationale:  To ensure a safe habitable atmosphere for the crew when 
communications with Constellation Systems, including other vehicles and 
Mission Systems, is unavailable, atmospheric parameters must be controllable 
by the crew. 
3.2.1.3.2  Composition Reporting 
[HS3013] The system shall display measurements of total pressure, partial pressure 
oxygen, and partial pressure carbon dioxide to the crew. 
Rationale:  Various procedures will require detailed knowledge by the crew of the 
values of total pressure, partial pressure oxygen, and partial pressure carbon 
dioxide in the vehicle's atmosphere.  Examples may include ISS docking, 
contingency EVA prebreathe, and loss of pressure procedures. 
3.2.1.3.3 Composition Alerting 
[HS3014] The system shall generate an alert when total pressure, ppO2, ppCO2, or 
ppN2 exceed the limits specified by HS3004, HS3004B, HS3004C, HS3004D, HS3005, 
HS3005B, and HS3005C. 
Rationale:  Various procedures (e.g., a loss of pressure emergency procedure) 
will be initiated based on the values of major constituents in the vehicle’s 
atmosphere.  Alerting removes the need for the crew to constantly monitor these 
atmospheric parameters during periods when there is no communications with 
Mission Operations (MO):  during communication outages or loss-of-signal. 
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3.2.1.4 Contaminants 
3.2.1.4.1 Microbial Air Contamination 
[HS3006] The system shall limit the levels of microbial contaminants by maintaining an 
average continuous flow of 20 cubic feet per minute (CFM) or greater per person of air 
that has been cleaned to have at least 99.97% of airborne particles 0.3 micrometers 
(µm) and larger in diameter/size removed. 
Rationale:  Microbial limits for breathing air are designed to prevent infection and 
allergic response.  Requirements are based upon industrial hygiene 
recommendations for similar environments (American Society of Heating, 
Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE-62)).  Limitations on 
fungi and bacteria in spacecraft are consistent with previous requirements, such 
as SSP 50260, Revision C, ISS Medical Operations Requirements Document 
(MORD).  ISS air systems relied on High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filter 
design to provide clean air, which has performed exceptionally well in controlling 
atmospheric microbial concentrations.  This requirement doesn’t apply to suited 
operations. 
3.2.1.4.2 Particulate Contamination 
[HS3006C] The system shall limit the concentration in the cabin atmosphere of 
particulate matter ranging from 0.5 micron to 100 microns in aerodynamic diameter to 
<0.2 mg/m3 with a crew generation rate of 0.09 mg/person-minute. 
Rationale:  Inhalation of particulates can cause irritation of the respiratory 
system.  Limits for particulates are based on OSHA standards.  Crew generation 
rates are based on a study that addressed particulate matter generated from 
people with a focus on skin fragments, sneezes, coughs, clothing fibers, 
metallics, hair, paint chips, plastics, and miscellaneous items that included tissue, 
food, yarn, woven and glass tape, finger nail clippings, and pencil lead.  Study 
results are documented in NASA/TP-1998-207978, Elements of Spacecraft 
Cabin Air Quality Design, Table 9 and were used as the basis for ISS High 
Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filter design, which has performed exceptionally 
well in controlling atmospheric microbial concentrations. 
3.2.1.4.3 Lunar Dust Contamination 
[HS3006D] The system shall limit the levels of lunar dust contaminants of less than 
10 and equal to or greater than 0.1 micron <TBR-70024-004> size in the internal 
atmosphere to below 0.05 mg/m3. 
Rationale:  Lunar dust poses a hazard in addition to that from ordinary 
particulates.  This limit is a 180-day (6-month episodic exposure) limit and is 
based on a minimum currently expected permissible limit, as estimated by the 
Lunar Atmosphere Dust Toxicity Assessment Group (LADTAG).  The final value 
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for this lunar dust limit will be provided by the LADTAG in 2010.  This 
requirement is not applicable to initial capability, only to lunar. 
3.2.1.5  Gaseous Pollutants Limits 
3.2.1.5.1  Gaseous Pollutants Limits 
[HS3007] The system shall limit individual gaseous pollutant concentrations in the 
habitable volume to below long-term limits described in JSC 20584, Spacecraft 
Maximum Allowable Concentrations (SMAC) for Airborne Contaminants. 
Rationale:  Safe air pollutant levels are established specifically for human-rated 
space vehicles by the Johnson Space Center (JSC) Toxicology Group in 
cooperation with a subcommittee of the National Research Council Committee 
on Toxicology.  Design consideration and analysis, which have been used 
previously to achieve the values in the SMACs, are outlined in NASA/TP-1998-
207978, Elements of Spacecraft Cabin Air Quality Design.  Historical methods 
used to achieve these values included a combination of air scrubbing, materials 
control (e.g., using NASA-STD-6001, Flammability, Odor, Off-Gassing, and 
Compatibility Requirements and Test Procedures for Materials in Environments 
that Support Combustion) and containment of system chemicals. 
3.2.1.6  Rate of Change of Pressure Limits 
3.2.1.6.1  Rate of Change of Pressure Limits 
[HS3009] The system shall limit exposure of the crew to the rate of change of total 
internal pressure to between -207 kPa (-30.0 psi) (-1,550 mmHg)/min and +93.1 kPa 
(+13.5 psi) (+698 mmHg)/min during nominal operations. 
Rationale:  The rate of change of pressure must be limited to prevent injury to the 
crew's ears and lungs during depressurization and re-pressurization.  These are 
physiological limits:  it is expected that pressure changes will be effected more 
slowly than this where possible.  The positive rate of change limit is designed to 
prevent barotraumas in spaceflight conditions where microgravity may have 
affected head and sinus congestion and is therefore much more conservative 
than the 310 kPa (45.0 psi) (2,330  mmHg)/minute (100 feet/minute) descent rate 
allowed by the US Navy dive manual limit.  The negative rate of change limit is 
consistent with the US Navy dive manual 66 feet/minute ascent rate allowance.  
This limit is for rate of change in pressure.  However, the magnitude must still be 
limited to prevent DCS.  The magnitude change allowed will be based on starting 
pressure and prebreathe accomplished. 
3.2.1.7  Combustion Products 
3.2.1.7.1  Combustion Products Measurement 
[HS3012B] The system shall provide a real time capability for the measurement of 
atmospheric concentrations of toxic combustion products in the following ranges: 
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carbon monoxide (CO) from 5 to 500 ppm, hydrogen cyanide (HCN) from 1 to 50 ppm, 
and hydrogen chloride (HCl) from 1 to 50 ppm. 
Rationale:  The crew must be able to measure the concentrations of the 
combustion products listed in the requirement to determine the correct course of 
action after a combustion event to mitigate risk to crew health.  References:  
TR-915-001 (White Sands Test Facility (WSTF), 14 May 1998) Evaluation of 
Compound Specific Analyzer-Combustion Products (CSA-CP), pp. 1-12; Space 
Physiology and Medicine (1994) Thermo-degradation of materials (pp. 147-8); 
International Conference on Environment Systems (ICES) Paper  2005-01-2872 
"An Environmental Sensor Technology Selection Process for Exploration" 
[Table 1]. 
3.2.1.7.2  Combustion Products Monitoring 
[HS3012A] The system shall provide a real time capability to monitor and display 
atmospheric concentrations of the toxic combustion products:  carbon monoxide (CO), 
hydrogen cyanide (HCN), and hydrogen chloride (HCl) in the habitable volume. 
Rationale:  Combustion events can present an immediate threat to the life of the 
crew because of the release of CO, HCN, and HCl.  The consequences of 
pyrolysis events during spaceflight are significant; therefore, a means is required 
to manage crew exposures to toxic compounds after a fire and to assess 
atmospheric decontamination. 
3.2.1.7.3  Carbon Monoxide Alert 
[HS3012D] The system shall alert the crew when the carbon monoxide (CO) 
concentrations exceed the lower limits in HS3012B. 
Rationale:  As the consequences of pyrolysis events during spaceflight are 
significant, the crew must be made aware if CO levels are above acceptable 
levels defined in HS3012B. 
3.2.1.8  Hazardous Chemicals 
3.2.1.8.1  Toxic Hazard Level 3 
[HS3015] The system shall use only chemicals that are Toxic Hazard Level 3 or below, 
as defined in Appendix C, table Criteria for Assignment of Toxicological Hazard Levels, 
in the habitable volume of the vehicle. 
Rationale:  Toxic hazard Level 4 compounds, which are defined in Appendix C, 
table Criteria for Assignment of Toxicological Hazard Levels, can pose an 
immediate risk to crew health and cannot be scrubbed from the environment.  
The prevention of Toxic Hazard Level 4 chemicals from being used in the 
habitable atmosphere will decrease the crew health risk to these chemicals. 
Revision:  E Document No:  CxP 70024 
Release Date:  11/19/10 Page:  37 of 503 
Title:  Constellation Program Human-Systems Integration Requirements 
 
3.2.1.8.2  Toxic Hazard Level 4 
[HS3015A] The system shall prevent Toxic Hazard Level 4 chemicals, as defined in 
Appendix C, table Criteria for Assignment of Toxicological Hazard Levels, from entering 
the habitable volume of the vehicle. 
Rationale:  Toxic Hazard Level 4 compounds, which are defined in Appendix C, 
table Criteria for Assignment of Toxicological Hazard Levels, can pose an 
immediate risk to crew health and cannot be scrubbed from the environment.  
These compounds include substances that: (1) are considered extremely 
hazardous to the crew and a release of the substance will not allow for crew 
survival (via escape or isolation), and/or (2) cause permanent damage to life 
support systems to the extent that they are unable to maintain the atmosphere at 
a marginally acceptable level, and/or (3) cannot be removed from the 
atmosphere by the life support systems or the life support systems cannot 
restore the atmosphere to marginally acceptable levels in 1 week.  The 
prevention of Toxic Hazard level 4 chemicals from entering the habitable 
atmosphere from an external source will decrease the crew health risk to these 
chemicals. 
3.2.1.8.3  Decomposition of Chemicals 
[HS9037] The system shall use only chemicals that, if released into the habitable 
volume, do not decompose into hazardous compounds that threaten crew health during 
all phases of operations. 
Rationale:  Only a few compounds have been shown to decompose into 
hazardous compounds during nominal Atmosphere Revitalization System 
operations on the Shuttle, but these compounds could present a toxic threat if the 
amount of the compound involved is sufficient and the product compound is 
hazardous.  Halon is an example of such a chemical; if it is sufficiently heated 
during its normal use as a fire suppressant, it breaks down into highly toxic 
gaseous compounds. 
3.2.1.9  Crew Protection 
3.2.1.9.1  Personal Protective Equipment 
[HS3016] The system shall provide Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) for each 
crewmember in the event of an emergency. 
Rationale:  Spaceflight experience has shown that all airborne toxic risks cannot 
be completely controlled; therefore, the crew must have access to individual 
protective equipment in the event of failure of other controls.  This equipment 
may include but is not limited to masks, goggles, gloves, eyewash, and 
contingency breathing apparatus.  Reference SSP 50653-1, Basic Provisions on 
Crew Actions in the Event of a Toxic Release on the ISS, Section 13.0, "Personal 
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Protective Equipment," p. 33.  In an emergency, this equipment must be near-to-
hand and quickly accessible. 
3.2.1.9.2  Contingency Breathing Apparatus 
[HS3017A] The system shall provide each member of the crew a contingency breathing 
apparatus, which provides breathable air that meets the quality specifications defined in 
HS3004B, HS3004C, and HS3004D. 
Rationale:  In the case of a medical or off-nominal condition, each crewmember 
will require delivery of uncontaminated and appropriate oxygen containing 
breathing gas. This requirement does not apply to suited operations. 
3.2.1.9.3  Crew Communication During Contingency Breathing 
[HS3017] The system shall provide voice communication between all crewmembers 
when wearing the contingency breathing apparatus. 
Rationale:  Wearing a contingency breathing apparatus may hinder clear 
communication between crewmembers, which is essential during an emergency. 
3.2.1.9.4  Mission Systems Communication During Contingency Breathing 
[HS3017B] The system shall provide voice communication between the crew and 
Mission Systems when wearing the contingency breathing apparatus. 
Rationale:  Wearing a contingency breathing apparatus may hinder clear 
communication between the crew and Mission Systems, which is necessary to 
provide vehicle and crew status. 
3.2.2  Potable Water 
3.2.2.1  Potable Water Quality 
3.2.2.1.1  Physiochemical Limits for Potable Water 
[HS3019] The system shall provide potable water at or below the physiochemical limits 
of HS3019, table Potable Water Physiochemical Limits at the point of crew 
consumption. 
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TABLE 3.2.2.1.1-1 - POTABLE WATER PHYSIOCHEMICAL LIMITS  
Taste 3 TTN 
Odor 3 TON 
Turbidity 1 NTU 
Color, True 15 PCU 
Free & Dissolved Gas1 5 % 
Acidity (pH) 4.5–9.0 N/A 
Chemical   
Ammonia2 1 mg/L 
Antimony 0.006 mg/L 
Arsenic 0.01 mg/L 
Barium2 10 mg/L 
Cadmium2 0.022 mg/L 
Chloride 250 mg/L 
Chlorine 4 mg/L 
Chromium 0.23 mg/L 
Copper 1.0 mg/L 
Cyanide 0.2 mg/L 
Fluoride 2 mg/L 
Iron 0.3 mg/L 
Lead 0.05 mg/L 
Manganese2 0.3 mg/L 
Mercury 0.002 mg/L 
Nickel2 0.3 mg/L 
Nitrate (as Nitrogen, NO2-N) 10 mg/L 
Nitrite (as Nitrogen, NO3-N) 1.0 mg/L 
Potassium 340 mg/L 
Selenium 0.01 mg/L 
Silver2 0.4 mg/L 
Sulfate 250 mg/L 
Total Dissolved Solids 500 mg/L 
Total Iodine3 0.2 mg/L 
Zinc2 2.0 mg/L 
Total Organic Carbon2 3 mg/L 
Acetone2 15 mg/L 
Alkylamines (di)2 0.3 mg/L 
Alkylamines (mono)2 2 mg/L 
Alkylamines (tri)2 0.4 mg/L 
Caprolactum2 100 mg/L 
Chloroform2 6.5 mg/L 
Di(2-ethylhexyl) phthalate2 20 mg/L 
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Di-n-butyl phthalate2 40 mg/L 
Dichloromethane2 15 mg/L 
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POTABLE WATER PHYSIOCHEMICAL LIMITS (CONCLUDED)   
Formaldehyde2 12 mg/L 
Formate2 2,500 mg/L 
2-Mercaptobenzothiazole2 30 mg/L 
Phenol2 4 mg/L 
n-Phenyl-beta-naphthylamine2 260 mg/L 
Semi-volatile Organic Compounds listed in 
EPA Method 625 
EPA MCL4,5 mg/L 
Volatile Organic Compounds listed in EPA 
524.2, Rev. 4 
EPA MCL4,5 mg/L 
NOTES: 
1. Free gas at vehicle atmospheric pressure and 98.6 °F, dissolved gas saturated 
at vehicle atmospheric pressure and 98.6 °F. 
2. 1,000-day SWEG in JSC 63414, Spacecraft Water Exposure Guidelines 
(SWEG). 
3. Derived from the total iodine intake limits specified in Shuttle Flight Rule A13-30. 
4. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Maximum Contamination Level (MCL). 
5. If a compound has both a SWEG and EPA MCL, the SWEG value takes 
precedence. 
 
Rationale:  Safe water pollutant levels have been either established specifically 
for human-rated space vehicles by the JSC Toxicology Group in cooperation with 
a subcommittee of the National Research Council Committee on Toxicology or 
are based on Maximum Contaminant Levels (MCL) established by the United 
States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  Point of crew consumption or 
contact refers to the location from which potable water is dispensed for use in 
drinks, food rehydration, health (medical), hygiene, and any potential in-flight 
maintenance sites.  These values should be used as the water quality design 
limits and are appropriate for protecting crew exposures up to 1,000 days.  From 
an operational standpoint, mission-specific exceptions may be relevant for 
certain chemicals if the total duration of crew spaceflight exposure (i.e., Orion 
exposure + lunar habitat exposure, or Orion exposure + ISS exposure) does not 
exceed 100 days.  This requirement is only applicable to FCE if FCE provides 
stored potable water. 
3.2.2.1.2  Microbial Limits for Potable Water 
[HS3019A] The system shall provide potable water that maintains water quality at or 
below the microbial limits of HS3019A, table Potable Water Microbial Limits at the point 
of crew consumption or contact. 
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TABLE 3.2.2.1.2-1 - POTABLE WATER MICROBIAL LIMITS  
Characteristic Maximum 
Allowable 
Units 
Bacterial Count 50 CFU/mL 
Coliform Bacteria Non-detectable per 100 mL 
- 
Fungal Count Non-detectable  per 100 mL 
- 
Parasitic Protozoa (e.g., Giardia 
and Cryptosporidium) 0 
- 
   
Rationale:  Microbially safe water is essential to prevent infection and mitigate 
risk to crew health and performance.  These limits are consistent with those 
defined by the JSC Microbiology Laboratory and in the ISS MORD.  On the ISS, 
maintenance of these specifications during operation has been accomplished 
using flow through a 0.2-micron filter and use of a residual biocide.  Point of crew 
consumption or contact refers to the location from which potable water is 
dispensed for use in drinks, food rehydration, health (medical), hygiene, and any 
potential in-flight maintenance sites.  This requirement is only applicable to FCE 
if FCE provides stored potable water. 
3.2.2.2  Potable Water Quantity 
3.2.2.2.1  Potable Water for On-Orbit Drinking 
[HS3025] The system shall provide a minimum of 2.0 L (67.6 fl oz) of potable water per 
crewmember per mission day for drinking. 
Rationale:  The amount of drinking water required to maintain crewmember 
hydration status and allow crewmembers to perform duties nominally is 2.0 L.  
This quantity is also required for adequate urine output to clear metabolic wastes 
and to account for perspiratory and other insensible losses.  Intake less than 
2.0 L will increase the risk of under hydration or dehydration of the crewmember, 
with consequences ranging from poor communication and crew performance due 
to dry mucous membranes, nosebleeds, headache, malaise and fitful sleep, to 
urinary tract infection or urinary calculi if the under-hydration state is continued. 
Additionally, a loss of body weight due to dehydration has been shown to raise 
body temperature from 0.1-0.23 ºC for each 1% of body weight lost. Dehydration 
also cancels many of the thermal benefits of heat acclimatization and aerobic 
fitness.  Considering the thermal stresses that may be encountered during the 
post-landing period, adequate hydration must be assured.  This amount does not 
include potable water requirements for other purposes such as rehydrating food, 
personal hygiene, medical treatment, pre-loading for re-entry, and post-landing 
consumption. 
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3.2.2.2.2  Potable Water for On-Orbit Food Rehydration 
[HS3127] The system shall provide a minimum of 500 mL (16.9 fl oz) of potable water 
per crewmember per mission day for food rehydration. 
Rationale:  The minimum 500 mL is based on current ratios of thermostabilized, 
freeze dried, and natural form foods from the ISS menu.  This amount does not 
include potable water requirements for other purposes such as drinking, personal 
hygiene, medical treatment, pre-loading for re-entry, and post-landing 
consumption.  If the ratio of thermostabilized, freeze-dried, and natural form 
foods is revised, the water requirement would be adjusted appropriately. 
3.2.2.2.3  Potable Hot Water Quantity for Rehydration 
[HS3118] The system shall provide 600 mL (20.3 fl oz) of hot water per person per meal 
for four crewmembers at the temperature required in HS3031. 
Rationale:  This requirement defines the expected amount of hot water 
necessary for a crewmember meal per the Space Food Systems Laboratory.  
Average hot water needed for a crewmember meal is dependent on whether a 
food warmer is present or not.  This water quantity is included in HS3025, 
Potable Water Onorbit Drinking and HS3127, Potable Water Onorbit Food 
Rehydration, not in addition to HS3025 and HS3127.  The in-flight food 
preparation time needed for a crewmember meal is specified in HS6005 and 
HS6102. 
3.2.2.2.4  Potable Water for Personal Hygiene 
[HS3028] The system shall provide a minimum of 400 mL (13.5 fl oz) of potable water 
per crewmember-day for personal hygiene. 
Rationale:  Clean water is necessary for maintaining skin, hair, and dental health 
of crewmembers.  Some of this water quantity can be met with the water in 
pre-wetted towels. 
3.2.2.2.5  Potable Water for Medical Use 
[HS3122] The system shall provide 500 mL (16.9 fl oz) of potable water for eye 
irrigation per crewmember for nominal particulate events (dust and Foreign Object 
Debris [FOD]). 
Rationale:  Eye irrigation is required for spaceflight based on experience and 
data from shuttle, ISS, and Apollo programs.  Eye wash capability for particulate 
events is expected especially for lunar missions due to the increased risk of 
exposure to dust on the lunar surface and after transfer from the surface into the 
Orion.  The volume in the medical use requirement will provide water for two 
particulate event eye washes per crewmember, which is an anticipated rate of 
likelihood. 
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3.2.2.2.6  Potable Water for Medical Contingency 
[HS3123] The system shall provide 5.0 L (169 fl oz) of potable water for medical 
contingency use (e.g., chemical exposure/burn). 
Rationale:  Water for medical contingency use is required for many situations 
including eye and wound irrigation during spaceflight based on experience and 
data from shuttle, ISS, and Apollo programs.  Some medical situations require 
much larger quantities of water than those stated in HS3122 (Potable Water for 
Medical Use); for example, LiOH or other Tox Level 2+ substances in the eye or 
skin wound. However, these events are off-nominal and occur at lower frequency 
than the particulate events during the mission and may be considered 
contingencies. 
3.2.2.2.7  Potable Water for EVA Operations 
[HS6063] The system shall provide an additional 240 mL (8.12 fl oz) of potable water 
per hour above nominal potable water provision, as defined in HS3025, for 
crewmembers performing EVA operations. 
Rationale:  Potable water is necessary during suited operations to prevent 
dehydration due to perspiration and insensible water loss, as well as to improve 
crew comfort.  The additional 240 mL (8.12 oz) is based upon measured 
respiratory and perspiratory losses during suited operations.  During a lunar EVA, 
crewmembers will most likely be suited for 10 hours, with approximately 7 of 
those hours expending energy on the lunar surface.  Apollo Summit strongly 
recommended the availability of this quantity of water for consumption during a 
lunar EVA. 
3.2.2.2.8  Potable Water for Fluid Loading 
[HS3026] The system shall provide a minimum of 1.0 L (33.8 fl oz) of potable water per 
crewmember for re-entry fluid loading countermeasures for each End-of-Mission (EOM) 
opportunity. 
Rationale:  The 1.0 L (33.8 fl oz) quantity is based on Shuttle Aeromedical flight 
rule for re-entry fluid loading, which requires 1.5 L (50.7 fl oz) initial fluid loading; 
however, 0.5 L (16.9 fl oz) of which will come from unconsumed daily water 
allocation per crewmember.  This allocation protects for nominal End of Mission 
(EOM) fluid loading plus one additional wave-off opportunity 24 hours later.  
Without this additional water allocation, the crew may have inadequate water 
available to fluid load and thus have hemodynamic compromise during and after 
deorbit.  Having inadequate fluid loading will almost certainly cause physiological 
difficulties in some, if not most, crewmembers.  A small, indefinable percentage 
will become temporarily incapacitated and it is not inconceivable that a 
significantly hypovolemic crewmember in a contingency could perish when 
he/she otherwise would not have.  For low earth orbital missions, protect for 
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EOM and EOM+1.  Lunar direct return does not need EOM+1 protection for fluid 
loading. 
3.2.2.2.9  Potable Water for Post-Landing 
[HS3027] The system shall provide a minimum of 1.0 L (33.8 fl oz) of potable water per 
crewmember for each 8-hour period of the entire crew recovery period, with 500 mL of 
this total water allotment readily and immediately accessible by each seated and 
restrained crewmember during the first 2-hours of post-landing activities. 
Rationale:  The system shall provide a minimum of 1.0 L (33.8 fl oz) per 8-hour 
period for 24 hours of potable water per crewmember for crew consumption after 
landing.  Orion will protect for a 24-hour post-landing recovery (ref. CA-PO0194), 
which will therefore require a total of 3.0 L (101 fl oz) of potable water for a 
dehydrated crewmember.  For the earth launch abort scenario, only 830 mL 
(28.1 fl oz) per 8-hour period for up to 24 hours (1.49 L [84.2 fl oz]) is required 
since in an abort scenario crew have not undergone the fluid loss of spaceflight 
therefore less water is required to maintain acceptable hydration state.  Because 
the nominal operation concept assumes crew will remain seated and restrained 
until recovery by ground recovery forces, 500 mL of this total water allotment 
must be readily and immediately accessible by each seated and restrained 
crewmember during the first 2-hours of post-landing activities. This requirement 
is only applicable to FCE if FCE provides stored potable water for post-landing 
use. 
3.2.2.3  Potable Water Delivery 
3.2.2.3.1  Potable Water Rate 
[HS3029] The system shall provide potable water to the crew at a rate of not less than 
500 mL/minute (16.9 oz/minute). 
Rationale:  This rate also ensures that the crew will be able to prepare for and 
perform tasks (i.e., filling drink bags and rehydrating food) that require potable 
water in a reasonable amount of time.  The requirement is based upon a 
maximum of 30 seconds between fills.  This rate requirement is not intended to 
require an additional water quantity beyond that required for nominal mission 
water usage.  This flow rate is not applicable to hot water.  The hot water flow 
rate will be based on task analyses that consider HS6005 "In Flight Food 
Preparation Time." 
3.2.2.3.2  Potable Water Dispensing 
[HS3117] The system shall provide the capability to dispense water in 15 mL (0.51 fl oz) 
increments between the quantities of 30 mL (1.01 fl oz) and 240 mL (8.12 fl oz), with an 
accuracy of +/- 5.0 mL (0.17 fl oz) at 30 mL (1.01 fl oz), +/- 10 mL (0.34 fl oz) between 
45-90 mL (1.52-3.04 fl oz), and +/- 10% between 105-240 mL (3.55-8.12 fl oz). 
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Rationale:  Measured amounts of water must be added to the food for proper 
hydration.  The 15 mL (0.51 fl oz) increment provides the ability to accurately 
meter the water based on current freeze-dried foods and beverages.  Accuracy 
requirements reflect current ISS Potable Water Dispenser requirements.  The 
amount of water that may be used for medical contingencies is not intended to be 
in addition to the water required for nominal mission water usage. 
3.2.2.4  Potable Water Temperature 
3.2.2.4.1  Potable Water Temperature for Cold Drinks 
[HS3030] The system should provide cold water at a maximum temperature of 15.6 ºC 
(60 ºF) for missions longer than 3 days. 
Rationale:  This water is to be used to rehydrate cold drinks. 
3.2.2.4.2  Potable Water Temperature for Hot Food and Drinks 
[HS3031] The system shall provide hot water at a temperature between 68.3 ºC 
(155 ºF) and 79.4 ºC (175 ºF). 
Rationale:  This water is to be used to rehydrate food requiring hot water.  Water 
at a temperature of 79.4 ºC (175 ºF) allows for the temperature of the food to still 
remain above 68.3 ºC (155 ºF), which prevents microbial growth.  The higher 
water temperature also allows for better rehydration of the foods and beverages. 
3.2.2.4.3  Potable Water Temperature for Personal Hygiene 
[HS3032] The system should provide personal hygiene water at a temperature between 
29.4 ºC (85 ºF) and 46.1 ºC (115 ºF). 
Rationale:  This temperature range is required to support body cleansing. 
3.2.2.4.4  Potable Water Temperature for Medical Use 
[HS3121] The system shall provide potable water for medical events at a temperature 
between 18 ºC (64.4 ºF) and 28 ºC (82.4 ºF). 
Rationale:  The temperature range is required to prevent thermal injury to the 
tissues during irrigation. 
3.2.2.5  Water Sampling 
3.2.2.5.1  Water Sampling 
[HS3034] The system shall provide access to potable water systems for the collection 
of water samples during ground processing, in-flight, and post-landing for contamination 
assessment. 
Rationale:  Rigorous ground processing with pre-flight water sampling and 
contamination assessment prevents in-flight water quality problems, and thus 
minimizes the need for in-flight contamination monitoring and remediation of any 
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water quality parameters that are out of specification.  Ground-based quality 
analyses of in-flight and post-landing samples provide a record of crew exposure 
and are used to determine follow-on ground processing steps.  In-flight sampling 
capability will also support real-time contaminant monitoring and remediation of 
stored or regenerated water systems as needed for long-duration lunar or Mars 
missions. 
3.2.3  Thermal Environment 
This section provides requirements for atmospheric temperature, humidity, dew point, 
and airflow. 
3.2.3.1  Atmospheric Temperature and Heat Stored by Crewmembers 
3.2.3.1.1  Nominal Atmospheric Temperature 
[HS3036] The system shall maintain the atmospheric temperature within the range of 
18 ºC (64.4 ºF) to 27 ºC (80.6 ºF) during all nominal flight operations, excluding suited 
operations, ascent, entry, landing, and post-landing. 
Rationale:  Human comfort without the use of thermal protective garments 
requires this fairly narrow temperature range.  The comfort zone is defined as the 
range of environmental conditions in which humans can achieve thermal comfort 
and not have their performance of routine activities affected by thermal stress.  
Thermal comfort is affected by the work rate, clothing, and state of 
acclimatization.  A graphical representation of the comfort zone as provided in 
Appendix E, figure Environmental Comfort Zone.  The comfort zone does not 
include the entire range of conditions in which humans can survive indefinitely:  
this is a larger zone that might require active perspiration or shivering, and these 
responses are initiated by elevated or lowered core temperatures.  The graph 
implies minimal air movement and assumes the radiant temperature of the 
surroundings to be equal to the dry bulb temperature.  The effects of 
acclimatization, work, and heavier clothing are shown as data trends by the 
arrows on the graph.  This temperature range has been used successfully for 
Space Transportation System (STS) and ISS vehicular operations. 
3.2.3.1.2  Contingency Control of Heat Stored by Crewmembers 
[HS3037] The Constellation Architecture (CA) shall prevent the energy stored by each 
crewmember from exceeding the Cognitive Deficit Onset (CDO) limits defined by the 
range, 4.7 kJ/kg (2.0 BTU/lb) > ΔQ stored > -4.1 kJ/kg (-1.8 BTU/lb), during ascent, 
entry, descent, landing, post-landing, off nominal flight operations, and suited operations 
longer than 12 hours, where ΔQ stored is calculated using the 41-Node man or Wissler 
model. 
Rationale:  This requirement is intended to cover brief temperature excursions 
due to contingency situations including excessively high metabolic rates or 
operational exposure to excessive ambient heat loads.  Every effort should be 
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made to keep crewmembers within a more narrow comfort zone of heat stored 
(Appendix E), including during microgravity EVA, as specified in HS11002.  
Calculation of heat accumulation or rejection (ΔQ stored) is per 41-Node man or 
Wissler model.  The ΔQ stored limits are plotted in Appendix E, figure Heat 
Storage to graphically show the boundaries of the human heat accumulation or 
rejection tolerance.  Heat accumulation rationale: A vehicular cabin with excess 
heat load may quickly reach crew tolerance limits and may impair crew 
performance and health.  Crew impairment begins when skin temperature 
increases greater than 1.4 ºC (2.5 ºF) (0.6 ºC [1 ºF] core) or if pulse is greater 
than 140 bpm.  Precise prediction of crew tolerances and time constraints for 
entry is not possible; therefore, environmental temperature must be controlled.  
Appendix E, table Core Temperature Range Limits and Associated Performance 
Decrements, identifies core temperature range limits and associated 
performance decrements.  Keeping the crewmember heat storage value below 
the performance impairment line allows the crew the ability to conduct even 
complex tasks without heat-induced degradation.  In a non-acclimatized 
individual, water loss is approximately 0.95 L (32 oz) per hour and salt loss is 
approximately 2 to 3 grams (0.0044 to 0.0066 lb) per hour.  In microgravity and 
elevated humidity, sweat forms an insulating layer over the body, further adding 
to the heat stress instead of relieving it.  If the crewmember is in a suit, the heat 
load may increase rapidly.  JSC thermoregulatory models (Wissler and 41-Node 
man) simulating hot cabin entries wearing launch and entry suits with the 
properties of the Advanced Crew Escape Suit (ACES) (thickness, conductance, 
wickability, and emissivity) predicted loss of all body cooling mechanisms.  
Supporting data from military aircrew protective ensembles suggest body 
temperature may increase more rapidly over time in ACES, compared to a shirt-
sleeve environment.  Heat rejection rationale:  If heat is removed from the body 
to the point of thermogenic shivering, crew task performance will be impaired in a 
similar fashion to excess heat storage.  Like the condition of excess heat storage, 
which can be mitigated by specialized cooling garments, excess heat rejection 
can be mitigated to some degree by the use of insulating garments.  Appendix E, 
figure Environmental Comfort Zone shows the effect of tolerance to cold 
temperature and wind by the addition of varying degrees of thermal protecting 
clothing. Keeping the crewmember heat rejection value above the performance 
impairment line in Appendix E, figure Heat Storage, allows the crew to conduct 
tasks without cold-induced degradation.  This requirement will be met by 
integrated systems with the details of each system's responsibility defined in 
individual system SRDs and in IRDs. 
3.2.3.2  Relative Humidity 
3.2.3.2.1  Relative Humidity for Nominal Vehicle 
[HS3046] The system shall maintain the average relative humidity level over each 
24-hour period between 25 and 75 percent during all crewed flight operations, excluding 
suited operations less than 4 hours and post-landing. 
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Rationale:  Average humidity must be maintained above this lower limit to ensure 
that the environment is not too dry for the nominal functioning of mucous 
membranes and to prevent static electricity build-up within the cabin, which could 
pose an increased electrical hazard to the crew.  Average humidity must be 
maintained below this upper limit for crew comfort and to limit formation of 
condensation.  Excess moisture in the glove can contribute to trauma at the 
fingertips.  Suited operations less than 4 hours include any EVA done from the 
Orion, ascent, entry, landing, and nominal IVA operations.  This requirement is 
applicable to lunar surface EVA and to survival IVA. 
3.2.3.2.2  Relative Humidity Tolerance Ranges for Crew Exposure 
[HS3126] The system shall restrict human exposure to humidity levels according to 
HS3126, table Relative Humidity Tolerance Ranges during suited operations less than 
4 hours and during nominal post-landing. 
TABLE 3.2.3.2.2-1 - RELATIVE HUMIDITY TOLERANCE RANGES  
Average Relative Humidity Time Allowed 
≤5% 1 hour 
>5% - 15% 2 hours 
>15 - 25% 4 hours 
>25 – 75% Indefinite* 
>75 – 85% 24 hours** 
>85 – 95% 12 hours** 
>95% 8 hours** 
NOTE:  Nominal humidity range is included for completeness.  HS3046 is the 
requirement for nominal humidity ranges. 
*  Assumes temperature is within nominal range 
**  Only after doffing a suit post-landing; duration may be shorter if temperature is 
outside nominal range 
 
Rationale:  The intent of this requirement is to apply to umbilical EVAs from Orion 
and to post-landing.  Average humidity must be maintained above the lower limits 
stated to ensure that the environment is not too dry for the nominal functioning of 
mucous membranes. If humidity is not maintained above the lower limits, 
additional water must be provided to the crew to prevent dehydration.  Humidity 
must be maintained below the upper limits for crew comfort, to allow for effective 
evaporation, and to limit the formation of condensation.  Excess moisture in the 
glove can contribute to trauma at the fingertips.  During umbilical use, the suit 
depends on the vehicle to provide life support.  Excess Relative Humidity (RH) in 
the cabin post-landing requires the suit to be doffed to enable cooling of the 
body.  If the temperature is elevated, high RH may interfere with the nominal 
evaporation process that enables perspiration to cool the body.  Thus high RH 
can pose a hazard for core body temperature excess.  For vehicle off-nominal, 
post-landing exposures >8 hrs, requirement HS3037 or HS11002 applies. 
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3.2.3.3  Ventilation 
3.2.3.3.1  In-flight Ventilation 
[HS3047] The system shall maintain a ventilation rate within the internal atmosphere 
such that two-thirds (66.7%) of the atmosphere velocities are between 4.57 m/min 
(15 ft/min) and 36.58 m/min (120 ft/min), except during suited operations, toxic cabin 
events, or when the crew is not inhabiting the vehicle. 
Rationale:  Crew and equipment give off heat, moisture, and CO2 that will lead to 
parameters outside the bounds of environmental requirements if adequate 
ventilation is not provided.  Maintaining proper ventilation within the internal 
atmosphere is necessary to ensure that stagnant pockets do not form, and the 
temperature, humidity, and atmospheric constituents are maintained within their 
appropriate ranges.  Similar values have been used on ISS.  Exceptions and 
more detail on ventilation rate measurement are listed in the verification 
requirement.  The two-thirds value for atmosphere velocities in the requirement 
has historically proven to be a reasonable balance between design constraints 
such as power, acoustics, and safety.  The effective atmosphere velocity range 
of 4.57-36.58 m/min (15-120 ft/min) pertains to the time averaged velocity 
magnitudes in the crew occupied space using averages over time periods 
sufficient to achieve stability.  This range is considered sufficient to provide 
circulation that prevents CO2 and thermal pockets from forming.  Cabin 
ventilation is not required during suited operation since the suit will provide 
necessary air circulation.  Fire or any toxic release into the atmosphere are 
examples of periods during which the mentioned ventilation rates are not in the 
best interest of air quality and crew health.  In those cases, the ventilation system 
may need to be shut down in order to protect the safety of the crew. 
3.2.3.3.2  Supplemental Ventilation 
[HS3050] Local ppO2, ppCO2, and relative humidity shall be controlled as defined in 
HS3005B, table Partial Pressure Oxygen Physiological Limits for Crew Exposure; 
HS3005C, table Partial Pressure CO2 Physiological Limits for Crew Exposure; and 
HS3046 for temporary maintenance activities in areas not in the normal habitable 
volume. 
Rationale:  The crew may be required to perform maintenance behind a panel in 
an area that is not part of the normal habitable volume, and which therefore does 
not have ventilation.  Maintaining proper ventilation within the internal 
atmosphere is necessary to ensure that stagnant pockets do not form and the 
temperature, humidity and atmospheric constituents are maintained within their 
appropriate ranges.  Examples of historical ventilation techniques include 
equipment such as flexible (reconfigurable) ducting, portable fans, or diverters. 
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3.2.3.4  User Control of Atmospheric Thermal Properties 
3.2.3.4.1  Temperature Set-Point Increments 
[HS3053] The system shall provide temperature set-points in increments of 1 °C 
(1.8 °F) or less between the operational temperatures defined in HS3036. 
Rationale:  An important factor in crew comfort is the maintenance of a 
comfortable cabin temperature.  A 1 °C (1.8 °F) increment is sufficient to maintain 
crew comfort. 
3.2.3.4.2  Temperature Set-Point Adjustment 
[HS3051] The system shall allow the crew to adjust the atmospheric temperature within 
the limits defined in HS3036, with the minimal allowable range of adjustability between 
21 °C (69.8 °F) and 27 °C (80.6 °F), inclusive. 
Rationale:  Individual comfort preferences and workload variations dictate that 
the set points for the temperature can be set by the crew. 
3.2.3.4.3  Temperature Set-Point Error 
[HS3054] The system shall control temperature to +/-1.5 °C (2.7 °F) of the set point of 
the operational temperatures defined in HS3036. 
Rationale:  Individual comfort preferences and workload variations dictate that 
temperature be controllable within this range as described in the paragraphs in 
HS3047, In-flight Ventilation.  1.5 °C (2.7 °F) precision is sufficient to maintain 
crew comfort. 
3.2.3.4.4  Temperature Set-Point Accessibility 
[HS3052] Atmospheric temperature set-point control shall be accessible to at least one 
crewmember during all nominal operations, including times when the crew is restrained. 
Rationale:  The crew will need to control the atmospheric temperature during all 
flight phases to ensure crew comfort for mission success. 
3.2.3.4.5  Ventilation Adjustment 
[HS3114] The system shall allow the crew to adjust the ventilation delivery to the cabin. 
Rationale:  The ability to control local cabin ventilation by adjusting the direction 
of air flow will enable the crew to prevent exhaled, CO2-rich air from building 
around the head (i.e., adjust for too-little ventilation), and to prevent drying of 
facial mucous membranes (i.e., adjust for too much ventilation).  Each 
Constellation vehicle will have unique ventilation characteristics;  therefore, the 
specific adjustment settings will be individually defined for each vehicle, and will 
be stated in child requirements in lower level documents. 
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3.2.3.5  Atmosphere Thermal Properties Monitoring 
3.2.3.5.1  Display of Actual Temperature 
[HS3115] The system shall display actual temperature with a display step size of 1 °C 
(1.8 °F). 
Rationale:  An accurate display of temperature is required for crew reference in 
altering the cabin environment. 
3.2.3.5.2  Display of Temperature Set-Point 
[HS3116] The system shall display the temperature set-point with a display step size of 
1 °C (1.8 °F). 
Rationale:  An accurate display of temperature set-point is required for crew 
reference in altering the cabin environment. 
3.2.3.5.3  Display and Monitoring of Temperature and Relative Humidity 
[HS3055] The system shall measure, record, and display temperature and relative 
humidity to the crew. 
Rationale:  Temperature and humidity are critical parameters in crew health and 
comfort.  The ability of the crew to track these data in a real time fashion 
prevents environmental conditions that could harm the crew or the vehicle. 
3.2.4  Acceleration 
This section presents the requirements for sustained and transient linear and rotational 
accelerations as well as occupant protection. Accelerations are defined using the 
coordinate system shown in Appendix C, figure Acceleration Environment Coordinate 
System and table Direction and Inertial Resultant of Body Acceleration.  The calculation 
of component linear accelerations includes 
linear accelerations that are induced by rotational velocities, and 
centripetal accelerations that are induced by rotational velocities. 
Sustained accelerations, linear or rotational, are events with a duration of greater than 
0.5 second.  Transient accelerations, linear or rotational, are events with a duration of 
less than or equal to 0.5 second. 
To convert from acceleration of free fall, standard (gn) to meter per second squared 
(m/s2) multiply by 9.80665 (National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
Special Publication (SP) 811, 1995 Edition). Occupant protection requirements in this 
document are included to control hazards presented by excessive crew loads due to 
high accelerations or insufficient crew restraint.  An additional hazard mode that may 
threaten occupant safety is structural failure, especially during off-nominal landing 
events.  It is important that both hazard elements be controlled in order to minimize 
crew injury during vehicle acceleration and deceleration events. 
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Structural failure (primary or secondary) may present an occupant protection hazard 
through impinging upon occupant volume in such a way as to injure crewmembers.  In 
order to protect against this hazard, it is necessary to define a "crew occupiable 
volume," or "survivable volume", that cannot be breached and, through hazard analysis 
and other methods, ensure that vehicle structure, subsystems, and components do not 
create critical or catastrophic hazard risks through entering this volume.  It is also 
important to ensure that implementation of protections against these hazards do not 
impede egress or otherwise create unintended additional risks.  This type of hazard is 
protected against through CxP 72000, Constellation Program System Requirements for 
the Orion System, with Table 3.2.2-1 defining certified landing conditions and impact 
condition probability criteria.  This hazard is also protected against through CxP 70135, 
Constellation Program Structural Design and Verification Requirements. 
3.2.4.1  Sustained Linear Acceleration 
These requirements apply to sustained, linear accelerations, measured at the heart. 
3.2.4.1.1  Crew Exposure to Rate of Change of Acceleration 
[HS3059] The system shall prevent the crew from being exposed to a rate of change of 
acceleration of more than 500 g/s during any sustained acceleration event. 
Rationale:  Acceleration onset rates greater than 500 g/s significantly increase 
the risk of crew incapacitation, thereby threatening crew survival. 
3.2.4.1.2  Linear Acceleration Limits during Nominal Return 
[HS3060] The system shall prevent the crew from being exposed to linear accelerations 
greater than those depicted by the dotted/green lines in HS3060, figures + GX Linear 
Sustained Acceleration Limits, - GX Linear Sustained Acceleration Limits, + GZ Linear 
Sustained Acceleration Limits, - GZ Linear Sustained Acceleration Limits, and +/- GY 
Linear Sustained Acceleration Limits.  
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FIGURE 3.2.4.1.2-1 - + GX LINEAR SUSTAINED ACCELERATION LIMITS  
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FIGURE 3.2.4.1.2-2 - - GX LINEAR SUSTAINED ACCELERATION LIMITS  
 
 
FIGURE 3.2.4.1.2-3 - +GZ LINEAR SUSTAINED ACCELERATION LIMITS  
 
 
Crew Loads Limits 
for sustained or short term plateau accelerations
0.1
1
10
100
0.1 1 10 100 1000
Duration (sec)
Ac
ce
le
ra
tio
n 
(g
's
)
Limit for Abort or Emergency Entry
Limit for Launch to Mission Destination
Limit for Return to Earth
+Gz    Eye Balls  Down
sustained
0.5
Crew Loads Limits 
for sustained or short term plateau accelerations
0.1
1
10
0.1 1 10 100 1000
Duration (sec)
A
cc
el
er
at
io
n 
(g
's
)
Limit for Abort or Emergency Entry
Limit for Launch to Mission Destination
Limit for Return to Earth
-Gz    Eye Balls Up
0.5
sustained
Revision:  E Document No:  CxP 70024 
Release Date:  11/19/10 Page:  56 of 503 
Title:  Constellation Program Human-Systems Integration Requirements 
 
FIGURE 3.2.4.1.2-4 - - GZ LINEAR SUSTAINED ACCELERATION LIMITS  
 
FIGURE 3.2.4.1.2-5 - +/-GY LINEAR SUSTAINED ACCELERATION LIMITS  
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Sustained Acceleration Limits, - GZ Linear Sustained Acceleration Limits, and +/- GY 
Linear Sustained Acceleration Limits from launch to mission destination. 
Rationale:  The dashed/blue lines in HS3060, figures + GX Linear Sustained 
Acceleration Limits, - GX Linear Sustained Acceleration Limits, + GZ Linear 
Sustained Acceleration Limits, - GZ Linear Sustained Acceleration Limits, and  
+/- GY Linear Sustained Acceleration Limits represent the maximum level of 
sustained acceleration allowed on a conditioned crewmember under nominal 
conditions.  These crewmembers should not be exposed to higher acceleration 
limits depicted by the dashed/blue lines in the figures.  Exposure to g-forces 
greater than these limits could significantly affect human performance for 
maneuvering and interacting with the spacecraft.  Each axis is to be analyzed 
separately, and conservatism in the limits for each axis covers any cumulative 
effect of acceleration in multiple axes.  This requirement can be met by 
integrated systems with the details of each system's responsibility in individual 
system SRDs and IRDs. 
3.2.4.1.4  Linear Acceleration Limits for Ascent Abort and Off-Nominal Entry 
[HS3062] The system shall prevent the crew from being exposed to linear accelerations 
greater than those depicted by the solid/red lines in HS3060, figures + GX Linear 
Sustained Acceleration Limits, - GX Linear Sustained Acceleration Limits, + GZ Linear 
Sustained Acceleration Limits, - GZ Linear Sustained Acceleration Limits, and +/- GY 
Linear Sustained Acceleration Limits during a launch abort or emergency entry. 
Rationale:  The solid/red lines in HS3060, figures + GX Linear Sustained 
Acceleration Limits, - GX Linear Sustained Acceleration Limits, + GZ Linear 
Sustained Acceleration Limits, - GZ Linear Sustained Acceleration Limits, and  
+/- GY Linear Sustained Acceleration Limits represent the maximum level of 
sustained acceleration allowed on a crewmember during a launch abort or 
emergency entry.  Under these extreme conditions, it may be necessary to 
expose the crew to accelerations more severe than those experienced nominally 
(see dashed blue lines), but crewmembers should never be exposed to 
accelerations greater than those depicted by the solid/red lines in the figures.  
Exceeding these elevated limits could significantly increase the risk of crew 
incapacitation, thereby threatening crew survival.  Each axis is to be analyzed 
separately, and conservatism in the limits for each axis covers any cumulative 
effect of acceleration in multiple axes. 
3.2.4.2  Occupant Protection 
3.2.4.2.1  Crew Injury Risk Limits 
[HS3064] The Constellation Architecture shall limit the injury risk criterion, β, to no 
greater than 1.0 according to the Brinkley Dynamic Response model in Appendix N, 
table Dynamic Response Limits. 
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Rationale:  The Brinkley Dynamic Response model will provide an injury risk 
assessment during dynamic phases of flight for accelerations less than 
0.5 second.  Application of this model assumes that the crew will be similarly 
restrained during all events where the Brinkley model is applied, as explained in 
Appendix N.  Human tolerance for injury risk limits for development of space 
vehicles that are based on human volunteer impact test data and operational 
emergency escape system experience, such as the Brinkley criterion, have been 
adjusted for landing impact after re-entry considering existing knowledge of the 
physical and physiological deconditioning due to long-term exposure to the 
microgravity of space.  The large experience in human testing of aircraft ejection 
seats and operational experience with emergency escape systems has enabled 
the highest fidelity for injury prediction, using the Brinkley model in the Gz axis.  
Although the maximum allowable Brinkley β value is 1.0 for any given level of 
risk, the vehicle occupant protection system design should strive to achieve β 
values as low as reasonably achievable for as many of the landing conditions 
and scenarios as possible.  The criteria include dynamic response limits that 
have been established for varying probabilities of injury.  This model may 
primarily be used for landing scenarios, but it is applicable for all dynamic phases 
of flight for accelerations less than 0.5 second.  Application of the Brinkley 
Dynamic Response model is described in NASA-TM-2008-215198, The Use of a 
Vehicle Acceleration Exposure Limit Model and a Finite Element Crash Test 
Dummy Model to Evaluate the Risk of Injuries During Orion Crew Module 
Landings.  Structural failure may present an occupant protection hazard through 
impinging upon occupant volume in such a way as to injure crewmembers.  This 
type of hazard is protected against through CxP 70135, Constellation Program 
Structural Design and Verification Requirements, Section 3. 
3.2.4.2.2  Head Protection Criteria 
[HS3124] The Constellation Architecture should limit the Head Injury Criteria (HIC) as 
defined per HIC 15 to values specified in Appendix N, table Head Injury Criteria. 
Rationale:  Keeping HIC 15 to less than values in Appendix N, table Head Injury 
Criteria significantly reduces head injury.  These values are derived based on 
acceleration at the head.  Blunt impacts, sharp edges and other sources of 
trauma may lead to head injuries and, therefore, should be considered in the 
design of head protection; however, it is not the intent of this requirement to 
control these additional factors.  Structural failure may present an occupant 
protection hazard through impinging upon occupant volume in such a way as to 
injure crewmembers.  This type of hazard is protected against through CxP 
70135, Constellation Program, Structural Design and Verification Requirements, 
Section 3.  The HIC 15 is calculated using the formula in Appendix N3.0 and is 
limited to values in Appendix N, table Head Injury Criteria for each 15-millisecond 
interval.  Historical implementation of this requirement has found the majority of 
the head protection comes from design and implementation of protective features 
of the crew helmet. Historically, to achieve the intended purpose, head protection 
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includes headrest systems that have continuously smooth surfaces without sharp 
edges to prevent penetration injury to the head and neck.  This requirement 
needs to be considered for both suited and unsuited scenarios.  The appropriate 
risk level will be determined by the Projects and concurred by the Program. 
3.2.4.2.3  Head Transient Acceleration Limits 
[HS3132] The Constellation Architecture should limit transient linear accelerations to 
the head to those specified in Appendix N, table Head Acceleration Limits. 
Rationale:  Limiting the accelerations applied to the head significantly reduces 
the likelihood of traumatic brain injury and injury to the skull and cervical spine.  
Historically, the peak head acceleration has been a key driver in the design and 
materials selection for the conformal elements within the flight helmet to prevent 
abrupt contact with the helmet.  This requirement needs to be considered for 
both suited and unsuited scenarios.  The appropriate risk level will be determined 
by the Projects and concurred by the Program. 
3.2.4.2.4  Neck Protection Criteria 
[HS3125] The Constellation Architecture should limit the bending moments applied to 
the neck to those specified in Appendix N, table Neck Protection Criteria. 
Rationale:  Limiting the cervical flexion and extension bending moments to those 
in Appendix N, table Neck Protection Criteria significantly reduces the likelihood 
of cervical spinal fracture or injury to soft tissues around the cervical spine.  Neck 
bending moments are influenced by both seat and helmet/suit design features.  
The appropriate risk level will be determined by the Projects and concurred by 
the Program. 
3.2.4.2.5  Transient Force Application Limits 
[HS3128] The Constellation Architecture should limit the transient forces applied to the 
crew to those specified in Appendix N, table Transient Force Application Limits 
<TBD-70024-005>. 
Rationale:  Limiting the forces applied to the cervical spinal elements will 
significantly reduce the risk of spinal fracture as well as soft tissue injury around 
the spinal elements.  Limitation of force applied to the body also protects internal 
organs and vasculature from injury.  The application of an optimized restraint 
system and the use of energy attenuation methods may work in tandem to limit 
these transient loads to the vehicle occupant's body, especially the head and 
neck.  Keeping the crew's neck under the tension, compression, and shear force 
limits may require the implementation of a head and neck restraint system similar 
to that used in the automotive industry.  Structural failure may present an 
occupant protection hazard through impinging upon occupant volume in such a 
way as to injure crewmembers.  This type of hazard is protected against through 
CxP 70135, Constellation Program Structural Design and Verification 
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Requirements, Section 3.  The appropriate risk level will be determined by the 
Projects and concurred by the Program. 
3.2.4.2.6  Chest Deflection 
[HS3129] The Constellation Architecture should limit the deflection of the crewmember's 
chest to the values specified in Appendix N, table Restrained Body Movement and 
Deflection <TBR-70024-001>. 
Rationale:  Limiting chest deflection (defined as the inward depression of the 
sternum toward the spinal column in the x-axis) lowers the likelihood of internal 
thoracic injury such as pneumothorax, cardiac or pulmonary contusion, rib 
fracture, etc.  Implementation of this requirement will mainly be a function of the 
seat and restraint system design.  Structural failure may present an occupant 
protection hazard through impinging upon occupant volume in such a way as to 
injure crewmembers.  This type of hazard is protected against through CxP 
70135, Constellation Program Structural Design and Verification Requirements, 
Section 3. 
3.2.4.2.7  Restrained Body Movement 
[HS3130] The Constellation Architecture shall limit the crew body movement relative to 
the seat, while seated and restrained, to those specified in Appendix N, table 
Restrained Body Movement and Deflection <TBR-70024-001>. 
Rationale:  Human survivability during dynamic phases of flight requires 
implementing restraint principles in order to prevent relative body component 
movement and adverse dynamic overshoot that may result.  Dynamic overshoot 
is a complex phenomenon involving material and tissue elasticity, geometry, 
mass distribution, natural frequency of the occupant, and seat and restraint 
properties.  Examples of historically employed restraint principles can be found in 
Appendix N.  The appropriate risk level will be determined by the Projects and 
concurred by the Program. 
3.2.4.2.8  Flail Injury Protection 
[HS5012] The Constellation Architecture shall prevent flail injury to restrained 
crewmembers during dynamic mission phases. 
Rationale:  During dynamic flight phases there is potential for extremity flail 
injury, which includes crewmember extremities impacting vehicular surfaces or 
objects, hyperextending, hyperflexing, hyper-rotating, fracturing, or dislocating if 
proper restraints are not used.  Features such as harnesses, form-fitting seats, 
and tethers may help maintain the proper position of the crewmember's body and 
limbs to reduce movement or contact with vehicle surfaces that would produce 
flail injury.  In addition, the design of the suit may contribute to reducing flail injury 
to the crew.  Preventing the inadvertent contact of extremities with vehicular 
structure or interior components will significantly reduce the likelihood of limb 
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fracture or soft tissue injury during a dynamic flight event.  Extremity guards, 
tethers, garters, and hand holds have been used to reduce extremity flail in other 
spacecraft, aircraft, and automotive vehicles.  Limiting the limb range of motion to 
the range of motion limits specified in Appendix B, table Unsuited Joint Mobility 
reduces the likelihood of hyperextending, hyperflexing, and hyper-rotating the 
limbs. 
3.2.4.3  Rotational Acceleration Limits 
3.2.4.3.1  Sustained Rotational Acceleration Limit 
[HS3065] The Constellation Architecture shall prevent the crew from being exposed to 
sustained rotational accelerations greater than 115 degrees/s2. 
Rationale:  Crewmembers are not expected to be able to tolerate sustained 
rotational accelerations in excess of 115 degrees/s2 without significant discomfort 
and disorientation.  This requirement will be met by integrated systems with the 
details of each system’s responsibility in individual system SRDs and in IRDs. 
3.2.4.4  Rotational Rates 
3.2.4.4.1  Rotational Limits for Nominal Return 
[HS3069] The system shall prevent the crew from being exposed to yaw, pitch, or roll 
rates greater than those depicted by the dotted/green line in HS3071, figure Angular 
Rate Limits from mission destination to Earth landing. 
Rationale:  Yaw, pitch, and roll rates are rotations about the body's z-, y-, and x-
axes respectively, as shown in Appendix C, figure Acceleration Environment 
Coordinate System.  These limits apply to all three axes and are conservative for 
yaw rates.  Deconditioned, ill or injured crewmembers are not expected to be 
able to tolerate sustained spin rates in excess of 5 to 8 rpm for extended periods 
of time.  In addition, crewmembers outside the spin axis may experience large 
undesirable centripetal forces in several vectors dependent upon the spin rate, 
orientation, and distance from the axis of rotation.  Therefore, returning 
crewmembers (potentially deconditioned, injured, or ill) should not be exposed to 
rotation rates greater than the more conservative limits depicted by the 
dotted/green line in the HS3071, figure Angular Rate Limits.  This could 
significantly affect human performance on entry, landing, and egress. 
3.2.4.4.2  Rotational Limits for Launch to Mission Destination 
[HS3070] The Constellation Architecture shall prevent the crew from being exposed to 
yaw, pitch, or roll rates greater than those depicted by the dashed/blue lines in HS3071, 
figure Angular Rate Limits from launch to mission destination. 
Rationale:  Yaw, pitch, and roll rates are rotations about the body's z-, y-, and x-
axes respectively, as shown in Appendix C, figure Acceleration Environment 
Coordinate System.  These limits apply to all three axes and are conservative for 
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yaw rates.  The dashed/ blue line in HS3071, figure Angular Rate Limits 
represents the maximum level of sustained ascent rotational rates allowed on a 
conditioned crewmember under nominal conditions.  Under nominal conditions, 
conditioned crewmembers should not be exposed to rotation rates greater than 
the limits depicted by the dashed/blue line in the figures.  This could significantly 
affect human performance for maneuvering and interacting with the spacecraft.  
This requirement will be met by integrated systems with the details of each 
system's responsibility in individual system SRDs and in IRDs. 
3.2.4.4.3  Rotational Limits for Ascent Abort and Off-Nominal Entry 
[HS3071] The system shall prevent the crew from being exposed to yaw, pitch, or roll 
rates greater than those depicted by the solid/red line in HS3071, figure Angular Rate 
Limits during a launch abort or emergency entry.  
 
FIGURE 3.2.4.4.3-1 - ANGULAR RATE LIMITS  
Rationale:  Yaw, pitch, and roll rates are rotations about the body's z-, y-, and 
x-axes respectively, as shown in Appendix C, figure Acceleration Environment 
Coordinate System.  These limits apply to all three axes and are conservative for 
yaw rates.  The solid/red line in HS3071, figure Angular Rate Limits represents 
the maximum level of sustained ascent rotational rates allowed on a conditioned 
crewmember in a launch abort or emergency entry.  Under these extreme 
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than those experienced nominally (see dashed/blue line), but crewmembers 
should never be exposed to rotation rates greater than the elevated limits 
depicted by the solid/red line in the figures.  This could significantly increase the 
risk of crew incapacitation or survivability. 
3.2.5  Vibration 
This section contains requirements to ensure that vibration to the crew does not cause 
injury during periods of acceleration, and does not negatively impact crew habitability 
during sustained, low-level vibration exposure. 
This section presents the requirements for vibration using the X, Y, Z coordinate system 
defined in Appendix C, figure Acceleration Environment Coordinate System and table 
Direction and Inertial Resultant of Body Acceleration, and in the International Standards 
Organization (ISO) 2631-1:1997, Mechanical Vibration and Shock – Evaluation of 
Human Exposure to Whole Body Vibration – Part 1:  General Requirements, Figure 1.  
"Dynamic phases of flight" refers to periods of acceleration and deceleration including 
ascent, pad and ascent abort, entry, descent, and landing. 
To convert from acceleration of free fall, standard (gn) to meter per second squared 
(m/s2) multiply by 9.80665 (National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
Special Publication (SP) 811, 1995 Edition). 
3.2.5.1  Health Limits for Vibration During Dynamic Phases of Flight 
[HS3105] The Constellation Architecture shall limit vibration to the crew such that the 
vectorial sum of the X, Y, and Z frequency-weighted accelerations between 0.5 and 
80 Hz is less than or equal to the levels and durations in HS3105, table Frequency-
Weighted Vibration Limited by Exposure Time During Dynamic Phases of Flight during 
dynamic phases of flight. 
TABLE 3.2.5.1-1 - FREQUENCY-WEIGHTED VIBRATION LIMITS BY EXPOSURE TIME 
DURING DYNAMIC PHASES OF FLIGHT  
Maximum Vibration Exposure 
Duration Per 24-hr Period 
Maximum Frequency-
Weighted Acceleration 
10 Minutes 0.4 g rms 
1 Minute 0.6 g rms 
 
Rationale:  There are limited data on the effects of high levels of vibration on 
health.  It is expected that internal organs and tissue structures could be 
damaged if the level of vibration or the time period for these levels were 
increased.  Studies were conducted in the 1960s to evaluate human tolerance to 
higher levels of vibration between 3 and 20 Hz for exposures lasting less than 
5 minutes (Temple et al, 1964).  These studies were conducted in the controlled 
laboratory environment with subjects supported by a rigid single-component 
space couch.  A multiple component, non-rigid support may increase the risk of 
injury to the spinal column.  In the semi-supine space couch configuration, the 
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sustained accelerative forces (i.e., constant G-load bias equal to 1.0 gn) are 
directed through the X-axis (back to chest) of the occupant.  The main focus of 
complaints was pain or pressure in the thorax and difficulty with respiration.  
Discomfort was also reported in the abdomen and head.  The 0.6-g weighted rms 
level falls in the vicinity of the upper boundary of the ISO 2631-1:1997, Annex B, 
Figure B.1 Health Guidance Caution Zones for a 1-minute exposure occurring 
during a 24-hour period.  Above this boundary, health risks are likely.  Below this 
boundary, caution for the potential for health risks is indicated.  However, it 
should be noted that some individuals involved in the studies conducted by 
Temple et al were unable to withstand vibration at the 0.6-g rms level for 
frequency components between 10 and 20 Hz because of severe discomfort.  
The 0.4-g weighted rms level for 10-minute exposure, however, is within the 
tolerance levels reported by Temple, et al (1964) for the frequencies between 
3 and 20 Hz.  The 0.4-g weighted rms level falls between the upper and lower 
boundaries of the ISO Standard 2631-1:1997, Annex B, Figure B.1 Health 
Guidance Caution Zones, where caution should be taken with regard to the 
potential for health risk.  For reference, the Apollo launch specification for the 
Command Module couch  (Report SID 64-1344C Space Division of North 
American Rockwell, Figure 18 B), yielded a maximum raw unweighted vibration 
level of 0.77 g rms when integrated from 0.5 to 80 Hz.  This maximum, which 
occurred ~90 sec following lift-off, lasted less than 10 sec (SID 64-1344C, Figure 
9).  Application of ISO standard 2631-1:1997 weighting factor Wk and constant 
k=1.0 for the body z-axis, described in the accompanying verification 
requirement, reduces this level to 0.26 g rms.  Application of ISO standard 
2631-1:1997 weighting factor Wd and constant k = 1.4 for the body x-axis, 
described in the accompanying verification requirement, reduces this level to 
0.07 g rms.  This requirement will be met by integrated systems with the details 
of each system's responsibility in individual system SRDs and in IRDs. 
3.2.5.2  Vibration Limits during Crew Sleep 
[HS3106] The Constellation Architecture shall limit vibration to the crew such that the 
frequency-weighted acceleration between 1.0 and 80 Hz in each of the X, Y, and Z axes 
is less than 0.01 g rms for each 2-minute interval during an 8.5-hour crew sleep period. 
Rationale:  For long-duration exposure (~8.5 hours), smaller vibrations to which 
the crew is exposed can adversely affect crew sleep.  International Standards 
Organization (ISO) 6954:2000, Mechanical vibration – Guidelines for the 
measurement, reporting and evaluation of vibration with regard to habitability on 
passenger and merchant ships, provides vibration exposure guidelines for 
habitability onboard passenger and merchant ships to include sleep areas and 
reflects the occupant perception of the vibration in these areas.  ISO-6954:2000, 
Section 7 states that vibration of 0.01 g rms or lower for crew accommodation 
areas in ships is not likely to draw adverse comments from occupants.  CxP 
70007, Constellation Design Reference Missions and Operational Concepts, 
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Annex 2: Flight Operations Scenarios can be referenced for information 
concerning duration of crew sleep periods. 
3.2.5.3  Pre-Launch Vibration Limit to Prevent Motion Sickness 
[HS3108] The Constellation Architecture shall limit vibration to the crew such that the 
frequency-weighted acceleration between 0.1 to 0.5 Hz in each of the X, Y, and Z axes 
is less than 0.05 g rms for each 10-minute interval during pre-launch. 
Rationale:  Low-frequency vibration, especially in the range between 0.1 and 
0.5 Hz, has the potential to cause motion sickness over relatively short exposure 
periods.  This may be encountered while the crew is in the vehicle during the pre-
launch period, given that the tall vehicle stack may be susceptible to swaying 
back and forth.  Reducing the amount of sway will prevent the onset of motion 
sickness during the pre-launch phase.  For assessing vibration between 0.1 and 
0.5 Hz, the Motion Sickness Dose Value (MSDV)  is calculated in accordance 
with ISO 2631-1: 1997, Annex D, Equation D-1.  According to ISO2631-1: 1997, 
Annex D, the percentage of unadapted adults who may vomit is equal to 
1.3 MSDV.  The value 0.05 g weighted rms acceleration indicates that 
approximately 17% or 1 out of 6 crewmembers may vomit.  Although the ISO 
2631-1 limits the acceleration measurement for assessing motion sickness to the 
vertical direction, this is based on the assumption that the human is in the seated 
upright posture.  Because the occupants of the subject vehicle will be in the 
semi-supine posture, the requirement is applied to all three orthogonal axes, X, 
Y, and Z.  The purpose of the 10-minute integration time is to constrain the 
deviations around the permitted average sway during a 2-hour pre-launch period.  
This requirement will be met by integrated systems with the details of each 
system's responsibility in individual system SRDs and in IRDs. 
3.2.6  Acoustics 
The requirements of this section will ensure that the vehicle provides the crew with an 
acoustic environment that will not cause injury or hearing loss, interfere with voice 
communications, cause fatigue, or in any other way degrade overall human-machine 
system effectiveness. 
The term "at the crewmember’s ear" is used for requirements for which hearing 
protection is allowed when meeting the requirement, while "at the head" is used for 
requirements for which hearing protection is not allowed.  When simulation is required, 
the ear canal volume will be assumed to be 2.0 cc. 
3.2.6.1  Acoustic Limits for Launch and Entry Phases 
3.2.6.1.1  Acoustic Limits for Post-Landing 
[HS3134] The system shall limit the Speech Interference Level, SIL (0.5, 1, 2, 4) and A-
weighted overall SPL, created by the sum of all simultaneously operating equipment, 
averaged over any 20 second measurement period, at crewmember head locations, to 
Revision:  E Document No:  CxP 70024 
Release Date:  11/19/10 Page:  66 of 503 
Title:  Constellation Program Human-Systems Integration Requirements 
 
61 dB and 75 dBA or less, respectively, during post-landing operations, including off-
nominal contingency operations. 
Rationale:  To control the interfering effects of high noise levels on crew voice 
communications subsequent to landing, including planned off-nominal 
operations, e.g. Snorkel Fan.  SIL (0.5, 1, 2, 4) or SIL(4) is calculated by one-
fourth of the sum of the octave band sound pressure levels, in dB, for octave 
bands with center frequencies of 500, 1000, 2000, and 4000 Hz.  This 
requirement is based on ANSI S12 65-2006 for the crewmember head-to-head 
distance of 1.7 m (5.5 ft).  The SIL limit was set at the voice level of “Very Loud” 
in Figure 1 of ANSI S12 65-2006.  The effect of reduced female voice intensity 
was also included by reducing the SIL level in Figure 1 by 4 dB (Reference 
Beranek and Ver, Noise and Vibration Control Engineering, 1992).  The A-
weighted Overall Sound Pressure Level component of this requirement has been 
added to control the frequency range outside of the SIL range and is not intended 
to protect voice communications; it protects crew-hearing. 
3.2.6.1.2  Noise Dose Limits for Launch and Entry 
[HS3073] The Constellation Architecture shall limit the noise dose at the crewmember’s 
ear calculated over any 24-hour period, to 100% or less, where the 24-hour noise dose, 
D, is calculated by: 
 
where N is the number of noise exposure events during the 24-hour period, Cn is the 
actual duration of the exposure event in minutes, and Tn is the maximum noise 
exposure duration allowed, based on the specific noise level, Ln, of an exposure event 
in dBA, calculated using:  
 
during launch and entry phases including ascent abort. 
Rationale:  Equivalent noise exposure levels above 85 dBA for more than 
8 hours have been shown to increase the risk of noise-induced hearing loss.  The 
above formulae can be used to calculate the 24-hour noise exposure levels 
based on the 8-hour 85 dBA criterion recommended by the National Institute for 
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), using the 3 dB trading rule.  The noise 
attenuation effectiveness of hearing protection or communications headsets may 
be used to satisfy this requirement.  This limit does not apply to impulse noise.  
This requirement will be met by integrated systems with the details of each 
system’s responsibility in individual system SRDs and in IRDs.  
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3.2.6.1.3  Impulse Noise Limit for Launch and Entry 
[HS3074] The Constellation Architecture shall limit impulse noise at the crewmember's 
ear to less than 140 dB peak overall Sound Pressure Level (SPL) during launch and 
entry including ascent abort. 
Rationale:  A limit of 140 dB peak SPL for impulse noise will prevent trauma to 
the hearing organs caused by impulse noise.  Ref.:  MIL-STD-1474D, 
Department of Defense Design Criteria Standard-Noise Limits.  The noise 
attenuation effectiveness of hearing protection or communications headsets may 
be used to satisfy this requirement.  This requirement will be met by integrated 
systems with the details of each system's responsibility in individual system 
SRDs and in IRDs. 
3.2.6.1.4  Hazardous Noise Limit for Launch and Entry 
[HS3072] The Constellation Architecture shall limit the maximum A-weighted overall 
SPL at the crewmember’s ear to 105 dBA or less during launch, entry, and suited 
(helmet on, visor down) burn-phases, and to 115 dBA or less during launch abort. 
Rationale:  Noise levels above 115 dBA have been shown to produce noise-
induced hearing loss, and the 105 dBA limit allows headroom for alarms and 
voice communications.  During launch abort, the communications during the 
abort motor firing are not needed, so the 115 dBA requirement is appropriate.  
Launch abort includes all aborts that may occur during take-off including pad, 
ascent, and high-altitude aborts.  The noise attenuation effectiveness of hearing 
protection or communications headsets may be used to satisfy this requirement.  
This limit does not apply to impulse noise.  This requirement will be met by 
integrated systems with the details of each system’s responsibility in individual 
system SRDs and in IRDs. 
3.2.6.1.5  Infrasonic Noise Limits 
[HS3081] The system shall limit infrasonic overall SPL at the crewmember's head 
location for frequencies from 1 to 20 Hz to less than 150 dB. 
Rationale:  The 150-dB limit for infrasonic noise levels in the frequency range 
from 1 to 20 Hz provides for health and well-being effects.  The noise attenuation 
effectiveness of hearing protection or communications headsets may not be used 
to satisfy this requirement, Ref.:  2001 American Conference of Governmental 
Industrial Hygienists, Threshold Level Values (TLVs), "Infrasound and Low-
Frequency Sound."  This limit does not apply to impulse noise.  No equivalent 
Ultrasonic requirement is necessary as counterpoint to this infrasonic 
requirement. 
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3.2.6.2  Acoustic Limits for the Orbit Phase 
3.2.6.2.1  Sound Pressure Level (SPL) Limits for Waste Management System 
[HS3133] The system shall limit the intermittent A-weighted overall SPL environment, 
measured at the expected user’s head position of crew-waste management systems, 
and at crew station head positions in the main habitable volume, to 68 dBA or less while 
the toilet is in operation. 
Rationale:  To provide for adequate hearing protection for toilet users of the 
WMS and crews at work stations in the main habitable volume.  The above level 
poses minimum impact to communication interference.  This requirement is 
based on a nominal toilet usage of 1 hour or less by individual crew, and 3 hours 
or less by others, over any 24-hour period and was based on ISS requirements, 
SSP 57000, Pressurized Payload Interface Requirements Document for 
Operations Within a Rack.  The noise attenuation effectiveness of hearing 
protection or communications headsets may not be used to satisfy this 
requirement. 
3.2.6.2.2  Impulse Noise Limit for the Orbit Phase 
[HS3078] The system shall limit impulse noise, measured at the crewmember's head 
location to less than 120 dB peak SPL during all mission phases except launch and 
entry. 
Rationale:  A limit of 140 dB peak SPL for impulse noise will prevent acoustic 
trauma. Ref.:  MIL-STD-1474D.  A limit of 120 dB peak SPL for impulse noise will 
prevent the crewmembers from being startled.  The noise attenuation 
effectiveness of hearing protection or communications headsets may not be used 
to satisfy this requirement. 
3.2.6.2.3  Annoyance Noise Limits for Crew Sleep 
[HS3079] The system shall limit impulse and intermittent noise SPLs at the 
crewmember's head location to less than 83 dB peak and 70 dBA, respectively, during 
crew sleep periods. 
Rationale:  Impulse noise must be limited to less than 10 dB above the 
background noise to avoid waking crewmembers who are sleeping.  Ref.:   
NASA-STD-3000, Man-Systems Integration Standards, Volume 1, Section 
5.4.3.2.3.4.  Communications and alarms are not subject to this requirement. 
3.2.6.2.4  Hazardous Noise Limit for the Orbit Phase 
[HS3075] The system shall limit the maximum A-weighted overall SPL at the 
crewmember’s head location and at the ears of space-suit occupants caused by known 
noise sources, including voice communications and alarms, and certified off-nominal 
operations to less than 85 dBA, during all mission phases except launch and entry. 
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Rationale:  The 85 dBA overall sound pressure level defines the hazardous noise 
limit at which action to reduce the noise level must be taken so that interference 
with voice communications and alarms, as well as increased risk for hearing loss, 
does not occur.  This requirement is not intended for nominal hardware 
emissions, whose requirements are specified in HS3076 and HS3109 but to limit 
the sound level of sources such as alarms, communications systems, and levels 
that occur during maintenance activities and certified off-nominal operations.  
This requirement was taken from NASA-STD-3000, Figure 5.4.3.2.1.1.  The 
noise attenuation effectiveness of hearing protection or communications 
headsets may not be used to satisfy this requirement, except for when this 
requirement is being applied to noise inside the space suit.  Note that alarm and 
voice communication levels inside the space suit are controlled by HS3110.  This 
limit does not apply to impulse noise. 
3.2.6.2.5  Sound Pressure Level (SPL) Limits for Continuous Noise during the 
Orbit Phase 
[HS3076] The system shall limit the SPLs, created by the sum of all simultaneously 
operating equipment, averaged over any 20-second measurement period, throughout 
the crew habitable volume, and at the ears of the space-suit occupant, to the values in 
HS3076, table Octave Band Sound Pressure Level Limits or less, within each of the 
specified octave bands during all mission phases except launch and entry. 
TABLE 3.2.6.2.5-1 - OCTAVE BAND SOUND PRESSURE LEVEL LIMITS  
Band center 
frequency (Hz) 63 125 250 500 1 k 2 k 4 k 8 k 16 k 
SPL (dB) 72 65 60 56 53 51 50 49 48 
 
Rationale:  This NC-52 requirement will limit noise levels within the crew-
habitable volume and in space suits (with visors up and down) to allow for 
adequate voice communications and habitability during the on-orbit mission 
operations.  The octave band sound level limits from 63 Hz to 8 kHz are 
equivalent to NC-52 and the 16-kHz octave band has been added to extend the 
range throughout the audible frequency range.  This requirement does not apply 
to alarms, communications, items listed in HS3109, table Approved Intermittent 
Noise Sources, or to any noise experienced during maintenance activities.  The 
noise attenuation effectiveness of hearing protection or communications 
headsets may not be used to satisfy this requirement, except for when this 
requirement is being applied to noise inside space suits when the helmet and 
communication headsets are being worn.  This limit does not apply to impulse 
noise. 
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3.2.6.2.6  Sound Pressure Level (SPL) Limits for Intermittent Noise during the 
Orbit Phase 
[HS3109] The system shall limit intermittent A-weighted overall SPL emissions from 
sources listed in HS3109, table Approved Intermittent Noise Sources, measured 0.6 m 
from the loudest point on the hardware, to the levels and nominal durations in HS3109, 
table Intermittent Noise A-Weighted Overall Sound Pressure Level and Corresponding 
Durational Duration Limits (Measured at 0.6 M) or less, for the time noise exceeds limits 
in HS3076, table Octave Band Sound Pressure Level Limits, over any 24-hour period 
during all mission phases except launch and entry. 
TABLE 3.2.6.2.6-1 - APPROVED INTERMITTENT NOISE SOURCES  
Pressurized Gas Transfer Systems 
Portable Equipment, Payloads and Cargo 
Engines/Thrusters 
Motorized valve assemblies 
Carbon Dioxide and Humidity Control Systems 
(including Swing Bed Pressure Exchange 
Systems) 
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TABLE 3.2.6.2.6-2 - INTERMITTENT NOISE A-WEIGHTED OVERALL SOUND PRESSURE 
LEVEL AND CORRESPONDING OPERATIONAL DURATION LIMITS  
(MEASURED AT 0.6 M)  
Maximum Noise Duration 
Per 24-hour Period 
LAmax 
(dBA re 20 µPa) 
8 Hours ≤ 49 
7 Hours ≤ 50 
6 Hours ≤ 51 
5 Hours ≤ 52 
4.5 Hours ≤ 53 
4 Hours ≤ 54 
3.5 Hours ≤ 55 
3 Hours ≤ 57 
2.5 Hours ≤ 58 
2 Hours ≤ 60 
1.5 Hours ≤ 62 
1 Hour ≤ 65 
30 Minutes ≤ 69 
15 Minutes ≤ 72 
5 Minutes ≤ 76 
2 Minutes ≤ 78 
1 Minute ≤ 79 
Not Allowed ≥ 80  
 
Rationale:  This requirement is a relaxation of the continuous noise requirement 
HS3076 for specifically approved intermittent noise producing hardware, and still 
provides for adequate speech intelligibility and habitability.  Intermittent noise 
producing hardware not included in the table above must meet HS3076.  Levels 
in HS3109, table Intermittent Noise A-Weighted Overall Sound Pressure Level 
and Corresponding Durational Duration Limits (Measured at 0.6 M) will limit 
intermittent noise levels of specific hardware items that are inherently noisy and 
operate for a short time period where alternative means for noise control are 
prohibitively expensive or impractical.  Durations associated with contingencies 
need not be used to define the noise level.  The nominal duration will be used to 
determine the appropriate noise level.  These sound level and operational 
duration limits are taken from ISS requirements (SSP 57000, Pressurized 
Payload Interface Requirements Document).  The noise attenuation 
effectiveness of hearing protection or communications headsets may not be used 
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to satisfy this requirement.  This limit does not apply to impulse noise.  Note that 
intermittent noise during crew sleep is limited to 70 dBA according to [HS3079] 
Annoyance Noise Limit for Crew Sleep. 
3.2.6.2.7  Tonal and Narrow-Band Noise Limits 
[HS3080] The system shall limit the maximum SPL of narrow-band noise components 
and tones to at least 10 dB less than the broadband SPL of the octave band that 
contains the component or tone for the 1-, 2-, 4-, and 8-kHz octave bands, and at least 
5 dB less than the broadband SPL of the octave band that contains the component or 
tone for the 63-, 125-, 250-, and 500-Hz octave bands. 
Rationale:  Limiting narrow band noise component and tone levels to 10 dB 
below the broadband level will prevent irritating and distracting acoustic 
conditions.  Ref.:  NASA-STD-3000, Figure 5.4.3.2.3.2. 
3.2.6.3  All Flight Phases 
3.2.6.3.1  Cabin Depressurization Valve Hazardous Noise Limit 
[HS3082] The system shall limit the maximum A-weighted overall SPL, at the 
crewmember's ear, to 105 dBA or less during cabin depressurization valve operations. 
Rationale:  Noise levels above 115 dBA have been shown to produce noise-
induced hearing loss, and the 105-dBA limit allows headroom for alarms and 
voice communications.  Historically, cabin depressurization valves have 
produced a high level of noise.  Whether or not the use of hearing protection may 
be used to satisfy this requirement will be specified in the Level III 
documentation.  This limit does not apply to impulse noise. 
3.2.6.3.2  Cabin Depressurization Valve Noise Dose Limits 
[HS3083] The system shall limit the noise dose at the crewmember’s ear, calculated 
over any 24-hour period, to 100% or less, where the 24-hour noise dose, D, is 
calculated by: 
 
where N is the number of noise exposure events during the 24-hour period, Cn is the 
actual duration of the exposure event, and Tn is the maximum noise exposure duration 
allowed, based on the specific noise level, Ln, of an exposure event, calculated using:  
 
during cabin depressurization valve operations.  
Rationale:  Equivalent noise exposure levels above 85 dBA for more than 8 
hours have been shown to increase the risk of noise-induced hearing loss.  The 
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above formulae can be used to calculate the 24-hour noise exposure levels 
based on the 8-hour 85-dBA criterion recommended by NIOSH, using the 3-dB 
trading rule.  This limit does not apply to impulse noise.  Whether or not the use 
of hearing protection may be used to satisfy this requirement will be specified in 
the Level III documentation. 
3.2.6.3.3  Reverberation Time 
[HS3084] The system shall provide a reverberation time in the crew habitable volume of 
less than 0.6 second within the 500-Hz, 1-kHz, and 2-kHz octave bands. 
Rationale:  This 0.6-second reverberation time standard will limit degradation of 
speech intelligibility to no more than 10% for ideal signal-noise ratios of >30 dB 
or 15% for a signal-noise ratio of 3 dB.  Reference NASA-STD-3000, Figure 
5.4.3.2.2.1, and C.  M. Harris, "Handbook of Acoustical Measurements and Noise 
Control, 3rd Ed.," p. 16.8. 
3.2.6.3.4  Noise Limit for Personal Communication Devices 
[HS3110] The system shall limit the maximum SPL at the crewmember’s ear created by 
a personal communication device to 115 dBA or less. 
Rationale:  Noise levels above 115 dBA have been shown to produce noise-
induced hearing loss.  Sound levels produced by personal communication 
devices are allowed to be at higher levels to overcome the noise generated 
during launch and descent.  A personal communication device may be an 
integrated part of the EVA helmet or an independent communication headset. 
3.2.6.3.5  Loudspeaker Alarm Audibility 
[HS3111] Loudspeakers shall produce non-speech auditory annunciations that exceed 
the masked threshold by at least 13 dB in one or more one-third octave bands where 
the alarm resides, as measured at the crewmember’s expected work and sleep station 
head locations. 
Rationale:  The 13-dB signal-to-noise ratio ensures that non-speech auditory 
annunciations are sufficiently salient and intelligible, according to ISO 7731, 
Ergonomics - Danger signals for public work areas Auditory danger signals.  ISO 
7731 is an accepted standard for ensuring the ability to detect and discriminate 
non-speech alarms and alerts. 
3.2.7  Ionizing Radiation 
The radiation sources in space, Galactic Cosmic Radiation (GCR), trapped particle 
radiation, and Solar Particle Events (SPEs), have distinct physical and biological 
damage properties compared to terrestrial radiation, and thus require distinct methods 
to project and mitigate risks.  NASA uses gender-based risk models and is developing 
new approaches to risk estimation. 
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Astronauts have been classified as radiation workers, and processes exist to protect 
them from excessive radiation exposure.  Therefore, exposures must be kept As Low 
As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA). 
3.2.7.1  Radiation Design Requirements 
3.2.7.1.1  Radiation Design Requirements 
[HS3085] The system shall provide protection from radiation exposure consistent with 
ALARA principles to ensure that effective dose (tissue averaged) to any crewmember 
does not exceed the relevant value given in HS3085, table System-Specific Radiation 
Design Requirements , for the design SPE, as specified in CxP 70023, Constellation 
Program Design Specification for Natural Environments (DSNE), Section 3.3.4. 
TABLE 3.2.7.1.1-1 - SYSTEM-SPECIFIC RADIATION DESIGN REQUIREMENTS  
 
System Radiation Design Requirement (mSv) 
Orion 150 
Altair 150 
 
Rationale:  The radiation design requirement is imposed to prevent clinically 
significant deterministic health effects, including performance degradation, 
sickness, or death in flight and to ensure that crew career exposure limits are not 
exceeded with 95% confidence.  The ALARA principle is a legal requirement 
intended to ensure astronaut safety.  An important function of ALARA is to 
ensure that astronauts do not approach radiation limits and that such limits are 
not considered "tolerance values."  ALARA is an iterative process of integrating 
radiation protection into the design process, ensuring optimization of the design 
to afford the most protection possible, within other constraints of the vehicle 
systems.  The protection from radiation exposure is ALARA when the 
expenditure of further resources would be unwarranted by the reduction in 
exposure that would be achieved.  Radiation protection for humans in space 
differs from that on Earth because of the distinct types of radiation, the small 
population of workers, and the remote location of astronauts during spaceflight.  
The radiation sources in space, Galactic Cosmic Rays (GCRs), trapped particle 
radiation, and Solar Particle Events (SPEs), have distinct physical and biological 
damage properties compared to terrestrial radiation, and the spectrum and 
energy of concern for humans differs from that for electronics.  Radiation 
protection for the crew must consider this environment and these concerns.  This 
requirement does not address GCR and trapped radiation exposure during the 
mission.  Exposure to nominal mission exposure will be covered by a legal 
exposure limit. 
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3.2.7.2  Active Radiation Monitoring 
3.2.7.2.1  Charged Particle Monitoring 
[HS3086] The system shall continuously measure and record the external fluence of 
particles of Z < 3, in the energy range 30 to 300 MeV/nucleon and particles of  
3 ≤ Z ≤ 26, in the energy range 100 to 400 MeV/nucleon and integral fluence 
measurement at higher energies, as a function of energy and time, from a monitoring 
location that ensures an unobstructed free space full-angle field-of-view 1.1345 radians 
(65 degrees) or greater. 
Rationale:  The data from the charged particle monitoring are the fundamental 
environmental information required for radiation transport calculations and crew 
exposure evaluation.  Given an accurately measured proton energy spectra 
incident on the vehicle during a solar particle event, detailed crew exposure can 
be evaluated.  This will limit the uncertainly of a single absorbed dose 
measurement in determining crew exposure from a solar particle event.  The 
external fluence of particles of Z < 3, in the energy range 30 to 300 MeV/nucleon 
and particles of 3 ≤ Z ≤ 26, in the energy range 100 to 400 MeV/nucleon, 
contains a large portion of the radiation environment expected for solar particle 
events, trapped particle radiation, and galactic cosmic rays.  The chosen range is 
appropriate for the practical size and weight of radiation monitors suitable for the 
vehicle.  The minimum angle required to establish a geometry factory needed to 
accurately measure the radiation fields is 1.1345 radians (65 degrees).  Charged 
particle monitoring hardware should be portable and transition with the crew in 
the primary vehicle during the mission to lunar surface and return to Low Earth 
Orbit (LEO). 
3.2.7.2.2  Dose Equivalent Monitoring 
[HS3088] The system shall provide an omnidirectional, portable system that can 
continuously measure and record the dose equivalent from charged particles with 
Linear Energy Transfer (LET) 0.2 to 1,000 keV/micrometer, as a function of time, at an 
average tissue depth of at least 2 mm. 
Rationale:  This measurement is the primary means for controlling crew exposure 
during missions.  The current exposure limit quantity for stochastic effects (career 
exposure limits) is specified in dose equivalent.  Tissue equivalent 
microdosimeters have been used extensively for crew exposure monitoring in 
space for this purpose.  There is a large set of data and calculations in the 
published literature that can be directly applied to crew exposure and risk 
determination using tissue equivalent microdosimeters.  The range of Linear 
Energy Transfer of 0.2 to1,000 keV/µm includes the full range expected from 
primary and secondary radiations of Solar Particle Events, trapped particle 
radiation, and galactic cosmic rays.  It is expected that this requirement and the 
absorbed dose monitoring requirement (HS3089) will be met by the same 
instrument.  Absorbed dose monitoring hardware and dose equivalent monitoring 
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hardware should be portable and be able to transition with the crew in the 
primary vehicle during the mission to lunar surface and return to LEO. 
3.2.7.2.3  Absorbed Dose Monitoring 
[HS3089] The system shall provide an omnidirectional, portable system that can 
continuously measure and record the absorbed dose from charged particles with Linear 
Energy Transfer 0.2 to 1,000 keV/micrometer, as a function of time, at an average 
tissue depth of at least 2 mm. 
Rationale:  The absorbed dose/dose equivalent instrument will be the primary 
instrument for controlling crew exposure during missions.  The current exposure 
limit quantity for deterministic effects (short term exposure limits) requires the 
determination of absorbed dose.  Tissue equivalent micro dosimeters have been 
used extensively for crew exposure monitoring in space.  There is a large set of 
data and calculations in the published literature that can be directly applied to 
crew exposure and risk determination, using tissue equivalent micro dosimeters.  
The range of Linear Energy Transfer of 0.2 to 1,000 keV/micrometer includes the 
full range expected from primary and secondary radiations of Solar Particle 
Events and galactic cosmic rays.  It is expected that this requirement and the 
dose equivalent monitoring requirement (HS3088) will be met by the same 
instrument.  Absorbed dose monitoring hardware should be portable and be able 
to transition with the crew in the primary vehicle during the mission to Lunar 
surface and return to LEO. 
3.2.7.3  Passive Radiation Monitoring 
3.2.7.3.1  Passive Radiation Monitoring 
[HS3090] The system shall provide passive dosimetry, capable of measuring time 
integrated absorbed dose and estimating Linear Energy Transfer based quality factors, 
at a minimum of six designated fixed locations within each pressurized vehicle/element. 
Rationale:  Passive area monitors provide a time-integrated measure of the 
spatial distribution of exposure rates inside the Constellation vehicles/elements.  
The exposure rates change with stowage reconfigurations.  Knowledge of the 
spatial distribution of exposure rate is necessary to identify areas that have a 
relatively high exposure rate (i.e., avoidance areas) and to reconstruct a 
crewmember’s exposure in the event of lost or unusable personal dosimeter 
data.  Passive dosimeters collect data even during situations when power is lost 
to other instruments. 
3.2.7.4  Reporting Radiation Data 
3.2.7.4.1  Radiation Data Reporting to the Crew - Absorbed Dose 
[HS3091] The system shall display the measured cumulative absorbed dose/minute 
averaged dose rate to the crew once per minute, with latency less than five minutes. 
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Rationale:  Radiation data are vital for quantifying in-flight risks to the crew.  For 
periods of time when the crew is not in communication with Mission Operations, 
the crew will need to be able to ascertain the radiation conditions within the 
vehicle and take appropriate actions as required.  The changes in the radiation 
environment that could cause additional crew exposure can occur in time periods 
as small as 1 to 5 minutes. 
3.2.7.4.2  Radiation Data Reporting to the Crew - Dose Equivalent 
[HS3119] The system shall display the measured cumulative dose equivalent/minute 
averaged dose equivalent rate to the crew once per minute, with latency less than 5 
minutes. 
Rationale:  Radiation data are vital for quantifying in-flight risks to the crew.  For 
periods of time when the crew is not in communication with Mission Operations, 
the crew will need to be able to ascertain the radiation conditions within the 
vehicle and take appropriate actions as required.  The changes in the radiation 
environment that could cause additional crew exposure can occur in time periods 
as small as 1 minute to 5 minutes. 
3.2.7.4.3  Radiation Data Reporting to Mission Systems - Absorbed Dose 
[HS3112] The system shall provide the measured cumulative absorbed dose/minute 
averaged dose rate to Mission Systems once per minute during periods when 
communication is available, with latency less than 5 minutes. 
Rationale:  Radiation data are vital for quantifying in-flight risks to the crew and 
for allowing Mission Operations to advise the crew on appropriate action in 
response to an SPE.  The quiescent galactic cosmic ray and trapped radiation 
data will be used to track the crew exposure throughout the mission as well as 
provide positive indication of proper health and status of the absorbed dose 
instrument.  This will ensure instrument performance before the onset of any 
solar particle event that may occur. 
3.2.7.4.4  Radiation Data Reporting to Mission Systems - Dose Equivalent 
[HS3120] The system shall provide the measured cumulative dose equivalent/minute 
averaged dose equivalent rate to Mission Systems once per minute during periods 
when communication is available, with latency less than 5 minutes. 
Rationale:  Radiation data are vital for quantifying in-flight risks to the crew and 
for allowing Mission Operations to advise the crew on appropriate action in 
response to an SPE.  The quiescent galactic cosmic ray and trapped radiation 
data will be used to track the crew exposure throughout the mission as well as 
provide positive indication of proper health and status of the absorbed dose 
instrument.  This will ensure instrument performance before the onset of any 
solar particle event that may occur. 
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3.2.7.4.5  Particle Archive Data 
[HS3113] The system shall provide the archive of all recorded charged particle, dose 
equivalent, and absorbed dose data to Mission Systems by the completion of the 
mission. 
Rationale:  Charged particle, dose equivalent, and absorbed dose data taken 
during missions will be used post-mission for radiation dose/risk assessment.  
These data will be used to determine the final dose of record for crewmembers, 
which will be used to track against crew exposure limits. 
3.2.7.5  Alerting for Radiation Data 
3.2.7.5.1  Alerting for Radiation Data 
[HS3092] The system shall alert the crew whenever the absorbed dose rate exceeds a 
pre-flight programmable threshold in the range 0.02 mGy/min to 10 mGy/min for three 
consecutive readings. 
Rationale:  Should communications from the ground be interrupted or lost, the 
crew requires on-board warnings when the radiation environment crosses 
dangerous thresholds so appropriate countermeasure actions can be taken.  
Varying user-defined thresholds may be set according to the radiation 
environmental conditions that may be encountered depending on mission phase.  
The intent is for the vehicle data management system to provide the alerting 
functionality. 
3.2.8  Non-Ionizing Radiation (NIR) 
3.2.8.1  Radio-Frequency Electromagnetic (EM) Field Radiation Limits 
3.2.8.1.1  Radio-Frequency Electromagnetic Field Radiation Limits 
[HS3093] The system shall limit the crew's exposure to radio-frequency (RF) 
electromagnetic fields to the limits specified in Appendix C, table Maximum Permissible 
Exposure (MPE) to Radio Frequency Electromagnetic Fields (Modified from IEEE 
C95.1-2005, Lower Tier) and figure Radio Frequency Electromagnetic Field Exposure 
Limits (Illustrated to Show Whole Body Resonance Effects Around 100 MHz) (Modified 
from IEEE C95.1-2005). 
Rationale:  All devices that generate radio frequency radiation (including, but not 
limited to, antennas and wireless systems) must limit the amount of this radiation 
to which the crew can be exposed.  These limits are modified from the Institute of 
Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) C95.1-2005, "Standard Levels with 
Respect to Human Exposure to Radio Frequency Electromagnetic Fields, 3 kHz 
to 300 GHz."  They are intended to establish exposure conditions for radio-
frequency and microwave radiation to which it is believed that nearly all workers 
can be repeatedly exposed without injury.  Modifications were made to the 
C95.1-2005 standard to remove an excessive safety margin in the power density 
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limit that was added in the 2005 standard.  This margin was added to account for 
theoretical possibility that small children could exceed the whole body averaged 
specific absorption rate basic restriction of 0.08 W/kg.  This requirement 
maintains a minimal safety factor of 50 for adults. 
3.2.8.2  Laser Radiation Limits 
3.2.8.2.1  Ocular Exposure to Lasers 
[HS3094] The system shall maintain ocular exposure of the crew to laser systems 
below the limits specified in ANSI Z136.1, 2007, American National Standard for Safe 
Use of Lasers, Table 5a and Table 5b without protective equipment 
Rationale:  This requirement limits ocular exposure to both continuous and 
repetitively pulsed lasers to protect against eye injury.  The limits are adopted 
from the Laser Institute of America’s publication “American National Standard for 
Safe Use of Lasers” (ANSI Z136.1, 2007).  The term laser system includes the 
laser, its housing, and controls.  This requirement applies to laser systems 
utilized both internal and external to the vehicle.  The safety analysis of all lasers 
will be carried out by ANSI Z136.1 methodology as specified in the verification 
requirement. 
3.2.8.2.2  Dermal Exposure to Lasers 
[HS3096] The system shall maintain dermal exposure of the crew to laser systems 
below the limits specified in ANSI Z136.1, 2007, American National Standard for Safe 
Use of Lasers, Table 7 without protective equipment. 
Rationale:  This requirement limits dermal exposure to both continuous and 
repetitively pulsed lasers to protect against skin injury.  The limits are adopted 
from the Laser Institute of America's publication ANSI Z136.1, 2007, American 
National Standard for Safe Use of Lasers.  The term laser system includes the 
laser, its housing, and controls.  This requirement applies to laser systems 
utilized both internal and external to the vehicle.  The safety analysis of all lasers 
will be carried out by ANSI Z136.1 methodology as specified in the verification 
requirement. 
3.2.8.3  Incoherent Radiation Limits 
Requirements for limiting crew exposure to the electromagnetic spectrum from the 
ultraviolet (180 nm) to the far infrared (3,000 nm) are derived from the methodology 
given in the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) 
standard, Threshold Limit Values® and Biological Exposure Indices®, sections "Light 
and Near-Infrared Radiation" and "Ultraviolet Radiation." 
This methodology allows for the quantification of the relationship between source 
strength and acceptable exposure times for each of four potential injury pathways 
(retinal thermal injury caused by exposure to visible light, retinal photochemical injury 
caused by chronic exposure to blue-light, thermal injury to the ocular lens and cornea 
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caused by infrared exposure, and exposure of the unprotected skin or eye to ultraviolet 
radiation).  These limits do not apply to laser exposure (see laser exposure limits).  The 
numerical values used by the ACGIH are amended for use by NASA by the insertion of 
a factor of 0.2 in the source term of each calculation with the exception of the 
calculation for ultraviolet exposure, which is not amended.  This removes the excessive 
margin of safety imposed by the ACGIH on general populations. 
3.2.8.3.1  Retinal Thermal Injury from Visible and Near Infrared Sources 
3.2.8.3.1.1  Retinal Thermal Injury from Visible and Near Infrared Sources 
[HS3098] The system shall limit exposure of the crew to spectral radiance Lλ at 
wavelengths between 385 and 1,400 nm such that: 
 
 
where Lλ is the source spectral radiance in W/(cm2•sr•nm), R(λ) is the Retinal Thermal 
Hazard Function given in Appendix C, table Blue-Light and Retinal Thermal Hazard 
Functions, t is the viewing duration in seconds, and α is the angular subtense of the 
source in radians. 
Rationale:  This requirement is intended to prevent retinal thermal injury from visible 
and near-infrared sources with wavelengths between 385 and 1,400 nm.  Any 
exposure to NIR must consider the entire pathway of the incident radiation prior to 
its interaction with a crewmember's body, including any concentration, diffusion, or 
filtering.  For example, concentration of source radiation by optical instruments and 
attenuation by vehicle window systems or EVA visors needs to be considered when 
evaluating the final radiation incident upon the crewmember.  Protection from NIR 
may be accomplished through the reduction of effective irradiance or by limiting 
exposure times.  Any means of providing NIR protection must not permanently 
degrade the ability of any optical systems to perform their intended function.  The 
transmittance required for windows, visors, and other optical devices can be 
reconciled with protection from NIR through the use of temporary filters, proper 
material selection, apertures, beam stops or splitters, or other appropriate means. 
3.2.8.3.2  Retinal Photochemical Injury from Visible Light 
3.2.8.3.2.1  Small Source Visible Radiation Limits 
[HS3099] The system shall limit the spectral irradiance Eλ of the crew at wavelengths 
between 305 and 700 nm for visible-light sources subtending an angle less than 11 
milliradians, such that: 
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where B(λ) is the blue-light hazard function given in Appendix C, table Blue-Light and 
Retinal Thermal Hazard Functions.  
Rationale:  This requirement is intended to prevent retinal photochemical injury 
from exposure to visible-light sources with wavelengths between 305 and 
700 nm.  Any exposure to NIR must consider the entire pathway of the incident 
radiation prior to its interaction with a crewmember's body, including any 
concentration, diffusion, or filtering.  For example, concentration of source 
radiation by optical instruments and attenuation by vehicle window systems or 
EVA visors need to be considered when evaluating the final radiation incident 
upon the crewmember.  Protection from NIR may be accomplished through the 
reduction of effective irradiance or by limiting exposure times.  Any means of 
providing NIR protection must not permanently degrade the ability of any optical 
systems to perform their intended function.  The transmittance required for 
windows, visors, and other optical devices can be reconciled with protection from 
NIR through the use of temporary filters, proper material selection, apertures, 
beam stops or splitters, or other appropriate means.  The sun subtends an angle 
of approximately 9 milliradians when observed from earth and is therefore 
considered a small source.  
3.2.8.3.2.2  Large Source Visible Radiation Limits 
[HS3101] The system shall limit the exposure of the crew to spectral radiance Lλ at 
wavelengths between 305 and 700 nm for visible light sources subtending an angle 
greater than or equal to 11 milliradians, such that: 
 
where B(λ) is the blue-light hazard function given in Appendix C Table C3-6. 
Rationale:  This requirement is intended to prevent retinal photochemical injury 
from exposure to large visible-light sources with wavelengths between 305 and 
700 nm. Any exposure to NIR must consider the entire pathway of the incident 
radiation prior to its interaction with a crewmember’s body, including any 
concentration, diffusion, or filtering. For example, concentration of source 
radiation by optical instruments and attenuation by vehicle window systems or 
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EVA visors need to be considered when evaluating the final radiation incident 
upon the crewmember.  Protection from NIR may be accomplished through the 
reduction of effective irradiance or by limiting exposure times.  Any means of 
providing NIR protection must not permanently degrade the ability of any optical 
systems to perform their intended function. The transmittance required for 
windows, visors, and other optical devices can be reconciled with protection from 
NIR through the use of temporary filters, proper material selection, apertures, 
beam stops or splitters, or other appropriate means.  
 
3.2.8.3.3  Thermal Injury from Infrared Radiation 
3.2.8.3.3.1  Thermal Injury from Infrared Radiation 
[HS3103] The system shall limit the spectral irradiance Eλ of the crew at wavelengths 
between 770 and 3,000 nm to 10 mW/cm2 for exposure durations longer than 
1,000 seconds, and for exposure durations less than 1,000 seconds such that: 
 
 
 
Rationale:  This requirement is intended to prevent ocular injury caused by 
overexposure to infrared radiation, including delayed effects to the lens (such as 
cataractogenesis.)  These Threshold Limit Values (TLVs) apply to an 
environment with an ambient temperature of 37 °C, and can be increased by 
0.8 mW/cm2 for every whole degree below 37 °C.  Any exposure to NIR must 
consider the entire pathway of the incident radiation prior to its interaction with a 
crewmember's body, including any concentration, diffusion, or filtering.  For 
example, concentration of source radiation by optical instruments and attenuation 
by vehicle window systems or EVA visors need to be considered when 
evaluating the final radiation incident upon the crewmember.  Protection from 
NIR may be accomplished through the reduction of effective irradiance or by 
limiting exposure times.  Any means of providing NIR protection must not 
permanently degrade the ability of any optical systems to perform their intended 
function.  The transmittance required for windows, visors, and other optical 
devices can be reconciled with protection from NIR through the use of temporary 
filters, proper material selection, apertures, beam stops or splitters, or other 
appropriate means.  
3.2.8.3.4  Ultraviolet Exposure for Unprotected Eye or Skin 
3.2.8.3.4.1  Ultraviolet Exposure for Unprotected Eye or Skin 
[HS3104] The system shall limit the spectral irradiance Eλ of the crew at wavelengths 
between 180 and 400 nm weighted by the spectral effectiveness function Sλ (given in 
Appendix C, table UV Radiation Exposure TLV and Spectral Weighting Function to: 
{ } 2
3000
770
438.12.0 cmWtE∑ −≤∆λλ
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A table of weighted spectral irradiances versus permissible exposure times is given in 
Appendix C, table Permissible Ultraviolet Exposures (200–400 nm). 
Rationale:  This requirement is intended to prevent ocular and dermal injury caused 
by overexposure to ultraviolet radiation.  A table of weighted spectral irradiances 
versus permissible exposure times is given in Appendix C, table Permissible 
Ultraviolet Exposures (200–400 nm) for discrete irradiances for reference.  These 
limits will be met by default when the limits set in Appendix C, table UV Radiation 
Exposure TLV and Spectral Weighting Function are met.  Any exposure to NIR 
must consider the entire pathway of the incident radiation prior to its interaction with 
a crewmember's body, including any concentration, diffusion, or filtering.  For 
example, concentration of source radiation by optical instruments and attenuation 
by vehicle window systems or EVA visors need to be considered when evaluating 
the final radiation incident upon the crewmember.  Protection from NIR may be 
accomplished through the reduction of effective irradiance or by limiting exposure 
times.  Any means of providing NIR protection must not permanently degrade the 
ability of any optical systems to perform their intended function.  The transmittance 
required for windows, visors, and other optical devices can be reconciled with 
protection from NIR through the use of temporary filters, proper material selection, 
apertures, beam stops or splitters, or other appropriate means.  
3.3  SAFETY 
This section is not intended to be a comprehensive collection of requirements related to 
safety. Additional safety topics are covered in other CxP documents and in other 
sections of this document. 
3.3.1  Emergency Equipment Access 
3.3.1.1  Emergency Equipment Access 
[HS4022] The system shall provide access to emergency equipment within the time to 
address the emergency. 
Rationale:  In the case of an emergency, access to emergency equipment must 
occur quickly, allowing the crew to take the proper actions to mitigate the 
situation.  Each emergency may have a unique time requirement and therefore a 
different constraint on access. 
3.3.2  Mechanical Hazards 
3.3.2.1  Corners and Edges Exposed during Nominal Operations 
[HS4002] Corners and edges to which the crew is expected to be exposed during 
normal operations shall be rounded as specified in Appendix D, table Corner and Edge 
Rounding Requirements. 
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Rationale:  Rounded corners and edges help to prevent personnel injury and 
damage to protective equipment (such as gloves and pressure suits) from sharp 
edges during normal operations, which may include suited operations. 
3.3.2.2  Corners and Edges Exposed during Maintenance 
[HS4003] Corners and edges, except for equipment with functional sharp edges, to 
which the crew is only expected to be exposed during in-flight maintenance, shall be 
rounded to at least 0.01 inches. 
Rationale:  Rounded corners and edges help to prevent personnel injury and 
damage to protective equipment from sharp edges during maintenance.  This 
does not apply to equipment with functional sharp edges, such as scissors, 
needles, and razor blades.  This requirement is derived from NASA-STD-3000. 
3.3.2.3  Corners and Edges of Loose Equipment 
[HS4004] Loose equipment, except for equipment with functional sharp edges, shall 
have corners and edges rounded as specified in HS4004, table Minimum Edge and 
Corner Radii for Loose Equipment. 
TABLE 3.3.2.3-1 - MINIMUM EDGE AND CORNER RADII FOR LOOSE EQUIPMENT  
Equipment Mass Minimum 
Edge radius  
mm (in) 
Minimum 
Corner radius  
mm (in) 
At Least  
kg (lb) 
Less Than  
kg (lb) 
0.0 (0.0) 0.25 (0.6) 0.3 (0.01) 0.5 (0.02) 
0.25 (0.6) 0.5 (1.1) 0.8 (0.03) 1.5 (0.06) 
0.5 (1.1) 3.0 (6.6) 1.5 (0.06) 3.5 (0.14) 
3.0 (6.6) 15.0 (33.1) 3.5 (0.14) 7.0 (0.3) 
15.0 (33.1) -- 3.5 (0.14) 13.0 (0.5) 
 
Rationale:  Rounded corners and edges help to prevent personnel injury and 
damage to protective equipment from sharp edges during normal operations.  
Equipment that can become loose and become a projectile must have more 
rounded corners and edges.  This requirement is derived from NASA-STD-3000. 
3.3.2.4  Burrs 
[HS4005] Exposed surfaces shall be free of burrs. 
Rationale:  Removal of burrs can help to prevent personnel injury and damage to 
protective equipment from sharp edges during normal operations. 
3.3.2.5  Sharp Items 
[HS4006] Functionally sharp items shall be prevented from causing injury to the crew or 
damage to equipment when not in use. 
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Rationale:  "Functionally sharp" items are those that, by their function, do not 
meet the requirement for exposed corners and edges  (i.e., syringe, scissors, 
knife).  These items must be prevented from causing harm when not in nominal 
use.  Capping sharp items is one way of doing this. 
3.3.2.6  Pinch Points 
[HS4021] The system shall prevent pinch points from injuring the crew. 
Rationale:  Pinch points can cause injury to the crew but may exist for the 
nominal function of equipment (i.e., equipment panels).  This may be avoided by 
locating pinch points out of the reach of the crew or providing guards to eliminate 
the potential to cause injury. 
3.3.2.7  Interior Item Restraints 
[HS4007] The system shall provide restraints for items that must be un-stowed during 
any portion of the mission. 
Rationale:  Many pieces of flight equipment, such as portable computing device 
and photographic equipment, may be deployed during on-orbit or extra-orbital 
maneuvers.  These must be restrained so that they do not harm the crew or other 
equipment or become lost during EVA and/or IVA operations. 
3.3.2.8  Holes 
[HS4023] Round or slotted holes that are uncovered shall be less than 1.02 cm (0.4 in) 
or greater than 3.56 cm (1.4 in) in minimum dimension for equipment located inside 
habitable volumes. 
Rationale:  This requirement addresses entrapment hazards associated with 
suited and unsuited crewmembers who are required to operate IVA controls. 
3.3.3  Electrical Hazards 
3.3.3.1  Electrical Hazard Potential 
[HS4008] The system shall protect the crew from electrical hazards per HS4008, table 
Electrical Hazard Potential and table Let-Go Current. 
TABLE 3.3.3.1-1 - ELECTRICAL HAZARD POTENTIAL  
 
Voltage/Current Hazard Level 
a. Worst-case credible failure results in exposure below 
threshold for shock: 
none 
1. Nonpatient with internal voltages below 30 volts 
rms 
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2. Current below maximum leakage current as 
defined in requirements HS4008B and HS4008C 
b. Worst case credible failure results in exposure 
exceeding threshold for shock and is below let-go 
current (Table 3.3.3.1-2) 
Critical  
(two controls 
required) 
c. Worst case credible failure results in exposure 
exceeding let-go current (Table 3.3.3.1-2) 
Catastrophic  
(three controls 
required) 
 
TABLE 3.3.3.1-2 - LET-GO CURRENT  
 
Rationale:  The values in the tables represent the currents beyond which a 
person is not able to release his/her grip if holding onto an electrically energized 
surface due to involuntary muscle contraction.  The threshold current for let-go is 
dependent on the frequency and wave shape of the current. 
3.3.3.2  Chassis Leakage Current - Nonpatient Equipment 
[HS4008B] The system shall limit the chassis leakage current for nonpatient equipment 
to less than the values in HS4008B, table Chassis Leakage Current – Nonpatient. 
TABLE 3.3.3.2-1 - CHASSIS LEAKAGE CURRENT - NONPATIENT  
Enclosure or Chassis Leakage Current 
Grounded Double Insulated 
(dc) (ac ma) (dc) (ac ma) 
ma rms ma rms 
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0.700 0.500 0.350 0.250 
 
Rationale:  Chassis leakage current for nonpatient equipment must not be great 
enough to shock the crew. 
3.3.3.3  Chassis Leakage Current - Patient Equipment 
[HS4008C] The system shall limit the chassis leakage current for patient care 
equipment to less than the values in HS4008C, table Chassis Leakage Current – 
Patient. 
TABLE 3.3.3.3-1 - CHASSIS LEAKAGE CURRENT - PATIENT  
 
Rationale:  While some patient care equipment may produce current by function, 
the chassis leakage current must not be great enough to shock the crew. 
3.3.4  Touch Temperature Limits 
3.3.4.1  Hot Touch Temperature Limit 
[HS4012] The system shall preclude the epidermis/dermis interface temperature from 
exceeding 44 ºC (111 ºF) during contact. 
Rationale:  Research by Greene et al. (1958) on human tolerance to heat pain 
showed that the pain threshold is reached at 43.7 ºC skin temperature.  Lloyd-
Smith and Mendelssohn (1948) found the pain threshold to be 44.6 ºC. Defrin et 
al. (2006) investigated heat pain threshold across the body and found the lowest 
level in the chest (42 ºC), the highest in the foot (44.5 ºC) and the hand was 
43.8 ºC.  In a study by Moritz and Henriques (1947), 44 ºC was the lowest 
temperature at which significant epidermal damage occurred, after exposure was 
sustained for 6 hours.  As the contact temperature increased above 44 ºC. the 
time to damage was shortened by approximately 50% for each 1 ºC rise in 
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temperature up to about 51 ºC.  Increasing contact pressure was not sufficient to 
increase the risk of thermal injury.  At contact skin temperatures above 70 ºC, it 
took less than 1 second to produce complete epidermal cell death.  Pain 
threshold, versus damage threshold, should be used to a) preclude skin damage, 
and b) prevent a startle pain reaction (i.e. pulling a hand away quickly), which 
may cause injury to due flail. 
3.3.4.2  Cold Touch Temperature Limit 
[HS4012A] The system shall preclude the skin temperature from going below 10 ºC 
(50 ºF) during contact. 
Rationale:  Studies on the thermal performance of space suit gloves have shown 
that pain from cold occurring at hand skin temperatures of 10 ºC was deemed 
tolerable (JSC 39116; Bue, 2009).  Previous research on human tolerance to 
cold has shown that numbness occurs at 7 ºC skin temperature (Provins and 
Morton, 1960) and risk of frostbite at 0 ºC (Havenith et al., 1992).  Pain threshold, 
versus damage threshold, should be used to: a) preclude skin damage, and b) 
prevent a startle pain reaction (i.e. pulling a hand away quickly), which may 
cause injury due to flail.  In addition, staying above the numbness threshold is 
important, both because numbness can mask skin damage which may impact 
flight safety, and to allow normal touch sensation for tasks after contact with cold 
objects. 
3.3.5  Fire Suppression Portability 
3.3.5.1  Fire Suppression Portability 
[HS4019] The system shall provide a portable fire suppression system. 
Rationale:  The crew must have portable fire-fighting capability, even if a fixed 
fire-fighting system is provided. 
3.4  ARCHITECTURE 
This section contains requirements for the overall layout of the vehicle’s crew interfaces.  
This includes translation paths, mobility aids, restraints, hatches, windows, and lighting. 
3.4.1  Configuration 
3.4.1.1  Layout Interference 
[HS5001] The system should separate functional areas whose functions would 
detrimentally interfere with each other. 
Rationale:  Co-location of unrelated activities could degrade operations resulting 
in increased workload and operational delays.  This consideration will be difficult 
to meet in a small volume, but every effort should be made to separate functions 
and capabilities that could operationally conflict with each other, or that produce 
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environmental conditions that will conflict with other tasks, e.g., glare, noise, 
vibrations, heat, odor, etc. 
3.4.1.2  Layout Sequential Operations 
[HS5002] The system should co-locate functional areas in which sequential operations 
are performed. 
Rationale:  Co-location of related, sequential functional work areas can reduce 
transit time, communication errors, and operational delays.  This consideration 
may seem to be met simply because of a vehicle's small size, but every effort 
should be made to group functions and capabilities supporting a task in as 
efficient a manner as possible to reduce crew workload.  For example, food 
stowage and food preparation areas should be located near one another to 
minimize the time required to retrieve food for meals. 
3.4.1.3  Workstation Visual Demarcations 
[HS5042] The system shall provide visual demarcations for adjacent workstations. 
Rationale:  Visual demarcations are needed to ensure that the crew is visually 
notified where adjacent workstations begin to prevent inadvertent use of other 
workstation elements.  Examples are physical indentation in the metal, color 
coding, and outlining. 
3.4.1.4  Workstation Orientation 
[HS5003] Workstations shall provide all user-interface elements with the same 
orientation in roll as the sagittal plane of the restrained operator's head. 
Rationale:  Maintaining a consistent orientation of workstation elements 
minimizes crewmember rotational realignments needed to perform tasks that 
have directionally dependent components such as reading labels and displays.  
Inconsistent and varied display and control orientations may contribute to 
operational delays and errors.  Given the complexity of some operations (e.g., 
piloting) a single orientation for all controls, displays, and labels may not be 
possible, but every effort should be made in design to minimize crewmember 
repositioning required to efficiently perform a task.  This requirement is meant to 
ensure that all equipment at a workstation is aligned with the crewmember's 
head, even if the head is turned, so that an operating crewmember must only 
adjust their body orientation slightly in pitch and yaw at a workstation but does 
not need to adjust their body orientation in roll. 
3.4.1.5  Location Coding 
[HS7009] The system shall use a standard location coding system to provide a unique 
identifier for each predefined location within the vehicle in accordance with HS7036. 
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Rationale:  Location coding provides a clear method of referring to different 
locations within the vehicle and will serve as a communication and situational 
awareness tool when traversing the vehicle or un-stowing/stowing equipment.  
An example of Shuttle location coding is the numbering of mid-deck lockers:  
locker MF28H is located on the mid-deck (M), forward (F) surface, 28% of the 
way to the right of the total width of the surface and 122 cm (48 inches) from the 
top of the surface (H indicates 8 alphabetic increments of 15.2 cm [6 inches] from 
the top). 
3.4.2  Translation Paths 
3.4.2.1  Ingress and Egress Translation Paths 
[HS5004] The system shall provide translation paths for ingress and egress (nominal 
and off-nominal) of suited crewmembers. 
Rationale:  Suited crewmembers must be able to get in and out of the vehicle on 
the ground or transfer between two docked vehicles in flight easily and quickly. 
3.4.2.2  Internal Translation Paths 
[HS5005] The system shall provide translation paths for the crew to conduct IVA 
operations. 
Rationale:  Translation paths are needed to support the safe and efficient 
movement of the crew throughout the vehicle.  Translation paths around the ISS 
eating stations have disrupted crew rest and relaxation required during meals. 
3.4.2.3  Crew Egress Translation Path - Ground 
[HS5010] The system shall provide a translation path for assisted ground egress of an 
incapacitated suited crewmember. 
Rationale:  Incapacitated suited crewmembers may be unable to egress the 
vehicle on their own and may also be in a constrained position that requires 
assisted extraction.  Long-duration Russian and United States missions have 
shown that muscles atrophy and bones lose calcium in microgravity.  Also, the 
heart adjusts to gravity-free pressures.  On return to earth and rapid onset of 
gravity, even healthy humans temporarily need assistance for some mobility 
tasks.  Applicable pressurization cases can be defined by analysis. 
3.4.2.4  Crew Ingress/Egress Translation Path in Space 
[HS5053] The system shall provide an in-space translation path for assisted ingress 
and egress of an incapacitated pressurized-suited crewmember. 
Rationale:  Incapacitated pressurized-suited crewmembers may be unable to 
ingress the Orion on their own and may also be in a constrained position that 
requires assistance.  This may include ingress from EVA or ingress/egress 
to/from the Orion from EVA or any vehicle or module to which the Orion is 
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docked.  Crew in a pressurized suit is the bounding case.  This requirement also 
includes assisted ingress and egress for crew in an unpressurized suit as well as 
unsuited crew. 
3.4.3  Restraints and Mobility Aids 
3.4.3.1  Standard Restraints and Mobility Aids 
[HS5006] Restraints and mobility aids should be standardized across Constellation 
Systems. 
Rationale:  Standardization of restraints and mobility aids will reduce learning 
and recognition times, which is especially important in emergencies. 
3.4.3.2  IVA Mobility Aids 
[HS5007] The system shall provide mobility aids for the crew to conduct IVA operations. 
Rationale:  Mobility aids, such as hand and foot restraints, allow crewmembers to 
efficiently move from one location to another in 0 g, as well as reduce the 
likelihood of inadvertent collision into hardware that may cause damage to the 
vehicle or injury to the crew.  Early experience in the Skylab program showed the 
problems of movement in microgravity.  Stopping, starting, and changing 
direction all require forces that are best generated by the hands or feet.  
Appropriately located mobility aids make this possible.  Mobility aids must be 
designed to accommodate a pressurized suited crewmember by providing 
clearance, non-slip surfaces, and non-circular cross sections.  Without 
predefined mobility aids, personnel will use available equipment that may be 
damaged from induced loads. 
3.4.3.3  Workstation Restraints 
[HS5008] The system shall provide restraints to allow crewmembers to perform two-
handed operations at a workstation in 0 g. 
Rationale:  Maintaining a static position and orientation at a workstation is 
necessary to ensure that controls can be activated without motion being imparted 
to the crewmember.  Without gravity to hold an individual onto a standing or 
sitting surface, the body will float or move in the opposite direction of an applied 
force.  The cognitive and physical work required to maintain body position during 
a task can interfere with the task performance.  Activities that use both hands 
must not require handholds to maintain position at a workstation but may require 
restraints such as foot loops, straps, or harnesses. 
3.4.3.4  Ingress and Egress Mobility Aids 
[HS5009] The system shall provide mobility aids for ingress and egress (nominal and 
off-nominal) of suited crewmembers. 
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Rationale:  Because of the limited maneuverability of a suited crewmember, 
mobility aids are required to allow crewmembers to safely and efficiently ingress 
and egress the vehicle.  Applicable pressurization cases can be defined by 
analysis. 
3.4.3.5  Commonly Distinguishable Handrails 
[HS5052] IVA handrails not used for flight crew egress should be colored Blue #25102 
per FED-STD-595, Colors Used in Government Procurement. 
Rationale:  During emergencies, crews need to be able to quickly discern mobility 
aids from the surrounding structures.  Visual cues such as color coding may aid 
in this function.  Commonality among visual cues is important so that crews can 
easily distinguish intended mobility aids from non-mobility aids that may be 
damaged by the application of crew-induced loads.  Blue #25102 is the color 
used on International Space Station for IVA handrails. 
3.4.3.6  Egress Handrails 
[HS5054] IVA handrails intended for use during flight crew egress should be colored 
Yellow #33538 per FED-STD-595, Colors Used in Government Procurement. 
Rationale:  During emergencies, crews need to be able to quickly discern mobility 
aids from the surrounding structures.  Visual cues such as color coding may aid 
in this function.  Commonality among visual cues is important so that crews can 
easily distinguish intended mobility aids from non-mobility aids that may be 
damaged by the application of crew-induced loads.  Yellow #33538 is the color 
used on International Space Station to denote “caution.”  Handrails used both for 
egress and non-egress functions should be yellow. 
3.4.4  Hatches 
3.4.4.1  Hatch Operation 
3.4.4.1.1  Nominal Hatch Operation 
3.4.4.1.1.1  Hatches Operable Inside and Outside 
[HS5013] Hatches shall be operable from both the inside and outside. 
Rationale:  Hatch operation includes unlatching/opening or closing/latching the 
hatch.  This requirement addresses both nominal and contingency operations, 
including isolation of the vehicle from other vehicles in an emergency (e.g., 
depress, fire, toxic spill).  The side hatch will be accessed from the inside during 
EVA, pad egress, and post-landing egress, and accessed from the outside in the 
case where docking fails and access to the vehicle must occur through the side 
hatch via EVA.  The docking hatch will be accessed from the Orion side after 
docking with the Altair/ISS, and from the Altair/ISS side upon return.  Crew 
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should be able to both ingress and egress the ground safe haven following 
emergency pad egress unassisted. 
3.4.4.1.1.2  Hatches Operable in 60 Seconds 
[HS5043] Hatches shall be operable in no more than 60 seconds. 
Rationale:  Hatch operation includes unlatching/opening or closing/latching the 
hatch. Excessively long operating times can delay crews on both sides of a hatch 
that would prevent ingress or egress.  Sixty seconds is based on engineering 
judgment related to easily operable hatch design without complicating hatch 
design.  The requirement applies to both flight vehicles and hatches in the 
ground safe haven following emergency pad egress.  This duration does not 
include pressure equalization between flight vehicles. 
3.4.4.1.1.3  Hatches Operable Without Tools 
[HS5044] Hatches shall be operable without the use of tools. 
Rationale:  Hatch operation includes unlatching/opening or closing/latching the 
hatch.  Lost or damaged tools will prevent the hatches from being opened or 
closed, which may result in Loss of Crew (LOC) or Loss of Mission (LOM).  
Ground operation of flight vehicle hatches and suited crew operation of hatches 
in the ground safe haven following emergency pad egress should not require 
tools.  Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) used to protect ground personnel 
from temperature extremes after vehicle reentry is not categorized as a tool; 
therefore, it is not prohibited by this requirement. 
3.4.4.1.1.4  Hatches Operable by Suited Crewmembers 
[HS5045] Hatches shall be operable by a single suited crewmember. 
Rationale:  Based on experience, opening a hatch by a suited crewmember is 
more difficult than by an unsuited crewmember due to reduced reach, mobility, 
and limited manual dexterity due to gloved hands and the pressurization level of 
the suit. 
3.4.4.1.1.5  Unlatching Hatches 
[HS5046] Vehicle hatches shall require two distinct and sequential operations to 
unlatch. 
Rationale:  Inadvertent hatch opening and subsequent cabin depressurization 
would be catastrophic.  Requiring two separate, distinct operations helps to 
ensure that the hatch will not be unlatched through accidental contact. 
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3.4.4.1.2  Pressure Equalization of Hatches 
3.4.4.1.2.1  Hatch Manual Pressure Equalization Inside and Outside 
[HS5014] The system shall provide manual pressure equalization from both the inside 
and outside. 
Rationale:  Air pressure must be equalized on either side of a hatch to safely 
open the hatch.  In some vehicle failure scenarios, non-manual methods for 
pressure equalization may fail.  Manual pressure equalization will enable hatch 
opening regardless of vehicle status. 
3.4.4.1.2.2  Hatch Manual Pressure Equalization by Suited Crewmembers 
[HS5048] The system shall allow manual pressure equalization by a pressurized suited 
crewmember. 
Rationale:  Based on experience, manual operations performed by pressurized 
suited crewmembers are more difficult due to reduced reach, mobility, and limited 
manual dexterity due to gloved hands and the pressurized suit.  In some vehicle 
failure scenarios, non-manual methods for pressure equalization may fail.  
Manual pressure equalization will enable hatch opening regardless of vehicle 
status. 
3.4.4.2  Hatch Indications 
3.4.4.2.1  Hatch Status Indications 
3.4.4.2.1.1  Hatch Latch Position 
[HS5049] The system shall provide latch position status from the inside and outside of 
each hatch. 
Rationale:  Indication of latch status on both sides of the hatch will allow both 
ground personnel  (launch pad) and flight crew to verify that each hatch is 
latched.  In combination with hatch closure status, this indicates proper security 
of the hatch. 
3.4.4.2.1.2  Hatch Closure Indication 
[HS5016] The system shall provide hatch closure indication from the inside and outside 
of each hatch. 
Rationale:  Indication of hatch closure status on both sides of the hatch will allow 
both ground personnel (launch pad) and flight crew to verify that each hatch is 
closed.  In combination with latch position status, this indicates proper security of 
the hatch.  Hatch closure implies that the hatch is in proper position to be 
latched. 
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3.4.4.2.1.3  Hatch Pressure Difference Measurement 
[HS5050] The system shall provide direct pressure difference measurement on the 
inside and outside of each hatch. 
Rationale:  Direct pressure difference measurement on both sides of the hatch 
will allow both ground personnel and flight crew to see the changes in pressure 
across the hatch and to know when the pressure difference is low enough to 
safely open the hatch.  This function would be used as-needed, and pressure 
difference indication is not required at all times.  However, the pressure 
difference indication must not require ground personnel or flight crew to call up a 
vehicle display. 
3.4.4.2.1.4  Hatch Visual Observation 
[HS5017] The system shall provide a window for direct, non-electronic visual 
observation of the environment on the opposite side of the hatch. 
Rationale:  Direct visual observation of the environment on the opposite side of 
the hatch allows the flight crew to determine the conditions or obstructions (such 
as the presence of fire or debris) on the other side of the hatch for safety 
purposes. 
3.4.5  Windows 
3.4.5.1  Window Optical Properties 
[HS5019] System windows shall meet or exceed the optical performance properties 
consistent with tasking as specified in JSC 63307, Requirements for Optical Properties 
for Windows Used in Crewed Spacecraft. 
Rationale:  The windows must be of sufficient optical performance so that they do 
not degrade visual acuity and performance.  JSC 63307 provides optical 
properties for different types of windows according to their associated tasks.  
These optical properties provide the system window with the optical properties 
and performance necessary to support a given task.  Orion tailors these windows 
optical quality requirements in CxP 72407, Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle 
Window Optical Properties Requirements.  Reference (i) "International Space 
Station Cupola Scratch Pane Window Optical Test Results," ATR-2003(7828)-1, 
January 17, 2003, and (ii) the Scientific and Technical Information Center Vehicle 
Integration and Test Office Window Testing report available at 
http://stic.jsc.nasa.gov/eresources/Imagery/index.html.  To permit use of 
telephoto camera and high-definition video equipment, the windows must be of 
sufficient optical performance so that images retrieved will not be significantly 
degraded and distorted. 
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3.4.5.2  Window Viewing for Piloting Tasks 
[HS5021] The system shall provide a minimum of two windows for direct, non-electronic 
viewing for piloting tasks. 
Rationale:  Because of the criticality of piloting tasks to the success of the 
mission and safety of the crew, the most reliable method of maintaining external 
observation is needed.  Windows are reliable and familiar to pilots, and do not 
have many of the failure modes associated with cameras and display systems. 
3.4.5.3  Window for External Viewing Observation 
[HS5022] The system shall provide a window for direct, non-electronic through-the-hull 
viewing and observation from the interior to the exterior and vice versa. 
Rationale:  Windows provide situational awareness and allow vehicle inspection 
and may be used for science and navigation.  Experience in past programs has 
shown that windows will be used for photography.  This requirement may be met 
with the use of an existing window such as a piloting window if one is already 
planned for incorporation into the system. 
3.4.5.4  Window for Motion Imagery and Photography 
[HS5055] The system shall support motion imagery and photography using lenses with 
apertures up to 100 mm in diameter through at least one window without causing image 
degradation on all human tended flight elements. 
Rationale:  Windows are routinely used for motion imagery and photography for a 
variety of purposes, which can include safety and engineering evaluations, 
documentation of operational activities and unusual events, and public relations.  
High resolution photography is of particular interest for lunar missions.  The 
imagery retrieved through a window for such purposes must not be degraded by 
the window. 
3.4.5.5 Window Cover, Shade, and Filter Removal or Replacement Without   
Tools 
[HS5051] System window covers, shades, and filters that are designed to be removed 
and replaced during flight shall be removable and replaceable without the use of tools. 
Rationale:  Where covers, shades, and filters are used, their removal and 
replacement must not be a burden to the crew; having to retrieve, use, and 
subsequently stow tools for this purpose would be an unnecessary burden on the 
crew and would consume valuable crew time. 
Revision:  E Document No:  CxP 70024 
Release Date:  11/19/10 Page:  97 of 503 
Title:  Constellation Program Human-Systems Integration Requirements 
 
3.4.5.6  Window Cover, Shade, and Filter Removal or Replacement in 
10 Seconds 
[HS5027] Window covers, shades, and filters that are designed to be removed and 
replaced during flight shall be removable in less than 10 seconds and replaceable in 
less than 10 seconds. 
Rationale:  The removal and replacement or the operation from closed to opened 
and opened to closed of protective covers (transparent - clear), shades (opaque), 
and filters (transparent - tinted) must not be a time burden to the crew.  Having 
the ability to remove or open and replace or close protective covers, shades, and 
filters quickly ensures their proper use and thus ensures that appropriate 
protection for the windows and the crew is in place when necessary.  Designs 
such as the Shuttle's window shades and side hatch filter and the ISS's Window 
Observational Research Facility (WORF) and AgCam Bump Shields actually take 
less than 5 seconds each to remove and replace (Shuttle's Shades and Side 
Hatch Filter) or retract (open) and deploy (close) (ISS's Bump Shields). 
3.4.5.7  Obstruction 
[HS5030] The system should define keep out zones to prevent the obstruction of 
windows' operational fields of view by any fixed equipment according to guidelines 
provided in Appendix M. 
Rationale:  Fixed equipment, such as window instrumentation, hardware, or a 
condensation prevention system, that would obscure the field of view from the 
normal crew position for window viewing may interfere with piloting and 
photography tasks.  Sufficient volume immediately around the window must also 
be provided to allow a helmeted crewmember to view through the window or two 
non-helmeted crewmembers to view through the window simultaneously.  
Transparent, conductive coatings are readily available for use in electro-thermal 
condensation prevention systems in lieu of wires that would be visible in the field 
of view (e.g., rear window defoggers on automobiles).  These coatings may in 
some cases also serve as an antireflective coating. 
3.4.5.8  Window and Internal Darkening 
[HS5031] Each system window shall be equipped with an opaque shade or shutter that 
prevents external light from entering the crew compartment such that the interior light 
level is reduced to 2 lux at 0.5 m (20 in) from each window. 
Rationale:  External illumination interferes with crew sleep and can interfere with 
onboard still and motion imaging as well as the crew’s circadian rhythm.  
Shades and shutters block external illumination from entering the habitable 
compartments through windows. 
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3.4.5.9  Window Proximity Finishes 
[HS5032] System window frame assemblies and supporting structure within 0.15 m 
(6 in.) from the perimeter of any window in all directions both internally and externally 
shall have a flat, black finish or coating with reflectance less than 10% over a 
wavelength range of 400–800 nm so that stray light is minimized and spurious 
reflections are reduced especially from between the panes. 
Rationale:  Many tasks require a clear viewing through the windows.  Stray light 
and spurious reflections are reduced when lusterless finishes are used on the 
window structure, around the window, on interior and exterior surfaces adjacent 
to the window that are visible to the observer, and especially on structure visible 
between the panes.  This permits viewing through the window without these 
unwanted light sources.  A number of commercially available black coatings meet 
these requirements such as Z-306 paint, which has a history of use within many 
NASA programs.  This paint has a diffuse reflectance of around 5% across the 
visible and infrared spectra.  The wavelength range is specified into the near 
infrared because some black finishes are highly reflective in the infrared and can 
cause a non-ionizing radiation hazard and/or discomfort.  This requirement 
includes fasteners, handrails, and connectors but does not include labeling, 
switch panels, switches, and switch guards.  These items should have a 
lusterless surface finish or coating.  Interior surfaces opposite the window should 
also have a surface finish that meets the diffuse reflectance requirement 
specified above where possible. 
3.4.6  Lighting 
3.4.6.1  Interior Lighting 
3.4.6.1.1  Lighting Level by Task 
[HS5035] The system shall provide the levels of light specified in HS5035, table 
Lighting Level by Task through a combination of interior lights. 
TABLE 3.4.6.1.1-1 - LIGHTING LEVEL BY TASK  
Task Illumination (lux) Measurement Location 
Invasive wound care 
(cleaning/suturing) 
≥ 500 
At treatment surface (mucosa or skin) 
Reading 6 point font  
(non self-illuminated text or 
graphics) 
On the surface to be read 
General Lighting ≥ 350 On most surfaces in vehicle common areas 
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Task Illumination (lux) Measurement Location 
Reading 12 point font 
(non self-illuminated text or 
graphics) 
On the surface to be read 
Handwriting/tabulating - ink on white 
paper ≥ 320 
On the paper 
Fine maintenance and repair work On the affected component surface 
Food preparation ≥ 300 On food preparation surfaces 
Dining 
≥ 250 
On intended dining surfaces 
Grooming On the face located 50 cm.  above center of mirror 
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LIGHTING LEVEL BY TASK (CONCLUDED)  
Task Illumination (lux) Measurement Location 
Non-invasive wound care 
 
On the wound 
Exercise On the exercise equipment 
Video conferencing On the face(s) 
Gross Maintenance & housekeeping On surfaces involved 
Mechanical assembly On the components involved 
Manual controls 
≥ 200 
On the visible control surfaces 
Panel - dark legend on light 
background On the panel surface 
Waste management ≥ 150 On the seat of the waste collection system 
Translation ≥ 110 At all visible surfaces within the habitable volume 
Panel - light legend on dark 
background ≥ 50 On the panel surface 
Emergency equipment shutdown ≥ 30 On controls 
Night lighting  ≤ 1 At crewmember eyes 
Emergency egress ≥ 10 On protruding surfaces 
Crew sleep in dedicated sleep 
quarters  ≤ 0.02 At crewmember eyes 
 
Rationale:  A wide range of crew tasks is expected to be performed within the 
vehicle.  The lighting levels will vary dependent upon the task being performed.  
For instance, cabin reconfiguration after orbit insertion may require simultaneous 
reading of labels and checklists, crew translation, mechanical assembly, and 
manual control at a variety of vehicle locations, each of which requires sufficient 
lighting without blockage from crew and equipment in transit.  Similarly, 
rendezvous and proximity operations may require general cabin darkening for 
out-the-window viewing but sufficient lighting for crew translation and manual 
control.  A single type of lighting at a single illumination level will be insufficient to 
support all tasks; therefore, both general and task illumination will be required.  
The light level 500 lux is required in the vehicle so that the crew can perform 
tasks without frequently requiring dedicated task lighting.  The Illuminating 
Engineering Society of North America (IESNA) states in the ninth edition of the 
IESNA Lighting Handbook, pages 10-13 and 10-15 that illumination at the 
500 lux level is defined to be for "performance of visual tasks of high contrast and 
small size or low contrast and large size."  This meets the requirements of all the 
tasks in HS5035, table Lighting Level by Task.  Examples include reading small 
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text (6 point), examining photographs of moderate detail, and minor medical 
care.  Portable lights may be used to supplement general and task lighting for 
off-nominal tasks and vehicle configurations, or where general illumination is 
reduced due to temporary blockage by equipment or stowage.  It is desirable to 
provide a sleep environment with minimal lighting.  The level specified as “Crew 
sleep in dedicated sleep quarters” in this table is applicable for dedicated crew 
sleep areas rather than sleep occurring in common areas, and is intended to 
provide lighting levels that are as low as is practical to implement and measure.  
The level specified as “Night lighting” is applicable for activities including sleep 
that occur in common areas, including vehicles that do not have dedicated sleep 
quarters.  Night lighting levels are intended to provide a dark enough 
environment to accommodate crew sleep without requiring significant mitigations 
by the crew to prepare for sleep periods.  The “Night Lighting” levels specified in 
the table are applicable to mission durations longer than three days.  For 
common sleep areas, location of eyes may be loosely defined; thus, likely 
location of eyes should be considered. 
3.4.6.1.2  Interior Light Adjustability 
[HS5034B] Interior lights shall be adjustable (dimmable) from their minimum output 
level (equal to less than 5% of maximum luminous intensity) to their maximum luminous 
intensity. 
Rationale:  Interior lighting must be adjustable to permit the crew to use out-the-
window views when there is little external light, for example during rendezvous, 
and to allow the selection of lower light levels when crewmembers are resting. 
3.4.6.2  Lighting Controls 
3.4.6.2.1  General Light Control 
[HS5039] Controls for interior lighting within each habitable volume shall be located 
within that volume. 
Rationale:  Operators should be able to see the effect of changes to lighting 
controls without changing their location or leaving the module. 
3.4.6.2.2  Workstation Light Control 
[HS5040] The system shall provide workstation lighting control to a crewmember who is 
restrained at the workstation. 
Rationale:  Individual tasks or crewmembers may require or desire higher or 
lower lighting levels than that provided for other tasks or crewmembers. 
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3.4.6.2.3  Workstation Light Position Adjustment 
[HS5041] The system shall provide a means for a crewmember restrained at the 
workstation to adjust the position of the task light(s) for those workstations that require 
repositionable workstation task lighting. 
Rationale:  Adjusting the position of a workstation light may be required during 
operations.  It would create a hazard if a crewmember were required to leave the 
workstation during critical periods such as ascent, rendezvous, or entry. 
3.4.6.2.4  Lighting ON/OFF Control 
[HS5056] Interior lighting shall include the provision for turning power to the lights On 
and Off, with a positive indication of power setting. 
Rationale:  HS5034B requires that interior lighting be adjustable to a minimum 
luminous intensity less than 5% of maximum luminous intensity.  Luminous 
intensity levels less than 5% of maximum but greater than zero may interfere with 
operations requiring that the crew module illumination be minimal for out-the-
window viewing, photography, and crew sleep.  Further, lighting may cause 
undesirable glare or cause discomfort to crew performing operations very close 
to the lights.  Light sources should be capable of being turned completely Off and 
returned to On.  Selection of the Off or On condition should be verifiable by the 
operator through means other than observing light emission from the source to 
distinguish the Off setting from a light system failure.  Possible On/Off indications 
include switch detent, switch toggle position, power pilot lamp, etc. 
3.5  CREW FUNCTIONS 
The following section discusses the design and layout requirements of facilities for 
specific crew functions within the vehicle. 
3.5.1  Food Preparation 
3.5.1.1  Cross-Contamination 
3.5.1.1.1  Cross-Contamination Prevention 
[HS6001] The system should prevent cross-contamination between food preparation 
and personal hygiene areas, and between food preparation and body waste 
management areas. 
Rationale:  This requirement helps protect crew health by limiting the transfer of 
microorganisms to the food preparation area. 
3.5.1.1.2  Cross-Contamination Separation 
[HS6002] The distance between food preparation and body waste management areas 
should be as large as possible. 
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Rationale:  This requirement is designed to prevent interference of body waste 
management functions with food preparation.  Shuttle and ISS designs both put 
the waste management facilities unnecessarily close to the food preparation 
areas.  It is a design goal because the other constraints on the layout of the 
spacecraft interior may preclude meeting any specific separation between the 
food preparation area and, for example, the body waste management area. 
3.5.1.2  Preparation 
3.5.1.2.1  Heating 
[HS6003] The system shall heat food and drinks to between 68 °C (155 °F) and 79 °C 
(175 °F). 
Rationale:  Heating is required for subjective quality of food.  Maintaining the 
temperature of rehydrated food above 68 °C (155 °F) helps prevent microbial 
growth.  Foods heated to above 79 °C (175 °F) could cause heat-related injury to 
crewmembers.  The vehicle should provide the ability to heat non-rehydrated 
foods. 
3.5.1.2.2  Rehydration 
[HS6004] The system shall allow the crew to rehydrate food and drinks with potable 
water. 
Rationale:  Many foods must be rehydrated prior to consumption because (i) the 
water content of food is an important component of daily water intake, and 
(ii) people are used to the taste and texture of hydrated foods.  Some foods must 
be rehydrated with hot water to ensure activation of certain chemical processes. 
3.5.1.2.3  In-Flight Food Preparation Time 
[HS6005] While in-flight, the system should allow the crew to prepare each meal for all 
crewmembers within a single 30-minute period. 
Rationale:  The water delivery and food heating systems must support meal 
preparation for the full crew if the mission schedule requires that they eat meals 
together.  This 30-minute period is based on a 1-hour time lined meal, which 
includes 5 minutes for un-stowing, 25 minutes for food preparation, 20 minutes 
for eating, 3 minutes for wiping and cleaning, 2 minutes for trash stowage, and 
5 minutes for re-stow of meal related items.  The intent of this requirement is not 
to preclude the preparation of meals that may take longer, if planned, but to 
provide vehicle capability for all crewmembers to eat a hot meal together within a 
scheduled 1-hour meal time. 
3.5.1.2.4  Lunar Surface Food Preparation Time 
[HS6102] While on the lunar surface, the system shall allow the crew to prepare each 
meal for four crewmembers within a single 30-minute period. 
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Rationale:  The water delivery and food heating systems must support meal 
preparation for the full crew, if the mission schedule requires that they eat meals 
together.  This 30-minute period is based on a1-hour time lined meal, which 
includes 5 minutes for un-stowing, 25 minutes for food preparation, 20 minutes 
for eating, 3 minutes for wiping and cleaning, 2 minutes for trash stowage, and 
5 minutes for re-stow of meal related items.  The intent of this requirement is not 
to preclude the preparation of meals that may take longer, if planned, but to 
provide vehicle capability for all crewmembers to eat a hot meal together within a 
scheduled 1-hour meal time. 
3.5.1.3  Food System 
3.5.1.3.1  Food System 
[HS6059] The system shall provide a food system with a diet including the nutrient 
composition per HS6059, table Nutrition Composition Breakdown. 
TABLE 3.5.1.3.1-1 - NUTRITION COMPOSITION BREAKDOWN TABLE   
Nutrients Daily Dietary Intake 
Protein 0.8 g/kg 
And ≤ 35% of the total daily energy intake 
And 2/3 of the amount in the form of animal protein 
and 1/3 in the form of vegetable protein 
Carbohydrate 50-55% of the total daily energy intake 
Fat 25-35% of the total daily energy intake 
Ω-6 Fatty Acids 14 g 
Ω-3 Fatty Acids 1.1-1.6 g 
Saturated fat <7% of total calories 
Trans fatty acids <1% of total calories 
Cholesterol <300 mg/day 
Fiber 10-14 grams/4,187 kJ 
Fluid 1-1.5 mL/4,187 kJ 
 And ≥ 2,000 mL 
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NUTRITION COMPOSITION BREAKDOWN TABLE (CONCLUDED)   
Nutrients Daily Dietary Intake 
Vitamin A 700-900 µg 
Vitamin D 25 µg 
Vitamin K Women: 90 µg  
 Men: 120 µg 
Vitamin E 15 mg 
Vitamin C 90 mg 
Vitamin B12 2.4 µg 
Vitamin B6 1.7 mg 
Thiamin Women: 1.1 µmol 
Men: 1.2 µmol 
Riboflavin 1.3 mg 
Folate 400 µg 
Niacin 16 mg NE 
Biotin 30 µg 
Pantothenic Acid 30 mg 
Calcium 1,200 – 2,000 mg 
Phosphorus 700 mg 
 And ≤ 1.5 x calcium intake 
Magnesium Women: 320 mg 
Men: 420 mg 
And ≤ 350 mg from supplements only 
Sodium 1,500 – 2,300 mg 
Potassium 4.7 g 
Iron 8–10 mg 
Copper 0.5–9 mg 
Manganese Women: 1.8 mg 
 Men: 2.3 mg 
Fluoride Women: 3 mg 
Men: 4 mg 
Zinc 11 mg 
Selenium 55–400 µg 
Iodine 150 µg 
Chromium 35 µg 
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Rationale:  A balanced diet is required to optimize crewmember health and 
performance.  The values identified in HS6059, table Nutrition Composition 
Breakdown are derived from the Nutrition Requirements, Standards, and 
Operating Bands for Exploration Missions. 
3.5.1.3.2  Metabolic Intake 
[HS6060] The system shall provide each crewmember with an average of 12,707 kJ 
(3,035 kilo-calories) per day. 
Rationale:  The Estimated Energy Requirements (EER) for space missions is 
based on Total Energy Expenditure (TEE), using an activity factor of 1.25 (active) 
along with the individual's age, body mass (kg), and height (m) in the following 
calculations:  EER for men 19 years and older EER = 622 - 9.53 x Age [y] + 
1.25 x (15.9  x Mass [kg] + 539.6 x Ht [m]) and EER for women 19 years and 
older EER = 354 - 6.91 x Age [y] + 1.25 x (9.36 x Mass [kg] + 726 x Ht [m]).  The 
value given in the requirement is based on the projected values for a mean male 
astronaut population in the year 2015 with a stature of 178.6 cm and a weight of 
82.4 kg.  The age used for these calculations is 45 years old.  This requirement is 
derived from the Nutrition Requirements, Standards, and Operating Bands for 
exploration missions. 
3.5.1.3.3  Metabolic Intake for EVA 
[HS6062] The system shall provide no less than an additional 837 kJ (200 kilocalories) 
above nominal metabolic intake as defined in HS6060, similar in nutrient composition to 
the rest of the diet per HS6059, per EVA hour for crewmembers performing EVA 
operations. 
Rationale:  Additional nutrients, including fluids, are necessary during suited 
operations as crewmember energy expenditure is greater during those activities.  
The additional 200 kilocalories, based on metabolic energy replacement 
requirements from moderate to heavy EVA task, allow the crewmember to 
maintain lean body weight during the course of the mission.  Lean body 
(especially muscular) weight maintenance is a key component of preserving crew 
health during the missions and keeping performance at a level required to 
complete mission objectives. 
3.5.2  Personal Hygiene 
3.5.2.1  Personal Hygiene Items 
[HS6105] The system shall provide personal hygiene items for each crewmember. 
Rationale:  Each crewmember needs personal hygiene capabilities for body 
cleansing, oral hygiene, and personal grooming throughout each space mission.  
Personal hygiene equipment and supplies must accommodate the physiological 
differences in male and female crewmembers in the microgravity environment.  
The supplies should also be able to meet the personal needs and comfort of the 
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crewmembers to the extent possible in the space module environment.  Personal 
hygiene includes the capability for crewmembers to cleanse their body and hair; 
to perform oral hygiene tasks related to tooth, mouth, and gum care; to condition 
their skin sufficiently to prevent drying and/or cracking; to shave body hair; to cut 
hair to maintain the length within mission and/or personal requirements; to trim 
nails; and to control body odor. 
3.5.2.2  Personal Hygiene Privacy 
[HS6009] The system shall provide visual privacy for personal hygiene. 
Rationale:  Certain hygiene functions require a degree of privacy, especially in a 
vehicle in which other crewmembers may be performing other functions 
simultaneously. 
3.5.2.3  Personal Hygiene Stowage 
[HS6010] The system should provide readily accessible stowage for personal hygiene 
supplies. 
Rationale:  Personal hygiene supplies, such as tissues and towels, may need to 
be accessed rapidly. 
3.5.2.4  Personal Hygiene Trash 
[HS6012] The system should provide readily accessible trash collection for disposable 
personal hygiene supplies. 
Rationale:  Crewmembers require readily accessible trash collection for 
disposable personal hygiene supplies to minimize crew exposure to the used 
items.  Access to trash collection hardware or compartments should not require 
the use of any tools or reconfiguration of vehicle hardware. 
3.5.2.5  Full Body Visual Privacy 
[HS6027] The system shall provide full body visual privacy for body waste 
management. 
Rationale:  In a small vehicle, provisions for privacy during waste management 
allow activities such as videoconferences to proceed uninterrupted. 
3.5.2.6  Body Self-Inspection and Cleaning 
[HS6028] The system should provide a means and sufficient volume for crewmembers 
to perform bodily self-inspection and cleaning after urination and defecation. 
Rationale:  In 0 g, body waste can float.  Therefore, after waste management, it 
is important for crewmembers to verify that they are clean. 
3.5.3  Body Waste Management 
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3.5.3.1  Vomitus Collection and Containment 
[HS6013] The system shall provide for the collection and containment of vomiting 
events of 0.5 L each as indicated in HS6013, table Vomitus Collection and 
Containment. 
TABLE 3.5.3.1-1 - VOMITUS COLLECTION AND CONTAINMENT  
Mission Design-to Number of Vomiting Events Per 
Crewmember Per Mission 
Orion to or from ISS 8 
Orion Lunar Mission 8 
Altair 1 
 
Rationale:  The total capacity of 4 L for Orion missions should accommodate four 
in-flight events with a total volume of 2 L for the Space Adaptation Syndrome 
(SAS) portion of the mission and 4 events post-flight with a total volume of 2 L for 
a possible water landing. The total capacity of 0.5 L per crewmember per mission 
for Altair missions should accommodate 1 in-flight event per crewmember to 
account for possible food-borne vomiting events.  Vomiting and its associated 
odor, mainly produced by the compound putrescene, may trigger a bystander 
nausea and vomiting reaction in adjacent crewmembers located in close 
proximity in an enclosed space.  Space Adaptation Syndrome (SAS) occurs in up 
to 70% of first time fliers (30% of whom may experience vomiting) during the first 
48-72 hours of microgravity.  In addition, a possible water landing may cause 
crewmembers to succumb to sea sickness.  The average number of vomiting 
episodes per crewmember will vary from 1 to 6 per day, over a 2- to 3-day 
period.  Regurgitation of the entire stomach contents will result on average in 
0.2 to 0.5 L of vomitus per event.  Stowage and disposal should be adequate for 
a worst-case number of involved crew, severity and duration of symptoms, as 
well as volume of gastrointestinal contents regurgitated. 
3.5.3.2  Feces 
3.5.3.2.1  Fecal Wipes 
[HS6016] The system shall provide collection and containment of consumable wipe 
materials used for fecal matter. 
Rationale:  Used consumable wipe materials must be collected and contained in 
a manner that minimizes possible escape of fecal contents into the habitable 
vehicle during microgravity operations because of the high content of possibly 
pathogenic bacteria contained in the stool and because of the potential of injury 
to crewmembers and hardware that could result from such dissemination.  The 
collection capacity accounts for the average healthy adult stool output/day.  
Historically, on the Shuttle, a total of 20 wipes per crewmember per day 
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(including urine and feces uses) were flown for waste management.  The Shuttle 
wipes packages hold 40 wipes and have the following dimensions:  20.3 cm x 
10.9 cm x 4.6 cm (8.0 in x 4.3 in x 1.8 in). 
3.5.3.2.2  Feces per Day 
[HS6017] The system shall provide collection and containment of an average of 
150 grams (by mass) and 150 mL (by volume) of fecal matter per crewmember per 
defecation at an average of two defecations per day. 
Rationale:  Fecal waste collection must be performed in a manner that minimizes 
possible escape of fecal contents into the habitable vehicle during microgravity 
operations because of the high content of possibly pathogenic bacteria contained 
in the stool.  In addition, there is the potential of injury to crewmembers and 
hardware that could result from such dissemination.  The collection capacity 
accounts for the average healthy adult stool output/day.  The number of 
defecations per day is individually variable ranging from two times per week to 
five times per day, with the assumed average of two times per day.  EVA suits 
will need to accommodate for fecal waste collection and containment during all 
suited activities.  Suited activities are not expected to exceed 10 hours.  From a 
waste management system standpoint, normal feces should not be accounted for 
on days when crewmembers are afflicted with diarrhea. 
3.5.3.2.3  Feces per Event 
[HS6020C] The system shall provide collection and containment of 500 grams 
(by mass) and 500 mL (by volume) of fecal matter per crewmember in a single 
event. 
Rationale:  Fecal waste collection must be performed in a manner that minimizes 
possible escape of fecal contents into the habitable vehicle during microgravity 
operations, because of the high content of possibly pathogenic bacteria 
contained in the stool and because of the potential of injury to crewmembers and 
hardware that could result from such dissemination.  The collection capacity 
accounts for the average healthy adult maximum output during a single event.  
From a waste management system standpoint, normal feces should not be 
accounted for on days when crewmembers are afflicted with diarrhea. 
3.5.3.2.4  Diarrhea per Event 
[HS6020] The system shall provide collection and containment of 1.5 L of diarrheal 
discharge in a single event. 
Rationale:  Fecal waste collection must be performed in a manner that minimizes 
possible escape of fecal contents into the habitable vehicle during microgravity 
operations because of the high content of possibly pathogenic bacteria contained 
in the stool and because of the potential of injury to crewmembers and hardware 
that could result from such dissemination.  The fecal discharge due to 
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gastrointestinal illness (diarrhea) occurs at an increased frequency and volume 
but is also variable and unpredictable.  The volume for a single discharge is to 
accommodate diarrhea caused by likely pathogens such as rotavirus and 
enterotoxigenic E coli.  The volume 1.5 L is based on evaluation of individuals 
afflicted with pathogenic diarrhea, as found in medical literature, based on most 
likely maximal discharge in afflicted individuals. The volume 1.5 L is a maximum 
output and the average output will be 0.5 L.  From a waste management system 
standpoint, normal feces should not be accounted for on days when 
crewmembers are afflicted with diarrhea. 
3.5.3.2.5  Diarrheal Events per Crewmember 
[HS6020D] The system shall provide for the collection and containment of diarrheal 
events as indicated in HS6020D, table Diarrhea Collection and Containment. 
TABLE 3.5.3.2.5-1 - DIARRHEA COLLECTION AND CONTAINMENT  
Mission 
Design-to Number of 
Diarrhea Events Per 
Crewmember Per 
Mission 
Total Volume of 
Diarrhea Per 
Crewmember Per 
Mission 
Orion to or from ISS (3 days) 4 2 L 
Orion Lunar Mission (16 days) 8 4 L 
Altair (Sortie) (7days) 6 3 L 
 
Rationale:  These design-to "number of events" and "total volume" diarrhea 
values represent more common and likely diarrhea causes, such as diet, 
medication, and gastrointestinal reactivity factors, or a low pathogenicity 
microbial event, all of which are unlikely to affect all crewmembers. 
Fecal discharge due to gastrointestinal illness (diarrhea) occurs at an increased 
frequency but is also variable and unpredictable.  It is assumed that there is an 
average volume of 0.5 L per event.  The World Health Organization (WHO) 
criteria for acute diarrhea is > 3 events of unformed stool within 24 hours, and 
since diarrhea of viral etiology typically lasts for a period of 1 to 3 days, one case 
of diarrhea would be expected to result in approximately 2 to 6 total liters of 
diarrhea.  After the second day of the diarrheal event with evacuation of the 
colon, fecal matter output per crewmember would be expected to be significantly 
reduced for the subsequent 2 days (less than 100 cc/day), and then fecal volume 
would be expected to return to normal.  From a waste management system 
standpoint, normal feces should not be accounted for on days when 
crewmembers are afflicted with diarrhea. 
In order to properly accommodate diarrheal events, the number of events must 
be specified.  The Orion Lunar mission (approximately 16 days), relative to the 
Orion ISS mission (approximately 3 days), has a higher number of events and 
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volume due to the longer duration of this mission, increasing the likelihood of 
diarrheal occurrence. Altair (sortie) values are based on the assumption of a 7 
day surface stay.  These design-to numbers represent an averaging of number 
and volume of diarrhea event occurrence and severity per crewmember based 
on source exposure likelihood.  These values assume that the likelihood of a 
maximal case diarrheal event affecting all crewmembers is extremely low.  
Values will not correspond directly with the length of mission due to the fact that 
once a diarrheal case occurs, multiple events are highly likely.  Minimal collection 
of diarrhea must be accounted for on every mission, with higher chances of more 
severe, or multiple cases on longer missions.  Based on available in-flight data 
as of July 2009, the likelihood of diarrhea is approximately 1.21 cases per 
person-year. 
3.5.3.3  Urine 
3.5.3.3.1  Urine Collection 
[HS6021] The system shall provide a crew interface that captures urine and controls 
splash. 
Rationale:  Urine output may be slightly greater or lower in various phases of the 
mission associated with g- transitions and fluid intake levels.  The urinary 
collection system must be capable of collecting all of the crewmember's output in 
succession, with an average void varying from 100 to 500 mL.  Rarely, a single 
void might be as much as 1 L, so the equipment should be able to accommodate 
this maximum.  The rate of urinary delivery into the system from the body will 
vary by gender (greater for females because of lower urethral resistance) but 
averages 10 to 35 mL/s.  Maximum flow rate with abdominal straining in a female 
may be as high as 50 mL/s for a few seconds.  The voided urine must be 
contained by the stowage and disposal hardware to prevent inadvertent 
discharge in the cabin that could result in injury to crewmember's mucous 
membranes or equipment. 
3.5.3.3.2  Urine Wipes 
[HS6022] The system shall provide the collection and containment of consumable wipe 
materials for urine. 
Rationale:  Urine output may be slightly greater or lower in various phases of the 
mission associated with g- transitions and fluid intake levels.  The urinary 
collection system must be capable of collecting all of the crewmember's output in 
succession, with an average void varying from 100 to 500 mL.  Rarely, a single 
void might be as much as 1 L, so the equipment should be able to accommodate 
this maximum.  The rate of urinary delivery into the system from the body will 
vary by gender (greater for females because of lower urethral resistance) but 
averages 10 to 35 mL/s.  Maximum flow rate with abdominal straining in a female 
may be as high as 50 mL/s for a few seconds.  The voided urine must be 
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contained by the stowage and disposal hardware to prevent inadvertent 
discharge in the cabin that could result in injury to crewmembers' mucous 
membranes or equipment.  Historically, on the Shuttle, a total of 20 wipes per 
crewmember per day (including urine and feces uses) were flown for waste 
management.  The Shuttle wipes packages hold 40 wipes and have the following 
dimensions:  20.3cm x 10.9cm x 4.6cm (8.0" x 4.3" x 1.8"). 
3.5.3.3.3  Urine per Crewmember 
[HS6023] The system shall collect, and isolate from the crew environment, a maximum 
urine output volume of: 
 
 
liters per crewmember, where t is the mission length in days.  
Rationale:  Urine production on the first day after launch (i.e., flight day "0") is 3 L per 
crewmember.  Urine output may be slightly greater or lower in various phases of the 
mission associated with g- transitions and fluid intake levels.  The urinary collection 
system must be capable of collecting all of the crewmember's output in succession, with 
an average void varying from 100 to 500 mL.  Rarely, a single void might be as much as 
1 L, so the equipment should be able to accommodate this maximum.  The rate of 
urinary delivery into the system from the body will vary by gender (greater for females 
because of lower urethral resistance) but averages 10 to 35 mL/s.  Maximum flow rate 
with abdominal straining in a female may be as high as 50 mL/s for a few seconds. The 
voided urine must be isolated from the crew environment by the stowage and disposal 
hardware to prevent inadvertent discharge in the cabin that could result in injury to 
crewmember's mucous membranes or equipment.  This requirement is not intended to 
preclude venting of collected urine.  
3.5.3.3.4  Urine per Hour 
[HS6024] The system shall provide collection and isolation from the crew environment 
of 1 L of urine per crewmember per hour. 
Rationale:  Urine output may be slightly greater or lower in various phases of the 
mission associated with g- transitions and fluid intake levels.  The urinary 
collection system must be capable of collecting all of the crewmember’s output in 
succession, with an average void varying from 100 to 500 mL.  Rarely, a single 
void might be as much as 1 L, so the equipment should be able to accommodate 
this maximum.  The rate of urinary delivery into the system from the body will 
vary by gender (greater for females because of lower urethral resistance) but 
averages 10 to 35 mL/s.  Maximum flow-rate with abdominal straining in a female 
may be as high as 50 mL/s for a few seconds.  The voided urine must be isolated 
from the crew environment by the stowage and disposal hardware to prevent 
inadvertent discharge in the cabin that could result in injury to crewmember’s 
tVU 23+=
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mucous membranes or equipment.  This requirement is not intended to preclude 
venting of collected urine. 
3.5.3.3.5  Urine per Day 
[HS6025B] The system shall provide collection and isolation from the crew environment 
for an average of 6 urinations per crewmember per day. 
Rationale:  The number of urinations per day is individually variable with the 
assumed average of six times per day.  Urine output may be slightly greater or 
lower in various phases of the mission associated with g- transitions and fluid 
intake levels.  The urinary collection system must be capable of collecting all of 
the crewmember’s output in succession, with an average void varying from 100 
to 500 mL.  Rarely, a single void might be as much as 1 L, so the equipment 
should be able to accommodate this maximum.  The rate of urinary delivery into 
the system from the body will vary by gender (greater for females because of 
lower urethral resistance) but averages 10 to 35 mL/s.  Maximum flow-rate with 
abdominal straining in a female may be as high as 50 mL/s for a few seconds.  
The voided urine must be isolated from the crew environment by the stowage 
and disposal hardware to prevent inadvertent discharge in the cabin that could 
result in injury to crewmember’s mucous membranes or equipment.  This 
requirement is not intended to preclude venting of collected urine. 
3.5.3.3.6  Urine Rate 
[HS6025] The system shall provide collection and isolation from the crew environment 
for urinary discharges of up to 1 L in a single micturition, at a maximum delivery of 
50 mL/s. 
Rationale:  Urine output may be slightly greater or lower in various phases of the 
mission associated with g- transitions and fluid intake levels.  The urinary 
collection system must be capable of collecting all of the crewmember’s output in 
succession, with an average void varying from 100 to 500 mL.  Rarely, a single 
void might be as much as 1 L, so the equipment should be able to accommodate 
this maximum.  The rate of urinary delivery into the system from the body will 
vary by gender (greater for females because of lower urethral resistance) but 
averages 10 to 35 mL/s.  Maximum flow-rate with abdominal straining in a female 
may be as high as 50 mL/s for a few seconds.  The voided urine must be isolated 
from the crew environment by the stowage and disposal hardware to prevent 
inadvertent discharge in the cabin that could result in injury to crewmember’s 
mucous membranes or equipment.  This requirement is not intended to preclude 
venting of collected urine. 
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3.5.3.4  Simultaneous Defecation and Urination 
3.5.3.4.1  Simultaneous Defecation and Urination 
[HS6014] The system shall allow a crewmember to defecate and urinate simultaneously 
without completely removing lower clothing. 
Rationale:  This capability will ensure that there is no accidental discharge of one 
or both waste components into the habitable volume, as many individuals are 
incapable of relaxing the gastrointestinal control sphincter without relaxing the 
urinary voluntary control sphincter, and vice versa.  To minimize impact to crew 
operations, waste elimination needs to be accomplished with minimal crew 
overhead, e.g., without completely removing clothing. 
3.5.3.5  Odor Control 
3.5.3.5.1  Waste Management Odor Control 
[HS6029] The system shall provide odor control for the waste management equipment. 
Rationale:  Uncontrolled waste-associated odors can have an adverse effect on 
crew performance and can exacerbate pre-existing symptoms of Space Motion 
Sickness. 
3.5.3.5.2  Auditory and Olfactory Privacy 
[HS6069] The system should provide auditory and olfactory privacy for body waste 
management. 
Rationale:  In a small vehicle, provisions for privacy during waste management 
allow things such as videoconferences to proceed uninterrupted. 
3.5.3.6  Waste Management Stowage 
3.5.3.6.1  Waste Management Stowage 
[HS6030] The system shall provide waste management supplies at a location that is 
accessible to the crewmember using the waste management station. 
Rationale:  Waste management wipes must be accessible where they are 
needed, in or immediately adjacent to the waste management system within 
reach of the crewmember. 
3.5.3.7  Waste Management Trash 
3.5.3.7.1  Waste Management Trash 
[HS6031] The system should provide readily accessible trash collection, with odor 
control, for waste management items. 
Rationale:  Waste management items that cannot be collected and contained 
with human waste must be disposed of immediately after use and within reach of 
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the crewmember without egressing the waste management restraint system and 
without the need to access closed compartments. 
3.5.4  Exercise 
3.5.4.1  Exercise Capability 
3.5.4.1.1  Exercise Capability 
[HS6032] The system shall provide the capability for aerobic and resistive exercise 
training for 30 continuous minutes each day per crewmember for missions greater than 
8 days. 
Rationale:  An exercise capability is not required on Orion missions to the ISS or 
for missions with total durations of less than 8 days.  Exercise is required on 
Lunar missions greater than 8 total days to maintain crew cardiovascular fitness 
(to aid in ambulation during g- transitions and to minimize fatigue), to maintain 
muscle mass and strength/endurance (to complete mission tasks such as EVA 
walk-back and contingency response capability,) and for recovery from strenuous 
tasks, confined postures, and to rehabilitate minor muscle injuries.  Per the 
Apollo crew participating in the June 2006 Apollo Medical Summit (Houston, TX) 
and recommendation from the 2005 Musculoskeletal Summit, exercise should be 
commenced as early as possible during the mission and continue throughout all 
mission phases.  Exercise will not be required on launch day, landing day, days 
that include ascent to and descent from the lunar surface, and on contingency, 
non-wave off days.  Given these exclusions, it is expected that exercise will be 
performed in the Orion on up to 11 days of a maximum 18-day Orion stay.  
Expected CO2, heat, and water output can be found in Appendix E, table Crew 
Induced Metabolic Loads for a Standard Mission Day With Exercise. 
3.5.4.2  Exercise Operational Envelope 
3.5.4.2.1  Exercise Operational Envelope 
[HS6035] The system shall provide 2.23 m x 1.01 m x 1.31 m (7.3 ft x 3.3 ft x 4.3 ft) of 
operational envelope for completion of exercise during non-dynamic mission phases 
when exercise is being conducted. 
Rationale:  The operational envelope is the greatest volume required by a 
crewmember to use an exercise device (not the deployed volume of the device) 
and is derived utilizing the HSIR Critical Anthropometry Dimensions, Appendix B, 
table Vehicle Design Critical Anthropometry Dimensions for maximum stature 
while standing and maximum sitting height while using a rower/cycle ergometer 
device (no arms overhead). 
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3.5.4.3  Environmental Loads during Exercise 
3.5.4.3.1  Thermal Environment During Exercise 
[HS6036] The system shall maintain the vehicle's thermal environment, as defined in 
HS3036 and HS3037 during crew induced thermal loading as defined in Appendix E, 
table Crew Induced Metabolic Loads for a Standard Mission Day With Exercise. 
Rationale:  Each crewmember can be expected to generate these heat loads 
during a mission.  Further rationale is found in Appendix E, table Crew Induced 
Metabolic Loads for a Standard Mission Day With Exercise legend and its 
associated Appendix E.  This requirement can be met by integrated systems with 
the details of each system's responsibility in individual system SRDs and in IRDs. 
3.5.4.3.2  Oxygen Levels During Exercise 
[HS6073] The system shall provide O2 for crew consumption as defined in Appendix E, 
table Crew Induced Metabolic Loads for a Standard Mission Day With Exercise. 
Rationale:  Each crewmember can be expected to consume these O2 quantities 
during a mission.  Further rationale is found in the table legend. 
3.5.4.3.3  Carbon Dioxide Levels During Exercise 
[HS6037] The system shall maintain the vehicle's atmospheric gases, as defined in 
HS3005, during crew generated CO2 loading as defined in Appendix E, table Crew 
Induced Metabolic Loads for a Standard Mission Day With Exercise. 
Rationale:  Each crewmember can be expected to generate these CO2 loads 
during a mission.  Further rationale is found in the legend of Appendix E, table 
Crew Induced Metabolic Loads for a Standard Mission Day With Exercise. 
3.5.4.3.4  Relative Humidity During Exercise 
[HS6038] The system shall maintain the vehicle's relative humidity, as defined in 
HS3046, during crew generated water vapor loading as defined in Appendix E, table 
Crew Induced Metabolic Loads for a Standard Day With Exercise. 
Rationale:  Each crewmember can be expected to generate these water vapor 
loads during a mission.  Further rationale is found in the legend of Appendix E, 
table Crew Induced Metabolic Loads for a Standard Mission Day With Exercise. 
3.5.5  Space Medicine 
3.5.5.1  Data and Communications 
3.5.5.1.1  Private Voice 
[HS6075] The system shall provide two-way private voice communication with Ground 
Operations during pre-launch activities and with Mission Systems during inflight 
activities, except during ascent, entry, and post-landing. 
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Rationale:  Private voice communication will assure that the exchange of medical 
information, therapeutic confidences, and psychological conferences between 
the crew and the medical operations support team, as well as family 
conferences, will remain private. 
3.5.5.1.2  Private Video 
[HS6076] The system shall provide private video capability with Mission Systems during 
all mission phases except ascent, entry, and post-landing. 
Rationale:  Private video communication will assure that the exchange of medical 
information, therapeutic confidences, and psychological conferences between 
the crew and the medical operations support team, as well as family 
conferences, will remain private.  This does not imply a private location in the 
vehicle. 
3.5.5.1.3  Communication Capabilities 
[HS6097] The system shall provide audio, text, and video uplink and downlink 
capabilities with a delivery delay of less than 4 hours. 
Rationale:  The behavioral health and performance countermeasures are 
necessary for successful adaptation to living and working in an isolated and 
confined environment, maintaining individual behavioral health and performance, 
and maintaining performance and functioning of the entire crew as a unit.  To be 
effective, countermeasures must be available that are consistent with individual 
and team needs, mission duration, and crew duty periods.  The audio, text, 
video, and e-mail uplink and downlink capabilities will be used to uplink news 
(audio/video and written summaries), recreational audio, and video materials, as 
well as maintain contact with family, friends, and other individuals or 
organizations. 
3.5.5.1.4  Personalized In-Flight Updates 
[HS6099] The system shall provide for in-flight updates of the personalized on-board 
databases. 
Rationale:  The behavioral health and performance countermeasures are 
necessary for successful adaptation to living and working in an isolated and 
confined environment, maintaining individual behavioral health and performance, 
and maintaining performance and functioning of the entire crew as a unit.  To be 
effective, countermeasures must be available that are consistent with individual 
and team needs, mission duration, and crew duty periods.  Periodic updates to 
the personalized on-board databases are necessary for the crewmember to aid 
in psychological adaptation by providing similar off-duty activities to those 
performed at home. 
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3.5.5.1.5  Biomedical Data 
[HS6077] The system shall collect biomedical data. 
Rationale:  Biomedical data transmission to the ground Mission Control Center 
(MCC) will be required for medical evaluation of crewmembers, including during 
suited operation;, therefore, biomedical data will need to be collected. 
3.5.5.1.6  Biomedical Relay 
[HS6078] The system shall relay biomedical telemetry to Mission Systems. 
Rationale:  Ground medical support during nominal and contingency 
circumstances, including medical events and during EVA, as well as during 
unrecoverable vehicle pressure loss is necessary to ensure the health and safety 
of the crewmember(s) and to provide appropriate information to the Flight 
Director.  Supervision of the biomedical data will maximize crew resource 
management for the event and minimize risk for the crewmember(s). 
3.5.5.1.7  Biomedical Display 
[HS6079] The system shall display biomedical data to the crew. 
Rationale:  Real-time biomedical data need to be displayed to the crew so the 
Crew Medical Officer(s) (CMO) can make decisions regarding the health status 
of the crew.  In the event of a medical emergency, the CMO requires data display 
to determine the appropriate course of treatment.  This becomes particularly 
critical during breaks in communication when no bio-medical data are being 
transmitted to flight surgeons in the Mission Control Center (MCC). 
3.5.5.2  Orthostatic Protection 
3.5.5.2.1  Orthostatic Protection 
[HS6082] The system shall provide crewmember orthostatic protection for return into a 
1-g environment. 
Rationale:  Orthostatic protection is needed to minimize operational impacts.  
Operational impacts can include loss of consciousness, inability to operate 
controls, and inability to egress the vehicle without assistance and thus could 
jeopardize the success of the re-entry and landing of the vehicle and the safety of 
the crewmembers.  Methods that have been successfully used to prevent 
orthostasis include fluid/salt loading regimens to maintain hydration, constrictive 
leg garments to prevent blood pooling, active cooling to maintain crew comfort, 
and recumbent crewmember seating to improve cerebral blood flow in 1 g.  
Furthermore, research studies of pharmacologic measures are also promising. 
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3.5.5.3  Medical Area and Capability 
3.5.5.3.1  Medical Care Provider Access 
[HS6083] The system shall provide a designated medical area with medical care 
provider access to the ill/injured crewmember. 
Rationale:  The medical care provider may need to complete tasks in close 
proximity to the ill/injured crewmember.  This includes tasks such as providing 
positive pressure ventilation.  This applies to all mission phases except Earth 
launch and lunar descent. 
3.5.5.3.2  Patient Electrical Isolation 
[HS6084] The system shall provide a designated medical area with patient electrical 
isolation. 
Rationale:  To protect both avionics of the vehicle and other crewmembers from 
inadvertent electrical shock, the patient will need to be electrically isolated from 
the vehicle in the event defibrillation is required. 
3.5.5.3.3  Access to Medical Equipment 
[HS6085] The system shall provide a designated medical area with access for medical 
equipment to patient interfaces. 
Rationale:  The medical provider, or caregiver, must be able to attach medical 
equipment appropriately to the ill/injured crewmember within the designated 
area.  The term "patient interface" is used to denote any part of the patient that 
must come in contact with the medical equipment.  For example, there must be 
enough volume in the designated area for a pulse oximeter probe to be attached 
to a patient's finger to obtain pulse oximetry data. 
3.5.5.3.4  Access to Deployed Medical Kits 
[HS6086] The system shall provide a designated medical area with access to deployed 
medical kits within the reach of medical care provider. 
Rationale:  In order for the medical care provider to effectively attend to an 
ill/injured crewmember, the provider must be able to reach the equipment and 
supplies in the deployed medical kits.  This requirement is to ensure that the 
provider can obtain equipment and supplies in a time efficient manner to meet 
the needs of an ill/injured crewmember. 
3.5.5.3.5  Medical Care Capabilities 
[HS6101] The system shall provide the medical care capabilities specified in HS6101, 
table Medical Care Capabilities. 
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TABLE 3.5.5.3.5-1 - MEDICAL CARE CAPABILITIES  
Level of 
Care Mission Capability 
I LEO < 8 days Space Motion Sickness, Basic Life Support, First 
Aid, Private Audio, Anaphylaxis Response 
II LEO < 30 day Level I + Clinical Diagnostics, Ambulatory Care, 
Private Video, Private Telemedicine 
III Beyond LEO < 30 day Level II + Limited Advanced Life Support, Trauma 
Care, Limited Dental Care 
IV Lunar > 30 day Level III + Medical Imaging, Sustainable 
Advanced Life Support, Limited Surgical, Dental 
Care 
V Mars Expedition Level IV Autonomous Advanced Life Support and 
Ambulatory Care, Basic Surgical Care 
 
Rationale:  NASA-STD-3001, Space Flight Human Systems Standard, Volume 1:  
Crew Health include definitions of the levels of medical care required to reduce 
the risk that exploration missions are impacted by crew medical issues, and that 
long-term astronaut health risks are managed within acceptable limits.  The 
levels of care and associated appendices define the healthcare, crew protection, 
and maintenance capability required to support the crew as appropriate for the 
specific mission destination and duration, as well as the associated vehicular 
constraints.  As mission duration and complexity increase, the capability required 
to prevent and manage medical contingencies correspondingly increases.  Very 
short duration missions (i.e., transfer missions, such as lunar ascent vehicle to 
Orion [<24 hours] or Orion to ISS or Mars Transit Vehicle) even if outside Low 
Earth Orbit (LEO) will be considered as Level I capability medical requirements.  
The ability to provide the designated level of care applies to all flight phases, 
including during pressurized suited operations. 
3.5.5.4  Crew Sleep Accommodations 
3.5.5.4.1  Crew Sleep Accommodations 
[HS6104] The system shall provide accommodations for crew sleep. 
Rationale:  The sleep accommodations requirement ensures that the crew is able 
to assume a proper configuration to obtain adequate sleep/rest for performance 
of duties.  At a minimum, sleep accommodations include a restrained sleeping 
position that allows for both full body extension as well as for bringing both knees 
up to the chest and allows for implementation of HSIR sleep requirements 
(HS3106, HS3079, and HS5035). 
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3.5.6  Stowage 
3.5.6.1  Stowage Nominal Operation 
[HS6044] The system should provide defined stowage locations that do not interfere 
with normal crew operations. 
Rationale:  This requirement is intended to prevent the stowage system from 
interfering with normal operations such as translation and vehicle control.  A 
“should” is used because constraints on the placement of other items may 
prevent the design from completely satisfying this requirement. 
3.5.6.2  Stowage Location 
[HS6046] The system should provide stowage for equipment and supplies near their 
intended point of use. 
Rationale:  To maintain a high level of efficiency in crew operations, it is 
important to locate items within easy reach of their point of use or consumption.  
A  “should” is used because constraints on the placement of other items may 
prevent the design from completely satisfying this requirement. 
3.5.6.3  Stowage Arrangement 
[HS6047] Stowed items should be arranged in functional groups. 
Rationale:  To promote efficient retrieval of stowed items, items used in the same 
procedure are best stowed together.  To promote crew comprehension of the 
stowage plan, similar items are best stowed together.  A “should” is used 
because (i) the previous two notions may contradict one another, and 
(ii) constraints on the placement of other items may prevent the design from 
completely satisfying this requirement. 
3.5.6.4  Stowage Reconfiguration 
[HS6049] Stowage should be reconfigurable during the mission. 
Rationale:  Any stowage system must be flexible enough to accommodate the 
changes and evolution expected in the stowage plan over the length of a 
mission.  For example, (i) as food is consumed during a mission, food stowage 
may need to be reallocated for trash, and (ii) during lunar return, lunar samples 
might be stowed in space originally allocated for water storage. 
3.5.6.5  Stowage Restraints 
[HS6050] The system shall provide restraints for stowed items sufficient to prevent 
them from coming loose under the expected acceleration and vibration environments. 
Rationale:  Stowed items must be restrained so that they are not free to move 
during vehicle motion, under the influence of internal air movement, or after 
inadvertent contact. 
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3.5.6.6  Stowage Equipment Cover Restraint 
[HS6106] The system shall provide a means to secure, in the open position, stowage 
and containment equipment covers that cannot be fully removed. 
Rationale:  In microgravity, attached covers must be restrained to allow for 
unobstructed access to stowage or containment volumes.  Crewmembers should 
be able to access the stowage container contents with both hands, and should 
not be required to hold covers open manually.  Covers must be secured such 
that they do not slam shut or swing open under normal vehicle accelerations and 
vibrations.  Mechanical restraints may include latches, clips, snaps, velcro, or 
other similar features. 
3.5.6.7  Stowage Hand Operation 
[HS6051] Stowage provisions shall be operable without the use of tools. 
Rationale:  To maximize the use of crew time, the stowage system must permit 
crew access and reconfiguration without the use of tools. 
3.5.6.8  Stowage Commonality 
[HS6052] Stowage provisions should be common throughout the vehicle. 
Rationale:  For example, stowage items such as ISS Cargo Transfer Bags 
(CTBs) should be interchangeable so that each bag is usable in each stowage 
location.  Lids, covers, and dividers should be interchangeable.  Stowage 
container sizes that are whole multiples of the smallest container size permit 
efficient reconfiguration of stowage.  This requirement is a "should" because, for 
example, a stowage container designed for a specific nook within the vehicle or 
to hold a specific device under ascent loading will not be interchangeable with 
others. 
3.5.6.9  Stowage Compatibility with Inventory Management 
[HS6053] The stowage system shall be compatible with the Program’s system for 
inventory management. 
Rationale:  ISS experience has shown that inventory management – the 
knowledge of the quantity and location of each type of supply – is crucial for 
mission planning and maintaining crew productivity.  The stowage system should 
help the crew and Mission Operations gather this stowage information, for 
example by using bar-coded and clearly labeled stowage locations. 
3.5.7  Trash Management 
3.5.7.1  Trash Management Nominal Operations 
[HS6054] The system should allocate space for trash stowage that does not interfere 
with normal crew operations. 
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Rationale:  This requirement is intended to prevent the trash system from 
interfering with normal operations such as translation and vehicle control.  A 
“should” is used because constraints on the placement of other items may 
prevent the design from completely satisfying this requirement. 
3.5.7.2  Trash Management Odor Control 
[HS6056] The trash management system shall provide odor control for wet trash. 
Rationale:  Uncontrolled odors can have an adverse effect on crew performance, 
and can exacerbate pre-existing symptoms of Space Adaptation Syndrome 
(SAS). 
3.5.7.3  Trash Management Contamination Control 
[HS6057] The trash management system shall prevent the release of trash into the 
habitable environment. 
Rationale:  Many components of trash act as nutrient sources for microorganisms 
and quickly increase their concentrations.  These microorganisms can include 
medically significant organisms, which could negatively impact crew health and 
performance.  Historically, prevention of the release of microorganisms has been 
accomplished through layers of containment and addition of trash to the system 
using methods that do not promote aerosolization of the contents. 
3.5.7.4  Trash Management Hazard Containment 
[HS6058] The trash management system shall prevent the escape of its contents 
including crew-generated biological wastes. 
Rationale:  If not properly contained, contents could damage equipment, injure 
crewmembers, and transmit disease.  Biological waste, including suited 
feces/urine collection devices, vomit, and feminine hygiene products, can also 
cause injury and transmit disease. 
3.6  CREW INTERFACES 
A vehicle's crew interface is any part of that vehicle through which information is 
transferred between the crew and the vehicle, whether by sight, sound, or touch.  
Usable, well-designed crew interfaces are critical for crew safety and productivity, and 
minimize training requirements.  This section provides requirements for crew-controlled 
processes and the design of crew interfaces for displays and controls.  A display is 
anything that provides visual or auditory information to crewmembers (e.g., label, 
placard, tone, or display device).  A display device is the hardware that displays 
information to crewmembers.  A control is anything that accepts crewmember 
commands or inputs, whether hardware or software. 
3.6.1  General 
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3.6.1.1  Consistent Crew Interfaces 
[HS7007] The system should provide crew interfaces that are consistent in appearance 
and operation across Constellation systems. 
Rationale:  The intent of this statement is to ensure as much commonality and 
consistency as possible across Constellation systems.  This will facilitate learning 
and minimize interface-induced crew error. 
3.6.1.2  Labeling 
[HS7036] The system shall provide labels for crew interfaces in accordance with CxP 
70152, Constellation Program Crew Interface Labeling Standard. 
Rationale:  Crew interface items must have identifiers (labels) to aid in crew 
training and error-free operation. 
3.6.1.3  Nomenclature 
[HS7079] Nomenclature related to on-orbit operations shall conform to the OpsNom 
Standards in CxP 70172-01, Constellation Program Data Architecture Specification, 
Volume 1:  Naming and Identification Rules . 
Rationale:  It is imperative for ISS operation that all operations personnel, 
including all ground controllers and onboard crewmembers, communicate using 
common nomenclature that unambiguously and uniquely defines all hardware 
and software items that may be utilized, the methods by which these are used, 
and data concerning these items.  This nomenclature must also be common 
among all operational products, including commands, procedures, displays, 
planning products, reference information, system handbooks, system briefs, 
mission rules, schematics, and payloads operations products.  Labeling 
applicable only to ground-based (non-operational) functions may use other 
common technical terms. 
3.6.1.4  Legibility 
[HS7044] The system shall provide crew interfaces that are legible under nominal 
conditions. 
Rationale:  Legibility is important for the crew's timely and accurate processing of 
information.  Legibility may vary depending on vehicle conditions (e.g., 
acceleration, vibration, and lighting) and must be accommodated.  For example, 
during flight phases where high vibration is expected, relevant displays may need 
to be designed with this in mind (e.g. analog vs. digital displays, larger graphics 
and text). 
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3.6.1.5  Language 
[HS7064] Text shall be written in the American English language based on Webster's 
New World Dictionary of American English, and all acronyms and terms used shall be 
based on the Cx Common Glossary & Acronyms:  
https://ice.exploration.nasa.gov/confluence/display/CxCGA/Common+Glossary+and+Ac
ronyms. 
Rationale:  The intent of this requirement is to ensure as much commonality and 
consistency as possible in written text (i.e., language and spelling) across vehicle 
subsystems and across Constellation systems.  This will facilitate learning and 
minimize interface-induced crew error. 
3.6.1.6  Use of Color 
[HS7065A] The system shall provide an additional cue to convey crew interface 
information when color is used to convey meaning. 
Rationale:  Redundant coding is required to accommodate the variability in 
people's capability to see color under different lighting conditions and to increase 
the saliency of identification markings.  Redundant cues can include language-
based cues (text labels and speech messages), as well as iconic cues presented 
via the visual, auditory or haptic modalities. 
3.6.2  Crew Performance 
3.6.2.1  Crew Interface Usability 
3.6.2.1.1  Crew Interface Usability 
[HS7066] The system shall provide crew interfaces that result in a maximum of 5% 
erroneous task steps per participant, where each erroneous task step is committed by 
10% or fewer participants. 
Rationale:  For optimal safety and productivity, software and hardware crew 
interfaces must support crew performance with minimal errors.  Errors may lead 
to significant timeline impacts or task failure; therefore errors can cause loss of 
efficiency, effectiveness, and satisfaction.  An erroneous task step is defined as a 
task step with one or more design-induced errors.  A design-induced error is an 
intentional action that does not reach its intended goal due to design issues.  
Examples of errors that may be design-induced include:  missed or incorrect 
inputs or selections, display navigation errors, errors due to inadequate hardware 
component design, errors due to lack of system feedback to user inputs, errors 
due to design inconsistency or unfamiliar terminology, and inability to complete a 
task step. Recoverable design-induced errors still negatively impact crew 
performance in terms of time and satisfaction; thus, they should be included in 
error calculations.  Unintentional errors that are related to human reliability are 
not covered by this requirement. 
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3.6.2.2  Crew Cognitive Workload 
3.6.2.2.1  Workload Measure: Nominal 
[HS7080] The system shall provide crew interfaces that together with nominal crew 
tasks result in Bedford Workload Scale ratings of 3 or less. 
Rationale:  The workload measurement requirement enables standardized 
assessment of whether temporal, spatial, cognitive, and perceptual aspects of 
tasks and the crew interfaces for these tasks are designed and implemented to 
support each other.  Application of workload measurement for crew interface and 
task designs in conjunction with other performance measures (such as error 
rates) helps assure safe, successful, and efficient system operations by the crew.  
Workload levels may be modulated (raised or lowered) through the combination 
of user-interface design and task design (e.g., task simplification, subtask 
combination and sequencing, and the distribution of tasks among multiple 
crewmembers and between crew and automation).  
3.6.2.2.2  Workload Measure: Off-Nominal 
[HS7080A] The system shall provide crew interfaces that together with off-nominal crew 
tasks result in a Bedford Workload Scale rating of 6 or less. 
Rationale:  The workload measurement requirement enables standardized 
assessment of whether temporal, spatial, cognitive, perceptual, and physical 
aspects of tasks and the crew interfaces for these tasks are designed and 
implemented to support each other.  Application of workload measurement for 
crew interface and task designs in conjunction with other performance measures 
(such as error rates) helps assure safe, successful, and efficient system 
operations by the crew.  Workload levels may be modulated (raised or lowered) 
through the combination of user-interface design and task design 
(e.g., task simplification, subtask combination and sequencing, and the 
distribution of tasks among multiple crewmembers and between crew and 
automation). 
3.6.2.3  Handling Qualities 
3.6.2.3.1  Handling Qualities for Manual Control – Level 1 
[HS7003] The system shall exhibit Level 1 handling qualities (handling quality ratings of 
1, 2, or 3) as defined by Cooper-Harper Scale during manual control of the spacecraft’s 
fight path and attitude for selected manual control scenarios. 
Rationale:  The intent of this requirement is to ensure that the crew is able to 
successfully control the vehicle or vehicle systems requiring manual operation 
during manual control.  Selected manual control scenarios that must meet Level 
1 handling qualities will be defined via review of potential manual control 
scenarios and associated manual control modes, with required manual control 
scenarios scoped with Program agreement.  A scenario includes one or more 
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handling quality related vehicle control tasks performed during a flight phase 
under specified conditions.  A handling quality related task is defined as the 
manual control capability that is being rated with the Cooper-Harper Rating 
Scale.  Each task within a scenario is rated separately and must meet Level 1 
handling qualities (handling quality ratings of 1, 2 or 3).  Reference NASA 
TND-5153 for the Cooper-Harper Rating Scale. 
3.6.2.3.2  Handling Qualities for Manual Control – Level 2 
[HS7004] The system shall exhibit at least Level 2 handling qualities (handling quality 
ratings of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6) on the Cooper-Harper Ratings Scale during manual control 
of the spacecraft’s flight path and attitude for selected manual control scenarios where 
the degradation of flight controls or the occurrence of severe and multiple failures 
preclude Level 1 ratings. 
Rationale:  Handling quality ratings worse than Level 1 are acceptable for special 
case manual control scenarios where the degradation of flight controls or the 
occurrence of severe and multiple failures preclude Level 1 ratings.  These 
selected scenarios will be pre-declared as Level 2 appropriate scenarios a priori 
based on identified degradation of flight controls or severe and multiple failures, 
and not merely as the result of a failure to meet Level 1.  A list and defined scope 
of special case scenarios will be created based upon a subset of identified 
manual control scenarios.  The applicability and implementation of these special 
cases will be scoped with Program agreement and documented through the 
creation of flight rules. 
3.6.3  Display and Control Layout 
3.6.3.1  Viewing Requirements 
3.6.3.1.1  Field of View 
[HS7010] The system shall locate displays and controls, which are viewed for 
operation, within the field of view of the crew using those displays and controls to 
perform their tasks. 
Rationale:  Displays and controls must be visible to the person using them during 
all phases of flight and under all conditions in which they are required.  The term 
"perform their task" is meant to include both monitoring and operating. 
3.6.3.1.2  Two-Crew Operations 
[HS7010A] The system shall locate displays and controls such that two operators can 
view each other's operations for functions that are critical. 
Rationale:  This requirement is intended to facilitate a two-crew operations 
concept, which provides redundancy in cockpit decision-making.  In the two-crew 
operations concept, the actions of the crewmember performing the task can be 
seen and verified by the other crewmember.  As a counter-example, many 
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Shuttle electrical and hydraulic controls can only be seen or operated by the pilot 
crewmember during the critical ascent phase.  This requirement is not intended 
to override the requirement that the vehicle be operable by a single crewmember. 
3.6.3.1.3  Viewing Critical Displays and Controls 
[HS7018] The system should locate critical displays and controls near the center of the 
crew's field of view. 
Rationale:  The operator needs to be able to quickly visually locate critical 
displays and controls in order to address problems.  This requirement applies to 
the crew during all operations, including ground operations of the emergency 
escape system. 
3.6.3.1.4  Viewing Frequently Used Displays and Controls 
[HS7018A] The system should locate frequently used displays and controls near the 
center of the operator's field of view. 
Rationale:  The operator needs to be able to quickly visually locate critical 
displays and controls in order to address problems.  This requirement applies to 
the crew during all operations, including ground operations, of the emergency 
escape system. 
3.6.3.1.5  Obscured Controls 
[HS7067] Controls that are intended for out-of-view operation shall be spatially or 
tactually distinct from one another. 
Rationale:  When the crew inadvertently operates the wrong control, serious 
errors can result.  Controls designed to be out-of-view while being operated must 
be spaced or shaped/textured such that the control can be identified with a 
pressurized gloved hand without line of sight.  This would include controls for 
vehicle operation as well as other controls (e.g., seat positioning).  It has been 
shown that human operators can use simple tactile coding to reliably distinguish 
between items. 
3.6.3.1.6  Self-Illuminated Controls and Displays 
[HS7082] The system shall provide self-illumination for displays and controls. 
Rationale:  Self-illumination (i.e., backlighting, trans-illumination, or integral 
lighting) of interfaces on a control panel provides contrast that is independent of 
external panel illumination.  With an available dimming function, luminance can 
be adjusted for legibility in operational low or high ambient illumination 
conditions.  The term panel is intended to include any push-button switches or 
data entry keyboards that may have self-illuminated markings. 
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3.6.3.2  Reach Requirements 
3.6.3.2.1  Functional Reach Envelope 
[HS7019] The system shall locate controls within the functional reach envelope of the 
crew using those controls to perform their tasks. 
Rationale:  Controls have to be within the operator's reach envelope under all 
vehicle conditions  (e.g., g-loads, vibration) and crew conditions (e.g., suited, 
seated, restrained, and unrestrained).  Controls can include display devices such 
as touch screens. 
3.6.3.2.2  Reach for Critical Controls 
[HS7021] The system should centrally locate critical controls within the functional reach 
envelope. 
Rationale:  During the design process, trade-off of location of critical controls 
must be made; however, all controls will be required to be within the functional 
reach envelope of the crew.  This requirement is intended to encourage the 
design of a layout that optimizes operations in the cockpit.  A “should” is used 
here because optimization is an iterative process. 
3.6.3.2.3  Reach for Frequently Used Controls 
[HS7021A] The system should centrally locate frequently used controls within the 
functional reach envelope. 
Rationale:  During the design process, trade-off of locations of frequently used 
controls must be made; however, all controls will be required to be within the 
functional reach envelope of the crew.  This requirement is intended to 
encourage the design of a layout that optimizes operations in the cockpit.  A 
“should” is used here because optimization is an iterative process. 
3.6.3.3  Display and Control Grouping 
3.6.3.3.1  Functional Related Displays and Controls 
[HS7022] The system should locate functionally related displays and controls near one 
another. 
Rationale:  This requirement is intended to encourage the design of a layout that 
optimizes operations in the cockpit.  A “should” is used here because 
optimization is an iterative process. 
3.6.3.3.2  Successive Operation of Displays and Controls 
[HS7023] The system should locate displays and controls operated in quick succession 
near one another. 
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Rationale:  Rapid, error-free operation and quick comprehension of system 
status are all improved by well-designed co-location of related controls. 
3.6.3.4  Control Spacing 
3.6.3.4.1  Control Spacing For Suited Operations 
[HS7024] The system shall space controls that are intended to be used by a 
pressurized suited crewmember such that they can be operated by a pressurized suited 
crewmember using those controls to perform their tasks. 
Rationale:  "Suited Operations" refers to the finite set of tasks that must be 
performed in a suit.  Control layout must take into account the fact that 
pressurized suited operators cannot operate with the same precision and 
dexterity as lightly clothed crewmembers in expected conditions (e.g., g loads, 
vibration, and acceleration).  Insufficient spacing may lead to inadvertent 
operation of an adjacent control. 
3.6.3.4.2  Control Spacing for Unsuited Operations 
[HS7925] The system shall space controls that are intended to be used by an unsuited 
crewmember such that they can be operated by an unsuited crewmember using those 
controls to perform their tasks. 
Rationale:  Even lightly clothed crewmembers may have difficulty operating 
controls under expected conditions (e.g., g loads, vibration, and acceleration).  
Insufficient spacing may lead to inadvertent operation of an adjacent control. 
3.6.4  Displays 
3.6.4.1  Display Content 
3.6.4.1.1  Task-Oriented Displays 
[HS7059] The system shall provide task-oriented displays. 
Rationale:  "Task-oriented" displays include all the information required to 
complete a task and are designed specifically to help the crew perform key or 
frequently performed tasks.  They consist of information from all of the different 
systems involved in the task.  This allows the crew to quickly and efficiently 
perform a task as opposed to the crew having to use multiple system displays to 
perform a task.  Examples of task displays are (i) a primary flight display, and (ii) 
a rendezvous display.  Providing task-oriented displays allows for efficiency and 
ease of operation. 
3.6.4.1.2  Subsystem-Oriented Displays 
[HS7060] The system shall provide subsystem-oriented displays. 
Rationale:  "Subsystem" refers to an operationally specific component, such as 
the Environmental Control and Life Support Subsystem (ECLSS).  "Subsystem-
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oriented" displays include all of the key information for a subsystem and are 
intended to help the crew monitor system health and status.  Subsystem displays 
allow the operator to see the state of a single subsystem at a glance and aid in 
troubleshooting.  They also allow the crew to perform tasks that were not 
originally envisioned.  Providing subsystem-oriented displays allows for efficiency 
and ease of monitoring. 
3.6.4.1.3  Viewing Simultaneous Task Information 
[HS7060A] The system should provide the display area necessary to present all of the 
information required for a task simultaneously (i.e., without toggling among displays). 
Rationale:  Without sufficient display devices (e.g., screens), it will be difficult to 
present the crew with enough information to control a complex spacecraft. 
3.6.4.1.4  Viewing Simultaneous Critical Task Information 
[HS7070] The system shall provide display area required to simultaneously display 
critical task information to a single operator. 
Rationale:  Rapid response to mission-critical tasks will require simultaneous 
display of multiple sources of information.  Without sufficient display devices 
(e.g., screens), it will be difficult to present the crew with enough information to 
control a complex spacecraft.  Given a large display device the number of 
devices required might be one; with smaller display devices the number of 
devices may increase. 
3.6.4.2  Display Hierarchy 
3.6.4.2.1  Location within the Display Hierarchy 
[HS7061] Displays shall provide the crew with the location of the current display within 
the display hierarchy. 
Rationale:  The crew must have situational awareness of where they are in the 
display hierarchy to maintain efficiency during navigation through the information 
management system. 
3.6.4.2.2  Access within the Display Hierarchy 
[HS7071] Displays should provide a method for the crew to have quick access to any 
level of the display hierarchy at any time. 
Rationale:  The crew should have quick access to any level of information to 
perform their task efficiently. 
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3.6.4.3  System Feedback 
3.6.4.3.1  State Change 
[HS7072] Data across systems shall be updated for display within 1.0 second of a state 
change. 
Rationale:  The recommended response time of 1.0 second applies for user-
system feedback (Nielsen, 1993).  The intent of this requirement is to provide the 
crew with current information in the event the same display is called up on 
multiple display devices (i.e., all users need to see the same data) on different 
systems within a vehicle or habitat, between docked vehicles, or between 
vehicles in proximity operations (i.e., Orion and Altair). 
3.6.4.3.2  Lost Data 
[HS7072A] The system shall inform the crew when a displayed data parameter is 
unavailable. 
Rationale:  Feedback on data that are unavailable (i.e., lost or stale) is important 
to the crew for accurately weighing data during trouble-shooting and decision-
making. 
3.6.5  Hardware and Software Controls 
3.6.5.1  Control Operation 
3.6.5.1.1  Compatibility of Movement 
[HS7063] Controls shall be designed such that the input direction is compatible with the 
resulting control response. 
Rationale:  Control-display compatibility is a widely-used design principle.  It 
promotes quick learning of the vehicle's input-response characteristics, and error 
free operation of vehicle and other controls. "Controlled Object" refers to a 
display element, equipment component, or vehicle.  Compatibility means that the 
control movement matches the expected results (e.g., control motion to the right 
is compatible with clockwise roll, right turn, and increase in volume). 
3.6.5.1.2  Control Feedback 
[HS7063A] The system shall provide a positive indication of crew-initiated control 
activation. 
Rationale:  A positive indication of control activation is used to acknowledge the 
system response to the control action.  For example, a physical detent, an 
audible click, an integral light, or a switch position may be used to provide a 
positive indication of control activation. 
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3.6.5.1.3  Protection against Inadvertent Activation 
[HS7063B] The system should protect against inadvertent operation of controls. 
Rationale:  This requirement allows for the design to preclude inadvertent 
operation.  For example, accidental activation by bumping can be prevented by 
the use of guards, covers, and physical separation from other controls.  
Accidental activation of commands using a computer display can be prevented 
with an  “arm-fire” mechanism.  This requirement is not intended to prevent 
operators from initially selecting the wrong control. 
3.6.5.1.4  Protection for Flight Actuated Critical Controls 
[HS7063C] The system shall protect against a single inadvertent actuation of mission 
critical and safety critical controls using a two-step process of two independent crew 
actions. 
Rationale:  A two-step process (e.g., arm-fire) is required to prevent an 
unintended control action that would result in either loss of mission or 
catastrophic hazards.  This requirement is not intended to prevent the crew from 
initially selecting the wrong control. 
3.6.5.1.5  Protection for Ground Actuated Critical Controls 
[HS7083] The system shall protect against a single inadvertent actuation of mission and 
safety critical controls using a two-step process of two independent ground personnel 
actions. 
Rationale:  Inadvertent, human-initiated actions can result in loss of mission, loss 
of vehicle, loss of crew, or result in permanent disability to crew and ground 
personnel.  A two-step process (e.g., arm-fire or select-send) is required to 
prevent an unintended control action that would result in loss of mission or a 
catastrophic hazard.  This requirement is not intended to prevent operators from 
initially selecting the wrong control. 
3.6.5.1.6  Coding for Emergency Controls 
[HS7063D] The system shall provide coding for emergency controls that is 
distinguishable from non-emergency controls as specified in CxP 70152, Constellation 
Program Crew Interface Labeling Standard. 
Rationale:  Coding for emergency controls should allow the operator to 
distinguish them from other controls.  It has been shown that operators react 
more quickly to simple coding such as colors and pictures than they do to written 
labels. 
3.6.5.1.7  Restraints for Control Operation 
[HS7063E] The system shall provide restraints for the crew for operation of controls 
during reduced gravity. 
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Rationale:  The crew must have a means of reacting to any required control input 
forces without letting those forces push him or her away from the control.  This 
helps the crew maintain position and apply required control forces. 
3.6.5.2  High-g Operations 
3.6.5.2.1  Over 3 g 
[HS7027] The system shall place controls used during accelerations above 3 g so that 
the operator can make control inputs via hand/wrist movements without reaching. 
Rationale:  Above 3 g, controls must be operable by a restrained, suited 
operator.  In a study of reaches under Gx loading with veteran astronauts and 
aviators as suited subjects, there was a 6% reduction in forward reach 
displacement at 3 g, 18% at 4 g, and 32% at 5 g (Schafer & Bagian, Aviation, 
Space, and Environmental Medicine, 64: 979, 1993).  Above 3 g, the accuracy of 
gross limb movements is compromised, and thus control action under these 
conditions should be limited to hand and wrist motions alone. 
3.6.5.2.2  Over 2 g 
[HS7028] The system shall place controls used during accelerations between 2 g and 
3 g so that the operator can make control inputs via hand/wrist movements and reaches 
within a forward +/-30 degree cone. 
Rationale:  Between 2 g and 3 g, controls must be operable by a restrained, 
suited operator.  In a study of reaches under Gx loading with veteran astronauts 
and aviators as subjects, suited subjects on average exhibited little impact at 2 g 
but did show a 6% reduction in maximum forward reach displacement at 3 g 
(Schafer & Bagian, Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine, 64: 979,1993).  
Hence, between 2 g and 3g, even with highly motivated and trained subjects, 
reaches will begin to show errors above 2 g, and so control actions should be 
limited to hand/wrist motions or forward arm movements within a +/- 30 degree 
cone (apex at the shoulder joint, aligned with the axis of acceleration).  For tasks 
requiring rapid response times or for deconditioned crew, a more conservative 
approach should be taken – controls should be placed to minimize reach.  
Awkward shoulder/elbow postures, which could result from reaches to 
displays/interfaces at close distances, will increase fatigue and errors and should 
therefore be avoided. 
3.6.5.2.3 Supports 
[HS7029] The system shall provide stabilizing support for operator limbs during 
exposure to anticipated accelerations above 2 g for all control tasks. 
Rationale:  Operator's arms/legs will require proper support and/or restraint to 
allow for accurate control inputs to remain within task performance limits during 
elevated g conditions and to prevent inadvertent control inputs during high-g 
nominal and abort scenarios. 
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3.6.6  Crew Notifications and Caution and Warning 
3.6.6.1  Crew Notifications 
3.6.6.1.1  Notifications 
[HS7049] The system shall notify the crew when critical crew actions are required. 
Rationale:  Timely reminders to the crew to perform critical actions are crucial for 
preventing the occurrence of off-nominal events.  Notifications are for actions that 
are not classified as caution and warning events. 
3.6.6.1.2  Manual Silencing 
[HS7049A] The system shall provide a manual silencing feature for active auditory 
annunciators. 
Rationale:  The crew must have the ability to silence an audible alarm that would 
otherwise annunciate continuously to prevent it from interfering with their 
response to the underlying fault.  There are well-known instances of aircraft 
crews that have been functionally incapacitated by audible alarms that they could 
not cancel. 
3.6.6.1.3  Volume Control for Auditory Annunciations 
[HS7075] The system shall provide a volume control from 5 to 100% of maximum for 
audio channels carrying aural annunciations, with the exception of caution and warning 
signals. 
Rationale:  The crew should have the ability to adjust volume of non-caution and 
warning signals to make desired signals intelligible.  Analogous to safety 
requirements in commercial aircraft, the crew does not adjust the caution and 
warning audio levels.  Rather, caution and warning audio levels shall be adjusted 
relative to the predicted background noise level.  There is provision to silence the 
alarm, but it must be audible initially per ISO 7731(above the masked threshold). 
3.6.6.1.4  Speech Intelligibility 
[HS7076] Auditory speech annunciations and communications shall provide a level of 
speech intelligibility equivalent to a 90% word identification rate. 
Rationale:  This requirement ensures that auditory speech annunciations and 
communications are sufficiently salient and intelligible.  ANSI S3.2-2009, 
American National Standard Method for Measuring the Intelligibility of Speech 
over Communicating System is a widely accepted standard for measuring the 
intelligibility of speech communications. 
3.6.6.1.5  Volume Control for Audio Communications 
[HS7077] The system shall provide a volume control from 5 to 100% of maximum for 
each audio channel carrying voice communications. 
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Rationale:  The crew should have the ability to adjust volume in order to 
communicate through scenarios in which multiple crew or Mission Systems 
personnel are speaking. 
3.6.6.2  Caution and Warning 
3.6.6.2.1  Annunciation Hierarchy 
[HS9029] The system shall assign off-nominal events into classes including:  
emergency, warning, caution, and advisory. 
Rationale:  Off-nominal events are usually divided into the following four classes 
to simplify training and user comprehension: emergencies, warnings, cautions, 
and advisories. 
3.6.6.2.2  Annunciation Prioritization 
[HS9029A] The system shall prioritize vehicle caution and warning annunciations as 
specified in Appendix K, table Alert Annunciation. 
Rationale:  The prioritization of caution and warning annunciations is required so 
that when there is more than one off-nominal event, the crew's attention is 
focused on the most critical.  Simultaneous auditory annunciations should be 
avoided. 
3.6.6.2.3  Visual and Auditory Annunciation 
[HS9030] The system shall provide visual and auditory annunciations to the crew for 
emergency, warning, and caution events. 
Rationale:  Off-nominal events are usually divided into the following four 
categories to simplify training and user comprehension:  emergencies, warnings, 
cautions, and advisories.  The use of both visual and auditory sensory modalities 
is required for redundancy, except for advisories, which may not have an auditory 
annunciation. 
3.6.6.2.4  Distinctiveness of Annunciations 
[HS9032] The system shall provide distinct audio annunciations and visual indications 
for Emergency, Warning, Caution, and Advisory alert classes as specified in the 
Appendix K, table Alert Annunciation. 
Rationale:  Off-nominal events are usually divided into classes (e.g., 
emergencies, warnings, cautions, and advisories). The use of distinct auditory 
annunciations for each of the event classes will simplify training and user 
comprehension. The use of both visual and auditory sensory modalities is 
required for redundancy. 
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3.6.6.2.5  Loss of Annunciation Capability 
[HS9032A] The system shall test for a failure of the visual and auditory annunciators on 
user request. 
Rationale:  Situational awareness and safety require a capability to test the 
Caution and Warning system.  The crew must be aware as soon as possible 
when the Caution and Warning annunciation system cannot be relied upon.  
Examples include a light test or smoke alarm test button. 
3.6.7  Crew-System Interaction 
3.6.7.1  Subsystem State Information 
[HS7058] The system shall provide subsystem state information on request. 
Rationale:  Subsystem state information is information related to the last-known 
or current condition of an application, process, or data item.  State information 
includes information such as operating mode, position, and system health.  This 
requirement makes all the data available to the crew if they request the 
appropriate information for troubleshooting and decision-making.  The term "on 
request" refers to requests by the crew as well as pre-defined system displays 
(e.g., automatic). 
3.6.7.2  System Responsiveness for Discrete Inputs 
[HS7058A] The system shall provide feedback within 0.1 second to the crew that a 
crew discrete input was received. 
Rationale:  The industry standard is 0.1 second for key response 
(MIL-STD-1472F).  The crew must have feedback that their input was received 
quickly enough so that they have confidence that the system is working correctly 
and that they do not make unnecessary additional inputs. 
3.6.7.3  System Responsiveness for Continuous Inputs 
[HS7058B] The system should provide controls such that the crew is unimpeded by the 
time lag between the operation of a control and the associated change in system state. 
Rationale:  This requirement is intended to prevent pilot-induced-oscillation and 
unnecessary re-actuation of vehicle controls.  For example, for many manual 
piloting tasks, vehicle-induced delays of over 0.1 second are considered 
unacceptable. 
3.6.7.4  Request for Information 
[HS7058C] The system should display information within 1.0 second of the crew 
request. 
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Rationale:  The industry standard is 1.0 second for user requests 
(MIL-STD-1472F).  Excessive delays in the presentation of information lead to a 
decrease in crew productivity and an increase in frustration. 
3.6.7.5  Request for Critical Information 
[HS7058D] The system shall display critical information within 1.0 second of the crew 
request. 
Rationale:  The industry standard is 1.0 second for user request 
(MIL-STD-1472F).  Excessive delays in the presentation of information lead to an 
increase in the time required for the crew to respond to changes in vehicle state.  
This requirement assumes that the display process is already running and that 
the crew is merely switching between displays. 
3.6.7.6  Menu Update Time 
[HS7058E] The system shall update menus used for display navigation within 
0.5 second of crew selection. 
Rationale:  The industry standard is 0.5 second for menu update 
(MIL-STD-1472F).  In order for the crew to effectively interact with a menu, 
selected menus must appear quickly. 
3.6.7.7  Command Feedback 
[HS7055] The system shall provide feedback to the crew within 2.0 seconds that the 
crew's command is in progress, completed, or rejected. 
Rationale:  The industry standard is 2.0 seconds for error feedback 
(MIL-STD-1472F).  The crewmember must have feedback that a step in his or 
her task has been completed, is in work, or cannot be completed in order to be 
able to continue their procedure or initiate an off-nominal procedure. 
3.6.8  Electronic Procedures 
3.6.8.1  Displaying Electronic Procedures System 
[HS9025] The system shall provide an electronic procedure system that, while 
executing a procedure, displays relevant vehicle data within the electronic procedure 
step being executed. 
Rationale:  An electronic procedure system is the most effective way for the crew 
to access, view, and interact with procedures.  The intent is that all procedures 
are available electronically and that, where appropriate, the operator can view 
telemetry indications from the same view in which they view procedure steps and 
select commands cued by the electronic procedure system and located on crew 
displays. 
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3.6.8.2  Cueing Electronic Procedures System 
[HS9025A] The system shall provide an electronic procedure system that, while 
executing a procedure, cues (or makes available) vehicle software commands that are 
required to be executed from the procedure. 
Rationale:  An electronic procedure system is the most effective way for the crew 
to access, view, and interact with procedures.  The intent is that all procedures 
are available electronically and that, where appropriate, the operator can view 
telemetry indications from the same view in which they view procedure steps and 
select commands cued by the electronic procedure system and located on crew 
displays. 
3.6.8.3  Current Procedure Step 
[HS9026] The system shall indicate to the crew which step in an electronically displayed 
procedure is currently being executed. 
Rationale:  This requirement prevents the crew from missing steps in a 
procedure by highlighting the step that requires the crew's attention. 
3.6.8.4  Completed Procedure Steps 
[HS9027] The system shall indicate to the crew which steps in an electronic procedure 
have been completed. 
Rationale:  This requirement prevents the crew from re-executing steps in a 
procedure by highlighting the steps that have been completed. 
3.6.8.5  Crew Notification of Required Procedure Action 
[HS9028] The system shall notify the crew whenever crew attention is required to 
complete an electronically displayed procedure. 
Rationale:  This requirement brings the crew back into a procedure after another 
agent has completed its steps or after the crew has been away from the 
procedure for a significant time.  This is required to prevent crew inattention to 
procedures that are interrupted or have many agents performing different steps. 
3.7  MAINTENANCE AND HOUSEKEEPING 
This section includes requirements for the maintenance and housekeeping of vehicle 
subsystems and components during flight. 
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3.7.1  Maintenance 
3.7.1.1  Efficiency 
3.7.1.1.1  ORU Change-out 
[HS8001] The system shall enable Orbital Replacement Unit (ORU) change out and 
planned equipment reconfiguration by personnel wearing clothing appropriate to the 
environment and phase of flight, including post-landing. 
Rationale:  Removing and replacing equipment may need to be done during any 
phase of flight, in which the vehicle may be in different gravity conditions, and by 
individuals wearing protective clothing and equipment that may limit mobility.  
Examples of protective clothing and equipment include flight suits and Self-
Contained Atmosphere Protective Ensemble (SCAPE) suits.  Equipment includes 
everything that is planned to be maintained in flight, from the Line Replaceable 
Unit (LRU) down to the component level.  Components may include computer 
cards, power supplies, or in some cases individual electronic components. 
3.7.1.1.2  Maintenance Time per Day 
[HS8002] The system shall require less than 2 person-hours per day of preventive 
maintenance and housekeeping during flight. 
Rationale:  Flight crew time for productive mission activities is at a premium 
during flight.  Preliminary studies based on ISS operation indicate that 
2 person-hours per day of overhead activities is the maximum amount of time 
that can be allocated without incurring detrimental effects on primary mission 
activities.  The requirement is allocated to each flight vehicle (e.g., Orion and 
Altair) individually, not in a docked configuration. 
3.7.1.1.3  ORU Maintenance Time 
[HS8003] ORUs shall have a total maintenance time for removal and replacement of no 
more than 3 hours. 
Rationale:  Crew time is at a premium during flight.  System designs should 
support efficient maintenance, which includes safing, access, removal, 
replacement, and closeout back to original hardware configuration.  Previous 
spaceflight experience and engineering judgment by subject matter experts 
indicate that all of these activities can be accomplished in 3 hours or less if the 
vehicle is designed to facilitate maintenance. 
3.7.1.1.4  ORU Replacement Time/Maintenance 
[HS8003-Objective] ORUs shall have a total maintenance time for removal and 
replacement of no more than 1 hour. 
Rationale:  Crew time is at a premium during flight.  System designs should 
support efficient maintenance.  Maintenance includes safing, access, removal, 
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replacement, and closeout back to original hardware configuration.  This is an 
objective requirement to reduce the on-orbit crew time spent on ORU changeout. 
3.7.1.1.5  Access Points 
[HS8026] Controls and maintenance access points should not be located near 
electrical, mechanical, and other hazards. 
Rationale:  Keeping hazardous equipment away from nominal work areas is 
highly desired to mitigate safety risks to the flight and ground crews.  This 
requirement is a  “should” because it is recognized that maintainers will need to 
access all parts of the vehicle and not all hazards can be completely eliminated. 
3.7.1.2  Error-Proof Design 
3.7.1.2.1  Physical Features 
[HS8005] Hardware maintained or reconfigured by the flight crew shall include physical 
features to prevent improper mounting. 
Rationale:  Improperly mounting equipment can result in unsafe conditions for 
flight crews, can increase the risk of Loss of Crew (LOC)/Loss of Mission (LOM) 
events, and may cause damage to hardware.  Physical features lessen the 
likelihood of human error.  Examples of physical features include supports, 
guides, size or shape differences, fastener locations, and alignment pins.  
Physical features are the first line of defense for preventing such errors. 
3.7.1.2.2  Labeling and Marking 
[HS8006] Equipment shall provide visual indication for correct mounting in accordance 
with HS7036. 
Rationale:  Improperly mounted equipment can lead to unsafe conditions for flight 
and ground crews, can increase the risk of LOC or LOM, and/or may cause 
damage to hardware.  In addition to physical features, labeling or marking 
mitigates human error.  Visual indication might include any marking on or 
adjacent to the equipment interface, labels, or color coding that provides 
information about mounting.  Unique labeling of equipment provides an indication 
that the equipment to be mounted and the mounting location match. 
3.7.1.2.3  Interchangeability 
[HS8007] ORUs that are not interchangeable functionally shall not create a hazard if 
interchanged physically. 
Rationale:  The intent is to prevent the installation of equipment that may 
physically fit into a location but that cannot perform its necessary function, or that 
performs a different function that can damage the associated system (e.g., two 
check valves that are physically identical but open at different pressures). 
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3.7.1.2.4  Connectors 
[HS8008] Connectors shall have physical features that preclude mis-mating and 
misalignment. 
Rationale:  Improper mating or misalignment of connectors can lead to short 
circuit or open circuit conditions that can reduce the safety of flight and ground 
crews, can increase the risk of LOC or LOM events, and may cause damage to 
hardware.  Physical features are often used to lessen the likelihood of human 
error.  Physical features to preclude improper mating typically include keying, 
such that connectors cannot be mated to the incorrect location. 
3.7.1.2.5  Visual Indication 
[HS8045] The system shall provide an orientation cue for the correct mating of 
connectors in accordance with HS7036. 
Rationale:  Labeling of connectors ensures efficient identification of connectors to 
be mated, which lowers the risk of improper mating and optimizes use of crew 
time.  Visual indication might include any marking on or adjacent to the 
equipment interface, labels, or color coding that provides information about 
mounting.  Identification as a label function is covered in the User Interface 
section of the HSIR. 
3.7.1.2.6  Connector Mating Indication 
[HS8046] Connectors shall indicate mating completion. 
Rationale:  Incomplete electrical connector mating can result in a short circuit or 
an open circuit.  Incomplete fluid connector mating can result in unexpected and 
possibly hazardous fluid release when the region of the system containing the 
fluid connector is pressurized.  These situations reduce the safety of flight or 
ground crews, increase the risk of LOC or LOM events, and/or may damage 
hardware.  Indication of a positive mating may be achieved using visual 
indicators, tactile feedback indicators, or a combination of both types of 
indications. 
3.7.1.2.7  Unique Identification Labeling 
[HS8047] Equipment shall provide labeling for unique identification of the equipment in 
accordance with HS7036. 
Rationale:  Labeling of equipment ensures efficient identification, which lowers 
the risk of improper use and optimizes use of crew time. 
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3.7.1.3  Access 
3.7.1.3.1  Disturbance of Equipment 
3.7.1.3.1.1  Disturbance of Equipment 
[HS8053] The system should be maintainable without removal of ORUs that are not 
directly the subject of maintenance activity. 
Rationale:  Not having to remove ORUs for maintenance tasks will minimize 
mission maintenance times and maximize system availability. 
3.7.1.3.2  Visual Access 
3.7.1.3.2.1  Visual Access 
[HS8009] The system shall provide visual access to crew interfaces during planned 
maintenance activities. 
Rationale:  Direct line-of-sight visual access reduces the likelihood of human 
error that can occur when blind (by feel) operations or operations requiring the 
use of specialized tools (e.g., mirrors or bore scopes) are performed.  Direct line 
of sight is intended to be required when the item is being manipulated by the 
crew.  Crew interfaces include items such as connectors and fasteners.  Direct 
line of sight for pin inspection is not required, though it is desired where possible.  
This does not apply to blind-mate connectors with guides, which are 
automatically de-mated and mated as a piece of equipment is removed and 
replaced. 
3.7.1.3.3  Physical Access 
3.7.1.3.3.1  Physical Access 
[HS8010] The system shall provide the crew, wearing protective clothing when 
appropriate, with the work envelope to perform all expected maintenance activities. 
Rationale:  Adequate access and working space is needed to allow personnel to 
efficiently access equipment in a way that minimizes the potential for human 
error or human induced damage.  Access, including reach envelope, is required 
for maintenance activities.  Access and work envelope are different for differing 
tasks.  In particular, protective garments may be required by the flight crew and 
must be accommodated. 
3.7.1.3.4  Maintenance Hazard 
3.7.1.3.4.1  Maintenance Hazard 
[HS8015] The system shall be maintainable without causing critical or catastrophic 
hazards. 
Rationale:  Performance of maintenance must not introduce additional hazards. 
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3.7.1.3.5  Crew Control of Power 
3.7.1.3.5.1  Crew Control of Power 
[HS8055] The system shall provide the crew with capability to control the interruption of 
power to an electrical circuit and confirm the de-energized status of the circuit that could 
expose crewmembers to voltages in excess of 32 V. 
Rationale:  This requirement addresses a maintenance issue by providing the 
flight crew with the ability to interrupt power, as opposed to only remote ground 
control, so that an IVA crewmember performing a maintenance action will have 
the ability to interrupt power to the maintenance area and the opportunity to 
confirm the de-energized status of the electrical circuitry before initiating work or 
during the course of activities in that area. 
3.7.1.4  Failure Notification 
3.7.1.4.1  Failure Notification 
[HS8016] The system shall alert the crew when flight-critical equipment has failed and 
when it is not operating within tolerance limits without removal of that equipment. 
Rationale:  This provides a means of expediting failure troubleshooting and of 
ensuring that the crew has adequate situational awareness of what functionality 
has been lost.  The alert in some cases may be a display that includes 
quantitative data indicating the extent of the out-of-tolerance condition. 
3.7.1.5  Circuit Protection 
3.7.1.5.1  No Fuses for Dynamic Flight Phases 
[HS8017] Fuses shall not be used to protect circuits where reset may be required 
during dynamic phases of flight. 
Rationale:  During dynamic phases of flight the crew may need to restore system 
operation rapidly to maintain vehicle control.  The intent of the requirement is to 
preclude the use of destructible circuit protection devices, such as fuses.  
Finding, sizing, and replacing fuses takes more time than resetting circuit 
breakers.  Nominal operation of the devices returns the circuit to normal 
functionality with a single crew task. 
3.7.1.5.2  Circuit Breakers Instead of Fuses 
[HS8018] Circuit breakers should be used in preference to fuses. 
Rationale:  There are several reasons why circuit breakers are preferred, 
including the ability to rapidly reset breakers, the elimination of the storage, 
logistics supply, and training required to provision spare fuses.  It is recognized 
that fuses probably cannot be totally eliminated, but where fuses are used rather 
than circuit breakers, the decision should be backed up by analysis. 
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3.7.1.5.3  Replacement Without Tools 
[HS8020] In-flight replaceable fuses shall be removable and replaceable without the 
use of tools. 
Rationale:  The elimination of tools eliminates the mass, volume, logistics supply, 
and training required to provision the tools.  This is not intended to preclude the 
use of a tool for the access panels that may need to be opened before fuse 
replacement. 
3.7.1.5.4  Replacement Without Component Removal 
[HS8021] In-flight replaceable fuses shall be removable and replaceable in-flight without 
requiring removal of other components. 
Rationale:  The removal of non-failed components to access fuses increases the 
likelihood of damage to the non-failed components, increases the time required 
to replace the fuse, and adds unnecessary functional retest of non-failed items.  
This is not intended to preclude the use of access panels that may need to be 
opened before fuse replacement. 
3.7.1.5.5  Circuit Breaker Resetting 
[HS8022] Circuit breakers, which may require actuation during critical flight phases, 
shall be operable without the removal or opening of access panels. 
Rationale:  Circuit breakers for ascent, entry, and landing phases of a mission 
must be operated quickly. 
3.7.1.5.6  Trip Indication 
[HS8023] The system shall provide an indication to the crew when an in-flight 
replaceable fuse or circuit breaker has opened a circuit. This requirement does not 
apply to circuit protection within portable loads. 
Rationale:  This requirement provides a means of expediting failure 
troubleshooting and ensures that the crew has adequate situational awareness of 
what functionality is available and what has been lost. 
3.7.1.6  Electrostatic Discharge (ESD) 
3.7.1.6.1  Electrostatic Discharge 
[HS8024] Equipment that is susceptible to electrostatic discharge damage during 
operation or planned in-flight maintenance shall be labeled as sensitive to electrostatic 
discharge damage in accordance with HS7036. 
Rationale:  This labeling is intended to notify the operator of possible electrostatic 
discharge sensitivity of the device, which may damage the equipment. 
3.7.1.7  Fasteners 
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3.7.1.7.1  Fastener Heads 
[HS8029] Tool-operated fasteners removed and replaced by the crew shall have self-
centering, anti-cam-out heads. 
Rationale:  This requirement is intended to exclude slotted fasteners––which are 
not self-centering––and Phillips fasteners––which require the constant 
application of force along the axis of the fastener to keep the tool seated in the 
fastener (i.e., to prevent "cam-out").  This will reduce the likelihood of fastener 
stripping and will make it easier for the crew to perform any in-flight maintenance.  
Examples of acceptable fasteners are internal hex-head, Torq-Set, Torx, and Tri-
Wing. 
3.7.1.7.2  Fastener Number and Variety 
[HS8030] The number and variety of fasteners used should be the minimum required to 
meet stress, bonding, pressurization, shielding, thermal, and safety requirements for 
items that may be removed by the flight crew. 
Rationale:  This is intended to balance the flight and ground crew effort required 
to remove fasteners with the design needs that require the fasteners (to satisfy 
stress, bonding, pressurization, shielding, thermal, and safety requirements).  
This implies that analysis is performed to determine the minimum number of 
fasteners that meets the design needs, and that no more than this number be 
used.  This requirement is also intended to be applied to the variety of fastener 
head types (e.g., Torq-set, hex-head, etc.). 
3.7.1.7.3  Captive Fasteners 
[HS8031] Fasteners operated by the crew during maintenance tasks shall be captive. 
Rationale:  A captive fastener is one that is automatically retained in a work piece 
when it is not performing its load-bearing job.  Captive fasteners, therefore, do 
not require the flight crew to restrain and store them during maintenance, and 
can more easily be installed with one hand, reducing maintenance times and 
reducing the chance of fastener loss. 
3.7.1.8  Fluids 
3.7.1.8.1  Equipment Isolation 
[HS8032] The system shall provide for isolation of fluids in ORUs during maintenance 
tasks. 
Rationale:  Isolation valves and quick-disconnect couplings allow for more 
efficient system maintenance, permit isolation and servicing, aid in leak 
detection, and eliminate the need to drain and refill systems. 
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3.7.1.8.2  Hazardous Levels of Fluid Leakage 
[HS8034] Fluid isolation features shall not leak hazardous levels of fluid exceeding 
concentrations identified in JSC 20584, Spacecraft Maximum Allowable Concentrations 
(SMAC) for Airborne Contaminants. 
Rationale:  The leakage of fluids (liquid or gas) is a crew health issues during 0-g 
operations (e.g., inhalation hazard).  Additionally, leakage during any mission 
phase (flight or ground) can cause hazardous conditions, increase housekeeping 
tasks, and may damage equipment.  This requirement is intended to cover both 
toxic and non-toxic fluids. 
3.7.1.9  Tools 
3.7.1.9.1  Common Toolset 
[HS8037] The system should be maintainable and reconfigurable on orbit using a 
minimum set of tools that are as common as feasible with the other systems. 
Rationale:  A minimum set of tools, common with other systems, allows for many 
maintenance tasks to be performed without a proliferation of unique tools and 
reduces the training and support requirements for the system.  Proprietary or 
unusual fasteners should be avoided, e.g., design to a common internal hex tool 
versus a new size/shape not commonly found in a tool kit. 
3.7.1.9.2  Tool Clearance 
[HS8052] The system shall provide tool clearances for tool installation and actuation for 
all tool interfaces during in-flight maintenance. 
Rationale:  Tools to be used for in-flight maintenance must be identified by the 
hardware developer, and clearance for its application must be accommodated to 
ensure that maintenance tasks can be performed. 
3.7.1.9.3  Tool Usage 
[HS8054] The system shall be maintained or reconfigured on-orbit using only those 
tools that can be used by the crew per Appendix B, table Unsuited Strength Data for the 
maintenance or reconfiguration task. 
Rationale:  It is necessary to ensure that all human-systems interfaces 
accommodate the entire current and future Minimum Crew Operational Load 
limits.  Analysis and testing provide the opportunity to determine that hardware is 
within the Minimum Crew Operational Loads limits.  Therefore, analysis and 
testing are necessary to ensure that all current and future crewmembers are able 
to interface and operate with the system hardware. 
3.7.2  Housekeeping 
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3.7.2.1  Design for Cleanliness 
3.7.2.1.1  Microbial Contamination 
[HS8041] System interior surfaces shall be compatible for cleaning bacterial 
contamination to a level of 500 CFUs per 100 cm2 or fewer. 
Rationale:  This requirement is intended to ensure that bacterial contamination 
on spacecraft internal surfaces can be removed to mitigate the risk of such 
contamination to the crew.  The limit is from the SSP 50260, ISS Medical 
Operations Requirement Document (ISS MORD). 
3.7.2.1.2  Fungal Contamination 
[HS8042] System interior surfaces shall be compatible for cleaning of fungal 
contamination to a level of 10 CFU per 100 cm2 or fewer. 
Rationale:  This requirement is intended to ensure that fungal contamination on 
spacecraft internal surfaces can be removed to mitigate the risk of such 
contamination to the crew.  The limit is from the SSP 50260, ISS Medical 
Operations Requirement Document (ISS MORD). 
3.7.2.1.3  Condensation Prevention on Interior Surfaces 
[HS8051] The system shall limit condensation persistence to 1 hour a day on surfaces 
within the internal volume during the mission. 
Rationale:  The formation of water condensate on internal surfaces has been 
demonstrated on the Mir and the ISS to promote the growth of fungi.  Examples 
of moisture buildup from previous spaceflight missions that resulted in fungal 
growth include non-insulated cold surfaces and designed operations, which 
moisten surfaces (such as wetting a cloth) without appropriate drying.  
Condensation on a non-ventilated surface will be difficult to dry. 
3.7.2.2  Replacement of Air Filters 
3.7.2.2.1  Replacement of Air Filters 
[HS8043] The system should allow a crewmember to remove and replace air filters that 
require in-flight servicing without the use of tools. 
Rationale:  Crew time is at a premium during a mission.  Tools will not be used in 
order to minimize the impacts to preventive maintenance and reduce overall 
weight. 
3.8  INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 
Information management is the act of performing functions with electronic data, 
including data input, organization, internal processing, storage, dissemination, and 
disposal.  Information management functions are performed by crew and Mission 
Systems using displays on display devices.  This section contains requirements related 
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to information management and the use of electronic data across Constellation 
systems.  Requirements specific to the design of the crew interfaces to these data are 
found in Section 3.6, Crew Interfaces. 
3.8.1  Crew Operability 
3.8.1.1  Crew Operability 
[HS9021] The system shall provide methods and tools for the crew to perform 
information management functions. 
Rationale:  Information management functions may need to be performed at 
times when only the crew can perform them, for example when there is no 
communication with Mission Systems.  Examples of information management 
functions include: graphing system trend information, composing and sending 
electronic mail, searching for and within procedures, and viewing training 
materials.  Information management functions do not necessarily reside on the 
flight avionics system. 
3.8.2  Data Available 
3.8.2.1  Data Rate 
[HS9014] The system should provide data acquired at a rate that enables the crew and 
ground personnel to perform tasks. 
Rationale:  Different classes of data must be gathered at different minimum rates 
to be useful to the crew or ground personnel, for example, navigation data might 
be gathered once per second, payload data once per minute, and routine 
medical data once per day. 
3.8.2.2  Data Fidelity 
[HS9040] The data shall have the fidelity for the crew to perform tasks. 
Rationale:  Data fidelity (accuracy, precision, reliability, latency, and resolution) is 
essential for proper vehicle functioning and for the crew to make timely and 
correct decisions, particularly in critical operations. 
3.8.3  Data Distribution 
3.8.3.1  Locations of Data 
[HS9018] The system shall provide the crew with data to perform tasks at each 
workstation where those tasks can be performed. 
Rationale:  The crew may choose to perform information management functions 
at varied locations throughout the vehicle. For example, a crewmember reading 
an online maintenance schematic may choose to move away from a 
crewmember having a private medical conference.  The use of alternative 
technologies such as digital paper, digital cameras, Personal Digital Assistants 
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(PDAs), or tablet computers may suffice to meet this requirement; however, the 
use of printed material, labels, or other displays to provide critical information at 
workstations is not precluded. 
3.8.3.2  Wired Network 
[HS9019] The system shall provide a wired distribution system for data. 
Rationale:  ISS and Shuttle Program history has shown that wireless connections 
can be unreliable and difficult to troubleshoot; therefore, they are not desired as 
the sole option for critical functions.  It is important to have a backup wired 
distribution system. This requirement is not intended to preclude the use of a 
primary wireless distribution system, which would be highly desirable. 
3.8.3.3  Wireless Network 
[HS9020] The system shall provide a wireless distribution system for data. 
Rationale:  ISS and Shuttle Program history has shown that wireless connectivity 
is desirable because it reduces clutter within the vehicle and improves mobility 
and productivity.  Because wire clutter is incompatible with launch and entry 
activities (such as emergency egress), a wireless solution is especially desirable.  
This requirement provides the capability for wireless; however, it does not dictate 
that all data be transmitted wirelessly. 
3.8.4  Data Backup 
3.8.4.1  Manual Information Capture and Transfer 
[HS9042A] The system shall provide a method for the crew to capture and transfer 
information from any display in a format that provides mobility and the ability to 
annotate. 
Rationale:  Users must be able to capture the contents of an information display 
for mobility or to make annotations.  The use of alternative technologies such as 
digital paper, digital cameras, Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs), or tablet 
computers would allow annotations to be shared more easily with Mission 
Systems, but this requirement does not preclude the use of printed material. 
3.9  GROUND MAINTENANCE AND ASSEMBLY 
This section addresses tasks to be performed by NASA and its launch site contractors 
in accomplishment of launch site processing and ground maintenance.  Launch site 
processing includes vehicle assembly (e.g., Ares I + Orion) activities that occur within 
the Outer Mold Line of the Launch Stack, Launch Stack physical integration 
(e.g., umbilical integration), and launch preparation (e.g., propellant loading).  Ground 
maintenance includes corrective and preventive maintenance activities associated with 
Line Replaceable Unit (LRU) removal and replacement.  These requirements do not 
apply to unplanned repair at the launch site, build activities at the manufacturing site, or 
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potential build up at the launch site prior to system integration (for example, build up of 
the Orion).  The requirements in this section apply only to those aspects of design that 
are under direct control of the vehicle developers, but not to the design of external 
Ground Support Equipment (GSE) and test systems.  These requirements do not apply 
to any powered portable equipment that is intended for flight. 
3.9.1  Ground Anthropometry, Biomechanics, and Strength 
3.9.1.1  Ground Anthropometry, Biomechanics, and Strength 
[HS10008] The system shall provide worksites for launch site processing and 
maintenance tasks that are sized to accommodate critical dimensions of the ground 
crew population based on 1988 U.S. Army Anthropometry Survey (ANSUR) database 
(NATICK/TR-89/044) 5th to 95th percentiles. 
Rationale:  The 5th to 95th percentiles were selected in order to ensure that a 
minimum level of accommodation is provided to the ground crew.  The intent of 
the requirement is to ensure that at least some members of the ground crew may 
perform a task while not necessarily ensuring that all members can perform 
every task.  Critical dimensions are defined using task analysis.  Though the 
ANSUR database may not directly reflect the population of the ground crew, this 
is a readily available standard database, and the intent of the requirement may 
be met using this database.  For some dimensions, civilian measurements 
greatly exceed ANSUR measurements; however, designing for 5th percentile to 
95th percentile ensures that tasks will accommodate most ground crew. The 5th 
percentile is based on female dimensions, and the 95th percentile is based on 
male dimensions.  Joint range of motion limitations for ground crew may be 
estimated using the joint mobility values in NASA-STD-3000, (Section 3.3.2.3, 
Joint Motion Data Design Requirements). 
3.9.2  Ground Natural and Induced Environments 
<Reserved> 
3.9.3  Ground Safety 
3.9.3.1  Ventilation Openings 
[HS10027] Ventilation openings within the reach envelope of ground crew during launch 
site processing shall preclude inadvertent insertion of foreign objects, which might 
damage the contents or injure the crew. 
Rationale:  Ventilation openings are needed by some flight components.  If these 
components are within the reach envelope of ground crew during performance of 
assembly and maintenance activities, they should be protected from accidental 
insertion of tools or body parts.  Such insertion could pose a hazard to crew or to 
the hardware. 
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3.9.3.2  Ground Processing Hardware Access 
[HS10030] The system shall protect ground crews against injury from sharp edges. 
Rationale:  Protection of ground crews from injury controls ground operations 
costs.  In those areas that ground crew would access for ground processing and 
maintenance, the design should protect them from sharp edges and corners. The 
intent of this requirement is for a design solution, not an operational solution, as 
the latter results in expensive recurring costs.  The requirement might be met by 
rounding of edges and corners or by designing flight structure that hides sharp 
edges and corners from crew access during planned operations.  It cannot be 
met by design of remove-before-flight protective structure. 
3.9.3.3  Hazards Labeling 
[HS10033] The system shall provide labels to identify hazards to ground crew or to 
equipment. 
Rationale:  Assembly and ground maintenance tasks can require ground crew to 
work with equipment that is susceptible to damage or that presents a hazard to 
the crew.  Hazard labels are required for protection of ground crews and to alert 
ground crews to special susceptibilities of equipment (e.g., electrostatic 
discharge). 
3.9.4  Ground Architecture 
This section contains requirements for the overall layout of the vehicle to aid the ground 
crew in performing launch processing and assembly.  Specific topics include layout of 
functional areas, translation paths. 
3.9.4.1  Work Station Layout Interference 
[HS10047] The system should separate functional areas where ground processing 
activities would detrimentally interfere with each other. 
Rationale:  Co-location of unrelated activities could degrade operations, resulting 
in increased workload and operational delays.  This consideration will be difficult 
to meet in a small volume, but every effort should be made to separate functions 
and capabilities that could operationally conflict with each other or that produce 
environmental conditions that will conflict with other tasks, e.g., SCAPE 
operations with wire testing and soldering next to clean room environments. 
3.9.4.2  Work Station Layout Sequential Operations 
[HS10048] The system should co-locate functional areas in which sequential ground 
operations are performed. 
Rationale:  Co-location of related, functional work areas can reduce transit time, 
communication errors, and operational delays.  This consideration may seem to 
be met simply because of a vehicle's small size, but every effort should be made 
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to group functions and capabilities supporting a task in as efficient a manner as 
possible to reduce crew workload.  For example, time to build access platforms 
inside the vehicle could be reduced if all similar operations are performed 
sequentially in a co-located area before platform removal. 
3.9.5  Ground Crew Functions 
<Reserved> 
3.9.6  Ground Crew Interfaces 
A system's ground crew interface is any part of that vehicle through which contact is 
made or information is transferred between the ground crew and the vehicle, whether by 
sight, sound, or touch.  Usable, well-designed ground crew interfaces are critical for 
ground crew safety and productivity, and to minimize training requirements.  This 
section provides requirements for ground crew-controlled processes and the design of 
ground crew interfaces, including displays, display devices, and controls.  A display is 
anything that provides information to crewmembers on a display device.  A display 
device is the hardware that displays information to crewmembers.  A control is anything 
that accepts ground crewmember commands or inputs, whether hardware or software.  
The requirements stated herein apply to all ground crew launch processing activities, 
with or without Personal Protective Equipment (PPE). 
3.9.6.1  Labeling 
[HS10039] The system shall provide labels for ground crew interface controls and 
indicators. 
Rationale:  Controls and data items must have labels to aid in ground crew 
training and error-free operation. 
3.9.6.2  Ground Labeling:  Non-Interference with Flight Labels 
[HS10055] Labels or part markings used for ground assembly and handling shall not 
interfere with crew interface flight labeling, visually or operationally. 
Rationale:  Crew interface flight labeling must take precedence over ground 
labeling to ensure safe flight operations.  Interference with the flight labeling by 
ground labeling can cause confusion for the crew.  When and where possible, 
the ground labeling should not be visible to the crew in-flight. 
3.9.6.3 Consistent Crew Interfaces 
[HS10050] The system should provide ground crew interfaces that are consistent in 
appearance and operation across Constellation systems. 
Rationale:  The intent of this statement is to ensure commonality and consistency 
across flight systems.  This will facilitate learning and minimize interface-induced 
ground crew error. 
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3.9.6.4  Legibility 
[HS10051] The system shall provide ground crew labels and displays that are legible 
under task conditions. 
Rationale:  Legibility is important for the ground crew's timely and accurate 
processing of information. 
3.9.6.5  Written Text 
[HS10052] Language text shall be written in the American English language, based on 
Webster's New World Dictionary of American English. 
Rationale:  The intent of this requirement is to ensure as much commonality and 
consistency as possible in written text (i.e., language and spelling) across vehicle 
subsystems and across flight systems.  Exceptions include acronyms and 
commonly understood words and terms that are derived from other languages 
where there is no suitable English replacement.  This will facilitate learning and 
minimize interface-induced ground crew error. 
3.9.6.6  Use of Color 
[HS10053] The system should provide an additional cue to convey ground crew 
interface information when color is used to convey meaning. 
Rationale:  Redundant coding is required to accommodate the variability in 
people's capability to see color under different lighting conditions, and to increase 
the saliency of identification markings.  Redundant cues can include labels, 
icons, and speech messages. 
3.9.6.7  Work Envelope Volumes 
[HS10002] The system shall provide work envelope volumes needed to perform 
corrective and preventive maintenance tasks, as well as assembly and other launch site 
processing tasks. 
Rationale:  The flight system components/subsystems (e.g., Ares I stages, Orion 
Service Module [SM], and Crew Module [CM]) must be assembled by the ground 
crew with sufficient work envelope to accomplish tasks.  Many of these tasks will 
constitute mating of components (bolts, connectors, etc.) across the interface 
between Elements (e.g., Ares I:  First and Second Stages) or between systems 
(Ares I and Orion).  These envelopes will, therefore, be identified by Vehicle-level 
task analyses and documented in Interface Control Documents (ICDs).  
Corrective and preventive maintenance tasks that are accomplished fully within 
one Element may be analyzed at the Element level.  In this case, corrective 
maintenance activities include only those associated with LRU removal and 
replacement.  This requirement does not apply to unplanned repair at the launch 
site, build activities at the manufacturing site, or potential build up before system 
integration.  Guidelines for envelope definition are found in FAA-HF-STD-001, 
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Section 14.1.  Sufficient envelope is defined by task analyst using this document 
and based on anthropometric requirements and task definition.  The envelope 
definition will be concurred with by Level II. 
3.9.6.8  Reach Envelope Volumes 
[HS10004] The system shall provide reach envelope volumes needed to perform 
corrective and preventive maintenance tasks, as well as assembly and other launch site 
processing tasks. 
Rationale:  The vehicle components must be designed to be assembled and 
maintained by the ground crew with sufficient reach envelope to accomplish 
tasks.  Many of these tasks will constitute mating of components (bolts, 
connectors, etc.) across the interface between Elements (e.g., Ares I:  First and 
Second Stages) or between systems (Ares I and Orion).  These envelopes will, 
therefore, be identified by Vehicle-level task analyses and documented in ICDs.  
In this case, corrective maintenance activities include only those associated with 
LRU removal and replacement.  This requirement does not apply to unplanned 
repair at the launch site, build activities at the manufacturing site, or potential 
build up before system integration.  Guidelines for envelope definition are found 
in FAA-HF-STD-001, Section 14.1-14.5 and NASA-STD-3000, Section 3.3.3, as 
applied to ground crews.  Sufficient envelope is defined by task analysts using 
these documents and based on anthropometric requirements and task definition.  
The envelope definition will be concurred with by Level II. 
3.9.6.9  Ground Crew Visual Access 
[HS10006] The system shall provide the ground crew visual access needed to perform 
corrective and preventive maintenance tasks, as well as assembly and other launch site 
processing tasks. 
Rationale:  The system components must be designed to provide the ground 
crew with visual access of the tasks to be performed as part of launch system 
assembly and of corrective and preventive maintenance.  That is, all tasks should 
have the object of the task (bolt, connector, etc.) in the direct line of sight of the 
ground crewmember performing the task, with the vehicle in the assembled, 
vertical configuration.  The envelopes will be identified by both the subsystem-
level and the Vehicle-level task analyses.  In this case, corrective maintenance 
activities include only those associated with LRU removal and replacement.  This 
requirement does not apply to unplanned repair at the launch site, build activities 
at the manufacturing site, or potential build up before system integration.  
Guidelines for envelope definition are found in FAA-HF-STD-001, Section 14.2 
and MIL-STD-1472F, Section 5.6.3.1.5.  Mirrors and periscopes should not be 
required.  Sufficient envelope is defined by task analyst, based on 
anthropometric requirements and task definition, and will be concurred with by 
Level II. 
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3.9.7  Launch Site Processing and Ground Maintenance 
3.9.7.1  Line Replaceable Units (LRUs) 
3.9.7.1.1  LRU Installation 
[HS10012] Line Replaceable Units (LRUs) shall include physical features that prevent 
incorrect installation. 
Rationale:  Each LRU is verified for flight in its designed orientation and 
configuration.  Not only is functionality of the item at risk if it is improperly 
installed, structural failure could result.  Physical features that ensure proper 
installation (e.g., supports, guides, size, or shape differences; fastener locations; 
and alignment pins) will at the same time assure that cables and fluid lines are 
not improperly stressed and that all fasteners are properly torqued. 
3.9.7.1.2  LRU Mounting/Alignment Labels/Codes 
[HS10013] LRUs shall be labeled or coded to identify proper mounting and alignment. 
Rationale:  Labels provide contextual information to help assure that the ground 
crew does not attempt to install an LRU incorrectly; such an attempt could 
damage the LRU or the interfaces on the vehicle.  Each LRU is verified for flight 
in its designed orientation and configuration. 
3.9.7.1.3  LRU Interchangeability 
[HS10014] LRUs that are not interchangeable functionally shall not be interchangeable 
physically. 
Rationale:  This requirement addresses installation of the wrong component.  
While some LRUs may be used for the same function in multiple instances (e.g., 
redundant strings) many may be physically similar but functionally distinct.  In 
such cases, installation in the wrong location could result in damage to the LRU 
or to the system into which it is inserted.  This requirement is intended to 
preclude such installation in the wrong location. 
3.9.7.1.4  LRU Tracking Labels 
[HS10031] LRUs shall be labeled with a logistics tracking label that uses the same 
standard as flight hardware. 
Rationale:  Logistics tracking labels shall be consistent with the programmatic 
logistics and supportability standards. 
3.9.7.1.5  LRU Labeling 
[HS10032] LRUs and flight components that are part of maintenance and launch site 
tasks shall be labeled to provide identification. 
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Rationale:  This requirement includes identification of the part, indication of male 
and female (for fluid connectors), jack or plug (electrical connectors), flow 
direction for fluid lines, and other similar information critical to assembly and 
maintenance tasks.  The naming used on labels must be consistent with 
programmatic naming conventions. 
3.9.7.1.6  LRU Protrusions 
[HS10042] LRU hardware shall have handling provisions for ground crews. 
Rationale:  This requirement is being included to avoid damage to flight hardware 
and to prevent injury to ground crew.  Labels, procedures, handles, or GSE 
attach points can be used to implement this requirement.  Damage to flight 
hardware and injury to the ground crew can result from poor grips to a non-
handle protrusion or from protrusions that do not hold the weight of the LRU.  
Non-handle protrusions can break and lead to dropping flight hardware or to 
disorienting the balance of the ground crew.  This can be prevented by clearly 
labeling handles as the designated lift points for the hardware. 
3.9.7.1.7  LRU Weight Limit 
[HS10045] LRUs that are required to be installed by one ground crewperson without 
Ground Support Equipment shall not exceed the safe weight limit as determined by the 
NIOSH lifting equation according to guidelines in Appendix L. 
Rationale:  The NIOSH lifting equation was designed to determine a 
recommended weight limit for safely lifting loads.  It accounts for factors that 
would affect a person's ability to lift, including the position of the load relative to 
the body, the distance lifted, the frequency of lifts, and the coupling (gripping) 
method.  These various factors need to be accounted for while determining safe 
weight limits for the ground crew during assembly, processing, and maintenance 
tasks.  The Applications Manual for the Revised NIOSH Lifting Equation provides 
the detailed methods for applying the equation to a variety of tasks along with 
examples.  A summary of the Applications Manual is included in Appendix L. 
3.9.7.1.8  LRU Removal Without Component Removal 
[HS10054] The system should allow for LRU removal without removing other 
components. 
Rationale:  Removing LRUs without having to remove other components may 
protect against damage and simplify vehicle maintenance tasks. 
3.9.7.1.9  LRU Removal and Replacement 
[HS8004] A single LRU removal and replacement activity, which is intended to be 
accomplished by a single technician, should be designed to be complete within an 8-
hour shift. 
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Rationale:  This requirement applies only to LRUs that can be removed and 
replaced by a single technician.  Total LRU removal and replacement time 
includes pre-operation set-up (i.e., safing, access, tool retrieval, etc.) removal, 
replacement, and post-operation closure (i.e., access panels replacement, final 
close-out inspections, restoration of original hardware configuration, etc.).  All of 
these tasks should be achievable within an 8-hour shift by one technician.  An 
LRU design that requires minimal time requirements for removal and 
replacement helps to ensure interfaces to reduce the potential of human error 
and collateral damage during removal and replacement. 
3.9.7.2  Connectors 
3.9.7.2.1  Connector Mismating 
[HS10015] The system shall have physical features that preclude mismating of 
connectors that are in the same physical location during launch site processing and 
corrective and preventive maintenance. 
Rationale:  Connector similarity could lead to inadvertent mismating, which is the 
mating of a male plug to the wrong female jack.  Mismating can damage pins or 
mechanisms, or even (once powered or filled with fluids) lead to personnel injury 
or equipment damage.  In this case, corrective maintenance activities include 
only those associated with LRU removal and replacement.  This requirement 
does not apply to unplanned repair at the launch site, build activities at the 
manufacturing site, or potential build up before system integration. 
3.9.7.2.2  Connector Mating Labels 
[HS10017] Connectors in the same physical location that must be mated during launch 
site processing and maintenance shall have labels that define correct mating. 
Rationale:  Labels will identify which connector plug is intended to be mated with 
which jack, as well as proper orientation for mating. 
3.9.7.3  Captive Fasteners 
3.9.7.3.1  Captive Fasteners 
[HS10026] The system should provide captive fasteners for maintenance activities. 
Rationale:  Captive fasteners for maintenance tasks prevent loss of fasteners.  
Dropped fasteners could become Foreign Object Debris, which could pose a risk 
during launch.  This could cause injury, impact launch schedule, or damage 
equipment. 
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3.9.7.4  Tools 
3.9.7.4.1  Toolset 
[HS10028] The system shall be assembled and maintained using only those tools 
identified in the Launch Site Task Tool List <TBD-70024-050>. 
Rationale:  Using a standard tool set for all equipment eliminates the proliferation 
of unique tools and reduces the training and support requirements for the ground 
crews.  Specialty tools require special logistics tracking (which adds to operations 
costs) and could become lost, postponing maintenance and requiring 
replacement at a high cost per unit. 
3.9.7.4.2  Tool Clearances 
[HS10024] The system shall provide tool clearances for tool installation and actuation 
for all tool interfaces during ground maintenance. 
Rationale:  Tool use for assembly and maintenance tasks must be considered as 
a design activity.  The tool to be used must be identified by the hardware 
developer, and clearance for its application must be accommodated.  The design 
of all tools that may be applicable (e.g., wrenches, torque multipliers, bales [on 
connectors]), should take into consideration the application of the tool. 
3.9.7.5  Fuse/Circuit Indication 
3.9.7.5.1  Fuse/Circuit Indication 
[HS10010] The system shall provide indication to the ground crew when a fuse or circuit 
breaker has opened a circuit. 
Rationale:  If a circuit has a protection device (e.g., fuse or circuit breaker), the 
potential exists that the device will need to be replaced or reset by the ground 
crew.  To facilitate these tasks, these devices must provide an indication of their 
state to the ground crew. 
3.9.7.6  Access 
3.9.7.6.1  Maintainability Without Deintegration 
[HS10001] The system shall not require deintegration or de-mating of previously tested 
and certified interfaces during corrective and preventive maintenance. 
Rationale:  The integrated design of the vehicle must be such that the ground 
crew is able to maintain the components (subsystems and Elements) in the 
integrated vehicle state and orientation.  The intent is to preclude deintegration of 
the Elements or their subsystems during or after vehicle assembly.  Such 
deintegration would constitute an extremely expensive and recurring addition to 
ground operating costs.  This can only be accomplished through integrated 
design so that the design of one subsystem (e.g., Ares I:  First Stage) does not 
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force deintegration of the subsystem it is mated to (Ares I: Second Stage) in 
order to perform maintenance on the integrated vehicle.  In this case, corrective 
maintenance activities include only those associated with LRU removal and 
replacement.  This requirement does not apply to unplanned repair at the launch 
site, build activities at the manufacturing site, or potential build up before system 
integration. 
3.9.7.6.2  Maintainability Without Disabling Subsystems 
[HS10009] The system should not require the disabling of subsystems that are not 
directly part of the maintenance activity during launch site corrective and preventive 
maintenance. 
Rationale:  All maintenance worksites must be designed such that removal and 
replacement do not disable a functional, certified, and fully-tested component or 
system.  Such disabling of a certified system results in costly retest and 
recertification, resulting in a larger launch site processing workforce.  In this case, 
corrective maintenance activities include only those associated with LRU removal 
and replacement.  This requirement does not apply to unplanned repair at the 
launch site, build activities at the manufacturing site, or potential build up before 
system integration. 
3.9.7.6.3  Appropriate Clothing and Equipment 
[HS10011] The system shall provide for launch site processing and corrective and 
preventive maintenance by personnel wearing clothing and equipment appropriate to 
the environment during assembly and maintenance tasks. 
Rationale:  The flight system components/subsystems (e.g., Ares I stages and 
Orion SM and CM) must be able to be assembled and maintained by the ground 
crew with sufficient work envelope and other accommodation to accomplish tasks 
under the constraints demanded by the task.  The constraints for some tasks will 
include the use of protective equipment.  This protective equipment (e.g., SCAPE 
suits) may be bulky, which must be accommodated in the design.  In this case, 
corrective maintenance activities include only those associated with LRU removal 
and replacement.  This requirement does not apply to unplanned repair at the 
launch site, build activities at the manufacturing site, or potential build up before 
system integration. 
3.9.7.6.4  Inspection Access 
[HS10025] Vehicle components that require inspection shall be accessible during 
launch site processing. 
Rationale:  Access must be designed for because it is required for inspection. 
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3.9.7.6.5  Cable Access 
[HS8011] The system shall provide access to cables for scheduled inspections and 
maintenance during ground operations. 
Rationale:  Access to cables is required to ensure that ground personnel can see 
and reach cables for inspection and maintenance activities. 
3.9.7.6.6  External Service Points 
[HS8013] External service points for launch pad operations shall be located within 60 
degrees, radially, of the plane between the vehicle and the service structure. 
Rationale:  The intent of this requirement is to ensure that vehicle systems that 
require late servicing at the launch pad (e.g., filling, draining, purging, bleeding, 
etc.) can be serviced from the main pad structure without the need for additional 
service structures or high-risk human tasks.  This is a requirement on vehicle 
design that service points be oriented toward the service structure.  Examples of 
service points are those used for filling, draining, purging, or bleeding. 
3.9.7.6.7  Visual Line of Sight 
[HS8048] The system should provide direct line-of-sight visual access to all equipment, 
except blind-mate connectors, on which maintenance is performed by ground 
personnel, including maintenance that requires the use of PPE. 
Rationale:  Direct line-of-site visual access reduces the likelihood of human error 
that can occur when blind (by feel) operations or operations requiring the use of 
specialized tools (e.g., mirrors or bore scopes) are performed.  PPE may be 
required for certain maintenance activities and must be accommodated.  Direct 
line of sight for pin inspection is not required, though it is desired where possible.  
A blind-mate connector is one that is automatically de-mated and mated as a 
piece of equipment is removed and replaced. 
3.9.7.7  Damage/Hazard Controls 
3.9.7.7.1  Maintenance Without Damage 
[HS10019] The system shall allow corrective and preventive maintenance without 
damaging other components. 
Rationale:  Deintegration of certified flight components will require costly 
recertification if disturbed.  This requirement is intended to limit such 
recertification.  The intent is to maintain a flight configuration for systems that are 
not part of the maintenance.  In this case, corrective maintenance activities 
include only those associated with LRU removal and replacement.  This 
requirement does not apply to unplanned repair at the launch site, build activities 
at the manufacturing site, or potential build up before system integration. 
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3.9.7.7.2  Fluid Management 
[HS10020] The system shall provide a method for isolating, draining, or venting fluids 
for subsystems that contain pressurized fluids during launch site processing and ground 
maintenance. 
Rationale:  Isolation or disconnect valves are needed to permit isolation and 
servicing and to aid in leak detection.  These valves will also prevent spillage and 
release of fluids during removal or replacement.  For enclosed systems that do 
not contain isolation or disconnect valves, a provision to drain fluids or vent 
gases is needed.  The term fluids refers to both liquids and gases in the context 
of this requirement. 
3.9.7.7.3  Fluid Spillage Control 
[HS10021] The system shall control spillage and the release of fluids during launch site 
processing. 
Rationale:  Elements or systems must provide methods for controlling liquid and 
gas spills during ground assembly and maintenance activities. 
3.9.7.7.4  System Safing Controls 
[HS10022] The system shall provide controls that allow ground personnel to safe the 
system prior to performing maintenance. 
Rationale:  Elements or systems must provide methods for system safing during 
ground assembly and maintenance activities.  Controls may include cut-out 
switches, warning placards, guards, etc. 
3.9.7.7.5  Equipment Protection 
[HS10023] System hardware should be designed to prevent loss of form, fit, and 
function due to planned handling and servicing operations during launch site processing 
tasks. 
Rationale:  Components and LRUs that are susceptible to damage during 
assembly or maintenance activities should be protected from ground crew 
activities, taking into consideration the use of platforms, tethering devices, 
Personal Protective Equipment, and other tools.  Structural elements that might 
be utilized as supports should be either designed to support ground crew-
induced loads or protected in some manner.  This includes protrusions that 
resemble handles or steps that are not designed to be handles or steps.  Use of 
such protrusions to support either the hardware or the ground crew represents a 
hazard to both the equipment and personnel.  If the hardware cannot be 
protected through hardware design due to weight, space, or cost concerns, the 
use of removable GSE that protects the flight hardware and surrounding 
structure can be used.  The cost associated with this method is increased 
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processing complexity, which could lead to FOD, longer processing times, and 
overhead in tracking the removable GSE. 
3.9.7.7.6  Safety Displays 
[HS10029] The system shall provide displays that are within the field of view of the 
launch site personnel performing the task when the task could result in a hazard if not 
viewed directly. 
Rationale:  When performance of assembly or maintenance tasks requires that 
feedback be provided to the ground crew (e.g., bolt torque of a critical 
component), the ground crew must have clear view of the display.  Absence of 
such access to displays could result in a hazard to the ground personnel or 
hardware. 
3.9.7.7.7  Protrusion Label/Support 
[HS10043] The system shall design all accessible protrusions that could be 
inadvertently used as handles, steps, handrails, or mobility aids to either support the 
weight of personnel or clearly label them as keep-out zones. 
Rationale:  Historical experience with Shuttle and Station has shown that it is 
important to make it clear which parts of a vehicle may not be used as handles, 
steps, or handrails so that as ground and flight crews move around the vehicle 
they do not inadvertently damage delicate portions of the vehicle.  Preference 
should be given to designing to support in areas where ground and flight crews 
will travel frequently. 
3.9.8  Ground Information Management 
<Reserved> 
3.10  EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY (EVA) 
This section contains requirements that define the needs and limitations of the human 
that are considered during design of Constellation Systems that support suited 
operations. 
3.10.1  Suit Atmosphere 
3.10.1.1  Suit Pressure 
3.10.1.1.1  Suit Pressure Set-Point Selection 
[HS11000] The system shall provide the capability for the crew to select discrete suit 
pressure set-points within the suit operating pressure ranges. 
Rationale:  To implement the operational concepts possible in a variable 
pressure suit, the crew must be able to select the desired discrete pressure 
setting.  In order to alleviate initial symptoms of DCS, the crew will need to select 
a suit pressure of 8 psia. However, lower pressures optimize the work efficiency 
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of the pressurized suited crew.  For efficient workload, the crew needs to be able 
to select a minimum operating pressure.  In the case of an unrecoverable vehicle 
pressure failure lasting up to 144  hours where the crew is not able to prebreathe 
before operating in a pressurized suit, the crew will need to be able to select 8 
psia to mitigate the risk of DCS, followed by the ability to select a mid-range suit 
operating pressure to allow for more mobility to operate the vehicle.  During 
umbilical use, the suit depends on the vehicle to provide life support.  Vehicle life 
support systems are adjustable by both flight and ground crew as specified in 
HS3001. 
3.10.1.1.2  Maintain Suit Pressure Set-Point 
[HS11019] The system shall maintain each individual suit pressure within 0.1 psi after 
that suit has achieved an equilibrium pressure for a set point. 
Rationale:  Maintaining a constant pressure level after a set point has been 
reached is important to protect the crew from discomfort in body cavities and 
sinuses, especially in the ear.  Human tolerance of pressure changes can be 
found in HS3009.  Maintaining a constant pressure level is intended to protect 
the crew in the pressurized suit as well as in the habitable volume of the vehicle.  
It is planned to expose the crew to pressure changes during suited operations in 
order to accomplish safe EVA operations.  Because of these nominal pressure 
changes and the relatively small total pressure volume in the suit, it is important 
that the pressurized suited crewmember is exposed to a pressure set-point that 
is constant (unchanging).  Excess fluctuations in suit pressure will cause 
pressurized suited crewmembers to constantly re-equilibrate pressure in body 
cavities and sinuses, which will increase the likelihood of pressure induced 
discomfort in these areas.  During umbilical use, the suit depends on the vehicle 
to provide life support. 
3.10.1.1.3  Suit Pressure Pause 
[HS11001] The system shall allow the suited crew to stop and restart suit pressure 
increases. 
Rationale:  Pressure changes during suited operations can result in barotrauma 
to the crewmember if adequate time is not allowed for anatomical compartmental 
pressure equalization, e.g., sinuses or middle ear cavity.  The ability to stop 
pressure changes will allow the crewmember to equalize body cavity pressures.  
During umbilical use, the suit depends on the vehicle to provide life support.  
This requirement is not intended to allow the crewmember to stop emergency 
pressurization processes. 
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3.10.1.2  Thermal Environment for the Suited Crewmember 
3.10.1.2.1  Control of Heat Stored by Crewmembers during EVA and Pre-launch 
Operations 
[HS11002] The system shall prevent the energy stored by each crewmember during 
EVA operations from exceeding the limits defined by the range:  3.0 kJ/kg (1.3 BTU/lb) 
> ΔQ stored > -1.9 kJ/kg (-0.8 BTU/lb), where ΔQ stored is calculated using the 41-
Node man or Wissler model. 
Rationale:  This requirement applies to nominal microgravity EVA operations, 
nominal surface EVA operations, and pre-launch operations.  Heat stored by 
crewmembers during launch, landing, and off-nominal suited operations is 
covered in HS3037.  Calculation of heat storage or rejection (ΔQ stored) is per 
41-Node man or Wissler model.  The ΔQ stored equation is plotted in Appendix 
E, figure Heat Storage, to graphically show the boundaries of the human heat 
accumulation or rejection tolerance.  Heat accumulation excess heat load may 
quickly reach crew tolerance limits and may impair crew performance and health.  
Crew impairment begins when skin temperature increases greater than 1.4 ºC 
(2.5 ºF) (0.6 ºC [1 ºF] core) or if pulse is greater than 140 bpm.  Appendix E, 
table Core Temperature Range Limits and Associated Performance Decrements, 
identifies core temperature range limits and associated performance decrements.  
Keeping the crewmember heat storage value below the performance impairment 
line allows the crew the ability to conduct complex tasks without heat-induced 
degradation.  If the crewmember is in a suit, the heat load may increase rapidly.  
JSC thermoregulatory models (Wissler and 41-Node man) simulating hot cabin 
entries wearing launch and entry suits with the properties of the Advanced Crew 
Escape Suit (ACES) (thickness, conductance, wickability, emissivity) predicted 
loss of all body cooling mechanisms.  Supporting data from military aircrew 
protective ensembles suggest body temperature may increase more rapidly over 
time in ACES compared to a shirt-sleeve environment.  The current change in 
heat storage limit should allow nominal suited operations with crewmember 
metabolic rates of 528 to 2,220 kJ/hr (500 to 2,100 BTU/hr) without undue heat 
discomfort.  Heat rejection rationale:  If heat is removed from the body to the 
point of thermogenic shivering, crew task performance will be impaired in a 
similar fashion to excess heat storage.  Like the condition of excess heat storage, 
which can be mitigated by specialized cooling garments, excess heat rejection 
can be mitigated to some degree by the use of insulating garments.  Appendix E, 
figure Environmental Comfort Zone shows the effect of tolerance to cold 
temperature and wind by the addition of varying degrees of thermal protecting 
clothing.  Keeping the crewmember heat rejection value above the performance 
impairment line shown in Appendix E, figure Heat Storage allows the crew to 
conduct tasks without cold induced degradation.  During umbilical use, the suit 
depends on the vehicle to provide life support. 
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3.10.1.2.2  Crew Accessibility to Suit Temperature Controls 
[HS11022] Independent suit temperature set-point control shall be accessible by each 
suited crewmember during all nominal operations, including times when the crew is 
restrained. 
Rationale:  Each suited crewmember will need to control and adjust their 
individual suit temperature during all flight phases to ensure crew comfort for 
mission success. 
3.10.1.3  Deleted 
3.10.1.4  Radiation Monitoring for Suited Crewmembers 
3.10.1.4.1  Suited Radiation Dose Equivalent Monitoring 
[HS11023] The system shall provide an omnidirectional detector that can continuously 
measure and record the dose equivalent from charged particles with Linear Energy 
Transfer (LET) 0.2 to 300 keV/micrometer, as a function of time, at two shielding 
depths: 0.5 g cm-2 water equivalent and 3.0 g cm-2 water equivalent. 
Rationale:  The absorbed dose/dose equivalent instrument will be the primary 
instrument for controlling crew exposure during EVA.  The current exposure limit 
quantity for deterministic effects (short-term exposure limits) requires the 
determination of absorbed dose in depth.  The range of linear energy transfer of 
0.2 to 300 keV/μm includes the broad range expected from primary and 
secondary radiation of solar particle events.  It is expected that this requirement 
and the absorbed dose monitoring requirement will be met by the same 
instrument. 
3.10.1.4.2  Suited Radiation Absorbed Dose Monitoring 
[HS11024] The system shall provide an omnidirectional detector that can continuously 
measure and record the absorbed dose from charged particles with Linear Energy 
Transfer (LET) 0.2 to 300 keV/micrometer, as a function of time, at two shielding 
depths: 0.5 g cm-2 water equivalent and 3.0 g cm-2 water equivalent. 
Rationale:  The absorbed dose/dose equivalent instrument will be the primary 
instrument for controlling crew exposure during EVA.  The current exposure limit 
quantity for deterministic effects (short-term exposure limits) requires the 
determination of absorbed dose in depth.  The range of linear energy transfer of 
0.2 to 300 keV/μm includes the broad range expected from primary and 
secondary radiation of solar particle events.  It is expected that this requirement 
and the dose equivalent monitoring requirement will be met by the same 
instrument. 
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3.10.1.4.3  Stowage for Suit Dosimeters 
[HS11004] The system shall provide a stowage location for a removable personal 
passive dosimeter that is external to the crewmember's body and internal to the 
pressurized volume of the suit (excluding helmet, gloves, and boots). 
Rationale:  A personal passive dosimeter is required by the Code of Federal 
Regulations (CFR) and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) for monitoring astronaut radiation exposure.  Providing a stowage 
location on the Liquid Cooling and Ventilation Garment (LCVG), for example, will 
minimize crew overhead to don and doff this hardware.  The standard passive 
dosimeters used for ISS/Shuttle/Mir by US and Russian scientists are installed 
inside the pressurized part of the suit.  Placing dosimeters inside the pressurized 
suit allows for appropriate selection of shielding location that is representative of 
the skin dose/organ dose that the crewmember is receiving.  Current state of the 
art dosimeters used by US scientists require a presence of oxygen to function 
properly. 
3.10.2  Suited Visibility 
3.10.2.1  Visual Field of View for a Suited Crewmember 
[HS11005] The system shall provide a suit with an external, visual field of view to 
perform suited IVA and EVA operations. 
Rationale:  To enhance work efficiency index and mission success, the visor 
must have minimal interference with nominal visual acuity.  The visor should 
promote an adequate visual field of view to perform ground, IVA, and EVA tasks 
and prevent tunnel vision. 
3.10.2.2  Optical Quality for Suited Crewmembers 
[HS11006] The system shall provide optical quality to perform suited tasks. 
Rationale:  To enhance work efficiency index and mission success, the visor 
must have minimal interference with nominal visual acuity.  The visor should 
minimize haze, discoloration, and fog.  The optical properties of the helmet visor 
will be controlled via specifications for that end item. 
3.10.3  Crew Functions for the Suited Crewmember 
3.10.3.1  Nutrition for Suited Crewmembers 
3.10.3.1.1  In-Suit Nutrition During Surface EVA Operations 
[HS11007] As specified in HS6062, the system shall provide the capability for nutrition 
consumption while a crewmember is performing surface EVA operations. 
Rationale:  During a surface EVA, crewmembers will most likely be suited for 
10 hours with approximately 7 of those hours on the surface expending energy.  
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Nutritional supply during suited operations will allow the crewmembers to 
maintain high performance levels throughout the duration of the EVA.  Apollo 
summit strongly recommended the availability of a high energy substance, either 
liquid or solid, for consumption during a surface EVA.  This capability is not 
required during contingency microgravity EVAs and/or for EVAs less than 4 
hours in duration. 
3.10.3.1.2  In-Suit Nutrition During Unpressurized Vehicle Survival 
[HS11008] As specified in HS6062, the system shall provide the capability for nutrition 
consumption by a crewmember in a pressurized suit during unpressurized vehicle 
survival operations. 
Rationale:  During long-duration suited operations, such as an unplanned 
pressure reduction scenario, the crew will need to consume nutrition from an 
external source to maintain crew performance.  This requirement addresses 
delivery of nutrition to the crew during extended contingency use of pressure 
suits.  The nutrition in contingency cases such as unplanned cabin 
depressurization could be delivered via a hydration drink port similar to that used 
in Apollo and could consist of a low-residue substance. 
3.10.3.2  Hydration for Suited Crewmembers 
3.10.3.2.1  In-Suit Hydration During EVA 
[HS11009] As specified in HS6063, the system shall provide the capability for water 
consumption by a crewmember in a pressurized suit during EVA operations longer than 
4 hours. 
Rationale:  During a lunar EVA, crewmembers will most likely be suited for 
10 hours with approximately 7 of those hours expending energy on the lunar 
surface.  Potable water is necessary during suited operations to prevent 
dehydration due to insensible water loss and to improve crew comfort.  Apollo 
summit strongly recommended the availability of 8 ounces of water per hour for 
consumption during a lunar EVA with water available for contingency scenarios, 
such as a 10-km walk-back in case of rover failure.  The intent of this 
requirement is to allow the crew to have "instant" (less than 2 seconds) access to 
potable water at their discretion.  Having the potable water system be 
rechargeable from an external source is acceptable as long as the internal suit 
reservoir is sufficient capacity to allow ready access to water without impacting 
work efficiency. 
3.10.3.2.2  In-Suit Hydration during IVA 
[HS11010] The system shall provide the capability for water consumption by a 
crewmember in a pressurized suit during suited intravehicular operations. 
Rationale:  During long duration suited operations, such as an unplanned 
pressure reduction scenario, the crew will need to consume water from an 
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external source to prevent crew performance degradation associated with 
dehydration. 
3.10.3.3  Waste Management 
3.10.3.3.1  Vomitus in the Suit 
[HS11011] The system should provide for isolation of the crewmember from vomiting 
events of 0.5 L each as indicated in HS6013, table Vomitus Collection and 
Containment. 
Rationale:  Space Adaptation Syndrome has affected crewmembers in the first 
72 hours of flight.  The crew is nominally suited during the first 72 hours of flight 
for certain dynamic phases; vomiting in the suit may occur at these times or if a 
contingency EVA occurs within that time frame.  On the planetary surface, a high 
magnitude Solar Particle Event (SPE) could result in exposures that produce 
prodromal nausea and vomiting.  If vomitus enters the internal suit environment, 
ideally it should be kept away from the suited crewmember’s naso-pharyngeal 
space. 
3.10.3.3.2  Nominal Urine Collection in the Suit 
[HS11012] The system shall collect and contain 500 mL + 2t/24 L of urine, where t is 
suited duration in hours. 
Rationale:  This requirement allows crewmembers to eliminate liquid waste at 
their discretion without affecting work efficiency during suited operations.  The 
suit will only be responsible for the expected urinary output during the time that 
the crewmember is in the suit.  The expected daily urine output is 2 L per day.  
The minimum for a single void is 500 mL, and 2t/24 protects for a second void 
while suited.  Nominal urine output should not be accounted for during an 
unrecoverable vehicle pressure failure lasting up to 144 hours. 
3.10.3.3.3  Urine Collection - Suited Contingency 
[HS11013] The system shall collect and contain 1 L per day per crewmember of urine 
during an unrecoverable vehicle pressure failure. 
Rationale:  In the event of an unrecoverable vehicle pressure failure, the 
crewmembers will have to remain suited for up to 144 hours without having the 
capability to access the fecal and urine collection system.  The waste quantities 
reflect the altered composition of the nutrition supplied during contingency suited 
operations and are characteristically low in residue.  Nominal fecal and urine 
output should not be accounted for during an unrecoverable vehicle pressure 
failure lasting up to 144 hours. 
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3.10.3.3.4  Feces Collection - Suited Contingency 
[HS11014] The system shall collect and contain 75 grams (by mass) and 75 mL (by 
volume) of fecal matter per crewmember per day during an unrecoverable vehicle 
pressure failure. 
Rationale:  In the event of an unrecoverable vehicle pressure failure, the 
crewmembers will have to remain suited for up to 144 hours without having the 
capability to access the fecal and urine collection system.  The waste quantities 
reflect the altered composition of the nutrition supplied during contingency suited 
operations and are characteristically low in residue.  Nominal fecal and urine 
output should not be accounted for during an unrecoverable vehicle pressure 
failure lasting up to 144 hours. 
3.10.4  Prevention and Treatment of Decompression Sickness 
3.10.4.1  Denitrogenation 
[HS6091] The Constellation Architecture shall maintain the pressure and gaseous 
oxygen concentration for the required time durations specified per HS6091, table 
Prebreathe Durations for Contingency EVA and table Prebreathe Durations for 
Nonrecoverable Cabin Depress for denitrogenation of the crew. 
 
TABLE 3.10.4.1-1 - PREBREATHE DURATIONS FOR CONTINGENCY EVA  
 
 
Notes / Assumptions: 
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1. Prebreathe durations based on Tissue Bubble Dynamics Model regression with NASA Bends 1-7 
and DCS risk ≤15%   Model: 360MGMB0MCB1-7_120707  (BGI ≤ 34.9 = DCS ≤ 15%). 
2. Prebreathe durations do not include depress times from prebreathe pressure to EVA suit 
pressure.  
3. Prebreathe durations assume 0.74PSI/min depress rates on 95% O2 from prebreathe pressure to 
suit pressure, except for 14.7 -10.2 PSI depress, for which a 15 minute depress on 95% O2 is 
assumed.  
4. Prebreathe performed prior to a nominal 101 - 70 kPa depress is performed entirely at starting 
saturation pressure.  
5. Prebreathe durations subsequent to nominal 101 - 70 kPa depress assume on mask at 95% O2 
during 60 min depress from 101 kPa to 70 kPa (45 mins at 101 kPa, 15 minute depress from 101 - 
70 kPa, all on 95% O2). 
6. Prebreathe times are not applicable to surface EVAs.  
7. Prebreathe is assumed to begin after 95% O2 has been achieved; and 95% O2 concentration 
maintained throughout the entire prebreathe duration. 
8. Deviations from stated assumptions may affect prebreathe durations.  
9. Contingency EVA prebreathe durations based on 6hr EVA, 95% O2 (4 hr planned, could go longer 
so conservatively use 6 hrs as we do for shuttle and ISS ops). 
10. Assume minimum 18hrs at 70 kPa 26.5% O2 (CEV) or 55 kPa 32% O2 (LSAM) between 6 hr 
EVAs by same crewmember.  
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TABLE 3.10.4.1-2 - PREBREATHE DURATIONS FOR NON-RECOVERABLE CABIN 
DEPRESS  
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Notes / Assumptions: 
1. Prebreathe durations based on Tissue Bubble Dynamics Model regression with NASA Bends 1-7 
and DCS risk ≤15% Model: 360MGMB0MCB1-7_120707  (BGI ≤ 34.9 = DCS ≤ 15%). 
2. Prebreathe durations do not include depress times from nominal cabin pressure to prebreathe 
pressure and from prebreathe pressure to EVA suit pressure.  
3. Prebreathe durations assume 0.74PSI/min depress rates on 95% O2 from prebreathe pressure to 
suit pressure, except for 14.7 -10.2 PSI depress, for which a 15 minute depress on 95% O2 is 
assumed.  
4. Prebreathe performed prior to a nominal 101 - 70 kPa depress is performed entirely at starting 
saturation pressure.  
5. Prebreathe durations subsequent to nominal 101 - 70 kPa depress assume on mask at 95% O2 
during 60 min depress from 101 kPa to 70 kPa (45 mins at 101 kPa, 15 minute depress from 101 - 
70 kPa, all on 95% O2). 
6. Contingency cabin depressurization scenario assumes immediate depress (at 0.74PSI/min) from 
previous cabin pressure to 55 kPa (i.e. no prebreathe performed before depress to 55 kPa).  
Listed prebreathe performed at 55 kPa. The capability to perform at least some prebreathe before 
depress to 55 kPa would reduce prebreathe times in some instances but that capability was not 
assumed.   
7. Prebreathe durations during cabin depressurizations assume repress on 95% O2 from 41 kPa (6 
psid) to 55 kPa (8 psid) following 15 minute pop-downs. 15 minute pop-downs do not include 
depress and repress time i.e. they include 15 minutes at 41 kPa.  
8. Prebreathe times are not applicable to surface EVAs.  
9. Prebreathe is assumed to begin after 95% O2 has been achieved; and 95% O2 concentration 
maintained throughout the entire prebreathe duration. 
10. Deviations from stated assumptions may affect prebreathe durations.  
11. Prebreathe durations based on 120+ hr contingency suited operations, 95% O2.  
 
Rationale:  Standardization of nitrogen washout (prebreathe) will reduce the risk 
of decompression sickness to within acceptable limits during reduced pressure 
operations.  HS6091, table Prebreathe Durations for Contingency EVA and table 
Prebreathe Durations for Nonrecoverable Cabin Depress were developed to 
calculate total crewmember prebreathe durations during various Design 
Reference Missions (DRMs).  The duration of the required prebreathes vary with 
pressure and oxygen concentration levels.  These values have been placed in 
the requirement as design drivers for the system architecture, such as tank size.  
Several notes and assumptions were considered when calculating these values.  
These notes and assumptions can be found in HS6091, table Prebreathe 
Durations for Contingency EVA and table Prebreathe Durations for 
Nonrecoverable Cabin Depress.  This requirement will be met by integrated 
systems with the details of each system's responsibility in individual system 
SRDs and in IRDs.  For the nonrecoverable cabin depressurization scenario 
HS6091, table Prebreathe Durations for Nonrecoverable Cabin Depress, it is 
assumed that prebreathe is performed at 55 kPa (8.0 psid) (414 mmHg).  
However, the reduced mobility that is allowed by the suit at 55 kPa may preclude 
the performance of critical tasks immediately following the depressurization 
event.  In recognition of this determination, scenarios were also modeled wherein 
suit pressure was dropped to 41 kPa (6.0 psid) (310 mmHg) for 15 minutes 
during the first and/or second hour post-depress (referred to as "pop-downs").  In 
all cases, the total time required after cabin depressurization before 
crewmembers can remain at 30 kPa (4.3 psid) (222.4 mmHg) is also shown.  
Also shown is the maximum time that could be spent at 41 kPa (6.0 psid) 
immediately following a depressurization while still remaining within the 15% 
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DCS risk.  In some such cases, it is necessary to return to 55 kPa (8.0 psid) for 
additional prebreathe after spending the maximum possible time at 41 kPa 
(6.0 sid), while in other cases it is possible to depress from 41 kPa (6.0 psid) 
directly to 30 kPa (4.3 psid) (indicated where the "maximum stay at 41 kPa 
[6.0 sid] [310 mmHg] with DCS risk ≤15%" is the same as the "total time since 
cabin depress before indefinite stay at 30 kPa").  Prebreathe durations were 
estimated using a physics-based Tissue Bubble Dynamics Model (TBDM) that 
provides a time-varying index of theoretical physiological decompression stress 
given inputs of the variations in pressure and gas composition during various 
Design Reference Mission (DRM) scenarios.  A BGI≤34.9=DCS≤15% was used 
in these calculations to protect the crewmember from a Type II DCS hit.  A 
BGI≤34.9=DCS≤15% is the threshold at which no Type II DCS hit has been 
observed in the past.  Additional information on the TBDM can be found in CAIT 
IDAQ4 SIG-05-1034 Denitrogenation and Decompression Sickness (DCS) TDS. 
3.10.4.2  DCS Event Pressure 
[HS6100] The Constellation Architecture shall provide a minimum crewmember initial 
saturation pressure to a DCS-affected crewmember within 20 minutes of a DCS event. 
Rationale:  DCS is a potential hazard of space flight and EVA due to changes in 
the operational pressure environment.  Rapid and appropriate intervention is 
required to optimize the outcome for the affected crewmember.  If treatment for 
DCS is instituted within 20 minutes of onset of symptoms, then the outcome of 
therapy has a higher probability of success and will likely require less magnitude 
and duration of hyperbaric oxygen therapy.  The requirement is, therefore, to 
have the crewmember back to their initial saturation pressure within 20 minutes, 
which may resolve DCS symptoms.  Initial saturation pressure is defined as the 
highest pressure to which the crewmember has been exposed during the 36 ours 
prior to beginning the EVA.  Beyond 20 minutes, higher pressures may be 
required to address DCS symptoms.  The US Navy Treatment, Table 6 
(treatment in a hyperbaric treatment facility) is the terrestrial standard for treating 
most forms of DCS; however, the terrestrial standard will not be achievable, or 
required, because the resource required to support it would be prohibitive and 
the expected outcomes from sub-terrestrial standard therapy are likely to be 
adequate for "altitude-induced" DCS symptoms.  Instead of a multi-place 
hyperbaric chamber, treatment vessels for the delivery of space DCS treatment 
may include pressure suits, airlocks, and vehicle habitable volumes, which may 
be used independently or in combination to achieve specified pressures and 
enriched/hyperbaric oxygen treatment.  The treatment plan will also include 
specific diagnostic and therapeutic procedures based on the severity of DCS 
symptoms observed and may include fluids (intravenous or oral), anti-
inflammatory medications, etc, and/or guidance for decisions on return 
contingencies and plans for terrestrial response after deorbit of the crewmembers 
with DCS. 
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3.10.4.3  DCS Over-Pressurization 
[HS6081] The system shall provide a pressure of 156.5 kPa (22.7 psia) (1,174 mmHg) 
to a DCS-affected crewmember, within 2 hours of a DCS event, for a minimum of 6 
hours. 
Rationale:  DCS is a potential hazard of space flight and EVA due to changes in 
the operational pressure environment.  Following initial treatment of DCS 
symptoms with hyperoxic pressure, it is usually necessary to provide follow-on 
treatment with higher levels of pressure for treatment of unresolved or recurrent 
DCS symptoms or prevention of recurrent symptoms.  In order to prevent 
progression of DCS symptoms or the development of DCS-induced deficits or 
permanent sequelae, in cases of unresolved or recurrent DCS symptoms, it is 
necessary to provide prompt pressure to the crewmember, above that of the 
starting vehicular pressure.  Rapid and appropriate intervention is required to 
optimize the outcome for the affected crewmembers.  The US Navy Treatment, 
Table 6 (treatment in a hyperbaric treatment facility) is the terrestrial standard for 
treating most forms of DCS; however, the terrestrial standard will not be 
achievable, or required, because the resources required to support it would be 
prohibitive and the expected outcomes from sub-terrestrial standard therapy are 
likely to be adequate for "altitude-induced" DCS symptoms.  Instead, treatment 
vessels for the delivery of hyperbaric oxygen may include pressure suits, 
airlocks, and vehicle habitable volumes, which may be used independently or in 
combination to achieve specified pressures.  The pressure 156.5 kPa (22.7 psia) 
(1174 mmHg) is chosen to match current DCS treatment capability on the ISS 
consisting of 101.4 kPa (14.7 psia) (760 mmHg) vehicular +55.2 kPa (8.0 psia) 
(413 mmHg) -57.2 kPa (8.3 psia) (429 mmHg) Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) 
suit pressure when operating the Bends Treatment Apparatus.  The DCS 
treatment pressure may be achieved by a combination of pressure vessels to 
include maximal vehicular or airlock pressure + maximal suit pressure.  If the 
assumption of maximal operating lunar pressure is 72.4 kPa (10.5 psia) (543 
mmHg) + suit is 56.5 kPa (8.2 psia) (424 mmHg), then the airlock or portable 
chamber would need to provide an additional 27.6 kPa (4 psia) (207 mmHg) of 
pressure to meet this requirement.  The treatment plan will also include specific 
diagnostic and therapeutic procedures including guidance for decisions on return 
contingencies and plans for terrestrial response return of the crewmembers with 
DCS, if return is required based on incomplete response to treatment.  Late 
onset or severe DCS requires higher pressures to treat but should still be 
administered as quickly as possible following the onset of symptoms for 
maximum effectiveness.  For the scenario when the vehicle cannot maintain 
pressure such as the uncontrolled cabin depressurization contingency (120-
hour), then 156.5 kPa (22.7 psia) (1,174 mmHg) DCS treatment pressure will not 
be obtainable. In this case, the architecture must provide a minimum of 55.2 kPa 
(8 psia) (413 mmHg) greater than ambient pressure for a minimum of 6 hours. 
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3.10.5  Data for Physiological Parameters 
3.10.5.1  Measurement of Physiological Parameters 
[HS11015] The Constellation Architecture shall measure physiological parameters for 
suited operations as shown in HS11015, table Measurement of Physiological 
Parameters. 
TABLE 3.10.5.1-1 - MEASUREMENT OF PHYSIOLOGICAL PARAMETERS  
Suit Parameter 
Unpressurized 
and Ventilation 
Pressure 
Operations 
Pressurized 
Operations 
Lunar Surface 
Operations 
Breathing gas flow rate (real-time) X X X 
ppO2 X X  
Oxygen consumption rate (real-time)    X 
Suit pressure (real-time)  X X 
ppCO2 (real-time)  X X 
Consumables (power, oxygen, water, etc., 
real-time) X X X 
Thermal loading to each EVA crewmember 
(calculated)   X 
Heart rate (real-time)  X X 
Metabolic Rate (calculated)    X 
Radiation Exposure Data    X 
Notes:    
• For suited operations, measure the parameters in gray on an individual suit basis. 
• For a single gas environment, ppO2 and total suit pressure are identical values and do not 
require separate sensors.  Otherwise for a mixed gas environment, measure these two 
parameters individually. 
 
Rationale:  Measurement, display, and transmission of biomedical data will 
maximize crew resource management for EVA and minimize the risk for the 
crewmembers during off-nominal operations.  Feedback of relevant suit 
atmospheric and physiologic information to the crew will allow better consumable 
management, improve optimization of EVA task performance, and reduce the 
risk of physiologic stress/injury.  Measurement of physiological parameters during 
contingency and mission-preserving EVA, as well as during unrecoverable 
vehicle pressure loss, is necessary to ensure the health and safety of the 
crewmembers.  The intent is to obtain biomedical data during suited operations 
with minimal crew time or effort required to don/doff the measurement hardware 
while maintaining crew comfort.  Although core temperature monitoring is not a 
requirement for suited operations, the suits shall provide other markers (liquid 
cooling garment inlet/outlet temperatures, heart rate, O2 consumption, and CO2 
Revision:  E Document No:  CxP 70024 
Release Date:  11/19/10 Page:  177 of 503 
Title:  Constellation Program Human-Systems Integration Requirements 
 
concentration) of thermal status.  For a single gas environment, ppO2 and total 
suit pressure are identical values and do not require separate sensors.  
Pressurized operations includes any microgravity EVA, DCS treatment, and 
unpressurized cabin IVA events.  This requirement will be met by integrated 
systems with the details of each system's responsibility defined in individual 
system SRDs and in IRDs. 
3.10.5.2  Display of Physiological Parameters 
[HS11016] The Constellation Architecture shall display physiological parameters to the 
flight crew for suited operations as shown in HS11016, table Display of Physiological 
Parameters. 
TABLE 3.10.5.2-1 - DISPLAY OF PHYSIOLOGICAL PARAMETERS  
Suit Parameter 
Unpressurized 
and Ventilation 
Pressure 
Operations 
Pressurized 
Operations 
Lunar Surface 
Operations 
Breathing gas flow rate (real-time) X X X 
ppO2 X X  
Oxygen consumption rate (real-time)   X 
Suit pressure (real-time)  X X 
ppCO2 (real-time)  X X 
Consumables (power, oxygen, water, 
etc., real-time) X X X 
Thermal loading to each EVA 
crewmember (calculated)   X 
Heart rate (real-time)   X 
Metabolic Rate (calculated)   X 
Radiation Exposure Data   X 
Notes:     
• For suited operations, measure the parameters in gray on an individual suit basis as 
specified in HS11015 and display them individually. 
• For a single gas environment, ppO2 and total suit pressure are identical values and do 
not require separate sensors.  Otherwise for a mixed gas, measure these two parameters 
individually as specified in HS11015. 
• For both unpressurized and ventilation pressure operations and pressurized operations 
display these parameters to the crew; however, all individual suited crewmembers are not 
required to view them. 
• For lunar surface operations, display all parameters to the individual suited crewmember. 
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Rationale:  Feedback of relevant suit atmospheric and physiologic information to 
the flight crew will allow better consumable management, improve optimization of 
EVA task performance, and reduce the risk of physiologic stress/injury.  Having 
insight into trends in physiological parameters and life-sustaining consumables 
will allow the IVA or EVA crew to act prospectively in preventing unsafe operating 
conditions, or responding to off-nominal scenarios.  Pressurized operations 
includes any microgravity EVA, DCS treatment, and unpressurized cabin IVA 
events.  This requirement will be met by integrated systems with the details of 
each system's responsibility defined in individual system SRDs and in IRDs. 
3.10.5.3  Alert for Off-Nominal Physiological Parameters 
[HS11017] The Constellation Architecture shall provide alerts to the flight crew for off-
nominal physiological parameters during suited operations as shown in HS11017, table 
Alerting for Off-Nominal Physiological Parameters. 
TABLE 3.10.5.3-1 - ALERTING FOR OFF-NOMINAL PHYSIOLOGICAL PARAMETERS  
Suit Parameter 
Unpressurized 
and Ventilation 
Pressure 
Operations 
Pressurized 
Operations 
Lunar 
Surface 
Operations 
Breathing gas flow rate (real-time)  X X 
ppO2    
Oxygen consumption rate (real-
time)   X 
Suit pressure (real-time)  X X 
ppCO2 (real-time).  X X 
Consumables (power, oxygen, 
water, etc., real-time)  X X 
Thermal loading to each EVA 
crewmember (calculated)   X 
Heart rate (real-time)    
Metabolic Rate (calculated)   X 
Radiation Exposure Data   X 
Notes:     
• For suited operations, measure the parameters in gray on an individual suit basis as 
specified in HS11015 and alert individually. 
• For a single gas environment, ppO2 and total suit pressure are identical values and do 
not require separate sensors.  Otherwise for a mixed gas environment, measure these 
two parameters individually as specified in HS11015. 
 
Rationale:  Alerting the crew as soon as relevant suit atmospheric and 
physiologic parameters move into the off-nominal range will allow the crew to 
appropriately react to off-nominal scenarios prior to development of unsafe 
operations.  Pressurized operations includes any microgravity EVA, DCS 
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treatment, and unpressurized cabin IVA events.  This requirement will be met by 
integrated systems with the details of each system's responsibility defined in 
individual system SRDs and in IRDs. 
3.10.5.4  Telemetry of Physiological Parameters 
[HS11018] The Constellation Architecture shall send telemetry of physiological 
parameters for suited operations as shown in HS11018, table Telemetry of 
Physiological Parameters. 
TABLE 3.10.5.4-1 - TELEMETRY OF PHYSIOLOGICAL PARAMETERS  
Suit Parameter 
Unpressurized 
and Ventilation 
Pressure 
Operations 
Pressurized 
Operations 
Lunar Surface 
Operations 
Breathing gas flow rate (real-time) X X X 
ppO2 X X  
Oxygen consumption rate (real-time)   X 
Suit pressure (real-time)  X X 
ppCO2 (real-time).  X X 
Consumables (power, oxygen, water, 
etc., real-time) X X X 
Thermal loading to each EVA 
crewmember (calculated)   X 
Heart rate (real-time)  X X 
Metabolic Rate (calculated)   X 
Radiation Exposure Data   X 
Notes:     
• For suited operations, measure the parameters in gray on an individual suit basis as 
specified in HS11015 and telemeter individually. 
• For a single gas environment, ppO2 and total suit pressure are identical values and do not 
require separate sensors.  Otherwise for a mixed gas environment, measure these two 
parameters individually as specified in HS11015.  
 
Rationale:  Ground medical support and crewmembers will need to see 
biomedical telemetry during contingency and mission-preserving EVA, as well as 
during unrecoverable vehicle pressure loss, to ensure the health and safety of 
the crewmembers and to provide appropriate information to the Flight Director.  
Supervision of the biomedical data and relevant suit atmospheric conditions will 
maximize crew resource management for the event and minimize the risk for the 
crewmembers.  These data will also be monitored during nominal lunar surface 
operations to ensure the health and safety of the crew, although automated suit 
algorithms may be the primary method rather than ground medical support.  
Although core temperature monitoring is not a requirement for suited operations, 
the suits shall provide other markers (liquid cooling garment inlet/outlet 
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temperatures, heart rate, O2 consumption, and CO2 concentration) of thermal 
status.  Pressurized operations includes any microgravity EVA, DCS treatment, 
and unpressurized cabin IVA events.  This requirement will be met by integrated 
systems with the details of each system's responsibility defined in individual 
system SRDs and in IRDs. 
4  HUMAN-SYSTEMS VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS 
4.1  ANTHROPOMETRY, BIOMECHANICS, AND STRENGTH 
4.1.1  Anthropometry 
 4.1.1.1  Anthropometric Dimensions for Unsuited Crewmembers 
[HS2001V] The fit, access, reach, view, and operation shall be verified by analysis and 
test.  The analysis shall include review of designs, drawings, flight-like mockups, and 
flight-like prototypes and extraction of measurements to compare against the 
information contained in Appendix B, tables Anthropometric Dimensional Data for 
American Female and Male, Vehicle Design Critical Anthropometry Dimensions, and 
Suit Design Critical Anthropometry Dimensions.  The analysis shall consist of task and 
worksite analysis performed on all crew functional areas.  The test shall measure the 
crew while physically interacting with a crew functional area within a flight or flight 
equivalent mockup.  The analysis and test results shall be verified against Appendix B, 
tables Anthropometric Dimensional Data for American Female and Male, Vehicle 
Design Critical Anthropometry Dimensions, and Suit Design Critical Anthropometry 
Dimensions by means of population analytical methods.  The verification shall be 
considered successful when the analysis and test show that the measurements have 
been met and that the entire range of unsuited crew can fit, access, reach, view, and 
operate all the human-systems interfaces. 
Rationale:  It is necessary to ensure that all human-systems interfaces do 
accommodate the entire current and future crew whose body dimensions have a 
specified range.  Inspection provides the opportunity to inspect and measure 
hardware dimensions that can be compared against the anthropometric 
dimensional ranges.  Task and worksite analyses provide the opportunity to test 
the interfaces with a limited number of human test subjects.  Hence, they will only 
provide the partial results on the test subjects.  Therefore, a population analysis 
is a necessary analytical method to ensure that all current and future 
crewmembers are able to interface with the system hardware. 
 4.1.1.2  Anthropometric Dimensions for Suited Crewmembers 
[HS2002V] The fit, access, reach, view, and operation shall be verified by analysis and 
test.  The analysis shall include review of designs, drawings, flight-like mockups, and 
flight-like prototypes and extraction of measurements to compare against the 
information contained in Appendix B, table Vehicle Design Critical Anthropometry 
Dimensions and table Suit Design Critical Anthropometry Dimensions.  The analysis 
shall consist of task and worksite analysis performed on all crew functional areas.  The 
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test shall measure the crew while physically interacting with a crew functional area 
within a flight or flight equivalent mockup.  The analysis and test results shall be verified 
against Appendix B, table Vehicle Design Critical Anthropometry Dimensions and table 
Suit Design Critical Anthropometry Dimensions by means of population analytical 
methods.  The verification shall be considered successful when the analysis and test 
show that the measurements have been met, and that the entire range of suited crew 
can fit, access, reach, view, and operate all the human-systems interfaces. 
Rationale:  It is necessary to ensure that all human-systems interfaces do 
accommodate the entire current and future crew whose body dimensions have a 
specified range.  Inspection provides the opportunity to inspect and measure 
hardware dimensions that can be compared against the anthropometric 
dimensional ranges.  Task and worksite analyses provide the opportunity to test 
the interfaces with a limited number of suited human test subjects.  Hence, they 
will only provide the partial results on the test subjects.  Therefore, a population 
analysis is a necessary analytical method to ensure that all current and future 
crewmembers are able to interface with the system hardware. 
4.1.2  Range of Motion 
 4.1.2.1  Range of Motion of an Unsuited Crewmember 
[HS2003V] The unsuited crewmember range of motion shall be verified by analysis and 
test.  The analysis shall include the review of designs, drawings, flight-like mockups, 
and flight-like prototypes and extraction of measurements to compare against the 
information in Appendix B, table Unsuited Joint Mobility.  The analysis shall consist of 
task and worksite analyses performed on all crew functional areas.  The test shall 
measure the crew while physically interacting with a crew functional area within a flight 
or flight equivalent mockup.  The analysis and test results shall be verified against 
Appendix B, table Unsuited Joint Mobility by means of population analytical methods.  
The verification shall be considered successful when the analysis and test show that the 
measurements have been met and that the unsuited crew can physically interact within 
the crewmember ranges of motion. 
Rationale:  It is necessary to ensure that all human-systems interfaces 
accommodate the entire current and future crew whose ranges of motion have a 
specified range.  Inspection provides the opportunity to inspect and measure 
hardware dimensions that can be compared against the range of motion ranges.  
Task and worksite analyses provide the opportunity to test the interfaces with a 
limited number of human test subjects.  Hence, they will only provide the partial 
results on the test subjects.  Therefore, a population analysis is a necessary 
analytical method to ensure that all current and future unsuited crewmembers are 
able to interface with the system hardware. 
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 4.1.2.2  Range of Motion of a Suited Crewmember 
[HS2004V] The suited crewmember range of motion shall be verified by analysis and 
test.  The analysis shall include the review of designs, drawings, flight-like mockups, 
and flight-like prototypes and extraction of measurements to compare against the 
information in Appendix B, table Unpressurized Suited Joint Mobility and table 
Pressurized Suited Joint Mobility for Nominal Pressure Microgravity Operations.  The 
analysis shall consist of task and worksite analyses performed on all crew functional 
areas.  The test shall measure the crew while physically interacting with a crew 
functional area within a flight or flight equivalent mockup.  The analysis and test results 
shall be verified against Appendix B, table Unpressurized Suited Joint Mobility and table 
Pressurized Suited Joint Mobility for Nominal Pressure Microgravity Operations by 
means of population analytical methods.  The verification shall be considered 
successful when the analysis and test show that the measurements have been met and 
that the suited crew can physically interact within the crewmember ranges of motion. 
Rationale:  It is necessary to ensure that all human-systems interfaces 
accommodate the entire current and future suited crew whose ranges of motion 
have a specified range.  The test provides the opportunity to measure the crew 
while physically interacting with the hardware and can be compared against the 
range of motion ranges.  Task and worksite analyses provide the opportunity to 
test the interfaces with a limited number of human test subjects.  Hence, they will 
only provide the partial results on the test subjects.  Therefore, a population 
analysis is a necessary analytical method to ensure that all current and future 
suited crewmembers are able to interface with the system hardware. 
4.1.3  Mass Properties 
 4.1.3.1  Total Crew Control Mass 
[HS2010V] The capability to deliver total crew mass to destination and return to earth 
shall be verified by analysis.  The analysis shall consider vehicle, cargo, and crew 
mass; flight performance; and center of gravity of the crewed launch vehicles and 
spacecraft.  The verification shall be considered successful when the analysis shows 
that the crew mass delivered capability of the system is equal to or greater than the 
value in HS2010, table Total Crew Control Mass. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.1.3.2  Mass Properties of an Unsuited Crewmember 
[HS2005V] Not Applicable. 
 4.1.3.3  Mass Properties of a Suited Crewmember 
[HS2006V] Sustaining the maximum mass of a suited subject for human system 
interfaces shall be verified by analysis.  The analysis shall include the review of designs, 
drawings, flight-like mockups, and flight-like prototypes and strength computations to 
compare against the information in Appendix B, table Whole-Body Mass of 
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Crewmember.  The analysis shall be performed to determine if damage will occur on 
those human-systems interfaces that are normally subjected to high forces during 
normal operation and emergency operations.  The verification shall be considered 
successful when the analysis shows that the vehicle systems with human interfaces 
accommodate the maximum suited crewmember mass per Appendix B, table Whole-
Body Mass of Crewmember. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.1.4  Strength 
 4.1.4.1  Structural Integrity of Hardware for an Unsuited Crewmember 
[HS2007V] "Maximum Crew Operational Loads" by unsuited crew shall be verified by 
analysis.  The analysis shall include the review of designs, drawings, flight-like 
mockups, and flight-like prototypes and extraction of measurements to compare against 
the information in Appendix B, table Unsuited Strength Data.  The structural analysis 
shall be performed to determine if damage will occur on those components that are 
normally subjected to high forces during normal operation and emergency operations.  
The analysis results shall be verified against Appendix B, table Unsuited Strength Data.  
The verification shall be considered successful when the analysis shows that the 
strength measurements have been met and that the unsuited crewmember can 
physically interact within the components/systems. 
Rationale:  It is necessary to ensure that all human-system interfaces do 
accommodate the entire current and future crew structural limits.  Analysis 
provides the opportunity to measure hardware dimensions that can be compared 
against the structural limits.  Task and worksite analyses provide the opportunity 
to verify human interfaces.  A population analysis is a necessary analytical 
method to ensure that all current and future crewmembers are able to interface 
with the system hardware. 
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 4.1.4.2  Structural Integrity of Hardware for a Suited Crewmember 
[HS2007BV] Not Applicable. 
 4.1.4.3  Minimum Crew Operational Loads for an Unsuited Crewmember 
[HS2008V] "Minimum Crew Operational Loads" for unsuited crew shall be verified by 
analysis and test.  The analysis shall include the review of designs, drawings, flight-like 
mockups, and flight-like prototypes and extraction of measurements to compare against 
the information in Appendix B, table Unsuited Strength Data.  The analysis shall be 
performed to determine if crewmembers can operate all components.  The test shall 
consist of a set of tasks to test the minimum operational loads required by the 
components.  The analysis and test results shall be verified against Appendix B, table 
Unsuited Strength Data by means of population analytical methods.  The verification 
shall be considered successful when the analysis and test show that the strength 
measurements have been met and that the crewmember can physically interact and 
operate all components. 
Rationale:  It is necessary to ensure that all human-systems interfaces do 
accommodate the entire current and future Minimum Crew Operational Load 
limits.  Analysis and testing provide the opportunity to determine that hardware is 
within the Minimum Crew Operational Loads limits.  Therefore, analysis and 
testing is necessary to ensure that all current and future crewmembers are able 
to interface and operate with the system hardware. 
 4.1.4.4  Minimum Crew Operational Loads for a Suited Crewmember 
[HS2008BV] Not Applicable. 
 4.1.4.5  Equipment Damage Hazard 
[HS2009V] The systems' withstanding of crew-induced loads will be verified by analysis.  
The analysis shall show that the system components have the ability to withstand crew 
induced loads as documented per CxP 70136-ANX01, Constellation Program Loads 
Data Book, Annex 1:  System-to-System Interface Loads, Section 3.0 and CxP 70135, 
Constellation Program Structural Design and Verification Requirements, Section 3.0.  
The verification shall be considered successful when the analysis shows positive 
margins of safety for the system components. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
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4.2  NATURAL AND INDUCED ENVIRONMENTS 
4.2.1  Atmosphere 
4.2.1.1  Atmospheric Quality for Nominal Vehicle Operations 
 4.2.1.1.1  Total Pressure for Nominal Vehicle Operations 
[HS3004V] Maintaining total internal pressure within the specified range shall be 
verified by analysis supported by test.  The analysis shall include a review of the vehicle 
design and the measurements of total internal pressure during operation of an 
integrated vehicle system.  At the vehicle or subsystem level, a test shall be performed 
using the vehicle's pressure control system in a controlled volume (i.e., pressure or 
vacuum chamber) with actual or simulated metabolic loads over the maximum mission 
duration to verify total internal pressure control.  The verification shall be considered 
successful when the test and analysis data show that the vehicle can maintain total 
pressure of the internal atmosphere within 51.7 kPa (7.50 psia) (388 mmHg) and 
103 Pa  (15.0 psia) (773 mmHg). 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.2.1.1.2  O2 Partial Pressure for Nominal Vehicle Operations 
[HS3004BV] The maintenance of oxygen partial pressure shall be verified by analysis 
supported by test.  The analysis shall include a review of the vehicle design and the 
measurements of partial pressure oxygen during operation of an integrated vehicle 
system.  At the vehicle or subsystem level, a test shall be performed using the vehicle's 
pressure control system in a controlled volume (i.e., pressure or vacuum chamber) with 
actual or simulated metabolic loads over the maximum mission duration to verify oxygen 
partial pressure control.  The verification shall be considered successful when the test 
and analysis data show that the vehicle can maintain the partial pressure oxygen of the 
internal atmosphere within the ranges described in the requirement. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.2.1.1.3  CO2 Partial Pressure for Nominal Vehicle Operations 
[HS3004CV] The maintenance of carbon dioxide partial pressure shall be verified by 
analysis supported by test.  The analysis shall include a review of the vehicle design 
and the measurements of partial pressure carbon dioxide during operation of an 
integrated vehicle system.  At the vehicle or subsystem level, a test shall be performed 
using the vehicle's pressure control system and the contaminant control system in a 
controlled volume (i.e., pressure or vacuum chamber) with actual or simulated metabolic 
loads over the maximum mission duration to verify carbon dioxide partial pressure 
control.  The verification shall be considered successful when the test and analysis data 
show that the vehicle can maintain the partial pressure of carbon dioxide in the internal 
atmosphere to less than 0.67 kPa (0.10 psi) (5.0 mmHg) average over any 1-hour 
timeframe. 
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Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.2.1.1.4  N2 Partial Pressure for Nominal Vehicle Operations 
[HS3004DV] The maintenance of partial pressure nitrogen shall be verified by analysis 
and test.  The analysis shall include a review of the vehicle design and the 
measurements of partial pressure nitrogen during operation of an integrated vehicle 
system test.  The verification shall be considered successful when the analysis shows 
that the vehicle can maintain the partial pressure nitrogen of the internal atmosphere 
within the ranges described in the requirement. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.2.1.2  Atmospheric Quality Limits for Crew Exposure 
 4.2.1.2.1  Total Pressure Tolerance Ranges for Crew Exposure 
[HS3005V] The maintenance of atmospheric pressure shall be verified by analysis 
supported by test.  The analysis shall include a review of the vehicle design and the 
measurements of atmospheric pressure during operation of an integrated vehicle 
system under nominal conditions.  At the vehicle or subsystem level, a test shall be 
performed using the vehicle's pressure control system in a controlled volume (i.e., 
pressure or vacuum chamber) with actual or simulated metabolic loads over the 
maximum mission duration to verify atmospheric pressure control.  The verification shall 
be considered successful when the test and analysis data show that the vehicle can 
maintain pressure of the internal atmosphere within the limits specified in HS3005, table 
Physiological Total Pressure Limits for Crew Exposure. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.2.1.2.2  O2 Partial Pressure Tolerance Ranges for Crew Exposure 
[HS3005BV] Maintaining the operating limits of the oxygen partial pressure shall be 
verified by analysis supported by test.  The analysis shall include a review of the vehicle 
design and the measurements of partial pressure oxygen during operation of an 
integrated vehicle system.  At the vehicle or subsystem level, a test shall be performed 
using the pressure control system of the vehicle in a controlled volume (i.e., pressure or 
vacuum chamber) with actual or simulated metabolic loads over the maximum mission 
duration to verify oxygen partial pressure control.  The verification shall be considered 
successful when the test and analysis data show that the vehicle can maintain the 
partial pressure of oxygen in the internal atmosphere within the limits specified in 
HS300B, table Partial Pressure Oxygen Physiological Limits for Crew Exposure. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.2.1.2.3  CO2 Partial Pressure Tolerance Ranges for Crew Exposure 
[HS3005CV] The maintenance of carbon dioxide partial pressure shall be verified by 
analysis supported by test.  The analysis shall include a review of the vehicle design 
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and the measurements of partial pressure carbon dioxide during operation of an 
integrated vehicle system.  At the vehicle or subsystem level, a test shall be performed 
using the vehicle's pressure control system in a controlled volume (i.e., pressure or 
vacuum chamber) with actual or simulated metabolic loads over the maximum mission 
duration to verify carbon dioxide partial pressure control.  The verification shall be 
considered successful when the test and analysis data show that the vehicle can 
maintain the partial pressure of carbon dioxide in the internal atmosphere within the 
limits specified in HS3005C, table Partial Pressure CO2 Physiological Limits for Crew 
Exposure. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.2.1.3  Control, Display and Alerting of Atmospheric Parameters 
 4.2.1.3.1  O2 and Total Pressure Control 
[HS3001V] Adjusting total pressure and ppO2 shall be verified by test.  The test shall 
include adjusting and measuring the ppO2 and total pressure during operation of an 
integrated vehicle system.  The verification shall be considered successful when the test 
shows that the ppO2 and total pressure can be adjusted by the crew and Constellation 
Systems within the ranges defined in requirements HS3004 and HS3004B. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.2.1.3.2  Composition Reporting 
[HS3013V] Displaying total pressure, partial pressure oxygen, and partial pressure 
carbon dioxide measurements to the crew shall be verified by demonstration.  The 
demonstration shall be an observation of the displays during various atmospheric 
conditions.  The verification shall be considered successful when the demonstration 
shows that total pressure, the partial pressure of oxygen, and the partial pressure of 
carbon dioxide can be displayed to the crew. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.2.1.3.3  Composition Alerting 
[HS3014V] Alerting the crew when the total pressure, ppO2, ppCO2, or ppN2 exceeds 
acceptability limits shall be verified by analysis supported by test.  The test shall 
exercise the caution and warning system by entering values that exceed the cabin 
atmospheric condition limits for total pressure, ppO2, ppCO2, or ppN2.  The verification 
shall be considered successful when the analysis and test data show that the systems 
can successfully detect and alert the crew when the constituents exceed limits 
described in HS3004, HS3004B, HS3004C, HS3004D, HS3005, HS3005B, and 
HS3005C. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
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4.2.1.4  Contaminants 
 4.2.1.4.1  Microbial Air Contamination 
[HS3006V] The limitation of microbial contaminants in the internal atmosphere shall be 
verified by analysis.  The analysis shall include a review of the vehicle design.  The 
verification shall be considered successful when the analysis shows that the average 
continuous air flow within the vehicle can remain at or above 20 cubic feet per minute 
(CFM) per person of air which has been cleaned to have at least 99.97% of airborne 
particles 0.3 micrometers (µm) and larger in diameter/size removed. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.2.1.4.2  Particulate Contamination 
[HS3006CV] The limit of particulate in the internal atmosphere shall be verified by 
analysis.  The analysis shall include a review of the vehicle design.  The verification 
shall be considered successful when the analysis shows that the 24-hour average 
particulate concentration within the vehicle remains below 0.2 mg/m3 for particles 
ranging from 0.5 micron to 100 microns in aerodynamic diameter and generated at a 
rate of 0.09 mg/person-minute. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.2.1.4.3  Lunar Dust Contamination 
[HS3006DV] The limit of lunar dust in the internal atmosphere shall be verified by 
analysis.  The analysis shall include a review of the vehicle design and testing of the 
Atmosphere Revitalization System (ARS).  The verification shall be considered 
successful when the analysis and tests show that the particulate contamination of less 
than 10 microns and equal to or greater than 0.1 micron size <TBR-70024-004> within 
the vehicle can remain below 0.05 mg/m3. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.2.1.5  Gaseous Pollutants Limits 
 4.2.1.5.1  Gaseous Pollutants Limits 
[HS3007V] Control of gaseous pollutants in the habitable volume shall be verified by 
analysis supported by subsystem test.  The analysis shall be based on the review of 
vehicle design and on measurements of trace chemical contaminant concentration 
buildup as a function of time acquired during an integrated vehicle system off-gassing 
test conducted according to NASA-STD-6001, Flammability, Odor, Off-Gassing, and 
Compatibility Requirements and Test Procedures for Materials in Environments that 
Support Combustion, Test 12.  The analysis supported by subsystem test data shall 
show that the vehicle controls the concentration of individual trace chemical 
contaminants introduced into the cabin for the load defined by HS3007V, table Trace 
Chemical Contaminant Design Load to less than 50 percent of the maximum 
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concentration.  HS3007V, table Trace Chemical Contaminant Design Load is a subset 
of parameters derived from JSC 20584, Spacecraft Maximum Allow Concentrations for 
Airborne Contaminants and is to be used as the design load until system offgassing test 
data become available.  The verification shall be considered successful when the 
analysis shows that gaseous pollutants in HS3007V, table Trace Chemical Contaminant 
Design Load are maintained to less than 50 percent of the maximum values in this 
table. 
Rationale:  Extensive study of trace contaminant control equipment performance 
and cabin air quality data from NASA's crewed space exploration program, 
including Shuttle, Spacelab, NASA-Mir, and International Space Station, has 
established that active trace chemical contaminant control is necessary for 
maintaining cabin air quality that is healthy for human occupants.  The design 
load model basis is NASA/TP-1998-207978, Elements of Spacecraft Cabin Air 
quality Design and NASA/TM 108497 supplemented by engineering evaluation of 
in-flight cabin air quality sample analyses from NASA's crewed space exploration 
program.  Multiple precautions must be incorporated into the vehicle design and 
operation to achieve acceptable air quality.  Accomplishing these tasks to meet 
the requirement can only be verified using in-flight samples obtained during 
missions. 
TABLE 4.2.1.5.1-1 - TRACE CHEMICAL CONTAMINANT DESIGN LOAD  
CONTAMINANT 
MAXIMUM 
CONCENTRATION 
(mg/m3)a 
GENERATION RATE 
OFFGASSING 
(mg/d-kg)b 
METABOLIC 
(mg/d-person) 
SYSTEM 
(mg/d) 
Methanol 90 1.3 × 10-3 0.9 0 
Ethanol 2,000 7.8 × 10-3 4.3 1,000 
n-butanol 40 4.7 × 10-3 0.5 0 
Methanal (formaldehyde) 0.12 4.4 × 10-6 0.4 0 
Ethanal (acetaldehyde) 3.6 1.1 × 10-4 0.6 0 
Benzene 0.2 2.5 × 10-5 2.2 0 
Methylbenzene (toluene) 15 2 × 10-3 0.6 0 
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TRACE CHEMICAL CONTAMINANT DESIGN LOAD (CONCLUDED)  
CONTAMINANT 
MAXIMUM 
CONCENTRATION 
(mg/m3)a 
GENERATION RATE 
OFFGASSING 
(mg/d-kg)b 
METABOLIC 
(mg/d-person) 
SYSTEM 
(mg/d) 
Dimethylbenzenes (xylenes) 48 3.7 × 10-3 0.2 0 
Furan 0.07 1.8 × 10-6 0.3 0 
Dichloromethane 10 2.2 × 10-3 0.09 0 
2-propanone (acetone) 52 3.6 × 10-3 19 0 
Trimethylsilanol 4 1.7 × 10-4 0 0 
Hexamethylcyclotrisiloxane 9 1.7 × 10-4 0 0 
Ammonia 3.5 8.5 × 10-5 50 175c 
Carbon monoxide 17 2 × 10-3 18 0 
Hydrogend 340 5.9 × 10-6 42 0 
Methaned 3,800 6.4 × 10-4 329 0 
a. 180-day Spacecraft Maximum Allowable Concentration from JSC 20584 dated June 1999 
except TBR. 
b. Offgassing rate is for the mass of internal, non-structural equipment. 
c. Ammonia generation by amine-containing system components, zero if no amine present. 
d. For mission operations concepts >1 month duration. 
 
4.2.1.6  Rate of Change of Pressure Limits 
 4.2.1.6.1  Rate of Change of Pressure Limits 
[HS3009V] The rate of total pressure change shall be verified by analysis.  The analysis 
shall include a review of the vehicle design and an evaluation of the worst-case 
scenario for pressure change during nominal operations.  The verification shall be 
considered successful when the analysis indicates that the vehicle will not exceed the 
pressure change described in the requirement. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.2.1.7  Combustion Products 
 4.2.1.7.1  Combustion Products Measurement 
[HS3012BV] The ability of the system to measure the specified atmospheric gas 
concentrations in real time in the required ranges shall be verified by test. The test shall 
show that the atmospheric monitoring instruments correctly determine the atmospheric 
gas concentrations over the given ranges.  The verification shall be considered 
successful when the test shows a real time capability for the measurement of 
atmospheric concentrations of the specified toxic combustion products over the 
specified ranges. 
Rationale:  The measurement capabilities of the atmospheric monitoring 
instruments can be verified by tests outside the vehicle.  Accuracy of 
measurement is not specified; therefore, commercial laboratory instrument 
accuracy can be assumed. 
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 4.2.1.7.2  Combustion Products Monitoring 
[HS3012AV] The ability of the vehicle to monitor and display atmospheric 
concentrations of CO, HCN, and HCl in the habitable volume of the vehicle in real time 
shall be verified by test and analysis.  Tests shall show that the atmospheric monitoring 
instruments correctly determine the gas concentrations and that these concentrations 
will be correctly displayed in real time in the vehicle. The analysis shall show that the 
atmospheric composition, pressure, circulation, and availability to the monitoring 
instruments provide the correct measurement of the gas concentrations.  The 
verification shall be considered successful when the tests and analysis show that the 
atmospheric concentrations of CO, HCN, and HCl in the habitable volume of the vehicle 
combustion products will be monitored and displayed in real time. 
Rationale:  The measurement capabilities of the atmospheric monitoring 
instruments can be verified by tests outside the vehicle.  The atmospheric 
concentration displays may be part of stand-alone instruments, so that the 
displays can also be verified outside the vehicle, or they may be integrated with 
other vehicle display systems and require a vehicle test.  Analysis of atmosphere 
conditions and circulation and presentation to the instruments is needed to 
confirm their performance in the vehicle. 
 4.2.1.7.3  Carbon Monoxide Alert 
[HS3012DV] The ability of the system to alert the crew whenever the carbon monoxide 
(CO) concentration exceeds the lower limit in HS3012B shall be verified by inspection 
and test.  The inspection shall examine verification compliance data for requirement 
HS3012B to confirm that the instrumentation correctly detects CO concentration at and 
above the lower detectable limit specified in HS3012B.  The test shall show that the 
detection of CO exceeding the lower limit produces an alarm to alert the crew.  The 
verification shall be considered successful when the inspection and test show that the 
alert system alerts the crew whenever the CO concentrations exceed the lower limit 
specified in HS3012B. 
Rationale:  The CO alarm, which may be part of the CO detection instruments or 
may be integrated with other vehicle systems, requires an on vehicle test. 
4.2.1.8  Hazardous Chemicals 
 4.2.1.8.1  Toxic Hazard Level 3 
[HS3015V] The use of Toxic Hazard Level 3 or lower chemicals in the habitable volume 
of the system shall be verified by analysis.  The analysis shall include a design review of 
the materials and chemicals selected for vehicle construction and their use in the 
operation of the vehicle.  The verification shall be considered successful when the 
analysis shows Toxic Hazard Level 3 or lower chemicals are the only chemicals used in 
the habitable volume of the vehicle. 
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Rationale:  The verification process involves 3 steps:  1) identification of potential 
compounds that could decompose in environmental systems, 2) identification of 
the products of decomposition, if any, and 3) determination if any decomposition 
products would be toxic at the concentrations anticipated. 
 4.2.1.8.2  Toxic Hazard Level 4 
[HS3015AV] The prevention of Toxic Hazard Level 4 chemicals from entering the 
habitable volume of the system shall be verified by analysis.  The analysis shall include 
a design review of the materials and chemicals selected for system construction and 
their use in the operation of the vehicle.  The analysis shall identify the location of any 
Toxic Hazard Level 4 chemicals and their levels of containment.  The verification shall 
be considered successful when the analysis shows that Toxic Hazard Level 4 chemicals 
cannot enter the habitable volume of the vehicle. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.2.1.8.3  Decomposition of Chemicals 
[HS9037V] The prevention of chemical decomposition into hazardous compounds in the 
habitable volume shall be verified by analysis and inspection.  The analysis shall identify 
chemicals that will be exposed to or have the potential to be introduced into the 
habitable volume and the likely chemical interactions with the environment.  The 
inspection shall include a review of Constellation Safety Review Panel approval 
documentation.  The verification shall be considered successful when the analysis and 
inspection show that no chemicals have been used in the system’s design that can be 
broken down or converted into compounds that threaten crew health and have the 
potential to be introduced into the habitable volume. 
Rationale:  The verification process involves 3 steps: 1) identification of potential 
compounds that could decompose in environmental systems, 2) identification of 
the products of decomposition, if any, and 3) determination if any decomposition 
products would be toxic at the concentrations anticipated. 
4.2.1.9  Crew Protection 
 4.2.1.9.1  Personal Protective Equipment 
[HS3016V] The provision of stowage space for PPE shall be verified by inspection.  The 
inspection shall include a review of the system design to ensure accessible stowage 
space for PPE.  The inspection shall identify the presence of PPE.  The verification shall 
be considered successful when the inspection identifies adequate stowage space and 
the presence of PPE. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
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 4.2.1.9.2  Contingency Breathing Apparatus 
[HS3017AV] The provisioning of a contingency breathing apparatus for each member of 
the crew with air that meets the quality specification defined in HS3004B, HS3004C, 
and HS3004D shall be verified by analysis and inspection.  The analysis shall determine 
the amount of breathing gas required for contingency provision to the entire crew.  The 
inspection shall identify the amount of breathing gas provided in the system for 
contingency use.  The verification shall be considered successful when the analysis and 
inspection show that each crewmember has a contingency breathing apparatus with air 
that meets the quality specification defined in HS3004B, HS3004C, and HS3004D. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.2.1.9.3  Crew Communication During Contingency Breathing 
[HS3017V] The presence of communication capability shall be verified by 
demonstration.  The demonstration shall include communication between individuals 
using the contingency breathing apparatus and flight or flight-like hardware.  The 
verification shall be considered successful when the demonstration shows 
communication between crewmembers while wearing the contingency breathing 
apparatus. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.2.1.9.4  Mission Systems Communication During Contingency Breathing 
[HS3017BV] The presence of communication capability shall be verified by 
demonstration. The demonstration shall include communication between vehicle and 
ground individuals using the flight or flight-like contingency breathing apparatus 
connected to a flight or flight-like communication system.  The verification shall be 
considered successful when the demonstration shows communication between the 
contingency breathing apparatus and Mission Systems. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.2.2  Potable Water 
4.2.2.1  Potable Water Quality 
 4.2.2.1.1  Physiochemical Limits for Potable Water 
[HS3019V] Physiochemical water quality shall be verified by test.  The test shall include 
evaluation of a fully integrated flight-equivalent water system for a length of time equal 
to the longest period expected between preparation of potable water and crew recovery.  
Samples shall be collected from multiple ports throughout the water system to verify 
compliance.  These tests shall be conducted using standard laboratory techniques 
described in Standard Methods for Examination of Water & Wastewater, American 
Public Health Association or alternate approved methodology that will provide 
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comparable data.  The verification shall be considered successful when test data are 
compliant with HS3019, table Potable Water Physiochemical Limits. 
Rationale:  Comprehensive in-flight analysis is impractical.  Verification will be 
completed by ground longevity testing of the full-scale water system.  Previous 
experience has shown that engineering design analysis cannot account for all 
factors affecting water quality, and full-scale tests are necessary to ensure water 
quality.  Water quality is affected by long-term contact with materials of 
construction and other design aspects that would only be revealed in a high-
fidelity integrated ground test.  Analytical methods that are not listed in Standard 
Methods for Examination of Water and Wastewater must be approved by the 
JSC water quality group prior to use. 
 4.2.2.1.2  Microbial Limits for Potable Water 
[HS3019AV] Microbiological water quality shall be verified by test.  The test shall 
include evaluation of a fully integrated flight-equivalent water system for a length of time 
equal to the longest period expected between preparation of potable water and crew 
recovery.  Samples shall be collected from all locations throughout the water system to 
which the crew may be exposed to verify compliance.  These tests shall be conducted 
using standard laboratory techniques described in Standard Methods for Examination of 
Water & Wastewater, American Public Health Association or alternate approved 
methodology that will provide comparable data.  The verification shall be considered 
successful when test data are compliant with HS3019A, table Potable Water Microbial 
Limits. 
Rationale:  Comprehensive in-flight analysis is impractical.  Verification will be 
completed by ground longevity testing of the full-scale water system.  Previous 
experience has shown that engineering design analysis cannot account for all 
factors affecting water quality, and full-scale tests are necessary to ensure water 
quality.  Water quality is affected by the growth of microorganisms during water 
storage and by other design aspects that would only be revealed in a high-fidelity 
integrated ground test.  Analytical methods that are not listed in Standard 
Methods for Examination of Water & Wastewater must be approved by the JSC 
microbiology group prior to use. 
4.2.2.2  Potable Water Quantity 
 4.2.2.2.1  Potable Water for On-Orbit Drinking 
[HS3025V] The provisioning of the specified quantity of potable water shall be verified 
by analysis.  The analysis shall determine the amount of potable water stowage on the 
vehicle for all vehicle configurations.  The verification shall be considered successful 
when the analysis shows sufficient volume and mass capacity for stowage of potable 
water in the amount of 2.0 L (67.6 fl oz) of potable water per crewmember per mission 
day (in addition to other potable water requirements), utilizing maximum crew size and 
maximum mission duration. 
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Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.2.2.2.2  Potable Water for On-Orbit Food Rehydration 
[HS3127V] The provisioning of the specified quantity of potable water shall be verified 
by analysis.  The analysis shall determine the amount of potable water stowage on the 
vehicle for all vehicle configurations.  The verification shall be considered successful 
when the analysis shows sufficient volume and mass capacity for stowage of potable 
water in the amount of 500 mL (16.9 fl oz) of potable water per crewmember per 
mission day (in addition to other potable water requirements), utilizing maximum crew 
size and maximum mission duration. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.2.2.2.3  Potable Hot Water Quantity for Rehydration 
[HS3118V] The system's provision of 600 mL (20.3 fl oz) of hot water per person per 
meal for four crewmembers at the temperature required in HS3031 shall be verified by 
inspection and test.  The inspection shall ensure that the system can provide hot water 
per requirement HS3031.  The test shall measure that the system can provide 600 mL 
(20.3 fl oz) of hot water per crewmember per meal for four crewmembers.  Verification 
shall be considered successful when inspection has verified that the system can provide 
hot water per requirement HS3031 and test has verified that the system can provide 
600 mL (20.3 fl oz) of hot water per crewmember per meal for four crewmembers. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.2.2.2.4  Potable Water for Personal Hygiene 
[HS3028V] The capability of the system to provide 400 mL (13.5 fl oz) of potable water 
per crewmember-day shall be verified by analysis.  The analysis includes a design 
review of the system to show that this quantity of water is available for personal 
hygiene. (The water in pre-wetted towels counts towards this quantity.)  The verification 
shall be considered successful when the analysis shows sufficient volume and mass 
capacity to supply this volume of potable water utilizing maximum crew size and 
maximum mission duration. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.2.2.2.5  Potable Water for Medical Use 
[HS3122V] Potable water for medical use events shall be verified by analysis.  The 
analysis shall determine the amount of potable water available on the vehicle for all 
vehicle configurations.  The verification shall be considered successful when the 
analysis shows that the system can provide potable water in the amount of 500 mL 
(16.9 fl oz) for medical use per crewmember for nominal eye irrigation particulate 
events, in addition to other potable water requirements, utilizing maximum crew size 
and maximum mission duration. 
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Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.2.2.2.6  Potable Water for Medical Contingency 
[HS3123V] Potable water for medical contingency events shall be verified by analysis.  
The analysis shall determine the amount of potable water available on the vehicle for all 
vehicle configurations.  The verification shall be considered successful when the 
analysis shows that the system provides potable water in the amount of 5.0 L (169 fl oz) 
for contingency events, in addition to other potable water requirements, utilizing 
maximum crew size and maximum mission duration. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.2.2.2.7  Potable Water for EVA Operations 
[HS6063V] The provisioning of water for EVA suited operations shall be verified by 
analysis.  The analysis shall assess the potable water system as a whole.  The 
verification shall be considered successful when the on-board total available potable 
water quantities provide 240 mL (8.12 fl oz) of potable water per crewmember per EVA 
hour for the maximum number of mission EVA days, in addition to other potable water 
requirements. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.2.2.2.8  Potable Water for Fluid Loading 
[HS3026V] The provisioning of the specified quantity of potable water for re-entry fluid 
loading shall be verified by analysis.  The analysis shall determine the amount of 
potable water stowage on the vehicle for all vehicle configurations.  The verification 
shall be considered successful when the analysis shows sufficient volume and mass 
capacity for stowage of potable water in the amount of 1.0 L (33.8 fl oz) per 
crewmember (in addition to other potable water requirements) considering maximum 
crew size for each EOM opportunity. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.2.2.2.9  Potable Water for Post Landing 
[HS3027V] The provisioning of the specified quantity of potable water for post-landing 
recovery shall be verified by analysis.  The analysis shall determine the amount of 
potable water available on the vehicle for all vehicle configurations.  The verification 
shall be considered successful when the analysis shows that the system can provide 
potable water in the amount of 1.0 L (33.8 fl oz) per 8-hour period of the entire crew 
recovery period per crewmember, and 500 mL of this total water allotment is readily and 
immediately accessible by each seated and restrained crewmember during the first 2-
hours of post-landing activities (in addition to other potable water requirements), 
considering maximum crew size. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
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4.2.2.3  Potable Water Delivery 
 4.2.2.3.1  Potable Water Rate 
[HS3029V] The potable water flow rate shall be verified by test.  The test shall measure 
the flow rate of the water in mL/minute.  The verification shall be considered successful 
when the test shows that the flow rate is maintained at a minimum of 500 mL/min 
(16.9 oz/min). 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.2.2.3.2  Potable Water Dispensing 
[HS3117V] The capability of the vehicle to dispense water in 15-mL (0.51-fl oz) 
increments (+/-10% or 5 mL [0.17 fl oz], whichever is greater) between the quantities of 
30 mL (1.01 fl oz) and 240 mL (8.12 fl oz) shall be verified by test.  Testing shall include 
dispensing of water in 15-mL (0.51-fl oz) increments, starting at 30 mL (1.01 fl oz).  The 
verification shall be considered successful when the test shows that the water system 
can dispense water in 15-mL (0.51-fl oz) increments (+/-10% or 5 mL [0.17 fl oz], 
whichever is greater) between the quantities of 30 mL (1.01 fl oz) and 240 mL (8.12 fl 
oz). 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required 
4.2.2.4  Potable Water Temperature 
 4.2.2.4.1  Potable Water Temperature for Cold Drinks 
[HS3030V] Not Applicable 
 4.2.2.4.2  Potable Water Temperature for Hot Food and Drinks 
[HS3031V] The capability of the system to provide potable water between 68.3 ºC (155 
ºF) and 79.4 ºC (175 ºF) shall be verified by test.  Testing will include measurements of 
the temperature and flow rate of the hot potable water.  The verification shall be 
considered successful when the test shows that the system can provide water at the 
specified temperature and the flow rate provided in HS3029. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.2.2.4.3  Potable Water Temperature for Personal Hygiene 
[HS3032V] Not Applicable 
 4.2.2.4.4  Potable Water Temperature for Medical Contingency 
[HS3121V] Providing potable water for medical use at the specified temperatures shall 
be verified by analysis.  The analysis will determine the temperature of the water to be 
used for medical events.  The verification shall be considered successful when the 
analysis shows that the system can provide water for medical events between 18 ºC 
(64.4 ºF) and 28 ºC (82.4 ºF). 
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Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.2.2.5  Water Sampling 
 4.2.2.5.1  Water Sampling 
[HS3034V] Access to the vehicle potable water systems for sample collection shall be 
verified by inspection.  The inspection will include a review of vehicle and potable water 
system designs to ensure access to the water supply during ground processing, in-
flight, and post-landing.  The verification shall be considered successful when the 
inspection shows access for potable water sample collection during ground processing, 
in-flight, and post-landing. 
Rationale:  Numerous factors can quickly affect water quality, as has been 
demonstrated in previous flight programs.  Thus, access to the water supply as 
close to launch as practical will allow sampling to confirm this quality.  As in-flight 
analysis is impractical, access for post-flight analysis is required to confirm water 
quality throughout the flight. 
4.2.3  Thermal Environment 
4.2.3.1  Atmospheric Temperature and Heat Stored by Crewmembers 
 4.2.3.1.1  Nominal Atmospheric Temperature 
[HS3036V] Maintaining the atmospheric temperature within the specified range shall be 
verified by analysis.  The analysis shall include a review of the system design, as well 
as a thermal model of the habitable volume based on the final flight configuration.  The 
model shall be validated using test data collected from the vehicle during pre-delivery 
acceptance testing.  The verification shall be considered successful when the analysis 
shows that the temperature can be maintained between 18 ºC (64.4 ºF) to 27 ºC  (80.6 
ºF) during all nominal flight operations, excluding suited operations, ascent, entry, 
landing, and post-landing. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.2.3.1.2  Contingency Control of Heat Stored by Crewmembers 
[HS3037V] The maintenance of the energy stored by the crew shall be verified by 
analysis.  Analysis shall include a review of the system design and demonstration of the 
system atmospheric control system in a high-fidelity test.  The verification shall be 
considered successful when the analysis shows that the system can maintain ΔQ stored 
within -4.1 kJ/kg (-1.8 BTU/lb) and 4.7 kJ/kg (2.0 BTU/lb), during simulated thermal 
conditions experienced during ascent, entry, descent, landing, post-landing, and off-
nominal suited and unsuited flight operations. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
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4.2.3.2  Relative Humidity 
 4.2.3.2.1  Relative Humidity for Nominal Vehicle 
[HS3046V] The capability of the system to maintain the average relative humidity level 
over each 24-hour period between 25 and 75 percent shall be verified by analysis.  The 
analysis shall be based on performance data collected on the Flight Environmental 
Control and Life Support System during subsystem or vehicle acceptance/qualification 
testing.  The verification shall be considered successful when the analysis demonstrates 
that the system can maintain the average relative humidity level over each 24-hour 
period between 25 and 75 percent for all simulated vehicle configurations, excluding 
suited operations less than 4 hours and post-landing. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.2.3.2.2  Relative Humidity Tolerance Ranges for Crew Exposure 
[HS3126V] The capability of the system to restrict human exposure to off-nominal 
relative humidity levels according to HS3126, table Relative Humidity Tolerance Ranges 
shall be verified by analysis.  The analysis shall be based on performance data 
collected on the Flight Environmental Control and Life Support System during 
subsystem or vehicle acceptance/qualification testing.  The verification shall be 
considered successful when the analysis demonstrates that the system can maintain 
the average relative humidity levels in the simulated vehicle configurations of suited 
operations less than 4 hours and post-landing. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.2.3.3  Ventilation 
 4.2.3.3.1  In-flight Ventilation 
[HS3047V] The capability to maintain a ventilation rate within the system shall be 
verified by analysis and test.  The analysis shall include a fluid dynamics model of the 
interior habitable volume and shall be of sufficient fidelity to identify potential areas 
within the habitable volume with no air movement.  The analysis shall include a plan to 
validate the model using data collected during the vehicles acceptance/qualification 
testing.  The analysis shall consider the ventilation rate only at a single, nominal setting 
for all fan speeds and diffusers.  The test shall be of the flight hardware's response to 
commands in the flight vehicle.  The verification shall be considered successful when 
the analysis and test establish that two-thirds (66.7%) of the atmosphere velocities are 
between 4.57 m/min (15 ft/min) and 36.58 m/min (120 ft/min), no more than 5 percent of 
the velocities are less than 2.13 m/min (7 ft/min), and no more than one percent of the 
velocities are in excess of 60.96 m/min (200 ft/min at a distance measured more than 
0.15 m [6 inches]) from the vehicle walls during all mission phases except during suited 
operations, toxic cabin events, or when the crew is not inhabiting the vehicle. 
Rationale:  Values of atmosphere velocities below the lower limit of 2.13 m/min (7 
ft/min) are considered too low to prevent hazardous CO2 and thermal pockets 
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from forming.  Values above the upper limit of 60.96 m/min (200 ft/min) are 
considered too high, such that they will present acoustic noise and air flow 
annoyance problems.  Atmosphere velocities within 15 cm (6 inches) of the walls 
are not considered.  Finally, fire or toxic release into the habitable volume are 
examples of periods during which the mentioned ventilation rates are not in the 
best interest of air quality and crew health.  In those cases, the ventilation system 
may need to be shut down in order to protect the safety of the crew. 
 4.2.3.3.2  Supplemental Ventilation 
[HS3050V] The environment for temporary maintenance activities in areas not in the 
normal habitable volume shall be verified by test.  The test shall be performed in a high-
fidelity mockup of the vehicle and shall account for expected crewmember metabolic 
loads. The verification shall be considered successful when the test shows that the 
environment is controlled as defined in HS3005B, table Partial Pressure Oxygen 
Physiological Limits for Crew Exposure; HS3005C, table Partial Pressure CO2 
Physiological Limits for Crew Exposure; and HS3046. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.2.3.4  User Control of Atmospheric Thermal Properties 
 4.2.3.4.1  Temperature Set-Point Increments 
[HS3053V] The increments of set-points for temperature control shall be verified by 
inspection.  The inspection shall include a review of the set-point control.  The 
verification shall be considered successful when the set-point control shows that the 
temperature can be adjusted in 1 °C (1.8 °F) or less increments within the ranges 
defined in HS3036. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.2.3.4.2  Temperature Set-Point Adjustment 
[HS3051V] The capability of the crew to adjust the atmospheric temperature shall be 
verified by test.  The test shall include the measurements of temperature during 
operation of an integrated vehicle system.  The verification shall be considered 
successful when the test shows that the temperature can be adjusted by the crew to 
between 21 °C (69.8 °F) and 27 °C (80.6 °F). 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.2.3.4.3  Temperature Set-Point Error 
[HS3054V] Temperature control within +/- 1.5 °C (2.7 °F) of the set-point shall be 
verified by analysis supported by test.  The test shall include the measurements of 
temperature during operation of an integrated vehicle system at various temperatures.  
The verification shall be considered successful when the analysis of the test results 
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shows that the temperature can be controlled to +/- 1.5 °C (2.7 °F) of the set 
temperature within the ranges defined in HS3036. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.2.3.4.4  Temperature Set-Point Accessibility 
[HS3052V] The crew adjustment of the atmospheric temperature set-point shall be 
verified by demonstration.  The demonstration shall consist of a single restrained 
crewmember adjusting the temperature during operation of an integrated vehicle system 
and shall be demonstrated by a single restrained crewmember.  The verification shall be 
considered successful when the demonstration shows that the temperature can be 
adjusted by a single crewmember. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.2.3.4.5  Ventilation Adjustment 
[HS3114V] The ability for the crew to adjust the ventilation delivery to the cabin shall be 
verified by inspection.  The inspection shall be of the cabin ventilation system.  The 
inspection shall be performed in the flight or flight equivalent vehicle.  This Level II 
requirement may include review of requirement verifications tested at lower levels.  The 
verification shall be considered successful when the inspection shows that the cabin 
ventilation delivery system is capable of air flow direction adjustment. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.2.3.5  Atmosphere Thermal Properties Monitoring 
 4.2.3.5.1  Display of Actual Temperature 
[HS3115V] Temperature display step sizes shall be verified by inspection.  The 
inspection shall be performed on flight-like hardware.  The verification shall be 
considered successful when the inspection shows actual temperature display step sizes 
of 1 °C (1.8 °F). 
Rationale:  No additional rationale is required. 
 4.2.3.5.2  Display of Temperature Set-Point 
[HS3116V] Display step sizes for the temperature set-point shall be verified by 
inspection.  The inspection shall be performed on flight-like hardware.  The verification 
shall be considered successful when the inspection shows that the temperature set-
point is displayed in step sizes of 1 °C (1.8 °F). 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.2.3.5.3  Display and Monitoring of Temperature and Relative Humidity 
[HS3055V] The ability of the system to measure and record temperature and relative 
humidity shall be verified by demonstration.  The demonstration shall be performed in a 
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flight or flight equivalent vehicle with flight software loads. The demonstration shall be 
considered successful when it demonstrates the vehicle’s ability to correctly measure, 
display to the crew, and record the temperature within the habitable volume. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.2.4  Acceleration 
4.2.4.1  Sustained Linear Acceleration 
 4.2.4.1.1  Crew Exposure to Rate of Change of Acceleration 
[HS3059V] The crew exposure to jerk during sustained events shall be verified by 
analysis and test.  Analysis shall use a certified simulation to verify all nominal flight 
phase scenarios, as well as 3-sigma bounding Monte Carlo studies with dispersed 
Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C), vehicle and environmental factors, when 
appropriate.  Tests shall be used to validate the model, using data obtained from 
nominal flight tests, parachute tests, and/or other available flight and ground-based 
tests.  Test data provide continuous acceleration measures to compute the linear jerk 
that would be experienced by the crew.  Such testing will require on-board acquisition 
(or sampling) of three-dimensional (3D) linear acceleration (along the x, y, and z axes) 
on a millisecond timescale. The verification shall be considered successful when the 
analyses indicate with 99% confidence that the simulated jerk is no greater than 500 g/s 
during any non impact phase of flight. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.2.4.1.2  Linear Acceleration Limits During Nominal Return 
[HS3060V] The crew exposure to sustained linear acceleration during a nominal return 
to earth shall be verified by analysis and test.  Analysis shall use a certified simulation to 
verify all nominal flight phase scenarios, as well as 3-sigma bounding Monte Carlo 
studies with dispersed GN&C, vehicle and environmental factors, when appropriate.  
Tests shall be used to validate the model using data obtained from nominal flight tests, 
parachute tests, and/or other available flight and ground-based tests.  The test data will 
provide continuous acceleration measures in order to compute the total linear 
acceleration that would be experienced by the crew directly by translation and indirectly 
by off-axis rotation (i.e., centrifugal force).  Such testing will require on-board acquisition 
(or sampling) of 3D linear and 3D rotational acceleration (along and around the x, y, and 
z axes) on a millisecond timescale.  The verification shall be considered successful 
when the analyses indicate with 99% confidence that simulated linear acceleration 
exposures of 500 ms or more during a nominal return are no greater than the limits 
depicted by the dotted green lines in the HS3060 figures contained within the section 
Linear Acceleration Limits During Nominal Return. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
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 4.2.4.1.3  Linear Acceleration Limits from Launch to Mission Destination 
[HS3061V] The crew exposure to sustained linear acceleration during a nominal trip to 
destination shall be verified by analysis and test.  Analysis shall use a certified 
simulation to verify all nominal flight phase scenarios, as well as 3-sigma bounding 
Monte Carlo studies with dispersed GN&C, vehicle and environmental factors, when 
appropriate.  Tests shall be used to validate the model, using data obtained from 
nominal flight tests, parachute tests, and/or other available flight and ground-based 
tests.  The test data will provide continuous acceleration measures in order to compute 
the total linear acceleration that would be experienced by the crew directly by translation 
and indirectly by off-axis rotation (i.e., centrifugal force).  Such testing will require on-
board acquisition (or sampling) of 3D linear and 3D rotational acceleration (along and 
around the x, y, and z axes) on a millisecond timescale.  The verification shall be 
considered successful when the analyses indicate with 99% confidence that simulated 
linear acceleration exposures of 500 ms or more during a nominal abound trip are no 
greater than the limits depicted by the dashed blue lines in the HS3060 figures 
contained within the section Linear Acceleration Limits During Nominal Return. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.2.4.1.4  Linear Acceleration Limits for Ascent Abort and Off-Nominal Entry 
[HS3062V] The crew exposure to sustained linear acceleration during ascent abort and 
off-nominal entry shall be verified by analysis supported by test.  Analysis shall use a 
certified simulation to verify nominal ascent-abort and off-nominal entry scenarios, as 
well as 3-sigma bounding Monte Carlo studies with dispersed GN&C, vehicle and 
environmental factors, when appropriate.  Tests shall be used to validate the model, 
using data obtained from nominal flight tests, parachute tests, and/or other available 
flight and ground-based tests.  The test data will provide continuous acceleration 
measures in order to compute the total linear acceleration that would be experienced by 
the crew directly by translation and indirectly by off-axis rotation (i.e., centrifugal force). 
Such testing will require on-board acquisition (or sampling) of 3D linear and 3D 
rotational acceleration (along and around the x, y, and z axes) on a millisecond 
timescale.  The verification shall be considered successful when the analyses indicate 
with 99% confidence that simulated linear acceleration exposures of 500 ms or more 
during ascent abort and off-nominal entry are no greater than the limits depicted by the 
solid red lines in the HS3060 figures contained within the section Linear Acceleration 
Limits During Nominal Return. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.2.4.2  Occupant Protection 
 4.2.4.2.1  Crew Injury Risks Limits 
[HS3064V] The crew exposure to impact acceleration shall be verified by analysis 
supported by test.  Analysis shall verify that the beta index for all Brinkley criteria is 
equal to or less than 1.0 given the dynamic response limits for the appropriate dynamic 
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response level in Appendix N, table Dynamic Response Limits.  Analysis shall use the 
Brinkley Model defined in Appendix N, section N2.0 for all necessary flight phases.  
Tests shall be used to validate the transient accelerations measured at the seat in the 
analysis models using data obtained from all applicable flight and ground-based tests.  
The test data shall provide continuous acceleration measures in order to compute the 
total linear acceleration that would be experienced by the crew directly by translation 
and indirectly by off-axis rotation (i.e., centrifugal force).  Such testing will require 
onboard acquisition (or sampling) of 3D linear and 3D rotational acceleration (along and 
around the x, y, and z axes) on a millisecond timescale.  The verification shall be 
considered successful when the analyses indicate with 99% confidence that the beta 
index for all Brinkley criteria is 1.0 or less during each simulated impact. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.2.4.2.2  Head Protection Criteria 
[HS3124V] Not Applicable. 
 4.2.4.2.3  Head Transient Acceleration Limits 
[HS3132V] Not Applicable. 
 4.2.4.2.4  Neck Protection Criteria 
[HS3125V] Not Applicable. 
 4.2.4.2.5  Transient Force Application Limits 
[HS3128V] Not Applicable 
 4.2.4.2.6  Chest Deflection 
[HS3129V] Not Applicable. 
 4.2.4.2.7  Restrained Body Movement 
[HS3130V] Limited crew body movement relative to the seat shall be verified by 
analysis and test.  The analysis shall define the worst-case loads imparted to the 
crewmember during dynamic phases of flight.  The test shall include video motion 
capture of dynamic event pulse sled testing.  Verification shall be considered successful 
when the analysis shows that crew body movement relative to the seat is less than or 
equal to what is specified in Appendix N, table Restrained Body Movement and 
Deflection  <TBR-70024-001>. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.2.4.2.8  Flail Injury Protection 
[HS5012V] The requirement shall be verified by analysis and test.  Analysis shall show 
that flail motion does not contact rigid hardware that would cause injury during dynamic 
flight phases.  Analysis shall be verified by test, which may include video motion capture 
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of dynamic event pulse sled testing. The verification shall be considered successful 
when the analysis shows that the system precludes crewmember limbs from impacting 
nearby rigid hardware that would cause injury, from hyper-extension, and from 
fracturing or dislocating of crewmember limbs. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.2.4.3  Rotational Acceleration Limits 
 4.2.4.3.1  Sustained Rotational Acceleration Limit 
[HS3065V] The crew exposure to sustained rotational acceleration shall be verified by 
analysis supported by test.  The analysis shall use a certified simulation to verify all 
nominal flight phase scenarios.  The simulation shall use test data collected from flight 
tests.  In addition nominal flight tests, ascent abort tests, parachute tests, and landing 
attenuation tests will provide acceleration measures to evaluate vehicle rotational 
acceleration.  Testing will require continuous on-board acquisition (or sampling) of 3D 
rotational acceleration (yaw, pitch, and roll) on a millisecond timescale.  The verification 
shall be considered successful when the analysis supported by test data indicates that 
the measured sustained rotational acceleration is no greater than 115 degrees/s2. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.2.4.4  Rotational Rates 
 4.2.4.4.1  Rotational Limits for Nominal Return 
[HS3069V] The crew exposure to rotation shall be verified by analysis and test.  The 
test shall consist of flight tests.  Nominal flight tests, ascent abort tests, parachute tests, 
and landing attenuation tests will provide acceleration measures to evaluate vehicle 
rotational acceleration.  Testing will require continuous on-board acquisition (or 
sampling) of 3D rotational rate at least every 100 ms.  The analysis shall use a certified 
simulation to verify all nominal flight phase scenarios, as well as 3-sigma bounding 
Monte Carlo studies with dispersed Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C), and 
vehicle and environmental factors.  The verification shall be considered successful 
when 1) the tests indicate that the measured rotation rate is no greater than the limits in 
those depicted in HS3071, figure Angular Rate Limits for all tests and 2) the analyses 
indicate with 99% confidence that the simulated rotation rate is no greater than these 
same limits. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.2.4.4.2  Rotational Limits for Nominal Return to Mission Destination 
[HS3070V] The crew exposure to rotation shall be verified by analysis and test.  The 
test shall consist of flight tests.  Nominal flight tests, ascent abort tests, parachute tests, 
and landing attenuation tests will provide acceleration measures to evaluate vehicle 
rotational acceleration.  Testing will require continuous on-board acquisition (or 
sampling) of 3D rotational rate at least every 100 ms.  The analysis shall use a certified 
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simulation to verify all nominal flight phase scenarios, as well as 3-sigma bounding 
Monte Carlo studies with dispersed GN&C, and vehicle and environmental factors.  The 
verification shall be considered successful when 1) the tests indicate that the measured 
rotation rate is no greater than the limits in those depicted in HS3071, figure Angular 
Rate Limits for all tests and 2) the analyses indicate with 99% confidence that the 
simulated rotation rate is no greater than these same limits. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.2.4.4.3  Rotational Limits for Ascent Abort and Off-Nominal Entry 
[HS3071V] The crew exposure to rotation shall be verified by analysis supported by 
test.  The analysis shall use a certified simulation to verify all nominal flight phase 
scenarios, as well as 3-sigma bounding Monte Carlo studies with dispersed GN&C, and 
vehicle and environmental factors.  The simulation shall use test data collected from 
flight tests.  Nominal flight tests, ascent abort tests, parachute tests, and landing 
attenuation tests will provide acceleration measures to evaluate vehicle rotational 
acceleration.  Testing will require continuous on-board acquisition (or sampling) of 3D 
rotational rate at least every 100 ms.  The verification shall be considered successful 
when the analyses supported by test data indicate with 99% confidence that the 
simulated rotation rate is no greater than these same limits. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.2.5  Vibration 
 4.2.5.1  Limits for Vibration During Dynamic Phases of Flight 
[HS3105V] The dynamic phases of flight vibration exposure health limit shall be verified 
by analysis supported by test.  The analysis shall consist of a simulation of the vibration 
levels at the crew seat (couch), assuming that the couch is a relatively rigid structure.  
The weighted acceleration shall be calculated in accordance with ISO 2631-1:1997 
using the frequency weighting Wd for the X and Y directions, Wk for the Z direction, and 
a multiplying factor k=1.4 in the X and Y directions and k=1 in the Z direction (ISO 
2631-1:1997, Table 3 and Section 7.2).  Test data obtained from ground vibration 
testing and/or flight tests, parachute tests, and/or entry tests shall be used to support 
validation of the model and to evaluate vehicle vibration under all dynamic phases of 
flight.  Testing will require on-board acquisition (or sampling) of the seat translational 
acceleration along the three orthogonal axes, X, Y, and Z on a millisecond timescale to 
determine the vibration profile.  The verification shall be successful when the analysis 
indicates with 99% confidence (e.g., 3-sigma bounding for Gaussian-distributed Monte 
Carlo studies with dispersed GN&C, and vehicle and environmental factors) that the 
vectorial sum of the X, Y, and Z frequency-weighted accelerations between 0.5 and 80 
Hz of the rigid crew seat does not exceed the levels and exposure durations in HS3105, 
table Frequency-Weighted Vibration Limits by Exposure Time During Dynamic Phases. 
Rationale:  The vibration levels that reach the crew are the result of several 
factors provided by the launch vehicle, the crew vehicle, connecting structure, 
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means of vibration attenuation, etc.  For cases where the crew is suited, the suit 
needs to be considered as an integral part of the seat.  The resultant vibration 
levels will likely be too complex to be determined from analysis alone.  In order to 
determine if the vehicle has met the tolerance vibration limit, which is a matter of 
crew safety, actual flight test data are required to understand what the crew will 
experience and to provide data for additional analyses given the possibility that 
the flight test vehicle will not be completely like the actual flight vehicle.  The 
measurement of acceleration is to be made on the crew seat (couch) structure 
and assumes that the structure is relatively rigid.  ISO 2631-1:1997 calls for the 
measurement of acceleration at the supporting surfaces between a seat and the 
occupant to account for the effects of any resilient cushion material.  The 
guidelines given for health in ISO 2631-1:1997 are based primarily on the upright 
seated occupant, not the semi-supine occupant.  The measurement is being 
made on the rigid seat (couch) structure with respect to the body’s X, Y, and Z 
coordinates defined in ISO 2631-1:1997 Figure 1 and in HSIR Appendix C.  It is 
assumed that the occupant will be rigidly coupled to the couch by the restraint 
system, minimizing any amplification of vibration by the cushion material. The 
tolerance data collected in the 1960s reported the accelerations of the vibration 
platform to which the couch was rigidly attached. 
 4.2.5.2  Vibration Limits During Crew Sleep 
[HS3106V] The crew sleep vibration limit requirement shall be verified by analysis 
supported by test.  The analysis shall use test data collected from flight tests to obtain 
flight vibration profiles of the vehicle's crew compartment after orbital insertion. Testing 
will require continuous on-board acquisition (or sampling) of translational acceleration in 
the three orthogonal axes X, Y, and Z on the support surfaces of the crew compartment 
used for rest areas on a millisecond timescale to determine the vibration profile.  The 
measurement should reflect the average acceleration levels expected to occur during 
an 8.5-hour sleep period.  The recorded test profile shall then drive an analytic 
simulation of crew compartment vibration.  In accordance with International Standards 
Organization (ISO) Standard 6954:2000, Section 6, the minimum measurement period 
shall be 2 minutes in case of significant vibration frequency content below 2 Hz.  All 
acceleration measurements shall be weighted in accordance with ISO 6954:2000, 
Annex A using the frequency weighting Wa (Table A.1).  The verification shall be 
considered successful when the analysis indicates with 99% confidence (e.g., 3-sigma 
bounding for Gaussian-distributed Monte Carlo studies with dispersed GN&C, and 
vehicle and environmental factors) that the simulated vibration levels on the support 
surfaces of the rest areas are less than 0.01 g frequency-weighted rms acceleration in 
each of the X, Y, and Z axes between 1.0 and 80 Hz for each 2-minute interval during 
an 8.5-hour crew sleep period. 
Rationale:  Because the final configuration of the vehicle and equipment will not 
be known until close to flight, an effective means of ensuring that sustained 
vibration levels are met is to perform an analysis of compartment vibration using 
available flight test data. 
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 4.2.5.3  Pre-Launch Vibration Limit to Prevent Motion Sickness 
[HS3108V] The pre-launch vibration limit shall be verified by analysis supported by test.  
The analysis shall use data collected from a flight test to obtain the vibration profile of 
the vehicle's crew compartment, particularly of the crew seats, on the pad prior to 
launch.  The weighted acceleration shall be calculated in accordance with International 
Standards Organization (ISO) Standard 2631-1:1997 using the frequency weighting Wf 
applied in each X, Y, and Z direction (Table 3).  Testing will require on-board acquisition 
(or sampling) of translational acceleration in the three orthogonal axes X, Y, and Z on a 
millisecond timescale to determine the vibration profile.  The recorded test profile shall 
then drive an analytic simulation of crew compartment vibration. The analysis shall 
consist of a simulation of the vibration levels at the crew seats.  The verification shall be 
successful when the analysis indicates with 99% confidence (e.g., 3-sigma bounding for 
Gaussian-distributed Monte Carlo studies with dispersed vehicle and environmental 
factors) that the simulated vibration level of the crew seats in each of the X, Y, and Z 
axes does not exceed 0.05 g frequency-weighted rms acceleration between 0.1 to 0.5 
Hz for each 10-minute interval during pre-launch. 
Rationale:  The vibration levels that reach the crew are the result of several 
factors provided by the launch vehicle, crew vehicle, connecting structure, and 
natural environment.  The resultant vibration levels may be too complex to be 
determined from analysis alone.  In order to determine if the vehicle has met the 
pre-launch vibration limit, actual flight test data are required to understand what 
the crew will experience, and to provide data for additional analyses given the 
possibility that the flight test vehicle will not be completely like the actual flight 
vehicle. 
4.2.6  Acoustics 
4.2.6.1  Acoustic Limits for Launch and Entry Phases 
 4.2.6.1.1  Acoustic Limits for Post-Landing 
[HS3134V] The Speech Interference Level (SIL) and A-weighted overall SPL limits shall 
be verified by test and analysis.  Measurements shall be made within the vehicle in the  
post-landing configuration with GSE, integrated GFE, stowage, vehicle installations, and 
closeouts installed in the expected configuration.  Hardware shall be operated across 
the expected range of operational settings (including settings corresponding to the 
expected highest noise levels).  Equivalent-continuous sound level, Leq, measurements 
shall be made within each octave band with center frequencies ranging from 63 Hz to 
84 kHz, using a Type 1 integrating-averaging sound level meter, with a 20-second 
averaging time.  The A-weighted overall SPL shall also be measured.  Measurements 
shall be made at expected crewmember head locations.  SIL(4) shall be calculated from 
the measurements.  The verification shall be considered successful when 
measurements show that the maximum SIL(4) for each crewmember head location is 
61 dB or less, and the maximum A-weighted overall SPL is 75 dBA or less.  If speech 
communications are expected for a distance greater than 1.7 m (5.5 ft), then the SIL(4) 
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requirement shall be adjusted according to ANSI S12 65-2006 for the appropriate 
crewmember head-to-head distance for the voice level of “Very Loud” in Figure 1 of 
ANSI S12 65-2006, and allowing 4 dB for reduced female voice intensity. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.2.6.1.2  Noise Dose Limits for Launch and Entry 
[HS3073V] The noise dose limits for launch and entry shall be verified by test and 
analysis.  The noise level as a function of time for the launch, entry, and ascent abort 
measured at the crewmember’s ears shall be determined by flight-testing.  The test and 
analysis shall consist of estimating the noise level as a function of time at the 
crewmember’s ear by combining significant noise sources from estimates of rocket 
noise and external flow boundary layer noise, and including acoustic insertion losses of 
acoustic isolation and protective devices.  The rocket noise should be determined by 
test.  Acoustic insertion losses of the pressure shell and other materials shall be 
determined by test.  The effectiveness of hearing protection, headsets, and helmets 
shall be determined by test.  Noise levels for the balance of the 24-hour calculation 
period shall be assumed to be 65 dBA.  The verification shall be considered successful 
when tests and analysis indicate that the 24-hour noise dose associated with launch, 
entry, and ascent abort predicted at the crewmember’s ears is 100% or less. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.2.6.1.3  Impulse Noise Limit for Launch and Entry 
[HS3074V] The impulse noise limit for launch and entry shall be verified by test and 
analysis.  The impulse noise level measured at the crewmember's ears shall be 
determined by flight-testing.  The test and analysis shall consist of estimating the 
impulse noise level at the crewmember's ear by combining significant noise sources and 
including acoustic insertion losses of acoustic isolation and protective devices.  The 
ignition noise should be determined by test.  Acoustic insertion losses of the pressure 
shell and other materials shall be determined by test.  The effectiveness of hearing 
protection, headsets, and helmets shall be determined by test.  Peak-hold sound 
pressure level measurements shall be made using a Type 1 sound level meter.  The 
frequency response of the sound level meter shall extend to at least 6 Hz at its lower 
limit.  Formal verification is not required for equipment with impulse noises that have 
peak overall SPLs of less than 110 dB.  The verification shall be considered successful 
when the test and analysis results indicate that the peak overall sound pressure level 
predicted at the crewmember’s ears is less than 140 dB. 
Rationale:  Significant noise sources consist of pyrotechnics, rocket ignition, and 
any other impulse noise source potentially greater than 110 dB SPL. 
 4.2.6.1.4  Hazardous Noise Limit for Launch and Entry 
[HS3072V] The hazardous noise limit for launch and entry shall be verified by test and 
analysis.  The maximum noise level measured at the crewmember’s ears shall be 
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determined by flight-testing.  The test and analysis shall consist of estimating the 
maximum sound level at the crewmember's ear by combining significant noise sources 
from estimates of rocket noise and external flow boundary layer noise and including 
acoustic insertion losses of acoustic isolation and protective devices.  The rocket noise 
should be determined by test.  Acoustic insertion losses of the pressure shell and other 
materials shall be determined by test.  The effectiveness of hearing protection, 
headsets, and helmets shall be determined by test.  The verification shall be considered 
successful when the tests and analysis indicate that the maximum level predicted at the 
crewmember's ears is 105 dBA or less during launch, entry, and suited (helmet on, visor 
down) burn-phases, and 115 dBA or less during launch abort. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.2.6.1.5  Infrasonic Noise Limits 
[HS3081V] The Launch and Entry Phases - Infrasonic Noise Limit shall be verified by 
test and analysis.  The maximum noise level measured at the crewmember’s ears shall 
be determined by flight-testing.  The test and analysis shall consist of estimating the 
maximum sound level at the crewmember’s ear by combining significant noise sources 
from estimates of rocket noise and external flow boundary layer noise, and including 
acoustic insertion losses of acoustic isolation and protective devices.  The rocket noise 
should be determined by test.  Acoustic insertion losses of the pressure shell and other 
materials shall be determined by test.  The effectiveness of hearing protection, 
headsets, and helmets is not allowed for this verification.  Sound pressure 
measurements shall be made over a frequency range from 1  to 20 Hz, using a Type 1 
integrating-averaging sound level meter at expected work station head locations.  The 
infrasonic noise level shall be measured via a 20 second Leq (slow time weighting).  
The verification shall be considered successful when the test and analysis indicate that 
the unweighted overall sound pressure level is 150  dB or less, at each expected work 
station head-location. 
Rationale:  Rocket and aerodynamic sources present during launch, entry, 
ascent abort and translunar injection or other long duration rocket firings are 
considered to be the only credible noise sources for this requirement. 
4.2.6.2  Acoustic Limits for the Orbit Phase 
 4.2.6.2.1  Sound Pressure Level (SPL) Limits for Waste Management System 
[HS3133V] The Waste Management System (WMS) noise limit shall be verified by test.  
Sound Pressure Level (SPL) measurements shall be made of the actual flight WMS 
(each serialized unit) in its flight configuration with closeouts and privacy curtain 
installed.  WMS shall be operated across the expected range of settings, including 
settings corresponding to the expected highest noise levels.  Measurements shall be 
made using a Type 1 integrating-averaging sound level meter for each flight WMS.  
Analysis shall be used to include any measured acoustical effects of WMS installation 
configuration, or to combine measured sound pressure levels of WMS and other 
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hardware items that must be operated simultaneously, when these factors are not 
accurately represented in field tests.  If the noise generated by WMS is influenced by 
the operation of another hardware item, then both items shall be tested together.  The 
verification shall be considered successful when the test indicates that the maximum 
noise levels at the expected user’s head position of the WMS, and at crew station head 
positions in the main habitable volume, meet the level of 68 dBA, or less. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.2.6.2.2  Impulse Noise Limit for the Orbit Phase 
[HS3078V] The impulse noise limit shall be verified by test.  The SPL measurements for 
this verification shall be made using the actual flight equipment (each serialized unit).  
Formal verification is not required for equipment with impulse noises that have peak 
overall SPLs of less than 100 dB.  Peak-hold sound pressure level measurements shall 
be made using a Type 1 sound level meter on all equipment that emits significant 
impulse noise at expected head locations.  The frequency response of the sound level 
meter shall extend to at least 6 Hz at its lower limit.  Measurement locations relative to 
specific noise sources must correspond to the shortest distance from the loudest point 
on the hardware to the closest possible crewmember head location.  This verification 
shall be considered successful when the test results show that the peak overall sound 
pressure level measurements are less than 120 dB. 
Rationale:  Serialized units must be verified individually because different units 
produced from the same design can generate significantly different noise levels. 
Significant impulse noise sources consist of valves, burst disks, and any other 
impulse noise source potentially greater than 100 dB SPL.  Noise attenuation 
gained by the use of hearing protection is not to be considered toward the 
compliance of this requirement, because hearing protection may not always be 
worn.  Intermediate testing and analysis should be performed and reviewed by 
NASA to ensure confidence that compliance with this requirement will be met 
and to preclude late impacts to cost, schedule, and hardware. 
 4.2.6.2.3  Annoyance Noise Limits for Crew Sleep 
[HS3079V] The annoyance noise limits shall be verified by test.  The measurements 
shall be made within the vehicle in the flight configuration with integrated Government 
Furnished Equipment (GFE), portable equipment, payloads, and cargo installed.  
Hardware shall be operated at settings that occur during crew rest periods.  
Measurements shall be made at expected sleep station head locations using a Type 1 
integrating-averaging sound level meter.  Measurement locations shall be no closer 
than 8 cm from any surface.  Peak-hold sound pressure level (impulse noise) and A-
weighted Overall SPL measurements shall be made.  The verification shall be 
considered successful when measurements show that the peak overall sound pressure 
levels are less than 83 dB peak for impulse noise (not weighted) and 70 dBA (A-
weighted) for intermittent noise. 
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Rationale:  Intermediate testing and analysis should be performed and reviewed 
by NASA to ensure confidence that compliance with this requirement will be met 
and to preclude late impacts to cost, schedule, and hardware. 
 4.2.6.2.4  Hazardous Noise Limit for the Orbit Phase 
[HS3075V] The hazardous noise limit shall be verified by test and analysis.  The SPL 
measurements for this verification shall be made using the actual flight equipment (each 
serialized unit) including GFE, portable equipment, payloads, and cargo.  Sound 
Pressure Level (SPL) measurements shall be made using a Type 1 integrating-
averaging sound level meter for each item of equipment and during all anticipated 
activities including maintenance.  The maximum A-weighted overall SPL (LAmax) with a 
fast (125 ms)  exponentially weighted time averaged response shall be measured.  
Analysis shall be used to include the effects of reflections, standing waves, or 
reverberation or to combine measured sound pressure levels of hardware items that will 
be operated simultaneously when these factors are not accurately represented in the 
field test.  If the noise generated by a specific hardware item is influenced by the 
operation of another hardware item then these hardware items shall be tested together.  
The verification shall be considered successful when field testing (and any performed 
simulations) indicates that the maximum level, measured at any location (no closer than 
8 cm to surfaces) within the habitable volume and at any maintenance operation head 
location, and at the ears of space-suit occupants, is below 85 dBA (LAmax) for any 
combination of individual hardware items that may occur simultaneously. 
Rationale:  Serialized units must be verified individually because different units 
produced from the same design can generate significantly different noise levels.  
Noise attenuation gained by the use of hearing protection is not to be considered 
toward the compliance of this requirement because hearing protection may not 
always be worn.  Intermediate testing and analysis should be performed and 
reviewed by NASA to ensure confidence that compliance with this requirement 
will be met and to preclude late impacts to cost, schedule, and hardware. 
 4.2.6.2.5  Sound Pressure Level (SPL) Limits for Continuous Noise during the 
Orbit Phase 
[HS3076V] The continuous noise limit shall be verified by test.  The measurements 
shall be made within the vehicle and space suits in the flight configuration with 
integrated GFE, stowage, vehicle installations, and closeouts installed.  Continuous 
noise generated by portable equipment, payloads, and cargo shall be assumed to be 
equivalent to NC-46 and shall be added to the verification measurements.  Hardware 
shall be operated across the expected range of operational settings (including settings 
corresponding to the expected highest noise levels).  Equivalent-continuous sound 
level, Leq, measurements shall be made within each octave band with center 
frequencies ranging from 63 Hz to 16 kHz, using a Type 1 integrating-averaging sound 
level meter with a 20-second averaging time.  Measurements shall be made at expected 
work and sleep station head locations, as well as throughout the habitable volume, to 
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determine a spatial average of other potential crew head locations.  Measurement 
locations shall be no closer than 30 cm from each other and no closer than 8 cm from 
any surface, and at the ears of space-suit occupants.  The spatial average shall be 
based on incoherent sound power addition (i.e., average of pressure-squared values).  
The verification shall be considered successful when field testing indicates that 
a.  the measured Leq at each expected work and sleep station head location (ear 
location of suited crew) and the estimated center of the habitable volume do not exceed 
the levels within each octave band indicated in HS3076, table Octave Band Sounds 
Pressure Level Limits. 
b.  the spatially-averaged SPLs (average of pressure-squared values) throughout the 
habitable volume do not exceed the levels given in HS3076, table Octave Band Sounds 
Pressure Level Limits.  The spatial average shall include locations used in 1) above, 
and a sufficient number of additional locations, to achieve a ± 2 dB 90% confidence 
interval within each octave band from 250 Hz to 16 kHz (see HS3076V, figure Number 
of Measurements vs. Standard Deviation to Determine A ± 2 dB 90% Confidence 
Interval). 
c.  no octave band sound pressure level measured at any location or at the maximum 
level location (i.e., the location of the maximum A-weighted overall sound pressure level 
found with a handheld sound level meter) within the entire habitable volume is more 
than 4 dB above the levels specified in HS3076, table Octave Band Sound Pressure 
Level Limits at the corresponding octave-band center frequency. 
Rationale:  Lower nominal settings of major hardware components shall also be 
tested and documented because expected maximum operational settings may 
not correspond to the highest noise levels.  Noise attenuation gained by the use 
of hearing protection is not to be considered toward the compliance of this 
requirement because hearing protection may not always be worn.  Intermediate 
testing and analysis should be performed and reviewed by NASA to ensure 
confidence that compliance with this requirement will be met and to preclude late 
impacts to cost, schedule, and hardware. 
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FIGURE 4.2.6.2.5-1 - NUMBER OF MEASUREMENTS VS, STANDARD DEVIATION TO 
DETERMINE A ± 2 DB 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL (FROM “ACOUSTICAL 
MEASUREMENTS AND NOISE CONTROL” BY C. M. HARRIS, P. 9.9, FIGURE 9.7)  
 4.2.6.2.6  Sound Pressure Level (SPL) Limits for Intermittent Noise during the 
Orbit Phase 
[HS3109V] The intermittent noise shall be verified by test and analysis.  Sound 
Pressure Level (SPL) measurements shall be made of the actual flight hardware (each 
serialized unit) in its flight configuration with closeouts installed.  Verification 
measurements may be performed on hardware items individually (i.e. as tested in an 
acoustic chamber), or integrated into the flight vehicle (e.g. for integrated hardware such 
as thrusters).  Hardware shall be operated across the expected range of settings, 
including settings corresponding to the expected highest noise levels.  Measurements 
shall be made using a Type 1 integrating-averaging sound level meter for each item of 
equipment indicated in HS3109, table Approved Intermittent Noise Sources.  The 
maximum A-weighted overall SPL (LAmax) shall be measured with a fast (125 ms) 
exponentially-weighted time-averaged response.  Analysis shall be used to include any 
measured or predicted acoustical effects of the hardware installation configuration or to 
combine measured sound pressure levels of hardware items that must be operated 
simultaneously when these factors are not accurately represented in field tests.  If the 
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noise generated by a specific hardware item is influenced by the operation of another 
hardware item, then these hardware items shall be tested together.  Analysis shall also 
be used to calculate the maximum operational duration to include the total time during 
any 24-hour period that the hardware item operates above the continuous noise limits 
given in HS3076, table Octave Band Sounds Pressure Level Limits.  This verification 
shall be considered successful when the test (and any performed simulations) indicates 
that the maximum noise level for the duration of intermittent operation, meets the level 
and duration limits specified in HS3109, table Intermittent Noise A-Weighted Overall 
Sound Pressure Level and Corresponding Operational Duration Limits (Measured at 0.6 
m) as measured either at 0.6 m or at the closest expected crew head-location from the 
loudest point on the hardware surface (at least 0.6 m from any habitable volume 
surface). 
Rationale:  Serialized units must be verified individually because different units 
produced from the same design can generate significantly different noise levels.  
Noise attenuation gained by the use of hearing protection is not to be considered 
toward the compliance of this requirement because hearing protection may not 
always be worn.  Intermediate testing and analysis should be performed and 
reviewed by NASA to ensure confidence that compliance with this requirement 
will be met and to preclude late impacts to cost, schedule, and hardware.  
Prototype or qualification units should be tested prior to manufacture of the actual 
flight equipment. 
4.2.6.2.7  Tonal and Narrow-Band Noise Limits 
[HS3080V] The tonal and narrow-band noise limit shall be verified by test.  The 
measurements shall be made within the vehicle in the flight configuration with integrated 
GFE, stowage, vehicle installations, and closeouts installed.  Hardware shall be 
operated across the expected range of operational settings (including settings 
corresponding to the expected highest noise levels).  Equivalent-continuous sound 
level, Leq, measurements shall be made within each octave band, with center 
frequencies ranging from 63  Hz to 16 kHz, using a Type 1 integrating-averaging sound 
level meter with a 20-second averaging time.  Tonal and narrow-band component 
measurements shall also be made using a Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) with a 
frequency resolution of 1 Hz.  Measurements shall be made at expected work and sleep 
station head locations.  The verification shall be considered successful when the test 
indicates that the maximum levels of tones and narrow band components, measured at 
all work and sleep station head locations, is at least 10 dB less than the value in the  
[HS3076], table Octave Band Sound Pressure Level Limits of the octave band that 
contains the component or tone for the 1-, 2-, 4-, and 8-kHz octave bands and at least 5 
dB less than the value in the [HS3076], table Octave Band Sound Pressure Level Limits 
of the octave band that contains the component or tone for the  63-, 125-, 250-, and 
500-Hz octave bands at the same location. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
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4.2.6.3  All Flight Phases 
  
 4.2.6.3.1  Cabin Depressurization Valve Hazardous Noise Limit 
[HS3082V] The cabin depressurization valve hazardous noise limit shall be verified by 
test and analysis.  The test and analysis shall consist of estimating the maximum sound 
level at the crewmember's ear by combining significant noise sources from estimates of 
valve noise and including acoustic insertion losses of protective devices.  The pressure-
relief valve noise shall be determined by test.  If allowed, the effectiveness of hearing 
protection, headsets, and helmets shall be determined by test.  The verification shall be 
considered successful when tests and analysis indicate that, during pressure relief valve 
operations, the maximum level predicted at the crewmember's ears is 105 dBA or less. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.2.6.3.2  Cabin Depressurization Valve Noise Dose Limits 
[HS3083V] The cabin depressurization valve - noise dose limit shall be verified by test 
and analysis.  The test and analysis shall consist of estimating the noise level as a 
function of time at the crewmember's ear by combining significant noise sources from 
estimates of valve noise and including acoustic insertion losses of protective devices.  
The pressure-relief valve noise shall be determined by test.  If allowed, the 
effectiveness of hearing protection, headsets, and helmets shall be determined by test.  
Noise levels for the balance of the 24-hour calculation period shall be assumed to be 65 
dBA.  The verification shall be considered successful when tests and analysis indicate 
that the 24-hour noise dose, associated with pressure valve releases, predicted at the 
crewmember's ears is 100% or less. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.2.6.3.3  Reverberation Time 
[HS3084V] The reverberation time limit shall be verified by test and analysis.  Field 
testing shall be used to measure the reverberation time inside the actual flight vehicle.  
The methodology given in ISO 3382, "Measurement of the Reverberation Time of 
Rooms with Reference to Other Acoustical Parameters," shall be used.  The test and 
analysis shall be considered successful when the reverberation time is less than 0.6 
second in the 500-Hz, 1-kHz, and 2-kHz octave bands. 
Rationale:  Intermediate testing and analysis should be performed and reviewed 
by NASA to ensure confidence that compliance with this requirement will be met 
and to preclude late impacts to cost, schedule, and hardware. 
 4.2.6.3.4  Noise Limit for Personal Communication Devices 
[HS3110V] The personal communication device SPL limit shall be verified by test.  
Measurements shall be made using a Type 1 integrating-averaging sound level meter 
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with an artificial ear or head simulator.  The verification shall be considered successful 
when the test shows that the measured maximum SPL at the crewmember's ear is 115 
dBA or less at maximum specified device audio input level and the maximum audio 
output volume setting. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.2.6.3.5  Loudspeaker Alarm Audibility 
[HS3111V] The loudspeaker nonspeech auditory annunciation levels shall be verified 
by test.  The measurements shall be made within the vehicle in the flight configuration 
with integrated GFE, stowage, vehicle installations, and closeouts installed.  Hardware 
shall be operated across the expected range of operational settings (including settings 
corresponding to the expected highest noise levels).  Sound pressure measurements 
shall be made within each one-third-octave band, with center frequencies ranging from 
300  Hz to 3 kHz, using a Type 1 integrating-averaging sound level meter using a peak 
hold function with a fast (125 ms) exponentially-weighted time averaged response.  
Measurements shall be made at expected work and sleep station head locations.  The 
ambient noise level shall be measured via a 20-second Leq (slow time weighting).  The 
verification shall be considered successful when the test indicates that, for each 
temporal component of the annunciation, the level in at least one one-third-octave band 
is more than 13 dB above the ambient noise level at each expected work and sleep 
station location. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.2.7  Ionizing Radiation 
4.2.7.1  Radiation Design Requirements 
 4.2.7.1.1  Radiation Design Requirements 
[HS3085V] Radiation exposure shall be verified by analysis.  The analysis shall be 
performed through the use of a model with the following components:  Design 
Environment:  CxP 70023, DSNE, Section 3.3.4.  Transport code:  The HZETRN_2005 
code provided as GFE by CxP.  Vehicle Geometry:  CFE CxP standard Computer Aided 
Drafting (CAD) model of the vehicle structure, hardware, stowage, and CFE equipment.  
This includes materials specification sufficient to derive chemical composition and bulk 
density for each instance/part in the design.  The vehicle as analyzed shall be 
representative of a standard lunar transit configuration for vehicle components, 
equipment and stowage items as well as a minimum crew complement placed within the 
habitable volume.  Shield Evaluation/Mass Distribution Evaluation:  Barrier Thickness 
Evaluator (BTE) code provided as GFE by CxP. 
Human Geometry: 50th percentile Computerized Anatomical Female (CAF) model 
provided as GFE by CxP.  Analysis locations within the human body and mass 
distribution solid angle distributions also provided for analysis as GFE by CxP. 
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The verification shall be considered successful when the analysis shows that the 
maximum effective dose incurred by any crewmember within the vehicle does not 
exceed the value given in HS3085, table System-Specific Radiation Design 
Requirements. 
 Effective dose shall be calculated as a quantity,  
 
 
where the equivalent dose, HT, is defined as 
 
 
DT,R is the dose averaged over a specific organ or tissue (T) due to radiation (R). 
The tissue weighting factor ωT is given in Table 4.3, for required tissues/organs, in 
National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP) Report Number 
132. 
Q(L) is the radiation quality factor as a function of same as specified in National Council 
on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP) Report Number 132, Table 4.2 Q 
vs. L relationship, Radiation Protection Guidance for Activities in Low-Earth Orbit. 
Rationale:  Analysis must be used to verify this requirement.  The complexity of 
radiation environment, radiation transport calculations, and vehicle/shielding 
geometry make verification by other methods intractable.  Selection of calculation 
inputs and algorithms follow a conservative approach and the calculation 
methods are state of the art for space radiation analysis.  
4.2.7.2  Active Radiation Monitoring 
 4.2.7.2.1  Charged Particle Monitoring 
[HS3086V] Charged particle monitoring shall be verified by test and analysis for 
detector integration into the vehicle.  The test shall use one flight equivalent instrument 
to verify the requirement.  The test shall use accelerator sources of charged particles 
with Z=1, 2, 6, 8, 14, and 26.  The test shall use two energies within 30 to 300 
MeV/nucleon for Z<3.  The test shall use two energies within 100 to 400 MeV/nucleon 
for 3≤Z≤26. The test shall use a total fluence of not less than 100,000 cm-2 delivered at 
a fluence rate range 500 cm-2 s-1 to 1,000 cm-2 s-1  for 2<Z<26 and a total fluence of 
100,000 cm-2 delivered at a fluence rate no smaller than 2,000 cm-2 s-1  for Z=1.  The 
analysis shall use a geometrical assessment of the CAD vehicle model to verify the 
unobstructed viewing angle requirement.  The verification shall be considered 
successful when the test shows agreement with reference fluence within ±10%, with an 
energy resolution <30% and when the analysis shows an unobstructed viewing angle 
not less than 1.1345 radians (65 degrees). 
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Rationale:  Test is the necessary method for verification of this requirement.  The 
verification cannot be performed for all components of the space radiation field in 
which the vehicle will be exposed.  The selected test fields span the range of the 
Z, energy, Linear Energy Transfer, fluence, and fluence rates expected during 
the missions. 
 4.2.7.2.2  Dose Equivalent Monitoring 
[HS3088V] Dose equivalent monitoring shall be verified by test.  The test shall use one 
flight equivalent instrument to verify the requirement.  The test shall be an exposure of 
the flight equivalent instrument to radiation sources.  The test shall use accelerator 
sources of charged particles with Z=1, 6, and 26.  The test shall use Cesium-137 or 
Cobalt-60 photon source.  Each radiation source shall deliver a total dose equivalent of 
10 mSv for each of the dose equivalent ranges of 0.5 mSv per hour to 3 mSv per hour 
and 5 mSv per hour to 10 mSv per hour.  The verification shall be considered 
successful when the test shows ±20% agreement between the measured and reference 
dose equivalent rate and total dose equivalent. 
Rationale:  Test is the necessary method for verification of this requirement.  
Instrument operation cannot be simulated or inspected.  Exposure to actual 
radiation fields is required to verify that the instrument is operational and that it 
meets design specifications.  The verification cannot be performed for all 
components of the space radiation field to which the vehicle will be exposed.  
The selected test fields span the range of the Z, energy, linear energy transfer, 
dose equivalents, and dose equivalent rates expected during the missions, 
including radiation fields expected during solar particle events. 
 4.2.7.2.3  Absorbed Dose Monitoring 
[HS3089V] Absorbed dose monitoring shall be verified by test.  The test shall use one 
flight equivalent instrument to verify the requirement.  The test shall be an exposure of 
the flight equivalent instrument to radiation sources.  The test shall use accelerator 
sources of charged particles with Z =1, 6, and 26.  Each radiation source shall deliver a 
total dose of 10 mGy for each of the dose equivalent ranges of:  0.5 mGy per hour to 3 
mGy per hour and 5 mGy per hour to 10 mGy per hour.  The verification shall be 
considered successful when the test shows ± 20% agreement between the measured 
and reference dose rate and total dose. 
Rationale:  Test is the necessary method for verification of this requirement.  
Instrument operation cannot be simulated or inspected.  Exposure to actual 
radiation fields is required to verify that the instrument is operational and that it 
meets design specifications.  The verification cannot be performed for all 
components of the space radiation field to which the vehicle will be exposed.  
The selected test fields span the range of the Z, energy, Linear Energy Transfer, 
absorbed doses, and absorbed dose rates expected during the missions, 
including radiation fields expected during solar particle events. 
Revision:  E Document No:  CxP 70024 
Release Date:  11/19/10 Page:  220 of 503 
Title:  Constellation Program Human-Systems Integration Requirements 
 
4.2.7.3  Passive Radiation Monitoring 
 4.2.7.3.1  Passive Radiation Monitoring 
[HS3090V] Passive dosimetry to measure radiation exposure in CxP vehicles/elements 
shall be verified by inspection and analysis.  The analysis shall determine the number 
and placement of measuring devices within the vehicle/element based on the interior 
configuration.  The inspection shall consist of a drawing review to confirm the number 
and the attach point locations of the devices in the vehicle interior.  The verification shall 
be considered successful when the inspection confirms that the system provides a 
minimum of six locations with passive radiation dosimeters attached to the interior of 
each pressurized vehicle/element. 
Rationale:  Analysis must be used to verify this requirement.  The complexity of 
radiation environment, radiation transport calculations, and vehicle/shielding 
geometry make verification by other methods intractable.  Selection of attach 
points will be based on the projected radiation exposures, using transport 
calculation and vehicle geometry, within the vehicle given in DRD T-045, Space 
Radiation Analysis and Certification Report. 
4.2.7.4  Reporting Radiation Data 
 4.2.7.4.1  Radiation Data Reporting to the Crew - Absorbed Dose 
[HS3091V] The absorbed dose data reporting shall be verified by test.  The test shall 
use one flight equivalent instrument to take the measurements.  The test shall use the 
vehicle data management system or equivalent to receive the measurements.  The test 
will be a simulated operational session of measurements taken by the flight equivalent 
instrument interfaced to the data management system or equivalent.  The test shall be a 
1-hour measurement.  The test shall be considered successful when the data reported 
to the vehicle data management system or equivalent are updated every 1 minute and 
the time tag on the data reported is less than 5 minutes older than actual time when the 
data were recorded. 
Rationale:  Test is the necessary method for verification of this requirement.  The 
instrument interface to the data management system or equivalent must be 
tested with the actual hardware to ensure that the instrument is passing data that 
can be recorded correctly. 
 4.2.7.4.2  Radiation Data Reporting to the Crew - Dose Equivalent 
[HS3119V] The dose equivalent data reporting shall be verified by test.  The test shall 
use one flight equivalent instrument to take the measurements.  The test shall use the 
vehicle data management system or equivalent to receive the measurements.  The test 
will be a simulated operational session of measurements taken by the flight equivalent 
instrument interfaced to the data management system or equivalent.  The test shall be a 
1-hour measurement.  The test shall be considered successful when the data reported 
to the vehicle data management system or equivalent are updated every 1 minute and 
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the time tag on the data reported is less than 5 minutes older than the actual time when 
the data were recorded. 
Rationale:  Test is the necessary method for verification of this requirement.  The 
instrument interface to the data management system or equivalent must be 
tested with the actual hardware to ensure that the instrument is passing data that 
can be recorded correctly. 
 4.2.7.4.3  Radiation Data Reporting to Missions Systems - Absorbed Dose 
[HS3112V] The absorbed dose data reporting shall be verified by test.  The test shall 
use one flight equivalent instrument to take the measurements.  The test shall use the 
vehicle data management system or equivalent to receive the measurements.  The test 
shall use Mission operations or equivalent.  The test will be a simulated operational 
session of measurements taken by the flight equivalent instrument interfaced to the data 
management system or equivalent and Mission operations or equivalent.  The test shall 
be a 4-hour measurement and transmission.  The test shall be considered successful 
when the received data are updated every minute, time tag on data received is less 
5 minutes older than actual time, and when the data received are transmitted. 
Rationale:  Test is the necessary method for verification of this requirement.  The 
instrument interface to the data management system or equivalent and Mission 
Systems must be tested with the actual hardware to ensure that the instrument is 
passing data that can be reported correctly. 
 4.2.7.4.4  Radiation Data Reporting to Mission Systems - Dose Equivalent 
[HS3120V] The dose equivalent data reporting shall be verified by test.  The test shall 
use one flight equivalent instrument to take the measurements.  The test shall use the 
vehicle data management system or equivalent to receive the measurements.  The test 
shall use Mission operations or equivalent.  The test will be a simulated operational 
session of measurements taken by the flight equivalent instrument interfaced to the data 
management system or equivalent and Mission Operations or equivalent.  The test shall 
be a 4-hour measurement and transmission.  The test shall be considered successful 
when the received data are updated every minute, time tag on data received is less 
5 minutes older than actual time, and when the data received are transmitted. 
Rationale:  Test is the necessary method for verification of this requirement.  The 
instrument interface to the data management system or equivalent and Mission 
Systems must be tested with the actual hardware to ensure that the instrument is 
passing data that can be reported correctly. 
 4.2.7.4.5  Particle Archive Data 
[HS3113V] Data archival shall be verified by test and analysis.  The test shall use each 
flight equivalent instrument used to make charged particle, dose equivalent, absorbed 
dose, measurements.  The test shall use the vehicle data management system or 
equivalent to receive the measurements.  The test shall use Mission Operations or 
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equivalent.  The test will be a simulated operational session of measurements taken 
and recorded by the flight equivalent instruments interfaced to the data management 
system or equivalent and Mission Operations or equivalent.  The test shall be a 1-day 
measurement and subsequent transmission of archival data.  The test shall be 
considered successful when the data received by Mission Operations are confirmed to 
be identical to the recorded data.  The analysis shall use a data set from each of the 
flight equivalent instruments equivalent to the data generated during flight operation.  
The analysis shall be considered successful when the total memory allocation for each 
flight equivalent instrument is shown to be larger than the mission data set size of the 
longest Design Reference Mission (DRM). 
Rationale:  Test is the necessary method for verification of this requirement.  The 
instrument interface to the data management system or equivalent and Mission 
Systems must be tested with the actual hardware to ensure that the instrument is 
passing archive data that can be downlinked correctly.  The integrity of the real 
acquired data must be confirmed to ensure that data corruption is not occurring 
during the downlink. 
4.2.7.5  Alerting for Radiation Data 
 4.2.7.5.1  Alerting for Radiation Data 
[HS3092V] The absorbed dose alerting shall be verified by demonstration.  The 
demonstration shall consist of setting thresholds at 0.02 mGy/min, 0.05 mGy/min, 1 
mGy/min, and 10 mGy/min.  The demonstration shall use a simulated data stream 
identical format to the absorbed dose data stream, input into the vehicle data 
management system, or equivalent, that will exceed each of the above thresholds for 
three consecutive readings.  The verification shall be considered successful when the 
demonstration shows that an alert in the vehicle data management system is generated 
when each of these thresholds is exceeded for three consecutive readings. 
Rationale:  Demonstration is the necessary method for verification of this 
requirement.  Due to the high dose rates required to exceed the alarm 
thresholds, it is not practical to use a flight equivalent instrument as the data 
source.  The data stream will be simulated with data identical to the absorbed 
dose data format.  Confirmation of the various alarm threshold settings and ability 
to generate an alarm if they are exceeded is important to ensure reliability of the 
alarm function and protect crewmembers during high dose rate conditions.  The 
alarm testing does not require analysis but will verify an alarm or no alarm 
condition. 
4.2.8  Non-Ionizing Radiation (NIR) 
Revision:  E Document No:  CxP 70024 
Release Date:  11/19/10 Page:  223 of 503 
Title:  Constellation Program Human-Systems Integration Requirements 
 
4.2.8.1  Radio-Frequency Electromagnetic (EM) Field Radiation Limits 
 4.2.8.1.1  Radio-Frequency Electromagnetic Field Radiation Limits 
[HS3093V] Crew exposure to radio-frequency electromagnetic fields shall be verified by 
analysis.  Data generated in response to the CxP E3 verification test requirements (CxP 
70080, Constellation Program Electromagnetic Environmental Effects (E3) 
Requirements Document) shall be analyzed and verified both for individual and 
combined RF EM fields.  A model of additive and synergistic RF EM fields shall be 
generated to show projected crew exposures in crew accessible areas, both internal 
and external to the vehicle.  The verification shall be considered successful when the 
analysis shows crew exposures are within the limits specified in Appendix C Table C3-1 
and Figure C3-1. 
Rationale:  The test which provides the data for this verification analysis is the 
same type of testing which is normally performed to determine EM field effects 
with regard to avionics hardware.  Analysis must be performed using this test 
data to synthesize the exact characteristics of each individual field produced, as 
well as the combined EM field environment, with regard to exposure levels for the 
crew.  NOTE:  Drive Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) Team to do 
assessments for humans in addition to the equipment. 
4.2.8.2  Laser Radiation Limits 
 4.2.8.2.1  Ocular Exposure to Lasers 
[HS3094V] Ocular exposure from laser systems shall be verified by analysis.  The 
analysis shall be performed as defined by American National Standards Institute (ANSI) 
standard, ANSI Z136.1, 2007 American National Standard for Safe Use of Lasers.  The 
verification shall be considered successful when the analysis shows that ocular 
exposure is within the limits in ANSI Z136.1, 2007 Tables 5a and 5b without protective 
equipment. 
Rationale:  Analysis must be used to verify this requirement.  To prove that the 
ANSI standard is met, the laser system must be analyzed with regard to its 
operating parameters, operational configuration, and isolation and containment 
measures. Protective equipment as defined by the ANSI standard is, 
"...protection in the form of goggles or spectacles, barriers, windows, clothing and 
gloves, and other devices which have been specifically selected for suitable 
protection against laser radiation."  (p. 42, Section  4.6.1) 
 4.2.8.2.2  Dermal Exposure to Lasers 
[HS3096V] Limiting skin exposure to laser systems shall be verified by analysis.  The 
analysis shall be performed as defined by ANSI Z136.1, 2007.  The verification shall be 
considered successful when the analysis shows that dermal exposure is within the limits 
in ANSI Z136.1, 2007 Table 7 without protective equipment. 
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Rationale:  Analysis must be used to verify this requirement.  To prove that the 
ANSI standard is met, the laser system must be analyzed with regard to its 
operating parameters, operational configuration, and isolation and containment 
measures. Protective equipment as defined by the ANSI standard is, "protection 
in the form of goggles or spectacles, barriers, windows, clothing and gloves, and 
other devices which have been specifically selected for suitable protection 
against laser radiation."  (p. 42, Section 4.6.1). 
4.2.8.3  Incoherent Radiation Limits 
4.2.8.3.1  Retinal Thermal Injury from Visible and Near Infrared Sources 
 4.2.8.3.1.1  Retinal Thermal Injury from Visible and Near Infrared Sources 
[HS3098V] Crewmember exposure limits shall be verified by test and analysis.  The test 
shall measure the transmittance of all transparent and translucent apertures and 
radiance of artificial sources from at least 385–1,400 nm in 1-nm increments.  
Transmittance measurements may be taken using witness samples in the normal flight 
configuration if the witness samples are large enough to capture the enhanced 
transmittance realized from multi-pane reflections; otherwise, transmittance 
measurements shall be performed on flight articles.  Spectral radiance measurements 
of artificial sources shall be done by type and lot.  The test report shall be provided to 
NASA, including the transmittance and radiance data, along with a graphical 
representation of these data.  The analysis shall include calculation of the limits 
indicated in the requirement using the transmittance and radiance values obtained 
during the test.  The verification shall be considered successful when the analysis 
shows that the limits calculated from the equations in this requirement are maintained 
within the applicable spectrum (385–1,400 nm). 
Rationale:  Test and analysis are required for verification of this requirement, as 
over this specified range several different damage mechanisms come into play.  
A full spectral test is required in the defined increments to assure that the 
equipment under test does not exhibit narrow spectral peaks in radiance or 
transmittance.  Each specified product resulting from the testing is necessary for 
verification of this requirement as well as other requirements in this section.  
Analysis is required to integrate individual elements that may contribute to the 
concentration or attenuation of NIR.  A witness sample is a portion of material 
that is processed at the same time and under the same conditions as the end 
item product. 
4.2.8.3.2  Retinal Photochemical Injury from Visible Light 
 4.2.8.3.2.1  Small Source Visible Radiation Limits 
[HS3099V] Crewmember exposure limits shall be verified by test and analysis.  The test 
shall measure the transmittance of all transparent and translucent apertures and 
radiance of artificial sources from at least 305–700 nm in 1-nm increments.  
Transmittance measurements may be taken using witness samples in the normal flight 
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configuration if the witness samples are large enough to capture the enhanced 
transmittance realized from multi-pane reflections; otherwise, transmittance 
measurements shall be performed on flight articles.  Spectral radiance measurements 
of artificial sources shall be done by type and lot.  The test report shall be provided to 
NASA, including the transmittance and radiance data, along with a graphical 
representation of these data.  The analysis shall include calculation of the limits 
indicated in the requirement using the transmittance and radiance values obtained 
during the test.  The verification shall be considered successful when the analysis 
shows that the limits calculated from the equations in this requirement are maintained 
within the applicable spectrum (305–700 nm). 
Rationale:  Test and analysis are required for verification of this requirement 
because several different damage mechanisms come into play over this specified 
range.  A full spectral test is required in the defined increments to assure that the 
equipment under test does not exhibit narrow spectral peaks in radiance or 
transmittance.  Each specified product resulting from the testing is necessary for 
verification of this requirement, as well as other requirements in this section.  
Analysis is required to integrate individual elements that may contribute to the 
concentration or attenuation of NIR.  A witness sample is a portion of material 
that is processed at the same time and under the same conditions as the end 
item product. 
 4.2.8.3.2.2  Large Source Visible Radiation Limits 
[HS3101V] Crewmember exposure limits shall be verified by test and analysis.  The test 
shall measure the transmittance of all transparent and translucent apertures and 
radiance of artificial sources from at least 305–700 nm in 1-nm increments.  
Transmittance measurements may be taken using witness samples in the normal flight 
configuration if the witness samples are large enough to capture the enhanced 
transmittance realized from multi-pane reflections; otherwise, transmittance 
measurements shall be performed on flight articles.  Spectral radiance measurements 
of artificial sources shall be done by type and lot.  The test report shall be provided to 
NASA, including the transmittance and radiance data, along with a graphical 
representation of these data.  The analysis shall include calculation of the limits 
indicated in the requirement using the transmittance and radiance values obtained 
during the test.  The verification shall be considered successful when the analysis 
shows that the limits calculated from the equations in this requirement are maintained 
within the applicable spectrum (305–700 nm). 
Rationale:  Test and analysis are required for verification of this requirement 
because several different damage mechanisms come into play over this specified 
range.  A full spectral test is required in the defined increments to assure that the 
equipment under test does not exhibit narrow spectral peaks in radiance or 
transmittance.  Each specified product resulting from the testing is necessary for 
verification of this requirement, as well as other requirements in this section.  
Analysis is required to integrate individual elements that may contribute to the 
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concentration or attenuation of NIR.  A witness sample is a portion of material 
that is processed at the same time and under the same conditions as the end 
item product. 
4.2.8.3.3  Thermal Injury from Infrared Radiation 
 4.2.8.3.3.1  Thermal Injury from Infrared Radiation 
[HS3103V] Crewmember exposure limits shall be verified by test and analysis.  The test 
shall measure the transmittance of all transparent and translucent apertures and 
radiance of artificial sources from at least 770–3,000 nm in 1-nm increments.  
Transmittance measurements may be taken using witness samples in the normal flight 
configuration if the witness samples are large enough to capture the enhanced 
transmittance realized from multi-pane reflections; otherwise, transmittance 
measurements shall be performed on flight articles.  Spectral radiance measurements 
of artificial sources shall be done by type and lot.  The test report shall be provided to 
NASA, including the transmittance and radiance data, along with a graphical 
representation of these data.  The analysis shall include calculation of the limits 
indicated in the requirement using the transmittance and radiance values obtained 
during the test.  The verification shall be considered successful when the analysis 
shows that the limits calculated from the equations in this requirement are maintained 
within the applicable spectrum (770–3,000 nm). 
Rationale:  Test and analysis are required for verification of this requirement 
because several different damage mechanisms come into play over this specified 
range.  A full spectral test is required in the defined increments to assure that the 
equipment under test does not exhibit narrow spectral peaks in radiance or 
transmittance.  Each specified product resulting from the testing is necessary for 
verification of this requirement, as well as other requirements in this section.  
Analysis is required to integrate individual elements that may contribute to the 
concentration or attenuation of NIR.  A witness sample is a portion of material 
that is processed at the same time and under the same conditions as the end 
item product. 
4.2.8.3.4  Ultraviolet Exposure for Unprotected Eye or Skin 
 4.2.8.3.4.1  Ultraviolet Exposure for Unprotected Eye or Skin 
[HS3104V] Crewmember exposure limits shall be verified by test and analysis.  The test 
shall measure the transmittance of all transparent and translucent apertures and 
radiance of artificial sources from at least 180–400 nm in 1-nm increments.  
Transmittance measurements may be taken using witness samples in the normal flight 
configuration if the witness samples are large enough to capture the enhanced 
transmittance realized from multi-pane reflections; otherwise, transmittance 
measurements shall be performed on flight articles.  Spectral radiance measurements 
of artificial sources shall be done by type and lot.  The test report shall be provided to 
NASA, including the transmittance and radiance data, along with a graphical 
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representation of these data.  The analysis shall include calculation of the limits 
indicated in the requirement using the transmittance and radiance values obtained 
during the test.  The verification shall be considered successful when the analysis 
shows that the limits calculated from the equations in this requirement are maintained 
within the applicable spectrum (180–400 nm). 
Rationale:  Test and analysis are required for verification of this requirement 
because different damage mechanisms come into play over this specified range 
several.  A full spectral test is required in the defined increments to assure that 
the equipment under test does not exhibit narrow spectral peaks in radiance or 
transmittance.  Each specified product resulting from the testing is necessary for 
verification of this requirement, as well as other requirements in this section.  
Analysis is required to integrate individual elements that may contribute to the 
concentration or attenuation of NIR.  A witness sample is a portion of material 
that is processed at the same time and under the same conditions as the end 
item product. 
4.3  SAFETY 
4.3.1  Emergency Equipment Access 
 4.3.1.1  Emergency Equipment Access 
[HS4022V] Emergency equipment access shall be verified by analysis.  The analysis 
shall identify all emergency equipment that is required to address emergencies and their 
location within the vehicle.  The analysis shall determine the time needed to access 
each piece of emergency equipment per the specific emergency scenario.  The 
verification shall be considered successful when the analysis shows that emergency 
equipment can be accessed within the time required to address the emergency. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.3.2  Mechanical Hazards 
 4.3.2.1  Corners and Edges Exposed During Nominal Operations 
[HS4002V] Corner and edge rounding for exposure during nominal operations shall be 
verified by analysis and inspection.  The analysis shall determine the location of corners 
and edges to which the crew or ground personnel are expected to be exposed during 
nominal operations.  The inspection shall consist of inspection of drawings of the 
identified corners and edges, and physical inspection of the edges using a glove or 
swatch cloth.  The verification shall be considered successful when the analysis and 
inspection show that corners and edges meet the roundness specifications in Appendix 
D, table Corner and Edge Rounding Requirements. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
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 4.3.2.2  Corners and Edges Exposed During Maintenance 
[HS4003V] Corner and edge rounding for exposure during maintenance shall be 
verified by analysis and inspection.  The analysis shall determine the location of corners 
and edges to which the crew is expected to be exposed during in-flight maintenance.  
The inspection shall consist of inspection of drawings of the identified corners and 
edges and a sharp edge inspection.  The verification shall be considered successful 
when the analysis and drawing inspection show that corners and edges are rounded to 
at least 0.01 inch and the sharp edge inspection identifies no issues. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.3.2.3  Corners and Edges of Loose Equipment 
[HS4004V] Loose equipment corner and edge rounding shall be verified by analysis 
and inspection.  The analysis shall determine what equipment is considered loose 
equipment.  The inspection shall consist of a review of drawings to identify that the 
design meets the specifications in Appendix D, table Corner and Edge Rounding 
Requirements.  The verification shall be considered successful when the analysis and 
drawing inspection show that corners and edges are rounded to the specifications in 
Appendix D, table Corner and Edge Rounding Requirements. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.3.2.4  Burrs 
[HS4005V] Absence of burrs on surfaces shall be verified by inspection and test.  The 
inspection shall determine the location of surfaces to which the crew or ground 
personnel are expected to be exposed during nominal operations.  The test shall be a 
swatch test on all potential burrs.  The verification shall be considered successful when 
the inspection and test show that no burrs are found on any exposed surfaces. 
Rationale:  Inspection and test of flight hardware are necessary because burr 
prevention is provided through quality workmanship, not design. 
 4.3.2.5  Sharp Items 
[HS4006V] Controls for sharp items shall be verified by inspection and analysis.  The 
inspection shall identify the sharp items to which the crew or ground personnel are 
expected to be exposed during nominal and maintenance operations.  The analysis 
shall identify controls for the sharp items.  The verification shall be considered 
successful when the inspection and analysis shows that sharp item controls are in place 
for the identified items. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.3.2.6  Pinch Points 
[HS4021V] Control for crew exposure to pinch points shall be verified by analysis.  The 
analysis shall identify the location of potential pinch point locations in the vehicle.  The 
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analysis shall identify controls for those pinch points that are accessible by the crew.  
The verification shall be considered successful when pinch points are either 
inaccessible to the crew or have a control to prevent injury. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.3.2.7  Interior Item Restraints 
[HS4007V] Restraints for unstowed items shall be verified by analysis.  The analysis 
shall identify all items that will be unstowed during any portion of the mission with 
consideration of the gravitational environment and identify the restraints provided by the 
system.  The verification shall be considered successful when the analysis shows that 
each item that will be unstowed has a restraint mechanism if required. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.3.2.8  Holes 
[HS4023V] Round or slotted holes that are uncovered for equipment located inside 
habitable volumes shall be verified by inspection.  The inspection shall be of 
engineering drawings.  The verification shall be considered successful when the 
inspection shows that the minimum dimension of uncovered round or slotted holes in 
the habitable volume are smaller than 1.02 cm (0.4 in) or greater than 3.56 cm (1.4 in). 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.3.3  Electrical Hazards 
 4.3.3.1  Electrical Hazard Potential 
[HS4008V] Prevention of crew exposure to currents greater than those in HS4008, table 
Electrical Hazard Potential and table Let-Go Current shall be verified by analysis and 
test.  The analysis shall determine the locations where the crew may be exposed to 
electrical currents.  The analysis shall identify controls at the locations where currents 
are greater than those provided in the tables.  The test shall measure the electrical 
current at each of the locations as identified in the analysis.  The verification shall be 
considered successful when the analysis and test show that the electrical current 
measured at each location to which the crew may be exposed is not greater than the 
current provided in the tables or that the electrical potentials controls are in place. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.3.3.2  Chassis Leakage Current - Nonpatient Equipment 
[HS4008BV] The nonpatient equipment chassis leakage current requirement shall be 
verified by test.  The test shall consist of measuring the powered-up leakage current at 
the exposed chassis/enclosure surface of actual nonpatient flight hardware that could 
come into contact with crew or ground personnel.  The verification shall be considered 
successful when the test indicates that the chassis leakage current is less than or equal 
to the associated limit in HS4008B, table Chassis Leakage Current – Nonpatient. 
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Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.3.3.3  Chassis Leakage Current - Patient Equipment 
[HS4008CV] The patient-care equipment chassis leakage current requirement shall be 
verified by test.  The test shall consist of measuring the powered-up leakage current at 
the exposed chassis/enclosure surface of actual patient-care flight hardware that could 
come into contact with crew, ground personnel, or patients.  The verification shall be 
considered successful when the test indicates that the chassis leakage current is less 
than or equal to the associated limit in HS4008C, table Chassis Leakage Current - 
Patient. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.3.4  Touch Temperature Limits 
 4.3.4.1  Hot Touch Temperature Limit 
[HS4012V] Hot touch temperature limits shall be verified by test or analysis.  A test, 
analysis or combination thereof shall determine the highest expected surface 
temperature of the object that may be contacted by the crew.  For unlimited contact  
time, the verification shall be considered successful if the object’s                (inverse 
square root of thermal inertia) is greater than 0.3 (which is the case for common 
materials such as Aluminum and less common materials such as pyrolitic graphite, gold 
and silver) and the object’s temperature is lower than 45°C.   
For contact time up to 10 seconds with any material, the verification shall be considered 
successful if the object’s temperature is lower than 50°C.  
If the object’s is less than 0.3 or the object’s surface temperature is higher 
than 45°C for unlimited contact time, or higher than 50°C for contact time up to 10 
seconds, an analysis shall be performed.  The analysis shall use the following two sets 
of equations to calculate the maximum allowable object temperature or contact duration 
that would prevent the epidermis/dermis interface temperature from exceeding 44°C.  
The verification is considered successful if the object temperature (as determined from 
analysis or representative test) does not exceed Tobject 
For skin contact between 1-5 seconds:  
 
 
Where: 
 
Tobject = object temperature (°C) 
YI   = antilog [YII ( a1 ) + log YIII ] 
YII  = 1.094 (t) -0.184 
YIII = 0.490 (t) -0.412 
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=  thermal inertia of contact object material (cal2/cm4 °C2 sec) 
k = thermal conductivity, p = density, and c = specific heat 
a1 =  epidermal thickness, in mm (average 0.25 mm) 
t =  time of exposure, in seconds (time of exposure is limited to between 1 
and 5 seconds) 
 
For skin contact < 1 second:  
Use the equation above using 1 second for the exposure time.  This is necessary to 
stay within the bounds of the data, and also allows for a margin of safety. 
 
For skin contact > 5 seconds: 
 
where: 
 Tobject = object temperature (°C) 
  (kρc)object = object thermal inertia (cal2/cm4 °C2 sec) 
 a, b = equation constants, found in the table below 
 
TABLE 4.3.4.1-1 - HOT TOUCH TEMPERATURE CONSTANTS  
time (s) a b 
10 0.475 50.07 
30 0.459 46.61 
60 0.446 45.90 
∞  0.422 44.87 
 
Below is a table of  for some common materials: 
 
TABLE 4.3.4.1-2 - INVERSE SQUARE ROOT OF THERMAL INERTIA FOR COMMON 
MATERIALS  
Material  Inverse Square Root of Thermal Inertia, 
(kρc)-1/2 (cm2 °C sec1/2/cal)  
Aluminum (6061T-6)  2.2  
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316 Stainless Steel  5.9  
Glass  28.8  
Teflon  57.5  
Nylon Hook Velcro  586 (effective)  
 
For contact times between those given in the table, perform a linear interpolation for 
time (a and b should not be interpolated).  For example, for a duration of 20 seconds, 
calculate Tobject for 10 and 30 seconds, equate the slope between 10 and 30 to the slope 
between 20 and 30 (or 10), and solve for the unknown variable, Tobject 
 
To calculate the allowable contact time for a given material at a particular temperature, 
build a table of allowable contact temperatures from 1 second to infinity and interpolate. 
Note that at a value of  = 50 cm2 °C s1/2/cal, the curves for 5 seconds and 10 
seconds intersect.  Above this point, the curve for 30 seconds must be used to 
interpolate all times between 5 and 30 seconds.  For  < 50 cm2 °C s1/2/cal, the 
curve for 10 seconds may be used for interpolation. 
 
The following is a graph for between 0 and 100: 
 
 
FIGURE 4.3.4.1-1 - ALLOWABLE HOT TOUCH TEMPERATURE DURATION  
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Rationale:  Stoll et al. (1979) developed a correlation to hot touch temperature 
data, which was valid from 1-5 seconds, and is represented by the equation.  
Beyond 5 seconds of contact, a different method is required.  Hattan and 
Halfdanarson (1982) found that a semi-infinite model correlated well with Stoll’s 
data using a contact conductance of 1,000 W/m2K.  Solving the one-dimensional 
semi-infinite model with contact conductance for object temperature, assuming 
initial skin temperature of 32.5°C, epidermis thickness of 0.25 mm, skin inverse 
square root of thermal inertia of 27.96 cm2 °C sec1/2 /cal), skin thermal 
conductivity of 0.54 W/m·K, and maximum dermis/epidermis temperature of 
44°C, yields the equation and constants given in the verification for contact 
duration greater than 5 seconds.  The object material is taken into account by 
using its thermal inertia in the equations.  This method is only valid for thick, 
single materials.  For aluminum, which has the lowest value of inverse thermal 
inertia for commonly flown materials, the methodology yields an allowable object 
temperature for infinite contact of 45.8 (deg) C.  For 10 seconds for aluminum the 
object temperature limit is 50.3 (deg) C.  Problems involving layers of materials 
(layups) may require the use of thermal models.  Thermal models can also allow 
more exact calculation of allowable touch temperatures for thermally thin single 
material objects.  The resulting allowable temperatures will be higher than those 
calculated using the above method.  
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If a thermal model is used for verification, the method of Hattan and Halfdanarson 
(1982) is used.  That is, it must meet the following conditions: 
• One-dimensional semi-infinite skin model using 
o thermal conductivity of 0.54 W/m·K 
o thermal diffusivity of 1.3x10-7 m2/s (combined with the thermal 
conductivity, this yields an inverse square root of thermal inertia of 
27.96 cm2 °C sec1/2 /cal  
o density of 1200 kg/m3 if required (modeling software may require the 
density and heat capacity of the skin as inputs – if this is the case, use 
this density, the thermal conductivity and the value of thermal diffusivity 
to calculate the specific heat), the exact value of density (and specific 
heat) do not affect the result 
o epidermal thickness of 0.25 mm 
• Contact conductance of 1000 W/m2K 
• One-dimensional finite model of the object using appropriate material 
properties and thicknesses 
 
The allowable contact time for a given object temperature is defined as the time when 
the epidermis/dermis interface reaches the pain threshold of 44°C. 
 
 4.3.4.2  Cold Touch Temperature Limit 
[HS4012AV]   Cold touch temperature limits shall be verified by test or analysis.  The 
test or analysis shall determine the lowest expected surface temperature of the object 
that may be contacted by the crew.  The verification shall be considered successful if 
the object temperature is higher than 10°C.  If the object surface temperature is lower 
than 10°C, an analysis shall be performed.  The analysis shall use the following 
equation to calculate the minimum object temperature that would limit skin temperature 
from going below 10°C.  The verification is considered successful if the object 
temperature (as determined from analysis or representative test) is not below Tobject 
 
 
where: 
 Tobject = object temperature(°C) 
  (kρc)object = object thermal inertia (cal2/cm4 °C2 sec) 
 a, b = equation constants, found in the table below 
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TABLE 4.3.4.2-1 - COLD TOUCH TEMPERATURE CONSTANTS  
 
Contact time (s) a b 
1 -0.880 -12.29 
2 -0.832 -6.10 
3 -0.802 -2.93 
4 -0.781 -0.86 
5 -0.765 0.66 
10 -0.712 4.77 
30 -0.620 9.50 
60 -0.525 10.00 
∞  -0.367 10.00 
 
Below is a table of for some common materials: 
 
TABLE 4.3.4.2-2 - INVERSE SQUARE ROOT OF THERMAL INERTIA FOR COMMON 
MATERIALS  
Material  Inverse Square Root of Thermal 
Inertia, (kρc)-1/2 (cm2 °C sec1/2/cal)  
Aluminum (6061T-6)  2.2  
316 Stainless Steel  5.9  
Glass  28.8  
Teflon  57.5  
Nylon Hook Velcro  586 (effective)  
 
For contact times between those given in the table, perform a linear interpolation for 
time (a and b should not be interpolated).  For example, for a duration of 20 seconds, 
calculate Tobject for 10 and 30 seconds, equate the slope between 10 and 30 to the slope 
between 20 and 30 (or 10), and solve for the unknown variable, Tobject 
 
To calculate the allowable contact time for a given material at a particular temperature, 
build a table of allowable contact temperatures from 1 second to infinity and interpolate.  
 
The following is a graph for  between 0 and 100: 
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FIGURE 4.3.4.2-1 - ALLOWABLE COLD TOUCH TEMPERATURE DURATION  
 
Rationale:  Very little data exists in the literature for cold touch temperature.  
Geng et al., (2006) obtained data which was used to create ISO 13732-3: 
Ergonomics of the thermal environment – Methods for the assessment of human 
responses to contact with surfaces, Part 3: Cold Surfaces.  However, there are 
only curves of time and allowable temperature for four specific materials: 
aluminum, stainless steel, Nylon, stone and wood.  This data was used to 
develop a generalized cold touch temperature curve (and resulting equation and 
constants) for any material. The object’s material is taken into account by using 
its thermal inertia in the equation.  This method is only valid for thick, single 
materials.  Problems involving layers of materials (layups) may require the use of 
thermal models. 
 
If a thermal model is used for verification, it must meet the following conditions: 
• One-dimensional semi-infinite skin model using 
o thermal conductivity of 0.54 W/m·K 
o thermal diffusivity of 1.3x10-7 m2/s (combined with the thermal 
conductivity, this yields an inverse square root of thermal inertia of 
27.96 cm2 °C sec1/2 /cal  
o density of 1200 kg/m3 if required (modeling software may require the 
density and heat capacity of the skin as inputs – if this is the case, use 
this density, the thermal conductivity and the value of thermal diffusivity 
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to calculate the specific heat), the exact value of density (and specific 
heat) do not affect the result. 
• Infinite contact conductance - to allow for the effects of condensation on the 
object surface. 
• One-dimensional finite model of the object using appropriate material 
properties and thicknesses. 
 
The allowable contact time for a given object temperature is defined as the time when 
the skin surface reaches the pain threshold of 10°C. 
 
4.3.5  Fire Suppression Portability 
 4.3.5.1  Fire Suppression Portability 
[HS4019V] The portable fire suppression system shall be verified by inspection.  The 
inspection shall include a review of the system design to ensure that a portable fire 
suppression system is included in the system design.  The verification shall be 
considered successful when the inspection shows that the design includes portable fire 
suppression equipment. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.4  ARCHITECTURE 
4.4.1  Configuration 
 4.4.1.1  Layout Interference 
[HS5001V] Not Applicable 
 4.4.1.2  Layout Sequential Operations 
[HS5002V] Not Applicable 
 4.4.1.3  Workstation Visual Demarcations 
[HS5042V] Demarcations for adjacent workstations shall be verified by inspection.  The 
inspection shall consist of identifying adjacent workstations and identifying the 
demarcations between adjacent workstations.  The verification shall be considered 
successful when the inspection shows that visual demarcations are identified for all 
adjacent workstations. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.4.1.4  Workstation Orientation 
[HS5003V] Workstation alignment shall be verified by analysis and inspection.  The 
analysis shall consist of determining all user-interface elements within each workstation, 
the expected crew head position at each workstation, and identifying the centerline for 
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each user interface element.  The inspection shall consist of measuring the orientation 
angle of each user-interface element as the angle between the crew head position local 
vertical centerline and the user-interface element local vertical centerline.  The 
verification shall be considered successful when analysis and inspection show that all 
orientation angles for all user-interface elements within each workstation are measured 
to be 0 degrees. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.4.1.5  Location Coding 
[HS7009V] Use of a standard location coding system providing unique identifiers shall 
be verified by inspection.  The inspection shall address all predefined locations within 
the vehicle.  The inspection shall be of inclusion of a standard location coding system 
within the vehicle Label Plan.  The verification shall be considered successful when the 
inspection shows that all predefined locations follow a standard location coding system 
in accordance with CxP 70152, Constellation Program Crew Interface Labeling 
Standard. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.4.2  Translation Paths 
 4.4.2.1  Ingress and Egress Translation Paths 
[HS5004V] Translation paths shall be verified by analysis and demonstration.  Analysis 
shall include identifying suited operation scenarios for crew ingress and egress (nominal 
and off-nominal) from one vehicle or transfer between two, including the likely 
pressurization state of suits.  Analysis shall consist of using high-fidelity computer 
graphic models.  The models shall include the vehicles, suited crewmembers, and 
suited crewmembers' movement through the translation paths.  The demonstration shall 
occur in a high-fidelity mockup in 1 g in the flight configuration with integrated GFE, 
stowage, vehicle installations, and closeouts installed.  The demonstration shall consist 
of suited subjects performing ingress and egress (nominal and off-nominal) operation 
scenarios.  The verification shall be considered successful when the analysis and 
demonstration show that suited ingress and egress (nominal and off-nominal) 
operations can be performed without being hampered by protrusions and snag points. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.4.2.2  Internal Translation Paths 
[HS5005V] Translation paths shall be verified by analysis and demonstration.  Analysis 
shall consist of performing unsuited operation scenarios using high- fidelity computer 
graphic models.  The models shall include the vehicle, unsuited crewmembers, and 
unsuited crewmembers' movement through the translation paths.  The demonstration 
shall occur in a high-fidelity mockup in 1 g in the flight configuration with integrated 
GFE, stowage, vehicle installations, and closeouts installed.  The demonstration shall 
consist of unsuited subjects performing operation scenarios.  The verification shall be 
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considered successful when the analysis and demonstration show that unsuited 
operations can be performed. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.4.2.3  Crew Egress Translation Path - Ground 
[HS5010V] The translation path for the assisted ground egress of an incapacitated 
suited crewmember shall be verified by analysis and demonstration.  The analysis shall 
consist of volumetric modeling of the ground translation path and human models of the 
incapacitated crewmember and the assisting crewmembers and/or ground personnel.  
The demonstration shall consist of a crewmember serving the role of the incapacitated 
crewmember and the assisting crewmembers and/or ground personnel.  The verification 
shall be considered successful when the analysis and demonstration prove that the 
ground translation path provides sufficient clearance for the assisted ingress and egress 
of an incapacitated suited crewmember. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.4.2.4  Crew Ingress/Egress Translation Path in Space 
[HS5053V] The translation path for the assisted in-space ingress and egress of an 
incapacitated pressurized-suited crewmember shall be verified by analysis and 
demonstration.  The analysis shall consist of volumetric modeling of the in-space 
translation path and human models of the incapacitated crewmember and the assisting 
crewmembers.  The demonstration shall consist of a high-fidelity mockup or flight 
vehicle and use of a simulated pressurized-suited crewmember with weight 
representative of the applicable gravity environment and the assisting crewmembers.  
The verification shall be considered successful when the analysis and demonstration 
prove that the in-space translation path provides sufficient clearance for the assisted 
ingress and egress of an incapacitated crewmember. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.4.3  Restraints and Mobility Aids 
 4.4.3.1  Standard Restraints and Mobility Aids 
[HS5006V] Not Applicable. 
 4.4.3.2  IVA Mobility Aids 
[HS5007V] The provision of mobility aid shall be verified by inspection.  Inspection shall 
consist of a review of engineering drawings and planned IVA operations.  The 
verification shall be considered successful when the inspection shows that mobility aids 
are in locations to support IVA operations. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
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 4.4.3.3  Workstation Restraints 
[HS5008V] Restraint placement for two-handed operations shall be verified by 
inspection.  The inspection shall consist of a review of engineering drawings and 
identified locations for two-handed operations.  The verification shall be considered 
successful when the inspection shows that restraint placement allows two-handed 
operations in 0 g. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.4.3.4  Ingress and Egress Mobility Aids 
[HS5009V] Mobility aids for ingress and egress (nominal and off-nominal) shall be 
verified by inspection.  The inspection shall consist of a review of engineering drawings 
and ingress and egress translation paths.  The verification shall be considered 
successful when the inspection shows that restraint placement allows for ingress and 
egress (nominal and off-nominal). 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.4.3.5  Commonly Distinguishable Handrails 
[HS5052V] Not applicable. 
 4.4.3.6  Egress Handrails 
[HS5054V] Not Applicable. 
4.4.4  Hatches 
4.4.4.1  Hatch Operation 
4.4.4.1.1  Nominal Hatch Operation 
 4.4.4.1.1.1  Hatches Operable Inside and Outside 
[HS5013V] Hatch operability from both sides shall be verified by demonstration.  The 
demonstration shall occur in a qualification vehicle or a high-fidelity mockup, and the 
vehicle or mockup shall be in the flight configuration with integrated GFE, stowage, 
vehicle installations, and closeouts installed.  The demonstration shall consist of one 
suited subject performing the following four tasks:  unlatching and fully opening each 
hatch from the inside, unlatching and fully opening each hatch from the outside, closing 
and latching each fully-opened hatch from the inside, and closing and latching each 
fully-opened hatch from the outside.  The verification shall be considered successful 
when the demonstration shows that a suited subject can complete the four tasks. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.4.4.1.1.2  Hatches Operable in 60 Seconds 
[HS5043V] Hatch operability in 60 seconds shall be verified by demonstration.  The 
demonstration shall occur in a qualification vehicle or a high-fidelity mockup, and the 
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vehicle or mockup shall be in the flight configuration with integrated GFE, stowage, 
vehicle installations, and closeouts installed.  The demonstration shall demonstrate 0-g 
operability by performing the tasks in 1 g and applying a 0-g factor to the task 
completion time.  The demonstration shall consist of one suited subject performing the 
following four tasks:  unlatching and fully opening each hatch from the inside, unlatching 
and fully opening each hatch from the outside, closing and latching each fully-opened 
hatch from the inside, and closing and latching each fully-opened hatch from the 
outside.  The demonstration task completion time shall be measured in seconds.  The 
verification shall be considered successful when the demonstration shows that the 
completion time is 60 seconds or less per task. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.4.4.1.1.3  Hatches Operable Without Tools 
[HS5044V] Hatch operability without the use of tools shall be verified by demonstration.  
The demonstration shall occur in a qualification vehicle or a high-fidelity mockup, and 
the vehicle or mockup shall be in the flight configuration with integrated GFE, stowage, 
vehicle installations, and closeouts installed.  The demonstration shall consist of one 
suited subject performing the following four tasks:  unlatching and fully opening each 
hatch from the inside, unlatching and fully opening each hatch from the outside, closing 
and latching each fully-opened hatch from the inside, and closing and latching each 
fully-opened hatch from the outside.  The demonstration task completion time shall be 
measured in seconds.  The verification shall be considered successful when the 
demonstration shows that the hatch is operable without the use of tools. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.4.4.1.1.4  Hatches Operable by Suited Crewmembers 
[HS5045V] Hatch operability by a suited crewmember shall be verified by analysis and 
demonstration.  Analysis shall include identifying suited operation scenarios for crew 
ingress and egress (nominal and off-nominal) from one vehicle or transfer between two, 
including the likely pressurization state of suits.  Analysis shall also identify which hatch 
operations are necessary for a suited crewmember.  The demonstration shall occur in a 
qualification vehicle or a high-fidelity mockup, and the vehicle or mockup shall be in the 
flight configuration with integrated GFE, stowage, vehicle installations, and closeouts 
installed.  The demonstration shall consist of one suited subject performing the following 
four tasks that are identified to be necessary for a suited crewmember:  unlatching and 
fully opening each hatch from the inside, unlatching and fully opening each hatch from 
the outside, closing and latching each fully-opened hatch from the inside, and closing 
and latching each fully-opened hatch from the outside.  The verification shall be 
considered successful when the analysis and demonstration show that a suited 
crewmember has successfully completed all tasks. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
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 4.4.4.1.1.5  Unlatching Hatches 
[HS5046V] Hatch unlatching shall be verified by demonstration.  The demonstration 
shall occur in a qualification vehicle or a high-fidelity mockup, and the vehicle or mockup 
shall be in the flight configuration with integrated GFE, stowage, vehicle installations, 
and closeouts installed.  The demonstration shall consist of one suited subject opening 
the hatch from a closed and latched position.  The verification shall be considered 
successful when the demonstration shows that unlatching requires two distinct and 
sequential operations. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.4.4.1.2  Pressure Equalization of Hatches 
 4.4.4.1.2.1  Hatch Manual Pressure Equalization Inside and Outside 
[HS5014V] Manual pressure equalization on each side of the hatch by a crewmember 
shall be verified by demonstration.  The demonstration shall occur in the vehicle or a 
high-fidelity mockup.  The demonstration shall consist of performing a manual pressure 
equalization procedure on both sides of each hatch under the range of expected 
internal/external pressure levels.  The verification shall be considered successful when 
the demonstration shows that the procedure can be performed. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.4.4.1.2.2  Hatch Manual Pressure Equalization by Suited Crewmembers 
[HS5048V] Manual pressure equalization on each side of the hatch shall be verified by 
demonstration.  The demonstration shall occur in the vehicle or a high-fidelity mockup.  
The demonstration shall consist of performing a manual pressure equalization 
procedure on both sides of each hatch under the range of expected internal/external 
pressure levels.  The verification shall be considered successful when the 
demonstration shows that a pressurized suited crewmember can complete the 
procedure. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.4.4.2  Hatch Indications 
4.4.4.2.1  Hatch Status Indications 
 4.4.4.2.1.1  Hatch Latch Position 
[HS5049V] Latch position status shall be verified by demonstration.  The demonstration 
shall occur in the vehicle or a high-fidelity mockup.  The demonstration shall consist of 
the following tasks completed on the inside and outside of each hatch:  open the latch 
and identify that the latch position status indicates that the latch is open; close the latch 
and identify that the latch position status indicates that the latch is closed.  Verification 
of latch position status shall be considered successful if the demonstration shows that 
all latch positions are accurately displayed on each side of each hatch. 
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Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.4.4.2.1.2  Hatch Closure Indication 
[HS5016V] Hatch closure status shall be verified by demonstration.  The demonstration 
shall occur in a qualification vehicle or a high-fidelity mockup.  The demonstration shall 
consist of the following tasks:  opening the hatch and identifying that the hatch closure 
status indicates that the hatch is open and closing the hatch and identifying that the 
hatch closure status indicates that the hatch is closed.  The verification shall be 
considered successful when the demonstration shows that the hatch closure status is 
displayed from each side of each hatch. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.4.4.2.1.3  Hatch Pressure Difference Measurement 
[HS5050V] Pressure difference measurement shall be verified by demonstration.  The 
demonstration shall occur in the vehicle or high-fidelity mockup.  The demonstration 
shall consist of one suited subject performing the pressure difference measurement on 
both sides of each hatch under the range of expected internal/external pressure levels.  
The verification shall be considered successful when the demonstration shows that all 
pressure differences are measured on each side of the vehicle. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.4.4.2.1.4  Hatch Visual Observation 
[HS5017V] The provision of a window that provides for direct visual, non-electronic 
observation of the opposite side of a hatch shall be verified by inspection of the 
engineering drawings and the flight article.  The adequacy of the field of view provided 
by the window shall be verified by analysis and demonstration.  The analysis shall 
provide a graphical depiction of the field of view with respect to the system in which it is 
installed.  The demonstration shall include an observer selected by NASA who has at 
least the visual acuity of a mission specialist astronaut.  The observer shall look through 
the window in the flight article or a high fidelity mockup thereof to determine the 
adequacy of the field of view provided.  The verification shall be considered successful 
when the inspection shows that there is a window present in the flight article for this 
purpose and the analysis and demonstration show that the direct visual, non-electronic 
field of view provided by the window is adequate to determine the state of the 
environment on the opposite side of the hatch in both viewing directions. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.4.5  Windows 
 4.4.5.1  Window Optical Properties 
[HS5019V] System window optical performance characteristics and tasking consistency 
shall be verified by analysis, inspection, and test.  The analysis shall include a task 
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analysis to identify the windows of the crewed system and the tasks to be performed at 
each window.  The inspection shall assess the optical properties of the windows and 
consist of an inspection of the engineering drawings and data packs for each pane and 
the finished window stack.  The test shall consist of optical tests and visual uniformity 
tests.  Visual uniformity testing shall be done on the finished windows, otherwise any 
other testing may be done on witness samples.  The visual uniformity tests shall utilize a 
test subject with a corrected or uncorrected visual acuity of 20/20.  The visual uniformity 
test report shall be provided to NASA and shall include wavefront properties and results 
of optical uniformity testing.  The verification shall be considered successful when the 
inspection and the optical tests show that the optical properties of each pane and the 
finished window stack meet or exceed the properties specified in JSC 63307, 
Requirements for Optical Properties for Windows Used in Crewed Spacecraft, and for 
Orion in CxP 72407, Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle Window Optical Properties 
Requirements, consistent with tasking identified in the analysis, and the visual 
uniformity tests show that there are no readily identifiable defects in any of the individual 
panes and in the finished window stack. 
Rationale:  Visual inspection and test prior to installation are necessary to identify 
any imperfections in optical quality or performance, and to determine the 
operational impacts of those visual imperfections, if any, given their type, 
severity, and location.  The methodology and procedure for test and verification 
of optical properties are contained in the following reference document:  ATR-
2000(2112)-1, International Space Station Destiny Module Science Window 
Optical Properties and Wavefront Verification Test Results, Aerospace Corp., 
March 2000; the methodology and procedure for visual uniformity testing are 
contained in the following reference document:  ATR-2003(7828)-1, International 
Space Station Cupola Scratch Pane Window Optical Test Results, Aerospace 
Corp., January 17, 2003.  A witness sample is a portion of that material that is 
processed at the same time and under the same conditions as the end item 
product.  NASA participation in test plan development and execution at the 
vendor's facility may be necessary and are permitted as part of NASA's technical 
oversight role. 
 4.4.5.2  Window Viewing for Piloting Tasks 
[HS5021V] The provision of a minimum of two piloting windows shall be verified by 
inspection of the engineering drawings and the flight article.  The functionality of system 
piloting windows shall be verified by analysis and demonstration.  The analysis shall use 
high-fidelity computer graphic models.  The demonstration shall use simulators and 
mockups that employ the computer graphic models and shall include piloting 
crewmembers at piloting workstations who shall evaluate the adequacy of the 
positioning of and views provided by the windows for the various piloting tasks.  The 
models shall include the piloted vehicle and all external objects required for piloting 
tasks such as the earth, moon, stars, and other vehicles.  The analysis shall provide a 
graphical depiction of the field-of-view through the piloting windows.  The verification 
shall be considered successful when the inspection verifies the presence of a minimum 
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of two piloting windows and the analysis and demonstration show that the fields-of-view 
through the piloting windows are adequate to support all NASA-approved piloting tasks. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.4.5.3  Window for External Viewing Observation 
[HS5022V] The provision of an external observation window shall be verified by 
inspection of the engineering drawings and data packs for the lead flight article, followed 
by inspection of engineering drawings and data packs only for subsequent articles.  The 
functionality of the external observation window shall be verified by analysis and 
demonstration.  The verification shall be considered successful when the inspection 
shows that a window has been provided for external observation and that the analysis 
and demonstration show that the system window provides the optical characteristics 
and field-of-view appropriate to its tasking per JSC 63307, Requirements for Optical 
Properties for Windows Used in Crewed Spacecraft. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.4.5.4  Window for Motion Imagery and Photography 
[HS5055V] The optical performance of the window that supports motion imagery and 
photography with lens apertures up to 100 mm in diameter shall be verified by analysis 
and test.  The analyses and tests shall show that the optical properties of the window 
and specifically the peak to valley transmitted wavefront errors are compliant with 
appropriate categories in JSC 63307, Requirements for Optical Properties for Windows 
Used in Crewed Spacecraft, and for Orion in CxP 72407, Orion Crew Exploration 
Vehicle Window Optical Properties Requirements.  The verification shall be considered 
successful when the analysis and test shows that the optical performance of the window 
that supports motion imagery and photography with lens apertures up to 100 mm in 
diameter. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.4.5.5  Window Cover, Shade, and Filter Removal or Replacement without 
Tools 
[HS5051V] The ability to remove and replace system window covers, shades, and filters 
without the use of tools by one crewmember shall be verified by demonstration. The 
demonstration shall occur in the flight article or a high-fidelity mockup.  The 
demonstration shall consist of removing and then replacing each window cover, shade, 
and filter without the use of tools by a crewmember test subject who shall be selected 
by NASA.  The verification shall be considered successful when the demonstration 
shows that each cover, shade, and filter is removable and replaceable without the use 
of tools by a single test subject. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
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 4.4.5.6  Window Cover, Shade, and Filter Removal or Replacement in 10 
Seconds 
[HS5027V] Window cover, shade, and filter removal or replacement in less than 10 
seconds shall be verified by demonstration.  The demonstration shall occur in the 
vehicle or high-fidelity mockup.  The demonstration shall consist of removing and then 
replacing each window cover, shade, and filter without the use of tools by a 
crewmember test subject who shall be selected by NASA.  The verification shall be 
considered successful when the demonstration shows that each cover, shade, and filter 
is removable in less than  10 seconds and replaceable in less than 10 seconds. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.4.5.7  Obstruction 
[HS5030V] Not Applicable. 
 4.4.5.8  Window and Internal Darkening 
[HS5031V] The provision of system window shades or shutters that prevent external 
light from entering the crew cabin shall be verified by inspection. The efficacy of system 
window shades and shutters shall be verified by test.  The inspection shall confirm that 
a system window shade or shutter has been provided for each window.  The test shall fit 
all shades into place and/or operate or move shutters into place over the window and 
then the internal illumination near each window on the interior of the system shall be 
measured.  The test shall utilize an external light source whose illumination on the 
exterior of the windows shall be equivalent to orbital sunlight illuminance at orbital noon 
with the largest of the windows directly facing the illumination source while the majority 
of the rest of the system windows also face the illumination source to the maximum 
extent possible.  There shall be no internal illumination sources present and the interior 
of the vehicle shall be completely darkened while the illumination near each window on 
the interior is measured.  The test measurement shall be at locations 0.5 m +/- 0.05 m 
(~0.6 ft) along the inboard normal at the point of maximum observable illumination.  The 
verification shall be considered successful when the inspection shows that the shade or 
shutter has been provided for each window and the test shows that the shades and 
shutters reduce the light level within the habitable volume to less than 2 lux. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.4.5.9  Window Proximity Finishes 
[HS5032V] The presence of a lusterless finish or coating on all system window frames 
and supporting structure shall be verified by inspection.  The efficacy of the finishes and 
coatings shall be verified by inspection of the product technical specification sheets of 
each finish and coating by lot.  The placement of the coating shall be verified by 
inspection of the window structure and finish or coating design and drawings to 
determine the geometry of the window and placement of lusterless finish or coating.  
The verification shall be considered successful when the inspection shows the required 
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finish or coating has been applied directions, both internally and externally and the test 
shows that the applied finishes or coatings have a reflectance of less than 10% over a 
wavelength range of 400–800 nm. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.4.6  Lighting 
4.4.6.1  Interior Lighting 
 4.4.6.1.1  Lighting Level by Task 
[HS5035V] The lighting level for tasks shall be verified by analysis and test.  The 
analysis shall identify the system surfaces to be illuminated by interior lights and shall 
consider architectural constraints, task requirements, and the operational configurations 
in which they will be used, including the positions of operators and deployed hardware.  
The test shall occur in a flight-like vehicle or high-fidelity mockup and will consist of 
measurement of illumination at the surfaces with an illuminance meter normal to the 
workstation work/reading plane with lights, workstations, deployed hardware, and 
operators in their design configurations.  The verification shall be considered successful 
when the analysis and test show that the surface illumination meets the values in 
HS5035, table Lighting Level by Task, and that most surfaces in the vehicle common 
areas can be illuminated by general lighting to 350 lux, including items in transit. 
Rationale:  Testing in the flight-like vehicle or high-fidelity mockup with 
representative tasks and hardware is necessary to validate the task analysis to 
identify lighting requirements per location, to determine potential interference and 
shadowing due to deployed hardware and operators, and to ensure that the 
lighting configuration is responsive to dynamic crew tasks and vehicle 
reconfiguration.  Because not all tasks will be defined with high fidelity prior to 
vehicle design, general illumination to 350 lux must be accommodated at most 
vehicle locations to ensure task performance and flexibility.  Portable lights may 
be used to supplement general and task lighting for off-nominal activities such as 
behind-the-panel maintenance but cannot be considered in vehicle lighting 
configurations for verification of tasks in the nominal configurations of the vehicle. 
 4.4.6.1.2  Interior Light Adjustability 
[HS5034BV] The adjustability of the interior lighting shall be verified by test.  The test 
shall be performed in a qualification vehicle or high-fidelity mockup.  The test shall 
consist of measurements performed as specified in the individual vehicle requirements.  
These requirements explicitly state the location and orientation of the measurement as 
well as the minimum and maximum illumination levels.  The verification shall be 
considered successful when the test shows that the interior lighting can be adjusted to 
its minimum and maximum output levels. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
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4.4.6.2  Lighting Controls 
 4.4.6.2.1  General Light Control 
[HS5039V] System interior lighting controllability shall be verified by analysis and 
demonstration. The analysis shall consist of identifying the interior lights, their 
associated controls, and likely configuration of the vehicle during the lights’ intended 
use. The demonstration shall consist of affecting the lighting controls in the intended 
vehicle configuration, and observing the change in lighting condition.  The verification 
shall be considered successful when the analysis and demonstration show that all 
vehicle interior lights can be controlled from the volume in which they are located and 
can be observed from the control location. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.4.6.2.2  Workstation Light Control 
[HS5040V] Workstation lighting control shall be verified by demonstration.  The 
demonstration shall occur in a qualification vehicle or high-fidelity mockup.  The 
demonstration shall consist of a subject restrained at a workstation powering on and off 
the workstation lighting.  The verification shall be considered successful when the 
demonstration shows that the subject is able to control the task lighting from the 
restrained position. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.4.6.2.3  Workstation Light Position Adjustment 
[HS5041V] Task lighting adjustability shall be verified by demonstration.  The 
demonstration shall occur in a qualification vehicle or high-fidelity mockup.  The 
demonstration shall consist of a subject restrained at a workstation, adjusting the 
position of the lighting, where applicable.  The verification shall be considered 
successful when the demonstration shows that the subject is able to adjust the task 
lighting from the restrained position. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.4.6.2.4  Lighting ON/OFF Control 
[HS5056V] Operation of the On/Off control to prevent and restore light emission by the 
lights shall be verified by demonstration. The demonstration shall consist of turning the 
On/Off control to the Off condition and subsequent observation of the controlled light by 
an observer who has been dark adapted for at least 20 minutes, followed by returning 
the control to the On condition. The demonstration shall be deemed successful if the Off 
condition of the control is evident by touch or sight, the adapted observer detects no 
visible light emanating from the light source with the control in the Off condition, and 
selection of the On condition of the control reactivates the light. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
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4.5  CREW FUNCTIONS 
4.5.1  Food Preparation 
4.5.1.1  Cross-Contamination 
 4.5.1.1.1  Cross-Contamination Prevention 
[HS6001V] Not Applicable 
 4.5.1.1.2  Cross-Contamination Separation 
[HS6002V] Not Applicable 
4.5.1.2  Preparation 
 4.5.1.2.1  Heating 
[HS6003V] The hot food and drink temperature shall be verified by test.  The test shall 
use a flight-like unit.  The test shall measure the temperature of the food and drink after 
heating.  The verification shall be considered successful when the test shows that the 
system can heat food and drink to temperatures between 68 °C (155 °F) and 79 °C (175 
°F). 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.5.1.2.2  Rehydration 
[HS6004V] Rehydration of food and drinks shall be verified by demonstration.  The 
demonstration shall consist of transferring potable water to the drink and food 
packages.  The verification shall be considered successful when the demonstration 
shows that appropriate amounts of water can be transferred into food and drink 
packages without depending on gravity. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.5.1.2.3  In-Flight Food Preparation Time 
[HS6005V] Not Applicable 
 4.5.1.2.4  Lunar Surface Food Preparation Time 
[HS6102V] The time required to prepare a meal for four crewmembers on the lunar 
surface shall be verified by test and analysis.  The test shall be performed in a high-
fidelity mockup.  The test shall record the time required for meal preparation for four 
crewmembers based on mission-specific food system requirements.  The analysis shall 
take the time recorded from the test and multiply it by a program defined reduced 
gravity factor.  The verification shall be considered successful when the test and 
analysis shows that four crew meals can be prepared within 30 minutes on the lunar 
surface. 
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Rationale:  The verification will need to show that all food preparation tasks can 
be completed within an expected timeline.  The analysis portion of this 
verification intends to account for the additional time typically required to 
complete tasks in a reduced gravity environment.  The program will define the 
reduced gravity factor for each mission profile. 
4.5.1.3  Food System 
 4.5.1.3.1  Food System 
[HS6059V] The nutritional content of the food system shall be verified by analysis.  The 
analysis shall determine nutrient content of each food item.  The analysis shall 
determine the nutrient content for a menu.  The verification shall be considered 
successful when analysis shows that the menu meets the nutritional requirements in 
HS6059, table Nutrition Composition Breakdown. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.5.1.3.2  Metabolic Intake 
[HS6060V] The metabolic intake provisioning shall be verified by analysis.  The analysis 
shall determine energy content of each food item.  In addition, further analysis shall 
determine the energy content for a menu. The verification shall be considered 
successful when the analysis shows that the menu meets 12,707 kJ (3,035 kilocalories) 
per day. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.5.1.3.3  Metabolic Intake for EVA 
[HS6062V] The additional nutrition for EVA suited operations shall be verified by 
analysis.  The analysis shall determine the nutritional content of each food item 
available for consumption during EVA operations.  The verification shall be considered 
successful when the analysis shows that the food items meet the additional 837 kJ (200 
kilocalories) per hour above nominal metabolic requirements for suited operations. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.5.2  Personal Hygiene 
 4.5.2.1  Personal Hygiene Items 
[HS6105V] The provision of personal hygiene items for each crewmember shall be 
verified by inspection.  The inspection shall be of the engineering drawings.  The 
inspection shall be considered successful when it is shown that personal hygiene items 
are present in the engineering drawings. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
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 4.5.2.2  Personal Hygiene Privacy 
[HS6009V] Visual privacy during personal hygiene shall be verified by demonstration 
and analysis.  The demonstration shall use a volumetrically accurate high-fidelity 
mockup of the vehicle.  The demonstration shall consist of subjects performing personal 
hygiene activities.  The analysis shall extrapolate to the minimum and maximum critical 
dimensions.  The verification shall be considered successful when the demonstration 
and analysis show that the largest male and smallest female crewmembers can 
complete all personal hygiene related activities with visual privacy. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.5.2.3  Personal Hygiene Stowage 
[HS6010V] Not Applicable 
 4.5.2.4  Personal Hygiene Trash 
[HS6012V] Not Applicable 
 4.5.2.5  Full Body Visual Privacy 
[HS6027V] Visual privacy during waste management shall be verified by demonstration.  
The demonstration shall consist of a crewmember performing all body waste 
management activities using a high-fidelity mockup.  The verification shall be 
considered successful when the demonstration shows that a crewmember can complete 
all body waste management related activities with full body visual privacy. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.5.2.6  Body Self-Inspection and Cleaning 
[HS6028] Not Applicable 
4.5.3  Body Waste Management 
 4.5.3.0.1  Vomitus Collection and Containment 
[HS6013V] Vomitus collection and containment shall be verified by demonstration and 
analysis.  The demonstration shall be performed with flight-like hardware to show 
containment independent of gravity.  The demonstration shall consist of release into the 
collection system.  The analysis shall determine the volume of the collection system.  
The verification shall be considered successful when the demonstration and analysis 
show that the collection system can collect and contain 0.5 L per event for the number 
of events identified in HS6013, table Vomitus Collection and Containment per 
crewmember for the duration of the mission. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
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4.5.3.2  Feces 
 4.5.3.2.1  Fecal Wipes 
[HS6016V] The consumable wipe materials collection and containment shall be verified 
by analysis.  The analysis shall determine the volume needed for accommodation of 
consumable wipe materials and shall identify controls for the escape of contents.  The 
verification shall be considered successful when the analysis shows that the volume 
needed for collection of consumable wipe materials is provided and escape of fecal 
contents is contained. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.5.3.2.2  Feces per Day 
[HS6017V] The collection and containment of fecal matter shall be verified by 
demonstration and analysis.  The demonstration shall be performed with flight-like 
hardware to show containment independent of gravity.  The demonstration shall consist 
of a release into the collection system, followed by a repeated release into the collection 
system.  The analysis shall determine the volume of the collection system.  The 
verification shall be considered successful when the analysis shows that 150 g and 150 
mL of fecal matter per crewmember per defecation at an average of two defecations per 
day are contained. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.5.3.2.3  Feces per Event 
[HS6020CV] The collection and containment of fecal matter shall be verified by 
demonstration and inspection.  The inspection shall determine the volume of the 
collection system.  The demonstration shall occur in an analogous gravity environment 
with flight-like hardware.  The demonstration shall consist of a release into the collection 
system.  The verification shall be considered successful when the inspection and 
demonstration show that the collection system can hold 500 g and 500 mL of fecal 
matter per crewmember, release can be collected, and release is contained. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.5.3.2.4  Diarrhea per Event 
[HS6020V] The per event collection and containment of diarrhea discharge shall be 
verified by demonstration and analysis.  The analysis shall determine the volume of the 
collection system.  The demonstration shall be performed with flight-like hardware to 
show containment independent of gravity.  The demonstration shall consist of a release 
into the collection system.  The verification shall be considered successful when the 
analysis and demonstration show that the collection system can hold 1.5 L of diarrheal 
discharge in a single event, each release can be collected with no spillage or leakage, 
and each release is contained. 
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Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.5.3.2.5  Diarrheal Events per Crewmember 
[HS6020DV] The collection and containment of diarrheal events for a mission shall be 
verified by demonstration and analysis.  The analysis shall determine the volume of the 
collection system.  The demonstration shall be performed with flight-like hardware to 
show containment independent of gravity.  The demonstration shall consist of repeated 
releases into the collection system.  The verification shall be considered successful 
when the analysis and demonstration show that the collection system for a mission can 
hold the specified number of events per crewmember as indicated in HS6020D, table 
Diarrhea Collection and Containment. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.5.3.3  Urine 
 4.5.3.3.1  Urine Collection 
[HS6021V] The collection of urine shall be verified by demonstration.  The 
demonstration shall be performed with flight-like hardware.  The demonstration shall 
consist of a release into the collection system.  The verification shall be considered 
successful when the demonstration shows that the release of urine can be collected 
with no splash. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.5.3.3.2  Urine Wipes 
[HS6022V] The collection and containment of consumable wipes shall be verified by 
demonstration and inspection.  The inspection shall determine the volume of the 
collection system.  The demonstration shall be performed with flight-like hardware 
independent of gravity.  The demonstration shall consist of disposing the consumable 
wipes into the collection system with a repeat disposal.  The verification shall be 
considered successful when the inspection and demonstration show that the collection 
system can hold the wipes, wipes are contained, and repeated disposals are contained 
with no leakage. 
Rationale:  The verification states that the demonstration shall be completed in 
an analogous gravity environment.  The verification must show that the method 
of collection and containment will work in the same gravity environments 
expected during the mission profiles. 
 4.5.3.3.3  Urine per Crewmember 
[HS6023V] The collection and isolation of urine shall be verified by inspection.  The 
inspection shall determine the volume of the collection system.  The verification shall be 
considered successful when the inspection shows that the collection system can collect 
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and isolate from the crew environment the amount of urine specified by the equation per 
crewmember for the duration of the mission. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.5.3.3.4  Urine per Hour 
[HS6024V] The collection and isolation of urine shall be verified by analysis and 
demonstration.  The analysis shall determine the volume of the collection system and 
the ability of the system to accommodate urine.  The demonstration shall be performed 
with flight-like hardware.  The demonstration shall consist of nx1 L releases into the 
collection system in 1 hour, where n is the number of crewmembers per mission (a 
maximum of 4).  The verification shall be considered successful when the analysis and 
demonstration show that the collection system can collect nx1 L of urine or simulated 
urine per hour and isolate it from the crew environment with no leakage. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.5.3.3.5  Urine per Day 
[HS6025BV] The collection and isolation of urine shall be verified by analysis.  The 
analysis shall determine the volumetric capacity of the collection system.  The 
verification shall be considered successful when the analysis shows that the collection 
system can collect and isolate from the crew environment six urinations per 
crewmember for the duration of the mission. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.5.3.3.6  Urine Rate 
[HS6025V] The collection and isolation of urine at a delivery rate shall be verified by 
demonstration.  The demonstration shall be performed with flight-like hardware and 
shall show the collection system to accommodate the urine delivery rate independent of 
gravity.  The demonstration shall consist of a release into the collection system, and 
repeated release into the collection system.  The verification shall be considered 
successful when the demonstration shows that the collection system can collect and 
isolate 1 L of urine from the crew environment at a maximum delivery rate of 50 mL/s. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.5.3.4  Simultaneous Defecation and Urination 
 4.5.3.4.1  Simultaneous Defecation and Urination 
[HS6014V] Simultaneous defecation and urination collection capability shall be verified 
by analysis and demonstration.  The analysis shall include the bodily waste system 
interface that can accommodate male and female bodies.  The demonstration shall be 
performed by male and female subjects with flight-like hardware.  The demonstration 
shall consist of the subjects using the device for simulated simultaneous defecation and 
urination without full removal of lower clothing.  The verification shall be considered 
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successful when the analysis and demonstration show containment and no spillage 
during and after simultaneous collection without completely removing lower clothing. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.5.3.5  Odor Control 
 4.5.3.5.1  Waste Management Odor Control 
[HS6029V] The odor control for waste management equipment shall be verified by 
demonstration and analysis.  The demonstration shall consist of the placement of 
concentrated odor sources in a flight-like system in a high-fidelity mockup of the waste 
management system.  The demonstration shall include the duration, environmental 
conditions, and operations of an expected mission.  A Crew Consensus evaluation shall 
determine whether the odor is contained during the demonstration.  The analysis shall 
identify the design features implemented to control odors.  The verification shall be 
considered successful when the Crew Consensus Report from the demonstration and 
analysis shows that the waste management system odors do not permeate the 
habitable volume of the vehicle. 
Rationale:  The magnitude of odor is affected by time duration and temperature.  
In order to accurately determine whether odor control is attained, these variables 
should be considered. 
 4.5.3.5.2  Auditory and Olfactory Privacy 
[HS6069V] Not Applicable 
4.5.3.6  Waste Management Stowage 
 4.5.3.6.1  Waste Management Stowage 
[HS6030V] Waste management supply accessibility shall be verified by demonstration 
and analysis.  The demonstration shall use a volumetrically accurate high-fidelity 
mockup.  The demonstration shall show access to the supplies while restrained.  The 
analysis shall extrapolate to the minimum and maximum critical dimensions.  The 
verification shall be considered successful when the demonstration and analysis show 
that all associated equipment and supplies are accessible by the largest male and 
smallest female crewmembers while located at the waste management station. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.5.3.7  Waste Management Trash 
 4.5.3.7.1  Waste Management Trash 
[HS6031V] Not Applicable 
4.5.4  Exercise 
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4.5.4.1  Exercise Capability 
 4.5.4.1.1  Exercise Capability 
[HS6032V] Time to exercise for missions greater than 8 days shall be verified by 
analysis.  The analysis shall determine the volume necessary to perform exercise and 
the mission timeline.  The verification shall be considered successful when the analysis 
shows that 30 continuous minutes each day per crewmember is available for missions 
greater than 8 days. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.5.4.2  Exercise Operational Envelope 
 4.5.4.2.1  Exercise Operational Envelope 
[HS6035V] The exercise envelope shall be verified by inspection.  The inspection shall 
determine the operational envelope for deployed exercise equipment.  The inspection 
shall occur in a volumetrically accurate high-fidelity mockup in nominal non-dynamic 
mission configuration.  The verification shall be considered successful when the 
inspection shows that the operational envelope available for exercise is 2.23 m x 1.01 m 
x 1.31 m (7.3 ft x 3.3 ft x 4.3 ft). 
Rationale:  The astronaut office will have a keen interest in the exercise envelope 
and, while their approval is not specified in the verification requirement, it is 
expected that the astronaut office will have input during the design process. 
4.5.4.3  Environmental Loads during Exercise 
 4.5.4.3.1  Thermal Environment During Exercise 
[HS6036V] The vehicle's response to environmental loads shall be verified by analysis.  
The analysis shall evaluate the vehicle systems' response to simultaneous metabolic 
loads as defined in Appendix E, table Crew Induced Metabolic Loads for a Standard 
Mission Day With Exercise.  The verification shall be considered successful when the 
analysis shows that the temperature inside the vehicle is maintained within the limits 
defined in HS3036 and HS3037. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.5.4.3.2  Oxygen Levels During Exercise 
[HS6073V] The system's response to environmental loads shall be verified by analysis.  
The analysis shall evaluate the vehicle systems' response to simultaneous metabolic 
loads as defined in Appendix E, table Crew Induced Metabolic Loads for a Standard 
Mission Day With Exercise.  The verification shall be considered successful when the 
analysis shows that oxygen partial pressure inside the habitable volume is maintained 
within the limits defined in HS3005B. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
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 4.5.4.3.3  Carbon Dioxide Levels During Exercise 
[HS6037V] The systems' response to environmental loads shall be verified by analysis.  
The analysis shall evaluate the systems' response to simultaneous metabolic loads as 
defined in Appendix E, table Crew Induced Metabolic Loads for a Standard Mission Day 
With Exercise.  The verification shall be considered successful when the analysis shows 
that CO2 inside the vehicle is maintained within the limits defined in HS3005. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.5.4.3.4  Relative Humidity During Exercise 
[HS6038V] The system's response to environmental loads shall be verified by analysis.  
The analysis shall evaluate the vehicle systems' response to simultaneous metabolic 
loads as defined in Appendix E, table Crew Induced Metabolic Loads for a Standard 
Mission Day With Exercise.  The verification shall be considered successful when the 
analysis shows that water vapor inside the habitable volume is maintained within the 
limits defined in HS3046. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.5.5  Space Medicine 
4.5.5.1  Data and Communications 
 4.5.5.1.1  Private Voice 
[HS6075V] The system's two-way private voice communication shall be verified by 
demonstration.  The demonstration shall be an integrated demonstration and shall 
consist of communications between the vehicle and designated Launch Control Center 
(LCC) and Mission Control Center (MCC) flight control team positions using flight-like 
avionics.  The verification shall be considered successful when the demonstration 
shows that audio transmitted between the vehicle and the Launch Control Center and 
the Mission Control Center can only be heard in the vehicle and at the designated flight 
control team positions. 
Rationale:  The Orion and Altair vehicles are only responsible for sending and 
receiving voice communication for this requirement.  The Ground Operations and 
Mission Systems will be responsible for providing the two-way private voice 
communication during the various mission phases. 
 4.5.5.1.2  Private Video 
[HS6076V] The system’s private video communication shall be verified by test.  The test 
shall be an integrated test and shall consist of a simulated video communication 
between the vehicle and designated Mission Control Center Flight control team 
positions using flight-like avionics.  The verification shall be considered successful when 
the test shows that video transmitted between the vehicle and the Mission Control 
Center can only be seen on orbit and at the designated flight control team positions. 
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Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.5.5.1.3  Communication Capabilities 
[HS6097V] Audio, text, and video uplink and downlink capabilities shall be verified by 
demonstration.  The demonstration shall consist of using the flight communication 
systems to exchange information with earth-bound individuals. The verification shall be 
considered successful when the demonstration shows that crewmembers can exchange 
audio, text, and video information with earth-bound individuals using flight 
communication systems with a delivery delay of less than 4 hours. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.5.5.1.4  Personalized In-Flight Updates 
[HS6099V] Updating personalized database in-flight shall be verified by demonstration. 
The demonstration shall consist of using the flight communication systems to update the 
personalized recreational on-board database from the mission systems.  The 
verification shall be considered successful when the personalized on-board database is 
accurately updated. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.5.5.1.5  Biomedical Data 
[HS6077V] The collection of biomedical telemetry from the suit shall be verified by test. 
The test shall be an integrated test and consist of sending a simulated biomedical 
telemetry from the suit to the vehicle using flight-like hardware. The verification shall be 
considered successful when the demonstration shows that biomedical telemetry is 
transmitted from the pressure suit to the vehicle. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.5.5.1.6  Biomedical Relay 
[HS6078V] The relay of suited biomedical telemetry shall be verified by test.  The test 
shall be an integrated test and shall consist of transmitting biomedical telemetry to the 
Mission Control Center using flight-like avionics.  The verification shall be considered 
successful when the test shows that biomedical telemetry is accurately transmitted to 
the Mission Control Center. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.5.5.1.7  Biomedical Display 
[HS6079V] The display of biomedical telemetry to crewmembers shall be verified by 
demonstration.  The demonstration shall send simulated biomedical telemetry to the 
crew displays using flight-like hardware.  The verification shall be considered successful 
when the demonstration shows that biomedical telemetry is displayed to crewmembers. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
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4.5.5.2  Orthostatic Protection 
 4.5.5.2.1  Orthostatic Protection 
[HS6082V] The provisioning of crewmember orthostatic protection shall be verified by 
analysis.  The analysis shall identify the vehicle's countermeasure capabilities to combat 
end of mission orthostasis.  The verification shall be considered successful when it is 
shown the vehicle protects the crewmember from orthostatic fluid shifts during re-entry 
and landing while allowing the crewmember to complete tasks associated with those 
mission phases. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.5.5.3  Medical Area and Capability 
 4.5.5.3.1  Medical Care Provider Access 
[HS6083V] The medical provider access to ill or injured crewmember shall be verified 
by demonstration and analysis.  The demonstration shall consist of a subject providing 
medical treatment to another subject in the medical area within a volumetrically 
accurate mockup.  The analysis shall extrapolate the demonstration to include all 
applicable mission phases.  The verification shall be considered successful when the 
demonstration and analysis show that a medical provider can access the ill or injured 
crewmember in the medical area to provide various levels of care during all applicable 
mission phases. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.5.5.3.2  Patient Electrical Isolation 
[HS6084V] The patient electrical isolation shall be verified by analysis.  The analysis 
shall determine how a crewmember will be restrained in the medical seat for 
defibrillation.  The analysis shall evaluate how electrical isolation from the vehicle is 
achieved. The verification shall be considered successful when the analysis shows that 
a crewmember is electrically isolated from the rest of the vehicle. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.5.5.3.3  Access to Medical Equipment 
[HS6085V] The interfaces from medical equipment to patient shall be verified by 
demonstration.  The demonstration shall configure pieces of medical hardware secured 
and being used with a surrogate ill or injured crewmember in the medical area in a 
volumetrically accurate mockup.  The verification shall be considered successful when 
the hardware interfaces with the surrogate as required, performing the function safely. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
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 4.5.5.3.4  Access to Deployed Medical Kits 
[HS6086V] The medical kit proximity to the provider shall be verified by analysis and 
demonstration.  The analysis shall consist of a worksite analysis to determine where the 
medical kits shall be deployed.  The demonstration shall consist of a crewmember 
performing the role of the medical care provider, and another crewmember performing 
the role of patient in a volumetrically accurate mockup. The verification shall be 
considered successful when the worksite analysis to determine locations for the medical 
kits has been completed, and the demonstration shows that the medical provider can 
reach both the crewmember and the medical kit. 
Rationale:  A worksite analysis and demonstration will determine if all medical 
provider tasks can be completed when considering the identified location of the 
deployed medical kits. 
 4.5.5.3.5  Medical Care Capabilities 
[HS6101V] The medical care capabilities shall be verified by inspection.  The inspection 
shall confirm closure of the requirements in CxP 70035, Constellation Program Portable 
Equipment, Payloads, and Cargo (PEPC) Interface Requirements Document, and the 
Portable Equipment SRD, for the mission's level of care capabilities in HS6101, table 
Medical Care Capabilities.  The verification shall be considered successful when the 
inspection shows that the requirements in CxP 70035 and the Portable Equipment SRD 
are closed. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.5.5.4  Crew Sleep Accommodations 
 4.5.5.4.1  Crew Sleep Accommodations 
[HS6104V] Accommodations for crew sleep shall be verified by inspection.  The 
inspection shall consist of a review of engineering drawings and the available restraints 
to maintain a sleeping position.  The verification shall be considered successful when 
the inspection shows that accommodations for crew sleep have been provided. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.5.6  Stowage 
 4.5.6.1  Stowage Nominal Operation 
[HS6044V] Not Applicable 
 4.5.6.2  Stowage Location 
[HS6046V] Not Applicable. 
 4.5.6.3  Stowage Arrangement 
[HS6047V] Not Applicable 
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 4.5.6.4  Stowage Reconfiguration 
[HS6049V] Not Applicable 
 4.5.6.5  Stowage Restraints 
[HS6050V] The restraint of stowed items during periods of expected acceleration and 
vibration shall be verified by analysis.  The analysis shall evaluate the effect of expected 
acceleration and vibration on the restraints of stowed items.  The verification shall be 
considered successful when the analysis shows that the restraint system is sufficient for 
the volume and mass of stowed items. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.5.6.6  Stowage Equipment Cover Restraint 
[HS6106V] The restraint of stowage or containment equipment cover in an open 
position shall be verified by analysis and demonstration.  The analysis shall identify the 
intended use of the stowage container including the likely size and configuration of its 
contents.  The analysis shall also evaluate and characterize the expected acceleration 
and vibration environment that the stowage system will be exposed to during its 
intended use.  The demonstration shall consist of a high- fidelity mockup or flight system 
and stowage system contents, and will show that the stowage system cover can be 
mechanically secured in an open position sufficient to access, extract, and return 
contents without being supported by hand.  The verification shall be considered 
successful when the analysis and demonstration show that the cover restraint system is 
sufficient to keep the cover in the open position in the expected acceleration and 
vibration environments. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.5.6.7  Stowage Hand Operation 
[HS6051V] The tool-free operation of stowage systems shall be verified by 
demonstration.  The demonstration shall be performed using high-fidelity stowage 
components.  The demonstration shall consist of a subject accessing and operating 
stowage compartments.  The verification shall be considered successful when the 
demonstration shows that all stowage compartments are accessible and operable 
without the use of any tools. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.5.6.8  Stowage Commonality 
[HS6052V] Not Applicable 
 4.5.6.9  Stowage Compatibility with Inventory Management 
[HS6053V] The stowage system's compatibility with the inventory management system 
shall be verified by analysis.  The analysis shall determine if the inventory management 
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system can be used with all stowage without modification.  The verification shall be 
considered successful when the analysis shows that the stowage system can be 
inventoried by the inventory management system. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.5.7  Trash Management 
 4.5.7.1  Trash Management Nominal Operation 
[HS6054V] Not Applicable 
 4.5.7.2  Trash Management Odor Control 
[HS6056V] The odor control for trash management equipment shall be verified by 
demonstration and analysis.  The demonstration shall consist of the placement of 
concentrated odor sources in a flight-like system in a high-fidelity mockup of the trash 
management system.  The demonstration shall include the duration, environmental 
conditions, and operations of an expected mission.  A crew consensus evaluation shall 
determine whether the odor is contained during the demonstration.  The analysis shall 
identify the design features implemented to control odors.  The verification shall be 
considered successful when the demonstration and analysis show that the trash 
management system odors do not permeate the habitable volume of the vehicle. 
Rationale:  The magnitude of odor is affected by time duration and temperature.  
These variables should be considered in order to accurately determine whether 
odor control is attained. 
 4.5.7.3  Trash Management Contamination Control 
[HS6057V] The prevention of trash release shall be verified by analysis.  The analysis 
shall include a review of the trash management system design.  The analysis shall 
examine date samples gathered from the surrounding environment after repeated 
operations of the trash management system where microorganisms are present.  The 
verification shall be considered successful when the analysis shows that 
microorganisms in trash are not released outside of the trash management system. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.5.7.4  Trash Management Hazard Containment 
[HS6058V] The trash management containment of its contents shall be verified by 
demonstration.  The demonstration shall consist of disposing items, including biological 
waste, into the trash management system and showing that containment is independent 
of gravity. The verification shall be considered successful when the demonstration 
shows that the trash management system contains these waste items. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
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4.6  CREW INTERFACES 
4.6.1  General 
 4.6.1.1  Consistent Crew Interfaces 
[HS7007V] Not Applicable 
 4.6.1.2  Labeling 
[HS7036V] Labeling shall be verified by inspection.  The verification shall be considered 
successful when the inspection of the vehicle Label Plan indicates that all crew interface 
items have an associated label that complies with the requirements in CxP 70152, 
Constellation Program Crew Interface Labeling Standard. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.6.1.3  Nomenclature 
[HS7079V] Nomenclature compliance to CxP 70172-01, Constellation program Data 
Architecture Specification, Volume 1:  Naming and Identification Rules shall be verified 
by inspection.  The verification shall be considered successful when the inspection 
indicates that all nomenclature items related to on-orbit operations have been approved 
by a panel chartered under the CxSECB as outlined in CxP 70172-01. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.6.1.4  Legibility 
[HS7044V] The legibility of crew interfaces shall be verified by analysis and test.  The 
analysis shall consist of a task analysis and an analysis of relevant legibility data to 
identify the interfaces that need to be read and interpreted, and the set of worst-case 
expected conditions during a nominal mission profile that need to be tested.  The test 
shall consist of a legibility test conducted with a minimum of 5 crewmembers, crew 
designated representatives, or engineering subjects, under the identified list of 
conditions in a high fidelity flight-like simulator or mockup.  The legibility test shall 
consist of rapid serial visual presentation and subsequent verbal identification by 
subjects of a representative selection of targets such as hardware labels and software 
elements (alphanumeric, icons, and symbols).  The verification shall be considered 
successful when the test shows an average identification accuracy of 98% for each type 
of target. 
Rationale:  Legibility verification testing of selected interfaces should be 
preceded by legibility testing of a broader selection of interfaces during the 
development cycle. This may be done in conjunction with usability testing, and 
will help ensure that interfaces selected for verification testing, as well as 
interfaces not selected for verification testing would have a high probability of 
passing the legibility requirement.  The accuracy rate in this requirement is 
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supported by ISO 9241-11:1998(E) which is based on data from unsuited 
subjects.  
 4.6.1.5  Language 
[HS7064V] The American English language requirement shall be verified by inspection.  
The inspection shall be performed on display text, hardcopy procedures and cue cards, 
labels, and placards.  The verification shall be considered successful when the 
inspection shows that all text is found to be written in the American English language 
based on Webster's New World Dictionary of American English, and all acronyms and 
terms used shall be based on the Cx Common Glossary & Acronyms: 
https://ice.exploration.nasa.gov/confluence/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=11267. 
Rationale:  This requirement may be a candidate for a higher-level document.  It 
resides in the HSIR until another appropriate document is identified.  The 
verification may change or may not be necessary. 
 4.6.1.6  Use of Color 
[HS7065AV] The redundancy of color interface cues shall be verified by demonstration.  
The demonstration shall first identify all interface components that use color to convey 
meaning.  The demonstration shall then determine whether the identified color-coded 
interface components also provide a second cue to convey that meaning.  The 
verification shall be considered successful when the demonstration shows that all color-
coded interface components provide a second noncolor cue when color is used to 
convey meaning. 
Rationale:  Demonstration is used to account for situations that involve 
processes or caution and warning, which would require interaction with the 
system rather than inspection of the system/drawings. 
4.6.2  Crew Performance 
4.6.2.1  Crew Interface Usability 
 4.6.2.1.1  Crew Interface Usability 
[HS7066V] Crew interface usability shall be verified by analysis and test.  The analysis 
shall identify the list of tasks to be performed and the potential errors that can be 
encountered using standard task analysis methods.  The test shall consist of usability 
evaluations based on standard best practices (e.g., Jacob Nielsen’s “Usability 
Engineering”, 1993).  During the usability evaluation, a minimum of 20 crewmembers or 
crew designated representatives will perform a set of NASA-approved onboard tasks in 
a high-fidelity flight-like simulator or mockup.  Usability evaluations should include 
collection of data such as completion times and ratings on subjective questionnaires 
that will help differentiate design-induced errors from errors related to human reliability.  
For the usability evaluation, a task is defined as an activity driven by a procedure.  The 
procedure consists of a series of task steps, where a task step is defined as a single 
instruction to the crewmember, as is typical of current spaceflight procedures.  Each 
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task must be completed; failed or incomplete tasks do not pass verification.  Participants 
should maintain task completion times commensurate with the performance 
requirements of the particular task.  The percentage of erroneous task steps for each 
participant is calculated by dividing the number of erroneous task steps by the total 
number of task steps and multiplying the result by 100.  Likewise, the percentage of 
participants committing each erroneous task step is calculated by dividing the number of 
participants committing each erroneous task step by the total number of participants 
and multiplying the result by 100.  The verification shall be considered successful when 
the results of the analysis and test show that the percentage of erroneous task steps 
per participant is no greater than 5%, and the percentage of participants who committed 
each erroneous task step is no greater than 10%. 
Rationale:  Although errors are often calculated as averages across participants, 
the approach used in this verification (calculating errors per participant and per 
task step) ensures that the number of design-induced errors of every task step 
and every participant is minimized.  The approach puts the emphasis on 
identifying usability problems, rather than just calculating an overall error rate.  
When more than 10% of participants commit the same erroneous task step, this 
indicates a serious design issue.  When one or more participants commit more 
than 5% erroneous task steps across the task, this again could indicate serious 
design issues.  If a single participant commits more than 5% erroneous task 
steps, this could indicate an issue such as deficiency in training or fatigue. In this 
case, results should be discussed with NASA.  Usability verification can be 
accomplished along with other verifications in well-planned human-in-the-loop 
evaluations. 
4.6.2.2  Crew Cognitive Workload 
 4.6.2.2.1  Workload Measure: Nominal 
[HS7080V] The workload rating for crew tasks shall be verified by analysis and test.  
The analysis shall consist of a task analysis to identify a list of NASA approved nominal 
tasks to be performed.  The test shall consist of an evaluation by at least eight trained 
personnel who are crew or designated crew representatives performing each of the 
listed crew tasks in a flight-like simulator or mockup (i.e., a facility that is determined to 
be as close to flight like as is possible) and providing workload ratings on the Bedford 
Workload Scale.  Tasks will be grouped so that related tasks will be performed 
concurrently and sequentially as expected during actual in-flight operations.  When 
tasks are designed to be performed by multiple crewmembers, multiple personnel shall 
participate in the test and provide individual workload ratings.  The evaluation period for 
each task shall span the duration of the task with personnel providing their ratings at the 
end of this period.  During workload evaluation tests, personnel will maintain 
performance error rates and completion times commensurate with the performance 
requirements of the particular task.  The verification shall be considered successful 
when the analysis in conjunction with the test results show that for representative 
nominal tasks identified in the analysis, at least 6 of the 8 ratings are no greater than a 
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rating of 3 on the Bedford workload scale, while up to 2 of the 8 ratings may exceed the 
rating of 3 (allowing workload ratings of 4, 5, or 6 on the Bedford workload scale).  For 
any ratings of 4, 5, or 6, a consensus must be reached by all of the participants 
indicating that the workload is acceptable in order for verification to be considered 
successful. 
Rationale:  Workload must be assessed repeatedly by highly trained individuals 
using a consistent methodology immediately following dynamic human-in-the-
loop simulations of tasks.  A key element of testing in a flight-like simulator or 
mockup is that the quality of error (i.e., consequences or penalties) is 
commensurate to the respective nominal, loss of mission, loss of crew, or loss of 
vehicle task or operational scenario.  Workload should also be assessed in the 
design phase, prior to verification (including multi-dimensional tools such as the 
NASA-TLX), to ensure that the design or task does not induce unnecessary 
workload.  The Bedford scale is appropriate for verification because it provides 
anchors for every rating, is familiar to the crew population, and provides a 
decision gate in which ratings above this gate are indicative of workload that is 
not satisfactory without a reduction in spare capacity.  When using the Bedford 
scale, each subject must be briefed as to what each of the ratings on the scale 
mean, the task they are rating, the time period over which to make the rating, and 
the other tasks for which they need to judge their spare capacity.  These items 
need to be consistent across subjects for each task.  The Bedford scale is not 
linear and the underlying distribution is not predicted to be normal, thus 
calculation of a mean and median or the uses of parametric statistics are not 
appropriate.  The Bedford scale allows for half ratings (e.g., 1.5), which is also 
allowed here, as long as the rating is less a 3 or less.  A rating of 3.5 or higher is 
only acceptable for verification of this requirement if a consensus of all 
participants indicates that the workload is acceptable.  
 4.6.2.2.2  Workload Measures: Off-Nominal 
[HS7080AV] The workload rating for crew tasks shall be verified by analysis and test.  
The analysis shall consist of a task analysis to identify a list of NASA approved off-
nominal tasks to be performed.  The test shall consist of an evaluation by at least eight 
trained personnel who are crew or designated crew representatives, and are 
representative of the crew population performing each of the listed crew tasks in a flight-
like simulator or mockup (i.e., a facility that is determined to be as close to flight like as 
is possible) and providing workload ratings on the Bedford Workload Scale.  Tasks will 
be grouped so that related tasks will be performed concurrently and sequentially as 
expected during actual in-flight operations. When tasks are designed to be performed 
by multiple crewmembers, multiple personnel shall participate in the test and provide 
individual workload ratings.  The evaluation period for each task shall span the duration 
of the task with personnel providing their ratings at the end of this period. During 
workload evaluation tests, personnel will maintain performance error rates and 
completion times commensurate with the performance requirements of the particular 
task.  The verification shall be considered successful when the analysis in conjunction 
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with the test results show that for representative off-nominal tasks identified in the 
analysis, all of the subjects provide a rating of 6 or less on the Bedford scale. 
Rationale:  Workload must be assessed repeatedly by highly trained individuals 
using a consistent methodology immediately following dynamic human-in-the-
loop simulations of tasks.  A key element of testing in a flight-like simulator or 
mockup is that the quality of error (i.e., consequences or penalties) is 
commensurate to the respective nominal, loss of mission, loss of crew, or loss of 
vehicle task or operational scenario. Workload should also be assessed in the 
design phase, prior to verification (including multi-dimensional tools such as the 
NASA-TLX), to ensure that the design or task does not induce unnecessary 
workload.  The Bedford scale is appropriate for verification because it provides 
anchors for every rating, is familiar to the crew population, and provides a 
decision gate in which ratings above this gate are indicative of workload that is 
not satisfactory without a reduction in spare capacity and a gate in which ratings 
above this gate are indicative of workload that is not tolerable for the task.  When 
using the Bedford scale, each subject must be briefed as to what each of the 
ratings on the scale mean, the task they are rating, the time period over which to 
make the rating, and the other tasks for which they need to judge their spare 
capacity.  These items need to be consistent across subjects for each task.  The 
Bedford scale is not linear and the underlying distribution is not predicted to be 
normal, thus calculation of a mean and median or the uses of parametric 
statistics are not appropriate.  This verification requires that every subject’s raw 
score is a 6 or less on the Bedford scale.  The Bedford scale allows for half 
ratings (e.g., 1.5), which is also allowed here, as long as the rating is a 6 or less.  
A rating of 6.5 or higher is not acceptable for verification of this requirement.  A 
rating of 6 or less is acceptable for this verification because workload is expected 
to be higher under off-nominal than nominal conditions, but workload is still rated 
as tolerable for the task. 
 4.6.2.3  Handling Qualities 
 4.6.2.3.1  Handling Qualities for Manual Control – Level 1 
[HS7003V] Handling qualities shall be verified by analysis and test.  Selected manual 
control scenarios will be defined via review of potential manual control scenarios and 
associated manual control modes, with the selected manual control scenarios scoped 
with Program agreement.  For each selected scenario, a list of handling quality related 
tasks will be generated as part of a task analysis.  A handling quality related task is 
defined as the manual control capability that is being rated with the Cooper-Harper 
Rating Scale.  Each task within a scenario is rated separately and must meet Level 1 
(handling quality ratings of 1, 2 or 3).  A test shall be conducted for each selected 
scenario with at least five crew trained as operators performing the listed control tasks 
in a flight-like simulator or mockup and providing handling-quality ratings on the Cooper-
Harper scale for each task in the scenario.  The verification shall be considered 
successful when the test shows that for each task associated with each of the selected 
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manual control scenarios, at least 60% of the ratings are Level 1 (handling quality 
ratings of 1, 2 or 3), while up to 40% may exceed Level 1 with a Level 2 rating (handling 
quality rating of 4, 5, or 6).  For any ratings of 4, 5, or 6, a consensus must be reached 
by all of the participants indicating that handling qualities are acceptable in order for 
verification to be considered successful. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.6.2.3.2  Handling Qualities for Manual Control – Level 2 
[HS7004V] Handling qualities shall be verified by analysis and test.  These selected 
special case scenarios will be pre-declared as Level 2 appropriate scenarios a priori 
based on identified degradation of flight controls or severe and multiple failures, and not 
merely as the result of a failure to meet Level 1.  Special case manual control scenarios 
will be defined via review of potential manual control scenarios and associated manual 
control modes, with the selected special case manual control scenarios scoped with 
Program agreement.  For each selected special case scenario, a list of handling quality 
related tasks will be generated as part of a task analysis.  A handling quality related task 
is defined as the manual control capability that is being rated with the Cooper-Harper 
Rating Scale.  Each task within a special case scenario is rated separately and must 
exhibit at least Level 2 handling qualities (handling quality ratings of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6).  
A test shall be conducted for each selected scenario with at least five crew trained as 
operators performing the listed tasks in a flight-like simulator or mockup, providing 
handling-quality ratings on the Cooper-Harper scale for each task in the scenario.  The 
verification shall be considered successful when the test shows that each task 
associated with each special case manual control scenario results in Level 2 ratings or 
better (handling quality ratings of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6). 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.6.3  Display and Control Layout 
4.6.3.1  Viewing Requirements 
 4.6.3.1.1  Field of View 
[HS7010V] The visibility of viewed displays and controls shall be verified by analysis.  
The analysis shall consist of a geometric worst-case calculation of the field of regard of 
a suited and seated crewmember.  The verification shall be considered successful when 
the analysis shows that all displays and controls, which need to be viewed for operation, 
are fully within the field of view of a suited and seated crewmember. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.6.3.1.2  Two-Crew Operations 
[HS7010AV] The capability of two operators to view and confirm each other’s inputs for 
mission critical functions shall be verified by demonstration.  The demonstration shall 
use a list of mission critical functions determined by a task analysis.  The demonstration 
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shall include two trained personnel performing mission critical functions in a flight-like 
simulator or mockup with the flight configuration of seating, controls, and displays.  The 
verification shall be considered successful when the demonstration shows that the 
vehicle provides a display location for personnel to view each other’s operations for all 
mission critical functions. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.6.3.1.3  Viewing Critical Displays and Controls 
[HS7018] Not Applicable 
 4.6.3.1.4  Viewing Frequently Used Displays and Controls 
[HS7018A] Not Applicable 
 4.6.3.1.5  Obscured Controls 
[HS7067V] Distinguishability of out-of view controls shall be verified by test.  The test 
shall consist of suited and seated operators using the out-of-view controls in a range of 
assigned control tasks.  The verification shall be considered successful when the test 
shows that the operators correctly distinguished the out-of-view controls during the 
tasks such that there is 95% confidence that operators will make less than 1% 
erroneous control selections. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.6.3.1.6  Self-Illuminated Controls and Displays 
[HS7082V] Self-illumination for displays and controls shall be verified by analysis and 
demonstration.  A task analysis shall identify the displays and controls that require self-
illumination, considering the likely ambient lighting conditions, general panel 
illumination, and cabin darkening.  The demonstration shall occur in a flight vehicle or 
high- fidelity mockup and will consist of observing the displays and controls in all likely 
ambient lighting conditions.  The verification shall be considered successful when the 
analysis and demonstration show that the identified displays and controls can be clearly 
observed and distinguished in the likely lighting conditions. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.6.3.2  Reach Requirements 
 4.6.3.2.1  Functional Reach Envelope 
[HS7019V] The location of controls within the crewmembers’ functional reach shall be 
verified by analysis.  The analysis shall consist of a geometric worst-case calculation of 
the reach envelope of a suited and seated crewmember.  The verification shall be 
considered successful when the analysis shows that all controls for each task are 
located within the reach envelope of the seated and suited crewmember performing the 
task. 
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Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.6.3.2.2  Reach for Critical Controls 
[HS7021V] Not Applicable 
 4.6.3.2.3  Reach for Frequently Used Controls 
[HS7021AV] Not Applicable 
4.6.3.3  Display and Control Grouping 
 4.6.3.3.1  Functional Related Displays and Controls 
[HS7022V] Not Applicable 
 4.6.3.3.2  Successive Operation of Displays and Controls 
[HS7023V] Not Applicable 
4.6.3.4  Control Spacing 
 4.6.3.4.1  Control Spacing for Suited Operations 
[HS7024V] Spacing of hand operated controls for gloved operations shall be verified by 
demonstration.  The demonstration shall be performed using a list of controls used by 
gloved crewmembers as determined by a task analysis.  The demonstration will use 
trained personnel, wearing a flight-like glove, representing the full anthropometric range 
of crewmembers.  The demonstration will be conducted in a flight-like simulator or 
mockup.  The verification shall be considered successful when the demonstration 
shows that hand operated controls used for gloved operations are spaced such that the 
controls can be operated without interfering with nearby controls. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.6.3.4.2  Control Spacing for Unsuited Operations 
[HS7925V] Spacing of hand operated controls for ungloved operations shall be verified 
by demonstration.  The demonstration shall be performed using a list of controls used 
by ungloved crewmembers as determined by a task analysis.  The demonstration will 
use trained personnel representing the full anthropometric range of crewmembers.  The 
demonstration will be conducted in a flight-like simulator or mockup.  The verification 
shall be considered successful when the demonstration shows that hand operated 
controls used for ungloved operations are spaced such that the controls can be 
operated. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.6.4  Displays 
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4.6.4.1  Display Content 
 4.6.4.1.1  Task-Oriented Displays 
[HS7059V] The availability of task-oriented displays shall be verified by inspection.  The 
inspection shall determine the availability of a task-oriented display for each task.  The 
verification shall be considered successful when the inspection confirms the existence 
of a task-oriented display associated with each task. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.6.4.1.2  Subsystem-Oriented Displays 
[HS7060V] The availability of subsystem-oriented displays shall be verified by 
inspection.  The inspection shall determine the availability of a subsystem-oriented 
display for each subsystem.  The verification shall be considered successful when the 
inspection confirms the existence of a subsystem-oriented display associated with each 
subsystem. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.6.4.1.3  Viewing Simultaneous Task Information 
[HS7060AV] Not Applicable 
 4.6.4.1.4  Viewing Simultaneous Critical Task Information 
[HS7070V] Simultaneous viewing of critical task information shall be verified by 
analysis.  The analysis shall determine for each critical task whether or not all of the 
task information needed to perform the task can be simultaneously displayed within the 
field of regard of a suited and seated crewmember performing the task.  The verification 
shall be considered successful when the analysis shows that the vehicle can 
simultaneously display all information needed for each critical task within the field of 
regard of a single seated and suited crewmember. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.6.4.2  Display Hierarchy 
 4.6.4.2.1  Location Within the Display Hierarchy 
[HS7061V] Location within the visual display hierarchy shall be verified by 
demonstration.  The demonstration shall consist of navigation through each of the 
displays using flight software and flight-like display device hardware.  The verification 
shall be considered successful when the demonstration shows that each display offers 
an opportunity to view one's location within the display hierarchy. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.6.4.2.2  Access Within Display Hierarchy 
[HS7071V] Not Applicable 
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4.6.4.3  System Feedback 
 4.6.4.3.1  State Change 
[HS7072V] Data update rate for state change shall be verified by test. The test shall be 
performed with flight-configuration software and hardware. The test shall run a scenario 
that simulates a display parameter changing on multiple displays. The verification shall 
be considered successful when the test shows that the changed data parameter is 
updated within 1 second on all displays that show the data. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.6.4.3.2  Lost Data 
[HS7072AV] Loss of displayed data parameters shall be verified by demonstration.  The 
demonstration shall be performed using flight-configuration software and a list of 
representative data types from a task analysis.  The software shall run a scenario that 
results in the loss of data parameters for the data sets being tested.  The verification 
shall be considered successful when the demonstration shows that the vehicle provides 
an indication that the parameters for each tested data set are unavailable. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.6.5  Hardware and Software Controls 
4.6.5.1  Control Operation 
 4.6.5.1.1  Compatibility of Movement 
[HS7063V] Input-output compatibility shall be verified by demonstration.  The 
demonstration shall use flight-configuration hardware and software controls.  The 
demonstration shall consist of activation of the controls and noting the control response.  
The verification shall be considered successful when the demonstration shows that the 
input-output mapping is compatible as defined in Appendix K, table Input-Output 
Compatibility. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.6.5.1.2  Control Feedback 
[HS7063AV] Feedback of crew-initiated control activation shall be verified by 
demonstration.  The demonstration shall consist of simulating crew activation of flight-
configuration hardware and software controls.  The verification shall be considered 
successful when the demonstration shows that all control systems provide an indication 
of crew-initiated control activations. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.6.5.1.3  Protection Against Inadvertent Activation 
[HS7063BV] Not Applicable. 
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 4.6.5.1.4  Protection for Flight Actuated Critical Controls 
[HS7063CV] Protection against inadvertent actuation of mission critical and safety 
critical controls by the crew shall be verified by analysis and demonstration.  The task 
analysis shall identify all mission and safety critical flight-configuration hardware and 
software controls.  The demonstration shall consist of the activation of the controls 
identified in the task analysis.  The verification shall be considered successful when the 
demonstration shows that the controls have two independent crew actions for activation. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.6.5.1.5  Protection for Ground Actuated Critical Controls 
[HS7083V] The ability of the system to protect against a single inadvertent actuation of 
mission and safety critical controls using a two-step process of two independent ground 
personnel actions shall be verified by analysis and inspection.  The analysis shall 
consist of review and assessment of MS and Ground Systems (GS) facilities designs 
and hazard analyses.  The inspection shall consist of review of the allocated MS and 
GS SRD sections requirements. The inspection shall be considered successful when 
the allocated MS and GS SRDs requirements are closed.  The analysis shall be 
considered successful when the assessment of the MS and GS facilities designs and 
closure of the hazard analysis confirm the ability of the system to protect against a 
single inadvertent actuation of mission and safety critical controls using a two-step 
process of two independent ground personnel actions. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.6.5.1.6  Coding for Emergency Controls 
[HS7063DV] Coding for emergency controls shall be verified by inspection.  The 
inspection shall involve all controls on the list of emergency controls as defined in a 
NASA-approved task analysis.  The inspection shall include a review of the vehicle 
Label Plan and determine whether coding is compliant with the emergency coding 
defined in CxP 70152, Constellation Program Crew Interface Labeling Standard.  The 
verification shall be considered successful when the inspection shows that coding 
meets the emergency coding defined in CxP 70152, Constellation Program Crew 
Interface Labeling Standard. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.6.5.1.7  Restraints for Control Operation 
[HS7063EV] Restraints for reduced gravity control operations shall be verified by 
analysis.  The analysis will use a list of controls required during reduced gravity crew 
operations as determined by a task analysis.  The analysis shall consist of computer 
models of the forces during control operations to determine if the restraints will allow 
proper operation of controls, taking into account the full anthropometric range and force 
capabilities of crewmembers.  The verification shall be considered successful when the 
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analysis shows that the restraint systems provided allow proper application of the forces 
necessary for the full range of operation of controls used during reduced gravity. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.6.5.2  High-g Operations 
 4.6.5.2.1  Over 3 g 
[HS7027V] Control placement for operations at 3 g or more shall be verified by analysis. 
The analysis shall be performed using a list of controls used during operations at 3 g or 
more as determined by a task analysis.  The analysis shall determine whether the 
controls can be accessed by a hand/wrist movement of a restrained/supported arm 
taking into account the full anthropometric range of crewmembers.  The verification shall 
be considered successful when the analysis shows that controls used in operations at 3 
g or more are accessible by hand/wrist movements of a restrained/supported arm. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.6.5.2.2  Over 2 g 
[HS7028V] Control placement for operations between 2 g and 3 g shall be verified by 
analysis.  The analysis shall be performed using a list of controls used during operations 
between 2 g and 3 g as determined by a task analysis.  The analysis shall determine 
whether the controls can be accessed either by hand/wrist movements of a 
restrained/supported arm or by forward reaches taking into account the full 
anthropometric range of crewmembers.  The verification shall be considered successful 
when the analysis shows that controls used during operations between 2 g and 3 g are 
accessible by hand/wrist movements of a restrained/supported arm or by a reach within 
a forward +/- 30 degree cone. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.6.5.2.3  Supports 
[HS7029V] Limb support for control operations during acceleration levels above 2 g 
shall be determined by analysis.  A task analysis shall identify the control tasks that will 
require stabilizing supports above 2 g and the performance standards required.  A 
modeling analysis shall be performed by using a CAD model to determine the support 
placement for limbs during the identified controls tasks.  The verification shall be 
considered successful when the analysis shows that limb support is sufficient to achieve 
identified performance standards for the control tasks. 
Rationale:  This requirement emphasizes the need to verify that support systems 
(in conjunction with the control interfaces) will maintain crew performance at or 
above defined standards while the task is performed under the anticipated 
sustained and stochastic acceleration profile. 
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4.6.6  Crew Notifications and Caution and Warning 
4.6.6.1  Crew Notifications 
 4.6.6.1.1  Notifications 
[HS7049V] Crew notification of required mission critical actions shall be verified by 
demonstration.  The demonstration shall use a list of mission critical action scenarios as 
determined from a task analysis.  The demonstration shall be performed with flight 
hardware and software running the mission critical action scenarios.  The verification 
shall be considered successful when the demonstration shows that notifications are 
received when mission critical actions are required. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.6.6.1.2  Manual Silencing 
[HS7049AV] The manual silencing feature for auditory annunciators shall be verified by 
demonstration.  The demonstration shall be performed on flight-configuration hardware 
and software.  The annunciators will be activated and the manual silencing feature will 
be selected.  The verification shall be considered successful when the demonstration 
shows that activating the manual silencing feature silences the active auditory 
annunciators. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.6.6.1.3  Volume Control for Auditory Annunciations 
[HS7075V] Auditory annunciation volume control shall be verified by test.  The test shall 
be made with flight hardware and software.  Auditory annunciations will be activated 
and the volume adjusted.  Aural-annunciation volume control shall be verified by test. 
The test shall be made with flight hardware and software. Aural annunciations will be 
activated and the volume adjusted.  Measurements shall be made, using a Type 1 
integrating-averaging sound level meter, at expected head locations at the receiving 
station.  The verification shall be considered successful when the test shows that the 
measured volume of aural annunciations, other than cautions and warnings, vary from 5 
to 100% of maximum across the full range of the volume control. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.6.6.1.4  Speech Intelligibility 
[HS7076V] Auditory speech annunciations and communications intelligibility shall be 
verified by analysis and test.  The analysis shall derive the nominal background noise 
spectrum for testing.  The test shall be made with flight-configuration hardware and 
software using the methodology given in ANSI S3.2-2009.  The verification shall be 
considered successful when the test and analysis indicates a 90% word identification 
level at the ear of the listener throughout the habitable volume. 
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Rationale:  1) Prototype or qualification annunciation and communication system 
designs should be tested by analysis prior to manufacture of the actual 
annunciation and communication system.  2) Intermediate testing and analysis 
should be performed and reviewed by NASA to ensure confidence that 
compliance with this requirement will be met and to preclude late impacts to cost, 
schedule, and hardware. 
 4.6.6.1.5  Volume Control for Audio Communications 
[HS7077V] Voice-channel volume control shall be verified by test.  The test shall be 
made with flight hardware and software.  Audio channels carrying voice will be activated 
and the volume adjusted while an operator speaks into the microphone at the sending 
station.  Measurements shall be made, using a Type 1 integrating-averaging sound 
level meter, at expected head locations at the receiving station.  The verification shall be 
considered successful when the test shows that the measured volume of each audio 
channel carrying voice communications varies 5 to 100% of maximum across the full 
range of the volume control. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.6.6.2  Caution and Warning 
 4.6.6.2.1  Annunciation Hierarchy 
[HS9029V] Off-nominal event classification shall be verified by demonstration.  The 
demonstration shall be performed using flight-configuration software.  The 
demonstration shall consist of the simulation of all contemplated off-nominal events and 
the classification of these events.  The verification shall be considered successful when 
the demonstration shows that each off-nominal event is correctly assigned to one of the 
classifications. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.6.6.2.2  Annunciation Prioritization 
[HS9029AV] Prioritization of caution and warning annunciations shall be performed by 
demonstration.  The demonstration shall be performed on a flight-configuration Caution 
and Warning System using all contemplated pairs of simultaneous off-nominal events.  
The verification shall be considered successful when the demonstration shows that the 
vehicle's caution and warning system prioritizes the caution and warnings annunciations 
according to Appendix K, table Alert Annunciation. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.6.6.2.3  Visual and Auditory Annunciation 
[HS9030V] Visual and auditory annunciations of emergency, warning, and caution 
events shall be verified by demonstration.  The demonstration shall be performed using 
flight-configuration software and hardware and all contemplated emergency, warning, 
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and caution events.  The verification shall be considered successful when the 
demonstration shows that each emergency, warning, and caution event triggers the 
correct visual and auditory annunciations. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.6.6.2.4  Distinctiveness of Annunciations 
[HS9032V] Distinctiveness of alert annunciations and visual indications shall be verified 
by demonstration.  The demonstration shall be performed on all nonspeech audio 
annunciations and visual indications using a flight-configuration system to annunciate 
the signals.  Signal content will be compared to Appendix K, table Alert Annunciation. 
The verification shall be considered successful when the demonstration shows that all 
nonspeech audio annunciations and visual indications meet the Appendix K, table Alert 
Annunciation. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.6.6.2.5  Loss of Annunciation Capability 
[HS9032AV] Notification of system failure of visual or auditory annunciators shall be 
verified by test.  The test shall be performed with flight-configuration software and 
hardware.  The test shall run a scenario that simulates failures of the visual and auditory 
annunciator systems.  The verification shall be considered successful when the test 
shows that the vehicle provides notification of either auditory or visual annunciator 
system failure. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.6.7  Crew-System Interaction 
 4.6.7.1  Subsystem State Information 
[HS7058V] Subsystem state information shall be verified by demonstration.  The 
demonstration shall be performed using flight-configuration software and a list of 
representative subsystems from a task analysis.  The demonstration shall involve 
requesting the display of subsystem states from the test data set.  The verification shall 
be considered successful when the demonstration shows that all requested subsystem 
state information is displayed to the crew. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.6.7.2  System Responsiveness for Discrete Inputs 
[HS7058AV] Discrete feedback delay shall be verified by analysis or test.  An analysis 
will show documentation of response time components (hardware/software and 
cognitive processing times) that combine to yield the final response time.  The test will 
be performed with flight-configuration hardware and software and will involve timing the 
delay between a discrete user input and system feedback that the input was received.  
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The verification shall be considered successful when the analysis or test indicates that 
the measured feedback delays are less than or equal to 0.1 second. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.6.7.3  System Responsiveness for Continuous Inputs 
[HS7058BV] Not Applicable 
 4.6.7.4  Request for Information 
[HS7058CV] Not Applicable 
 4.6.7.5  Request for Critical Information 
[HS7058DV] The response delay for critical displays shall be verified by test.  The test 
shall be performed on a flight-configuration computer with a subset of mission critical 
displays.  The test will involve requesting a mission critical display and timing the delay 
between the request and the presentation of the display.  The verification shall be 
considered successful when the test shows that critical information is displayed within 
1.0 second of the crew request. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.6.7.6  Menu Update Time 
[HS7058EV] Menu update rate shall be verified by test.  The test shall be performed 
with flight-configuration hardware and software.  The test shall consist of navigation 
through all menus while timing the delay between each menu selection and the 
appearance of the next level of the menu.  The verification shall be considered 
successful when the test shows that measured time between menu selection and 
appearance of the next menu level is less than or equal to 0.5 second. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.6.7.7  Command Feedback 
[HS7055V] Command feedback delay shall be verified by test.  The test will be 
performed using flight-configuration hardware and software and using a representative 
list of commands from a task analysis.  The test will involve timing the delay between a 
command and feedback that the command is being processed, completed, or rejected.  
The verification shall be considered successful when the test shows that all delays are 
shown to be less than or equal to 2.0 seconds. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.6.8  Electronic Procedures 
 4.6.8.1  Displaying Electronic Procedures System 
[HS9025V] The electronic procedure system providing relevant vehicle information via 
displays shall be verified by demonstration.  The demonstration shall be performed 
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using flight-configuration hardware and software and a representative list of procedures, 
including those completed by crew and automation.  The demonstration shall involve 
the simulation of tasks using the electronic procedures.  The verification shall be 
considered successful when the demonstration shows that during any given step in the 
execution of the procedures, relevant vehicle information is displayed electronically. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.6.8.2  Cueing Electronic Procedures System 
[HS9025AV] The ability of the electronic procedure system to provide cues to required 
vehicle software commands shall be verified by demonstration.  The demonstration 
shall be performed using flight-configuration hardware and software and a 
representative list of procedures, including those completed by crew and automation.  
The demonstration shall involve the simulation of tasks using the electronic procedures.  
The verification shall be considered successful when the demonstration shows that 
during the execution of the procedures, software commands required during the 
execution of the procedure are cued (made available). 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.6.8.3  Current Procedure Step 
[HS9026V] The indication of the current procedure step shall be verified by 
demonstration.  The demonstration shall be performed using flight-configuration 
hardware and software and a representative list of procedures, including those 
completed by crew and automation.  The demonstration shall involve the simulation of 
the tasks using the electronic procedures.  The verification shall be considered 
successful when the demonstration shows that the procedure display indicates the step 
in the procedure that is currently being executed. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.6.8.4  Completed Procedure Steps 
[HS9027V] The indication of the completed procedure step shall be verified by 
demonstration.  The demonstration shall be performed using flight-configuration 
hardware and software and a representative list of procedures, including those 
completed by crew and automation.  The demonstration shall involve the simulation of 
the tasks using the electronic procedures.  The verification shall be considered 
successful when the demonstration shows that the procedure display indicates the step 
in the procedure that has been completed. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.6.8.5  Crew Notification of Required Procedure Action 
[HS9028V] Crew notifications of required procedural actions shall be verified by 
demonstration.  The demonstration shall be performed using flight-configuration 
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hardware and software and a representative list of procedures, including those 
completed by crew and automation.  The demonstration shall involve the simulation of a 
task using the electronic procedures.  The verification shall be considered successful 
when the demonstration shows that the crew was notified that attention to the procedure 
is required. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.7  MAINTENANCE AND HOUSEKEEPING 
4.7.1  Maintenance 
4.7.1.1  Efficiency 
 4.7.1.1.1  ORU Changeout 
[HS8001V] The maintenance and reconfiguration tasks shall be verified by analysis.  
The analysis shall consist of worksite analyses for each task.  The verification shall be 
considered successful when all replaceable or reconfigurable equipment has been 
shown to be removable and replaceable or reconfigured under the task constraints. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.7.1.1.2  Maintenance Time per Day 
[HS8002V] The number of hours for preventive maintenance and housekeeping shall 
be verified by analysis.  The analysis shall determine the total number of hours required 
for preventive maintenance and housekeeping for the mission duration and average the 
hours over the mission duration.  The verification shall be considered successful when 
the analysis shows that all preventive maintenance and housekeeping can be 
accomplished for a mission while requiring no more than an average of two person-
hours per day. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.7.1.1.3  ORU Maintenance Time 
[HS8003V] The number of hours for ORU maintenance shall be verified by analysis.  
The analysis shall consist of time studies for all ORU maintenance tasks.  The 
verification shall be considered successful when the analysis shows that all ORUs have 
been assessed and can be maintained within 3 hours. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.7.1.1.4  ORU Replacement Time/Maintenance 
[HS8003V-Objective] Not Applicable. 
 4.7.1.1.5  Access Points 
[HS8026V] Not Applicable 
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4.7.1.2  Error-Proof Design 
 4.7.1.2.1  Physical Features 
[HS8005V] The features to preclude improper mounting shall be verified by inspection.  
The inspection shall consist of a review of engineering drawings for hardware that is 
maintained or reconfigured and that is mounted.  The verification shall be considered 
successful when the inspection shows that the mounted hardware has features to 
preclude improper mounting. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.7.1.2.2  Labeling and Marking 
[HS8006V] The visual indication for correct equipment mounting shall be verified by 
inspection.  The verification shall be considered successful when the inspection of the 
vehicle Label Plan shows that a visual indication for correct equipment mounting has 
been provided in accordance with CxP 70152, Constellation Program Crew Interface 
Labeling Standard. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.7.1.2.3  Interchangeability 
[HS8007V] Hazard prevention for physically interchangeable ORUs that do not perform 
the same function shall be verified by inspection.  The inspection shall consist of a 
review of the safety hazard reports for ORUs.  The verification shall be considered 
successful when the inspection confirms that controls are in place to prevent ORUs that 
are functionally different from being physically interchanged. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.7.1.2.4  Connectors 
[HS8008V] Physical features to preclude mismating and misalignment shall be by 
inspection, analysis, or demonstration.  For the connector physical features, a 
demonstration consisting of mating and demating shall be performed for each connector 
type.  For an integrated configuration, inspection and analysis shall be performed.  The 
inspection shall consist of a review of the drawings for connector part numbers.  An 
analysis shall assess the arrangement of the different types of connectors and the cable 
lengths. 
The verification for the connector physical features shall be considered successful when 
the demonstration shows that the different types of connectors cannot be mismated and 
that misalignment is prevented within the connector type.  The verification for the 
integrated configuration shall be considered successful with the inspection and analysis 
show that connectors cannot be mismated within connector groupings. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
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 4.7.1.2.5  Visual Indication 
[HS8045V] Orientation cues on connectors shall be verified by inspection.  The 
verification shall be considered successful when the inspection of the vehicle Label Plan 
shows that there is an orientation cue that can be used prior to mating in accordance 
with CxP 70152, Constellation Program Crew Interface Labeling Standard. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.7.1.2.6  Connector Mating Indication 
[HS8046V] Completion of connector mating shall be verified by demonstration.  The 
demonstration shall consist of mating and demating connector types.  The verification 
shall be considered successful when the demonstration shows that a positive indication 
is provided when the mating is completed. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.7.1.2.7  Unique Identification Labeling 
[HS8047V] Identification labeling shall be verified by inspection.  The verification shall 
be considered successful when the inspection of the vehicle Label Plan shows that all 
equipment has a uniquely identifying label in accordance with CxP 70152, Constellation 
Program Crew Interface Labeling Standard. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.7.1.3  Access 
4.7.1.3.1  Disturbance of Equipment 
 4.7.1.3.1.1  Disturbance of Equipment 
[HS8053V] Not applicable. 
4.7.1.3.2  Visual Access 
 4.7.1.3.2.1  Visual Access 
[HS8009V] The visual access shall be verified by analysis.  The analysis shall consist of 
worksite analyses that examine planned maintenance tasks and show the task 
interfaces to be within visual access of the maintainer.  The verification shall be 
considered successful when analysis shows that the design provides visual access for 
planned maintenance tasks except blind-mate connector mating. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
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4.7.1.3.3  Physical Access 
 4.7.1.3.3.1  Physical Access 
[HS8010V] The work envelope for maintenance activities shall be verified by analysis.  
The analysis shall consist of worksite analyses for all interfaces that must be accessed 
to perform maintenance on each replaceable equipment item.  The verification shall be 
considered successful when the analysis shows that all maintenance tasks can be 
shown to be within the access of the anthropometric range of flight crews, from work 
locations appropriate to the tasks, and under the environmental constraints (e.g., 
protective garment) of the tasks. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.7.1.3.4  Maintenance Hazard 
 4.7.1.3.4.1  Maintenance Hazard 
[HS8015V] Access to ORUs shall be verified by inspection.  The inspection shall consist 
of a review of drawings and models that show the ORU location and all surrounding 
equipment.  The verification shall be considered successful when access to ORUs can 
be accomplished without impacting other systems. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.7.1.3.5  Crew Control of Power 
 4.7.1.3.5.1  Crew Control of Power 
[HS8055V] Crew interruption of electrical power and confirmation of energized circuits 
shall be verified by analysis and demonstration.  The analysis shall identify locations 
that could expose IVA crewmembers to voltages in excess of 32V.  The demonstration 
shall be in the flight vehicle and include a subject demonstrating the ability to interrupt 
electrical power at the locations identified in the analysis.  The analysis and 
demonstration shall be considered successful when it is shown that the crewmember 
can interrupt electrical power and confirm the de-energized status of the circuit that 
could expose crewmembers to voltages in excess of 32V. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.7.1.4  Failure Notification 
 4.7.1.4.1  Failure Notification 
[HS8016V] Component failure alert shall be verified by demonstration.  The 
demonstration shall include simulating out-of-tolerance operation of equipment.  The 
verification shall be considered successful when an alert is detected upon the system’s 
receipt of out-of-tolerance limits. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
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4.7.1.5  Circuit Protection 
 4.7.1.5.1  No Fuses for Dynamic Flight Phases 
[HS8017V] Circuit protection shall be verified by analysis.  An analysis shall determine 
which circuits may reset during dynamic phases of flight.  The verification shall be 
considered successful when the analysis shows that fuses are not required to protect 
circuits during dynamic phases of flight. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.7.1.5.2  Circuit Breakers Instead of Fuses 
[HS8018V] Not Applicable 
 4.7.1.5.3  Replacement Without Tools 
[HS8020V] The removal and replacement of fuses shall be verified by inspection.  The 
inspection shall consist of review of the engineering drawings for all equipment that 
contain in-flight replaceable fuses.  The verification shall be considered successful when 
the inspection shows that fuses can be removed and replaced without a tool. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.7.1.5.4  Replacement Without Component Removal 
[HS8021V] The removal and replacement of fuses in-flight shall be verified by 
inspection.  The inspection shall consist of a review of drawings or models for 
equipment with in-flight maintenance that contain fuses.  Verification shall be 
considered successful when the inspection shows that each fuse can be removed and 
replaced without the removal of other components. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.7.1.5.5  Circuit Breaker Resetting 
[HS8022V] The access to reset circuit breakers by a restrained suited crewmember 
shall be verified by analysis and inspection.  An analysis shall determine the circuit 
breakers the crewmembers need to reach during ascent and entry.  The inspection shall 
consist of a review of drawings or models for the integrated circuit breakers.  The 
verification shall be considered successful when the analysis and inspection show that 
the crewmember can reach each identified circuit breaker during dynamic flight phases 
without removing or opening a panel. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.7.1.5.6  Trip Indication 
[HS8023V] Indication of an open circuit shall be verified by inspection.  The inspection 
shall consist of a review of the engineering drawings for hardware that uses fuses and 
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circuit breakers.  The verification shall be considered successful when the inspection 
shows that feedback is provided when the circuit is open. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.7.1.6  Electrostatic Discharge (ESD) 
 4.7.1.6.1  Electrostatic Discharge 
[HS8024V] The labeling of “sensitive to electrostatic discharge” shall be verified by 
analysis and inspection.  The analysis shall determine which equipment is susceptible 
to electrostatic discharge damage during operation or planned in-flight maintenance. 
The inspection shall consist of reviewing the vehicle Label Plan for the identified 
hardware.  The verification shall be considered successful when the inspection of the 
vehicle Label Plan shows that the hardware drawings illustrate the locations for 
sensitive to electrostatic discharge labels for the hardware identified in the analysis. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.7.1.7  Fasteners 
 4.7.1.7.1  Fasteners Heads 
[HS8029V] Anti-cam-out heads shall be verified by analysis and inspection.  The 
analysis shall identify on-orbit, tool-operated fasteners.  The inspection shall consist of a 
review of the engineering drawings.  The verification shall be considered successful 
when the analysis and inspection show that on-orbit, tool-operated fasteners have a 
self-centering anti-cam-out head. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.7.1.7.2  Fasteners Number and Variety 
[HS8030V] Not Applicable 
 4.7.1.7.3  Captive Fasteners 
[HS8031V] The use of captive fasteners shall be verified by inspection.  The inspection 
shall consist of a review of the drawings that contain fasteners that will be used in-flight.  
The verification shall be considered successful when the inspection shows that each 
fastener to be actuated during in-flight maintenance tasks is captive. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.7.1.8  Fluids 
 4.7.1.8.1  Equipment Isolation 
[HS8032V] Fluid isolation features shall be verified by inspection.  The inspection shall 
consist of a review of the engineering drawings for the components and ORUs that 
contain fluid and require maintenance.  The verification shall be considered successful 
when the inspection shows that the components and ORUs have fluid isolation features. 
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Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.7.1.8.2  Hazardous Levels of Fluid Leakage 
[HS8034V] Fluid leakage shall be verified by test.  The test shall measure the amount of 
fluids released while connecting and disconnecting a fluid interface.  The verification 
shall be considered successful when the test shows that amount of fluid released does 
not exceed levels described in JSC20584, Spacecraft Maximum Allowable 
Concentrations (SMAC) for Airborne Contaminants. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.7.1.9  Tools 
 4.7.1.9.1  Common Toolset 
[HS8037V] Not applicable. 
 4.7.1.9.2  Tool Clearance 
[HS8052V] Tool clearance shall be verified by analysis.  Tool interfaces shall be 
assessed, and the allowance for the specified tool shall be analyzed through the entire 
tool use envelope.  Verification shall be considered successful when all tool interfaces 
have been shown to be in compliance. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.7.1.9.3  Tool Usage 
[HS8054V] Tool usage shall be verified by analysis and test.  The analysis shall be 
performed to determine if crewmembers can operate all tools per Appendix B, table 
Unsuited Strength Data.  The test shall consist of a set of tasks to test the operation and 
structural limit of the components.  The analysis and test results shall be verified against 
Appendix B, table Unsuited Strength Data by means of population analytical methods.  
The verification shall be considered successful when the analysis and test show that the 
strength measurements have been met and that the crewmember can physically 
interact and operate all tools for the on-orbit maintenance and reconfiguration tasks. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.7.2  Housekeeping 
4.7.2.1  Design for Cleanliness 
 4.7.2.1.1  Microbial Contamination 
[HS8041V] Microbial contamination shall be verified by test.  The test shall collect 
samples on the interior surfaces.  The verification shall be considered successful when 
the test shows that all sampled interior surfaces show fewer than 500 CFU per 100 cm2 
of microbial contamination. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
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 4.7.2.1.2  Fungal Contamination 
[HS8042V] Fungal contamination shall be verified by test.  The test shall be conducted 
prelaunch.  The test shall collect samples on the interior surfaces.  The verification shall 
be considered successful when the test shows that all sampled interior surfaces show 
fewer than 10 CFU per 100 cm2 of fungal contamination. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.7.2.1.3  Condensation Prevention on Interior Surfaces 
[HS8051V] The condensation persistence on surfaces shall be verified by analysis.  
The analysis shall consider crew induced metabolic loads in Appendix E, table Crew 
Induced Metabolic Loads for a Standard Mission Day With Exercise.  The analysis shall 
include a thermal analysis to determine expected water on internal surfaces.  The 
verification shall be considered successful when the analysis shows that condensation 
persistence is limited to 1 hour a day on surfaces within the internal volume during the 
mission. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.7.2.2  Replacement of Air Filters 
 4.7.2.2.1  Replacement of Air Filters 
[HS8043V] Not Applicable. 
4.8  INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 
4.8.1  Crew Operability 
 4.8.1.1  Crew Operability 
[HS9021V] The capability for the crew to perform information management functions 
shall be verified by analysis and demonstration.  The analysis shall determine the 
methods and tools for the crew to perform information management functions.  The 
analysis shall show what information management functions are required to be available 
to the crew.  The demonstration shall use flight-configuration software displays that 
show that each information management function, determined by a task analysis, can 
be performed on-board the vehicle.  The verification shall be considered successful 
when information management functions defined by the analysis are shown to be 
available to the crew. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.8.2  Data Available 
 4.8.2.1  Data Rate 
[HS9014V] Not applicable. 
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 4.8.2.2  Data Fidelity 
[HS9040V] The data fidelity requirement shall be verified by analysis and test.  The 
analysis shall determine the data fidelity required for a given task.  The test shall be 
performed on a flight-configuration workstation using flight-configuration software loads.  
The data fidelity required for each task will be assessed.  The verification shall be 
considered successful when the test shows that the data have been acquired with the 
fidelity specified by the analysis. 
Rationale:  The data necessary for proper performance of all crew and ground 
personnel tasks for a given mission shall be determined by a task analysis. 
4.8.3  Data Distribution 
 4.8.3.1  Locations of Data 
[HS9018V] The workstation data availability shall be verified by demonstration.  A task 
analysis shall determine what tasks will be performed on a given workstation and the 
data required to perform those tasks.  The demonstration shall be performed on flight-
configuration workstations and software.  The verification shall be considered 
successful when the demonstration shows that all data required at a particular 
workstation are available at that workstation. 
Rationale:  The data necessary for proper performance of all crew and Mission 
Systems personnel tasks for a given workstation shall be determined by a task 
analysis. 
 4.8.3.2  Wired Network 
[HS9019V] The vehicle's wired data distribution system shall be verified by analysis and 
demonstration.  The analysis shall identify the required wired locations including a 
review of operational criticality.  The demonstration shall be performed using simulated 
data streams with flight-configuration software loads and flight-configuration hardware.  
The verification shall be considered successful when the demonstration shows that 
vehicle data can be distributed through the wired data network to the locations defined 
by the analysis. 
Rationale:  The analysis will determine what data will go to what location. 
 4.8.3.3  Wireless Network 
[HS9020V] The vehicle's wireless data distribution system shall be verified by analysis 
and demonstration.  The analysis shall identify the required wireless locations including 
a review of operational criticality.  The demonstration shall be performed using 
simulated data streams with flight-configuration software loads and flight-configuration 
hardware.  The verification shall be considered successful when the demonstration 
shows that vehicle data can be distributed through the wireless data network to the 
locations defined by the analysis. 
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Rationale:  The analysis will determine what data will go to what location. 
4.8.4  Data Backup 
 4.8.4.1  Manual Information Capture and Transfer 
[HS9042AV] The ability to provide a method for the crew to capture and transfer 
information from any display in a format that provides mobility and the ability to annotate 
shall be verified by demonstration.  The demonstration shall consist of a sample set of 
information being captured and transferred using flight-configuration hardware and flight 
software loads.  The verification shall be considered successful when the demonstration 
produces the desired information that can be mobile and have the ability to annotate. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.9  GROUND MAINTENANCE AND ASSEMBLY 
4.9.1  Ground Anthropometry, Biomechanics, and Strength 
 4.9.1.1  Ground Anthropometry, Biomechanics, and Strength 
[HS10008V] The provision of worksites that are sized for the anthropometric range of 
ground crews shall be verified by analysis.  The analysis shall consist of worksite 
analyses for each assembly and ground maintenance task, as defined by the Vehicle 
Assembly and Ground Maintenance Task Analysis.  The verification shall be considered 
successful when the analysis shows that each worksite is sized for the anthropometric 
range of stature for the 5th to 95th percentiles of the ground crew population for 
anthropometric dimensions that were defined based on task analysis. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.9.2  Ground Natural and Induced Environments 
4.9.3  Ground Safety 
 4.9.3.1  Ventilation Openings 
[HS10027V] Protection of ventilation openings from inadvertent insertion of foreign 
objects shall be verified by analysis and inspection.  The task analysis shall identify 
assembly and maintenance worksites.  Worksite analysis shall show the reach envelope 
of crews during tasks, and an inspection of drawings shall be used to assure that 
openings within the reach envelope are protected from inadvertent insertion of tools or 
body parts.  The verification shall be considered successful when the inspection shows 
that openings identified in the analysis are protected from insertion of foreign objects. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.9.3.2  Ground Processing Hardware Access 
[HS10030V] Protection from sharp edges shall be verified by analysis and inspection.  
The task analysis shall identify the flight system equipment with which the ground crew 
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will interact with during assembly and maintenance tasks, as identified in the Vehicle 
Assembly and Maintenance Task Analysis.  The inspection shall be a review of 
drawings of the flight system equipment identified in the task analysis.  The verification 
shall be considered successful when the analysis and inspection show that the 
identified areas have protection from sharp edges. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.9.3.3  Hazards Labeling 
[HS10033V] Hazard labeling shall be verified by inspection.  The inspection shall 
identify the list of equipment that is susceptible to damage or constitutes a hazard to the 
ground crew.  This list will include the type of hazard (ESD, chemical, pressurized fluid, 
etc.).  The verification shall be considered successful when the inspection shows that all 
items on the list have been labeled with hazard information 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.9.4  Ground Architecture 
 4.9.4.1  Work Station Layout Interference 
[HS10047V] Not Applicable. 
 4.9.4.2  Work Station Layout Sequential Operations 
[HS10048V] Not Applicable. 
4.9.5  Ground Crew Functions 
4.9.6  Ground Crew Interfaces 
 4.9.6.1  Labeling 
[HS10039V] Labels for ground crew interface controls and indicators shall be verified by 
inspection and analysis.  The task analysis shall define those tasks for which there are 
controls or indicators.  Inspection of drawings shall determine if labels have been 
incorporated into the design for those tasks.  The verification shall be considered 
successful when the inspection shows that the controls and indicators identified in the 
analysis have been labeled. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.9.6.2  Ground Labeling - Non-interference with Flight Labels 
[HS10055V] Noninterference of ground assembly labels with crew interface labeling will 
be verified by inspection and analysis.  The inspection shall be a review of drawings for 
hardware that contains crew interface labels and ground labels.  The analysis shall 
assess the use of crew labeling and determine if ground labeling is nearby.  The 
verification shall be considered successful when the inspection and analysis show that 
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the ground labels do not interfere with the crew interface flight labeling, visually or 
operationally. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.9.6.3  Consistent Crew Interfaces 
[HS10050V] Not applicable. 
 4.9.6.4  Legibility 
[HS10051V] Legibility of labels and displays shall be verified by analysis.  The analysis 
shall determine which labels and displays the ground crew will use and the associated 
task conditions.  The verification shall be considered successful when the analysis 
shows that the labels and displays are legible under the task conditions. 
Rationale:  The intent of the requirement is to ensure that the information can be 
read or is otherwise legible under the task conditions.  It is assumed that this will 
include appropriate placement and orientation of the information. 
 4.9.6.5  Written Text 
[HS10052V] The American English language requirement shall be verified by 
inspection.  The inspection shall be performed on items containing text.  The verification 
shall be considered successful when the inspection shows that all text is found to be 
written in the American English language based on Webster's New World Dictionary of 
American English. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.9.6.6  Use of Color 
[HS10053V] Not applicable. 
 4.9.6.7  Work Envelope Volumes 
[HS10002V] Assembly and maintenance work envelope volumes shall be verified by 
analysis.  The analysis shall consist of task and worksite analysis.  The Vehicle 
Assembly Task Analysis and the Vehicle Maintenance Task Analysis shall be applied to 
determine task assumptions and constraints (e.g., SCAPE suit), and the worksite 
analysis shall account for constraints.  Analysis shall account for the anthropometric 
range as applicable, the task, and the environmental constraints.  The verification shall 
be considered successful when the analysis shows that the tasks have the needed work 
envelope volumes. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.9.6.8  Reach Envelope Volumes 
[HS10004V] Reach envelope volumes for assembly and maintenance tasks shall be 
verified by analysis.  The analysis shall examine all assembly tasks identified in the 
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Vehicle Assembly Task Analysis.  The task analysis shall determine task assumptions 
and constraints (e.g., SCAPE suit), and worksite analysis shall account for constraints 
per FAA-HF-STD-001, Sections 14.1 through 14.5 and NASA-STD-3000 Section 3.3.3.  
The analysis shall also include a worksite analysis.  This analysis shall account for the 
anthropometric range applicable, the task, and the environmental constraints.  The 
verification shall be considered successful when the analysis shows that the reach 
envelope volumes needed for corrective and preventive maintenance tasks have been 
provided. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.9.6.9  Ground Crew Visual Access 
[HS10006V] Visual access shall be verified by analysis.  The analysis shall examine 
assembly and maintenance tasks, as identified in the Vehicle Assembly Task Analysis 
and the Vehicle Maintenance Task Analysis, respectively.  A worksite analysis shall be 
performed using CAD models and human models that display field of view of the ground 
crew.  The verification shall be considered successful when the analysis shows that the 
ground crew has the visual access to perform the tasks associated with vehicle 
maintenance. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.9.7  Launch Site Processing and Ground Maintenance 
4.9.7.1  Line Replaceable Units (LRUs) 
 4.9.7.1.1  LRU Installation 
[HS10012V] Features to prevent incorrect LRU installation shall be verified by 
inspection.  The inspection shall examine the LRU drawings and their interfaces to the 
vehicle for features that preclude incorrect installation.  The verification shall be 
considered successful when the inspection shows that all LRUs have features to 
preclude incorrect installation. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.9.7.1.2  LRU Mounting/Alignment Labels/Codes 
[HS10013V] Identification for proper mounting and alignment of LRUs shall be verified 
by inspection.  The inspection shall examine LRU drawings and their interfaces to the 
vehicle for labels or other coding that indicates proper installation.  The verification shall 
be considered successful when the inspection shows that all LRUs and their interfaces 
have a visual indication of proper mounting and alignment. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
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 4.9.7.1.3  LRU Interchangeability 
[HS10014V] Noninterchangeability of LRUs shall be verified by analysis.  The function 
of LRUs shall be determined by inspection of documentation, drawings, and diagrams.  
Drawings of LRUs and their interfaces shall be examined for installation and connection 
design.  Analysis shall compare those LRUs that are determined to be functionally 
distinct to ensure that they cannot be installed in place of any other distinct unit.  The 
verification shall be considered successful when the analysis shows that LRUs are 
functionally distinct replaceable units that cannot be installed in the wrong location. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.9.7.1.4  LRU Tracking Labels 
[HS10031V] The labeling for logistics tracking shall be verified by inspection.  The 
inspection shall review the drawings of LRUs with which the ground crew shall interact 
based on the assembly and maintenance tasks, as identified in the Vehicle Assembly 
and Maintenance Task Analysis.  The verification shall be considered successful when 
inspection shows that the LRUs have logistics tracking labels. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.9.7.1.5  LRU Labeling 
[HS10032V] LRU and flight component labeling shall be verified by analysis and 
inspection.  The task analysis shall identify the LRUs and flight components with which 
the ground crew will interact during assembly and maintenance tasks, as identified in 
the Vehicle Assembly and Maintenance Critical Task Analysis.  The inspection shall be 
a review of the LRU and flight component drawings based on the task analysis.  The 
verification shall be considered successful when the analysis and inspection shows that 
the hardware identified in the task analysis is labeled with identification information 
within the view of the ground crew. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.9.7.1.6  LRU Protrusions 
[HS10042V] LRU handling provisions shall be verified by inspection.  The inspection 
shall consist of a review of engineering drawings and handling procedures for LRU 
handling provisions.  The verification shall be considered successful when the 
inspection shows that all LRUs have handling provisions for ground crews. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.9.7.1.7  LRU Weight Limit 
[HS10045V] The safe lifting weight for one ground person without Ground Support 
Equipment shall be verified by analysis.  The analysis shall consider the frequency, 
height, coupling, and other multipliers for the installation per Appendix L from the point 
of lifting to the point of installation.  The verification shall be considered successful when 
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the analysis shows that the identified LRUs do not exceed the NIOSH recommended 
weight limit for one ground crewperson. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.9.7.1.8  LRU Removal without Component Removal 
[HS10054V] Not applicable. 
 4.9.7.1.9  LRU Removal and Replacement 
[HS8004V] Not Applicable. 
4.9.7.2  Connectors 
 4.9.7.2.1  Connector Mismating 
[HS10015V] Prevention for mismating connectors within the same physical location 
shall be verified by analysis and inspection.  The analysis shall identify which connector 
plugs might possibly be mated to which jacks and the cable lengths associated with 
each connector.  The inspection shall review all drawings for the connector assemblies 
identified by the analysis that could possibly be mated.  The verification shall be 
considered successful when the analysis and inspection show that connectors within 
the same physical location cannot be physically mismated. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.9.7.2.2  Connector Mating Labels 
[HS10017V] Connector mating labels shall be verified by inspection.  The inspection 
shall consist of a review of engineering drawings that contain the connectors to be 
mated during launch site processing.  The verification shall be considered successful 
when the inspection shows that the connectors within the same physical location have 
labels that define correct mating. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.9.7.3  Captive Fasteners 
 4.9.7.3.1  Captive Fasteners 
[HS10026V] Not applicable. 
4.9.7.4  Tools 
 4.9.7.4.1  Toolset 
[HS10028V] Tools used for assembly and maintenance shall be verified by analysis.  
The Vehicle Assembly Task Analysis and the Vehicle Maintenance Task Analysis will 
identify those tasks that require tools and the tool for each respective task.  The 
analysis will compare the identified tools with the table Launch Site Task Tool List 
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<TBD-70024-050>.  The verification shall be considered successful when the analysis 
shows that all tools used for maintenance and assembly are on the tool list. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.9.7.4.2  Tool Clearances 
[HS10024V] Tool clearances for assembly, launch site processing, and corrective and 
preventive maintenance at the launch site shall be verified by analysis.  The Vehicle 
Assembly Task Analysis and the Vehicle Maintenance Task Analysis will identify those 
tasks that require tools and the tool for each respective task.  The verification shall be 
considered successful when the analysis shows that all tool interfaces have the 
clearance needed for installation and actuation. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.9.7.5  Fuse/Circuit Indication 
 4.9.7.5.1  Fuse/Circuit Indication 
[HS10010V] Indication of an open circuit shall be by inspection.  Drawings shall be 
inspected for devices that contain a fuse or circuit breaker.  The verification shall be 
considered successful when the inspection shows that each drawing identifying circuit 
protection devices has a callout that specifies the parts that are designed to provide a 
positive indication of an open circuit. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.9.7.6  Access 
 4.9.7.6.1  Maintainability Without Deintegration 
[HS10001V] Maintainability without deintegration or demating of certified interfaces 
shall be verified by analysis and demonstration.  The analysis shall examine preventive 
ground maintenance tasks, as identified in the Vehicle Maintenance Task Analysis.  
Worksite analysis for each task shall evaluate the need to deintegrate or demate 
systems for each of the defined tasks.  A demonstration of the maintenance task shall 
be performed only for tasks require two or more personnel.  The verification shall be 
considered successful when the analysis and demonstration show that maintenance 
tasks can be completed without deintegration or demating of previously tested and 
certified interfaces. 
Rationale:  The Vehicle Maintenance Task Analysis is a complete listing of all 
tasks associated with vehicle maintenance (includes, e.g., bolt insertion, bolt 
torquing, connector mating, etc.).  This task analysis becomes a deliverable 
product that is the basis of procedures development.  Worksite analysis is 
typically a CAD-based assessment of task feasibility, using human models. 
Simple measurement may be accomplished by drawing inspection. 
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 4.9.7.6.2  Maintainability without Disabling Subsystems 
[HS10009V] Not applicable. 
 4.9.7.6.3  Appropriate Clothing and Equipment 
[HS10011V] Accommodation for ground crews wearing protective clothing and 
equipment shall be verified by analysis.  The analysis shall consist of worksite analyses 
for each assembly task, as defined by the Vehicle Assembly Task Analysis.  Task 
analysis shall identify those tasks that require protective equipment for assembly.  
Worksite analysis shall assess task feasibility under the constraints of protective 
equipment.  The verification shall be considered successful when the analysis shows 
that tasks that require protective clothing and/or equipment can be accommodated 
within the worksite. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.9.7.6.4  Inspection Access 
[HS10025V] Accessibility for component inspection during launch site processing shall 
be verified by analysis.  The analysis shall identify components required to be inspected 
during launch site processing.  An accessibility analysis shall be completed for each 
identified component.  The verification shall be considered successful when the analysis 
shows that each component requiring inspection can be accessed. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.9.7.6.5  Cable Access 
[HS8011V] Cable accessibility shall be verified by analysis.  The maintenance and 
inspection task list will identify those cables that require inspection.  The analysis shall 
consist of an assessment of the visibility and reach access to cables for ground 
operations.  The verification shall be considered successful when the analysis shows 
that the ground crew can gain access to all cables. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.9.7.6.6  External Service Points 
[HS8013V] The external service point locations shall be verified by inspection.  The 
inspection shall consist of a review of drawings or models of the external service points 
and their location in relation to the service structure.  The verification shall be 
considered successful when the inspection shows that all service points are within 60 
degrees radially of the plane between the vehicle and service structure.   
Rationale:  The Orion and Ares I project meet the intent of this requirement via 
interface requirements in CxP 70052-02 CxP Ares I-to-GS IRD Vol 2 and CxP 
70028 CxP Orion-to-Ground Systems IRD. 
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 4.9.7.6.7  Visual Line of Sight 
[HS8048V] Not applicable. 
4.9.7.7  Damage/Hazard Controls 
 4.9.7.7.1  Maintenance Without Damage 
[HS10019V] Protection for components during scheduled or preventive maintenance 
shall be verified by analysis.  The task analysis shall identify all scheduled or preventive 
maintenance tasks.  The analysis shall examine drawings and models for each area 
and the surrounding equipment.  The verification shall be considered successful when 
the analysis shows that all maintenance activities associated with one component does 
not result in damage of other in-place and certified components. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.9.7.7.2  Fluid Management 
[HS10020V] Isolating, draining, or venting of pressurized fluids during launch site 
processing and ground maintenance shall be verified by analysis.  The Vehicle 
Assembly Task Analysis and the Vehicle Maintenance Task Analysis shall identify those 
systems that contain pressurized fluids.  The verification shall be considered successful 
when the analysis shows that all subsystems with pressured fluids that require ground 
crew intervention have isolation features or provisions for draining or venting. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.9.7.7.3  Fluid Spillage Control 
[HS10021V] Controls for fluid release during launch site processing shall be verified by 
inspection.  The inspection shall review drawings and other documentation for controls 
that provide methods of limiting ground crew exposure to fluid spillage.  The verification 
shall be considered successful when the inspection shows that design for assembly and 
maintenance tasks includes controls for spillage and fluid release. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.9.7.7.4  System Safing Controls 
[HS10022V] Controls to safe the system prior to maintenance shall be verified by 
inspection.  The inspection drawings and other documentation shall identify controls that 
provide methods of system safing.  The verification shall be considered successful 
when the inspection shows that controls for safing the system have been provided for 
assembly and maintenance tasks. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.9.7.7.5  Equipment Protection 
[HS10023V] Not applicable. 
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 4.9.7.7.6  Safety Displays 
[HS10029V] Display placement for tasks that could result in a hazard shall be verified 
by analysis.  Task analysis shall determine which tasks require operator views of 
displays for successful task completion.  Worksite analysis shall evaluate the position of 
the display while the task is being performed.  The verification shall be considered 
successful when the analysis shows that all tasks requiring visual access to displays are 
within the field of view of the personnel performing the task. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.9.7.7.7  Protrusion Label/Support 
[HS10043V] Protrusions that could be used as handles, steps, or handrails shall be 
verified by analysis.  The analysis shall determine which protrusions could be 
inadvertently used for handles, steps, handrails or mobility aids.  The verification shall 
be considered successful when the analysis shows that the identified protrusions 
accessible to the ground and flight crews can support the weight of personnel or that 
they are clearly labeled as a Keep Out Zone. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.9.8  Ground Information Management 
4.10  EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY (EVA) 
4.10.1  Suit Atmosphere 
4.10.1.1  Suit Pressure 
 4.10.1.1.1  Suit Pressure Set-Point Selection 
[HS11000V] Discrete test points for suit pressure shall be verified by demonstration and 
test.  The demonstration shall be an evaluation by pressurized suited crewmembers 
selecting each of the discrete pressure set-points.  The test shall involve measurements 
of total suit pressure taken at each set-point.  The verification shall be considered 
successful when the demonstration shows that the crewmember can select each set 
point as documented in a crew consensus report and the test measurements confirm 
the required suit pressure at each set-point. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.10.1.1.2  Maintain Pressure Set-Point 
[HS11019V] Maintaining the selected pressure shall be verified by test and inspection. 
The test shall consist of actual or simulated metabolic loads while each discrete total 
pressure value is selected.  Continuous measurements of the system's pressure shall 
be taken for a specified period of time at each discrete pressure set-point.  The 
inspection of test results shall consist of a review of pressure fluctuation levels.  The 
verification shall be considered successful when the test and the inspection of the test 
Revision:  E Document No:  CxP 70024 
Release Date:  11/19/10 Page:  299 of 503 
Title:  Constellation Program Human-Systems Integration Requirements 
 
results show that the system limits total pressure fluctuations to within +/-0.05 psig of 
the established set-point. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.10.1.1.3  Suit Pressure Pause 
[HS11001V] The capability of the system to allow the suited crew to stop and restart 
suit pressurization shall be verified by test.  The test shall consist of pressurized suited 
crewmembers stopping and restarting the pressurization process with suit pressure 
measurements taken continuously throughout the test.  Verification shall be considered 
successful when the test data confirm that suit pressurization started and stopped in 
response to inputs from the crewmembers, and subjective evaluation by the 
crewmembers, as documented in a crew consensus report, confirms the ability of the 
crew to initiate the start and stop of pressurization while in a pressurized suit. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.10.1.2  Thermal Environment for the Suited Crewmember 
 4.10.1.2.1  Control of Heat Stored by Crewmembers during EVA and Pre-launch 
Operations 
[HS11002V] Maintaining the energy stored by the crew in a pressurized suit shall be 
verified by analysis.  The analysis shall use performance data and data from 
acceptance/qualification testing for the EVA suit system, along with worst-case 
anticipated metabolic loading.  The verification shall be considered successful when the 
analysis shows that during EVA operations the suit system can maintain ΔQ stored 
within 3.0 kJ/kg/hr (1.3 BTU/lb) > ΔQ stored > -1.9 kJ/kg/hr (-0.8 BTU/lb). 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.10.1.2.2  Crew Accessibility to Suit Temperature Controls 
[HS11022V] The crew adjustment of their suit temperature set point shall be verified by 
analysis and demonstration.  The analysis shall determine what suited tasks are to be 
performed during a nominal operation while restrained and unrestrained.  The 
demonstration shall consist of a single suited crewmember adjusting the temperature 
during operation of an integrated vehicle system.  The verification shall be considered 
successful when the analysis and demonstration show that the temperature can be 
adjusted by a single suited crewmember, including times when the crew is restrained. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
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4.10.1.3  Deleted 
4.10.1.4  Radiation Monitoring for Suited Crewmembers 
 4.10.1.4.1  Suited Radiation Dose Equivalent Monitoring 
[HS11023V] Dose equivalent monitoring shall be verified by test.  The test shall use one 
flight equivalent instrument to verify the requirement.  The test shall be an exposure of 
the flight equivalent instrument to radiation sources.  The test shall use accelerator 
sources of charged particles with Z=1 with energies of 50 MeV, 100 MeV, and 200 MeV.  
The test shall use Cesium-137 or Cobalt-60 photon source.  Each radiation source shall 
deliver a total dose equivalent of 100 mSv for each of the dose equivalent ranges of:  1 
mSv per hour to 30 mSv per hour and 100 mSv per hour to 400 mSv per hour.  The 
verification shall be considered successful when the test shows ±20% agreement 
between the measured and reference dose equivalent rate and total dose equivalent. 
Rationale:  Test is the necessary method for verification of this requirement.  
Instrument operation cannot be simulated or inspected.  Exposure to actual 
radiation fields is required to verify that the instrument is operational and meets 
design specifications.  The verification cannot be performed for all components of 
the space radiation field in which the vehicle will be exposed.  The selected test 
fields span the range of energy, linear energy transfer, dose equivalents, and 
dose equivalent rates expected during the missions, specifically radiation fields 
expected during solar particle events. 
 4.10.1.4.2  Suited Radiation Absorbed Dose Monitoring 
[HS11024V] Absorbed dose monitoring shall be verified by test.  The test shall use one 
flight equivalent instrument to verify the requirement.  The test shall be an exposure of 
the flight equivalent instrument to radiation sources.  The test shall use accelerator 
sources of charged particles with Z=1 with energies of 50 MeV, 100 MeV, and 200 MeV.  
Each radiation source shall deliver a total dose of 10 mGy for each of the dose 
equivalent ranges of:  0.5 mGy per hour to 15 mGy per hour and 50 mGy per hour to 
200 mGy per hour.  The verification shall be considered successful when the test shows 
±20% agreement between the measured and reference dose rate and total dose. 
Rationale:  Test is the necessary method for verification of this requirement.  
Instrument operation cannot be simulated or inspected.  Exposure to actual 
radiation fields is required to verify that the instrument is operational and meets 
design specifications.  The verification cannot be performed for all components of 
the space radiation field in which the vehicle will be exposed.  The selected test 
fields span the range of energy, Linear Energy Transfer, absorbed doses, and 
absorbed dose rates expected during the missions, specifically radiation fields 
expected during solar particle events. 
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 4.10.1.4.3  Stowage for Suit Dosimeters 
[HS11004V] Designated stowage for a personal passive dosimeter within the EVA 
system shall be verified by inspection.  The inspection shall consist of a review of the 
EVA suit system certification hardware.  The verification shall be considered successful 
when the inspection shows the dosimeter can be stowed internally in the suit, excluding 
the helmet, gloves, and boots, and external to the crewmember's body. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.10.2  Suited Visibility 
 4.10.2.1  Visual Field of View for a Suited Crewmember 
[HS11005V] The field of view needed for a suited crewmember to perform tasks shall 
be verified by analysis and demonstration.  The analysis shall identify suited tasks that 
require the suited crewmember to view the task in order to complete the task.  The 
demonstration shall consist of suited crewmembers performing the identified tasks.  
Each identified task shall be demonstrated at least once using a flight-like suit.  The 
verification shall be considered successful when the analysis and demonstration show 
that a suited crewmember has the field of view necessary to perform tasks. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.10.2.2  Optical Quality for Suited Crewmember 
[HS11006V] The optical qualities of suit visors shall be verified by analysis and test.  
The analysis shall consist of a task analysis and an analysis of relevant legibility data to 
identify the interfaces that need to be read and interpreted, and the set of worst-case 
expected conditions during a nominal mission profile that need to be tested.  The test 
shall consist of a legibility test conducted with a minimum of 5 crewmembers, crew 
designated representatives, or engineering subjects with normal or corrected to normal 
vision, under the identified list of conditions in a high fidelity flight-like simulator or 
mockup.  The legibility test shall consist of rapid serial visual presentation and 
subsequent verbal identification by subjects of a representative selection of targets such 
as hardware labels and software elements (alphanumeric, icons, and symbols).  The 
verification shall be considered successful when the test shows an average 
identification accuracy of 98% for each type of target.   
Rationale:   Detailed characteristic visor optical properties will be verified via EVA 
System level verifications which may be performed in conjunction with the HSIR 
verification. A flight-like simulator is to be provided by the vehicle office, with joint 
verification performed in conjunction with legibility verification as per HS7044V.  
Heritage hardware has typically had minimal success meeting specified perfect 
optical qualities; therefore, the intent is to ensure that any degradation in helmet 
optical qualities does not significantly impact legibility. 
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4.10.3  Crew Functions for the Suited Crewmember 
4.10.3.1  Nutrition for Suited Crewmembers 
 4.10.3.1.1  In-Suit Nutrition During Surface EVA Operations 
[HS11007V] Nutrition consumption by a pressurized suited crewmember shall be 
verified by demonstration.  The demonstration shall consist of a pressurized suited 
subject consuming nutrition.  The verification shall be considered successful when the 
demonstration shows that a pressurized suited crewmember can consume nutrition as 
specified in HS6062 for surface EVAs. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.10.3.1.2  In-Suit Nutrition During Unpressurized Vehicle Survival 
[HS11008V] Nutrition consumption by a pressurized-suited crewmember shall be 
verified by demonstration.  The demonstration shall consist of a pressurized-suited 
subject consuming nutrition.  The verification shall be considered successful when the 
demonstration shows that a pressurized-suited crewmember can consume nutrition as 
specified in HS6062 for suited intravehicular operations. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.10.3.2  Hydration for Suited Crewmembers 
 4.10.3.2.1  In-Suit Hydration During EVA 
[HS11009V] Water consumption by a pressurized-suited crewmember shall be verified 
by demonstration.  The demonstration shall consist of a pressurized-suited subject 
consuming water during simulated EVA tasks.  The verification shall be considered 
successful when the demonstration shows that the pressurized-suited crewmember can 
consume water as specified in HS6063. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.10.3.2.2  In-Suit Hydration During IVA 
[HS11010V] Water consumption by a pressurized-suited crewmember shall be verified 
by demonstration.  The demonstration shall consist of a pressurized-suited subject 
consuming water during simulated intravehicular tasks.  The verification shall be 
considered successful when the demonstration shows that the pressurized-suited 
subject can consume water. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.10.3.3  Waste Management 
 4.10.3.3.1  Vomitus in the Suit 
[HS11011V] Not Applicable. 
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 4.10.3.3.2  Nominal Urine Collection in the Suit 
[HS11012V] The collection and containment of urine during suited operations shall be 
verified by analysis and test.  The analysis shall determine the capacity of the system.  
The test shall release liquid into the containment system, where the maximum t value is 
10 hours.  The amount of released liquid shall be based on the maximum amount 
expected.  The verification shall be considered successful when the analysis and test 
show that the system collects and contains 500 mL + 2 t/24 L of urine where t is suited 
duration in hours. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.10.3.3.3  Urine Collection - Suited Contingency 
[HS11013V] The contingency suited collection of urine shall be verified by 
demonstration.  The demonstration shall collect and contain 1 L of liquid per day per 
crewmember using a flight-like suit waste collection system during a simulated 
unrecoverable vehicle pressure failure.  The verification shall be considered successful 
when the demonstration shows that 1 L of liquid per day per crewmember is collected 
and contained. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.10.3.3.4  Feces Collection - Suited Contingency 
[HS11014V] The contingency suited collection of feces shall be verified by 
demonstration.  The demonstration shall collect and contain 75 grams (by mass) and 75 
mL (by volume) of simulated feces per crewmember per day using a flight-like suit 
waste collection system during a simulated unrecoverable vehicle pressure failure.  The 
verification shall be considered successful when the demonstration shows that the 
quantity of simulated fecal waste is collected and contained. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
4.10.4  Prevention and Treatment of Decompression Sickness 
 4.10.4.1  Denitrogenation 
[HS6091V] Maintaining the internal pressure and gaseous oxygen concentration for the 
required time durations for denitrogenation shall be verified by test.  The test shall 
adjust the pressures and concentrations as defined in HS6091, table Prebreathe 
Durations for Contingency EVA and table Prebreathe Durations for Nonrecoverable 
Cabin Depress in an integrated configuration of the vehicle including the suit.  The 
verification shall be considered successful when the test shows that the vehicle can 
vary pressures and gas concentrations per the denitrogenation protocol. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
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 4.10.4.2  DCS Event Pressure 
[HS6100V] The system's Decompression Sickness (DCS) initial treatment capability 
shall be verified by test.  The test shall use a structurally flight-like mockup to simulate a 
recovery from an EVA DCS scenario, initiating DCS treatment, and measuring the 
atmospheric pressure at the skin surface of a dummy crewmember, assuming that the 
recovery/treatment chamber pressure is at crewmember initial saturation pressure and 
that the dummy crewmember is suited at the time the treatment begins.  The verification 
shall be considered successful when the test shows that crewmember initial saturation 
pressure or more of atmospheric pressure is measured at the dummy crewmember's 
skin within 20 minutes of test onset. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.10.4.3  DCS Over-pressurization 
[HS6081V] Decompression Sickness (DCS) treatment capabilities shall be verified by 
analysis.  The analysis shall evaluate the system’s ability to provide a pressure of 156.5 
kPa (22.7 psia) (1,174 mmHg) to a DCS affected crewmember via a combination of 
vehicle and suit pressures.  The verification shall be considered successful when the 
analysis shows that the specified pressure can be achieved by crewmembers within 2 
hours of a DCS event and maintained for 6 hours. 
Rationale:  The 2-hour limit includes the time it takes for the crew to don their 
suits, assuming they are not suited at the time the need for treatment is realized. 
4.10.5  Data for Physiological Parameters 
 4.10.5.1  Measurement of Physiological Parameters 
[HS11015V] The measurement of physiological parameters shall be verified by 
demonstration.  The demonstration shall include a pressurized-suited subject with 
measurements for each of the specified parameters recorded.  The verification shall be 
considered successful when the demonstration shows that all parameters identified in 
HS11015, table Measurements of Physiological Parameters are measured by the 
Constellation Architecture. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.10.5.2  Display of Physiological Parameters 
[HS11016V] The display of physiological parameters being measured by the 
Constellation Architecture shall be verified by demonstration.  The demonstration shall 
send the identified parameters from the Constellation Architecture to the crew display. 
The verification shall be considered successful when the demonstration shows that all 
parameters identified in HS11016, table Display of Physiological Parameters are 
displayed to the crew. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
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 4.10.5.3  Alert for Off-Nominal Physiological Parameters 
[HS11017V] Alerts for off-nominal physiological parameters shall be verified by 
demonstration.  The demonstration shall send the identified parameters from the 
Constellation Architecture to the crew.  The verification shall be considered successful 
when the demonstration shows that alerts are provided for all parameters identified in 
HS11017, table Alerting for Off-Nominal Physiological Parameters to the intended 
audience. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
 4.10.5.4  Telemetry of Physiological Parameters 
[HS11018V] The transmission of physiological parameters for suited operations shall be 
verified by demonstration.  The demonstration shall include the Constellation 
Architecture transmitting the identified parameters.  The verification shall be considered 
successful when the demonstration shows that all parameters identified in HS11018, 
table Telemetry of Physiological Parameters are transmitted from the Constellation 
Architecture. 
Rationale:  No further rationale is required. 
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APPENDIX A 
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS AND GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
A1.0 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
3D Three-dimensional 
AATD Aviation Applied Technology Directorate 
ac alternate current 
ACES Advanced Crew Escape Suit 
ACGIH American Council of Governmental Industrial Hygienists 
AGARD Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development 
ALARA As Low As Reasonably Achievable 
AM Asymetic Multiplier 
AMS Acute Mountain Sickness 
ANSI American National Standards Institute 
ANSUR Anthropometric Survey of US Army Personnel 
ARS Atmosphere Revitalization System 
ASHRAE American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air Conditioning Engineers 
BEI Biological Exposure Indices 
BFxRM Bone Fracture Risk Module 
BGI Bubble Growth Index 
BMD Bone Mineral Density 
bpm beats per minute 
BSP Body Segment Properties 
BTE Barrier Thickness Evaluator 
BTU British Thermal Unit 
C Celsius 
CA Constellation Architecture 
CAD Computer Aided Drafting 
CAF Computerized Anatomical Female 
CAIT Constellation Analysis Integration Tool  
cal  calorie (gram) 
CARD Constellation Architecture Requirements Document 
cc cubic centimeter 
CDO Cognitive Deficit Onset 
CEV Crew Exploration Vehicle  
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CFE Contractor Furnished Equipment 
CFM cubic feet per minute 
CFR Code of Federal Regulations 
CFU colony forming unit 
cm centimeter 
CM Crew Module  Coupling Multiplier 
CMO Crew Medical Officer 
CNS Central Nervous System 
CO carbon monoxide 
CO2 carbon dioxide 
CPR Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation 
CR Change Request 
CSA-CP Compound Specific Analyzer-Combustion Products 
CTB Cargo Transfer Bag 
Cx Constellation 
CxP Constellation Program 
CxSECB Constellation Systems Engineering Control Board 
d day (as in mg/d or mg/d-person) 
dB decibel 
dBA decibels adjusted 
dc direct current 
DCS Decompression Sickness 
DM Distance Multiplier 
DoD Department of Defense 
DOT Department of Transportation 
DR Dynamic Response 
DRD Data Requirements Document 
DRlim Dynamic Response Limit 
DRM Design Reference Mission 
DSNE Design Specification for Natural Environments 
DXA Dual-Energy X-ray Absorbance 
E3 Electromagnetic Environmental Effects 
EAWG Exploration Atmospheres Working Group 
ECLSS Environmental Control and Life Support Subsystem 
EER Estimated Energy Requirements 
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EM Electromagnetic 
EMI Electromagnetic Interference 
EMU Extravehicular Mobility Unit 
EOM End-of-Mission 
EPA Environmental Protection Agency 
ERB Engineering Review Board 
ESD Electrostatic Discharge 
EVA Extravehicular Activity 
F Fahrenheit 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FCE Flight Crew Equipment 
FD Flight Day 
FED Federal 
FFISS Fully Functional International Space Station 
FFT Fast Fourier Transform 
fG frequency in GHz 
fl fluid 
fM frequency in MHz 
FM Frequency Multiplier 
FOD Foreign Object Debris 
FRI Fracture Risk Index 
ft foot 
g gram gravity 
g/s g per second (where a "g" equals 9.8 meters per second squared) 
GCR Galactic Cosmic Radiation 
GFE Government Furnished Equipment 
GHz gigaHertz 
GN&C Guidance, Navigation, and Control  
gn acceleration of free fall, standard 
GO Ground Operations 
GOST Russian State Standard 
  
GS Ground Support 
GSE Ground Support Equipment 
HCl hydrogen chloride 
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HCN hydrogen cyanide 
HEPA High Efficiency Particulate Air 
HIC Head Injury Criteria 
HM Horizontal Multiplier 
hr hour 
HSIR Human-Systems Integration Requirements 
Hz hertz 
ICD Interface Control Document 
ICES International Conference on Environment Systems 
IEEE Institute of Electronic and Electrical Engineers 
IESNA Illuminating Engineering Society of North America 
in inch 
IRD Interface Requirements Document 
IRL Indy Racing League 
ISBN International Standard Book Number 
ISO International Standards Organization 
ISS International Space Station 
IVA Intravehicular Activity 
J joule 
JSC Johnson Space Center 
JSSG Joint Service Specification Guide 
keV kiloelectronvolt 
kg kilogram 
kHz kilohertz 
kJ kilojoule 
km kilometer 
kPa kilopascal 
L liter 
LADTAG Lunar Atmosphere Dust Toxicity Assessment Group 
LAmax maximum A-weighted overall sound pressure level 
lb pound 
LC Load Constant 
LCC Launch Control Center 
LCG Liquid Cooling Garment 
LCVG Liquid Cooling and Ventilation Garment 
LEO Low Earth Orbit 
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Leq Equivalent Continuous Noise Level 
LET Linear Energy Transfer 
LiOH Lithium Hydroxide 
LOC Loss of Crew 
LOM Loss of Mission 
LOTS Loss of Tracking Skills 
LRU Line Replaceable Unit 
LSAM Lunar Surface Access Module 
m meter 
m/s2 meters per second squared 
m2 square meters 
m3 cubic meters 
ma milliampere 
MAG Maximum Absorbency Garment 
Max maximum 
MCC Mission Control Center 
MCL Maximum Contamination Level 
MeV Mega electron Volt 
mg milligram 
mGy milligray 
MHz megahertz 
mHz millihertz 
MIL Military 
min minute 
Min minimum 
mJ millijoule 
mL milliliter 
mm millimeter 
mmHg millimeter of mercury 
MMOD Micro Meteoroid Orbital Debris 
MO Mission Operations 
MORD Medical Operations Requirements Document 
MPE Maximum Permissible Exposure 
MR Metabolic Rate 
ms millisecond 
MS Mission Systems 
MSDV Motion Sickness Dose Value 
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MSIS Man-Systems Integration Standards 
mSv millisiever 
MTBI Minor Traumatic Brain Injury 
mW milliwatt 
N/A Not Applicable 
N2 nitrogen 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NASCAR National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing 
NCRP National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements 
NIOSH National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 
NIR Non-Ionizing Radiation 
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology 
nm nanometer 
NO2 nitrate 
NO3 nitrite 
NPR NASA Procedural Requirement 
NTU Nephelometric (Turbidity) Units 
O2 oxygen 
OPR Office of Primary Responsibility 
ORU Orbital Replacement Unit 
OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
oz ounce 
Pa Pascal 
PCU Platinum-Cobalt Units 
PDA Personal Digital Assistant 
PEPC Portable Equipment, Payloads, and Cargo 
pg Page 
ppCO2 partial pressure carbon dioxide 
PPE Personal Protective Equipment 
ppm parts per million 
ppN2 partial pressure Nitrogen 
ppO2 partial pressure Oxygen 
psi pound per square inch 
psia pound per square inch absolute 
psid pound per square inch differential 
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psig pound per square inch gauge 
QCT Quantitative Computerized Tomography 
RER Respiratory Exchange Ratio 
RF Radio Frequency 
RH Relative Humidity 
RHC Rotational Hand Controller 
rms root mean square 
rpm revolution per minute 
RWL Recommended Weight Limit 
SAE Society of Automotive Engineers 
SAS Space Adaptation Syndrome 
SCAPE Self-Contained Atmosphere Protective Equipment 
SCUBA Self-Contained Underwater Breathing Apparatus 
SE&I Systems Engineering and Integration 
SEBS Spacehab Emergency Breathing System 
sec 
SEMA 
second 
Specialty Equipment Market Association 
SFI Formerly SEMA Foundation, Inc. 
SI International Standard of Units 
SID Standard Interface Document 
SIG System Integration Group 
SIL Speech Interference Level 
SM Service Module 
SMAC Spacecraft Maximum Allowable Concentration 
SP Special Publication 
SPE Solar Particle Event 
SPL Sound Pressure Level 
SRD System Requirements Document 
SSP Space Shuttle Program 
STD Standard 
STPD standard temperature and dry gas at standard barometric pressure:  0 °C, 101.3 kPa, dry 
STS Space Transportation System 
SWEG Spacecraft Water Exposure Guideline 
TBD To Be Determined 
TBDM Tissue Bubble Dynamics Model 
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TBR To Be Resolved 
TDS Task Description Sheet 
TEE Total Energy Expenditure 
THC Translational Hand Controller 
TLV Threshold Limit Values 
TLX Task Load Index 
TM Транспортный модифицированный (Modified Transport)  
TMA Транспортный модифицированный антропометрический (Modified Transport - Anthropometric) 
TON Threshold Odor Number 
TTN Threshold Taste Number 
TWA Time Weighted Average 
US United States 
USAAVSCOM United States Army Aviation Systems Command 
UV Ultraviolet 
V Volt 
VM Verticle Multiplier 
VO2 maximal oxygen consumption 
W Watts 
WMS Waste Management System 
WORF Window Observational Research Facility 
WSTF White Sands Test Facility 
μg microgram 
μm micrometer 
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A2.0 GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
Term Definition 
Abort 
Early termination of the mission or mission phase prior to 
reaching the mission destination due to a failure or other 
condition that endangers the crew.  At the moment an 
Abort is declared, the focus of the operation switches 
from flying the planned mission to saving the crew.  A 
successful Abort ultimately places the crew in the portion 
of the space flight system normally used for reentry, and 
places them in a safe situation suitable for successful 
return and rescue.  Aborts include scenarios where the 
vehicle is damaged or not recovered. 
Accessible 
An item is considered accessible when it can be 
operated, manipulated, serviced, removed, or replaced 
by the suitably clothed and equipped user with applicable 
body dimensions conforming to the anthropometric range 
and database specified by the procuring activity or if not 
specified by the procuring activity, with applicable 5th to 
95th percentile body dimensions.  Applicable body 
dimensions are those dimensions which are design-
critical to the operation, manipulation, removal, or 
replacement task. 
Advanced Life Support 
For the Constellation Program, "Advanced Life Support" 
is defined as that level of medical care which provides 
the capability to stabilize and/or reverse a life-threatening 
illness or injury as defined in the following criteria: 
A.  Unstable vital signs (heart rate <42 or >100, 
respiratory rate <8 or >30, systolic blood pressure <90 or 
>200, pulse oximetry <90% on room air, signs of 
confusion, pallor, extreme pain, or altered mental status). 
B.  Use of an artificial airway, assisted breathing device, 
or ventilator. 
C.  Need for any intravenous drug infusion(s). 
D.  Recent or anticipated use of defibrillator, 
cardioversion, or transcutaneous pacing. 
E.  Need for continuous physiological monitoring. 
F.  Need for continuous monitoring and care by another 
crewmember. 
G.  Failure of one or more organ system(s). 
Examples of "Advanced Life Support" hardware may 
include a respiratory support device, intravenous 
pharmaceuticals and fluids, defibrillation, etc. 
Revision:  E Document No:  CxP 70024 
Release Date:  11/19/10 Page:  315 of 503 
Title:  Constellation Program Human-Systems Integration Requirements 
 
 
Term Definition 
Advisory 
A message that indicates a safe or normal configuration, 
operation of essential equipment, or imparts information 
for routine action purposes. 
Alert 
Activation of any aural alarms, indicators, light, or flag 
used to make the operators aware of a particular 
situation. 
Alerting System 
System that encompasses aural tones, indicators, lights, 
lighted buttons and flags that raise operators’ awareness 
of a particular situation.  Includes emergency, warning, 
caution and advisory classes of alerts.  Commonly 
referred to as the “caution and warning” system. 
Ambulatory Care 
The level of medical care which a crewmember can 
independently provide to himself or herself.  While the 
flight surgeon might be consulted, no complex 
interventions or assistance from other crewmembers are 
needed.  Many of the conditions which require 
"ambulatory care" are minor ailments which would be 
likely to resolve eventually even in the absence of 
treatment, but may still in the interim have significant 
mission impact.  In addition, it should be noted that if a 
minor ailment is not properly diagnosed and treated in its 
initial stages, it may progress to a much more severe 
condition; e.g., bronchitis if untreated may become 
pneumonia, a bladder infection if untreated may lead to a 
kidney infection (pyelonephritis) or sepsis.  Criteria for 
"ambulatory care" are defined as: 
A.  Administration of oral or topical medications. 
B.  No more than one procedure required for resolution 
of condition (example:  single dose of intravenous 
medication or reduction of dislocation). 
C.  Ability to perform the majority of scheduled mission 
tasks. 
Auditory Annunciation 
An audible computer-generated speech or non-speech 
signal.  Examples include an emergency klaxon and a 
speech-based message. 
Auditory Annunciation 
An audible computer-generated speech or non-speech 
signal.  Examples include an emergency klaxon and a 
speech-based message. 
Basic Life Support 
The level of medical care which provides the capability 
for Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (CPR), basic airway 
management, and crew immobilization. 
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Term Definition 
Catastrophic Hazard A condition that may cause the loss of life, permanently disabling injury, or a loss of flight assets. 
Caution An event that needs attention, but not immediate action. 
Clinical Diagnostics 
The level of medical care which provides the capability 
for assessing vital signs and medical conditions and 
reaching a clinical diagnosis.  Examples of "Clinical 
Diagnostics" hardware may include stethoscope, 
thermometer, blood pressure cuff, urine chemistry strips, 
portable limited body fluid analyzer, etc. 
Contingency EVA 
An EVA performed to deal with critical failures or 
circumstances, which are not adequately protected by 
redundancy or other means.  An EVA not scheduled in 
the pre-mission timeline required to affect the safety of 
the crew, outpost, and/or safe return of the vehicle. 
Crew Human onboard the spacecraft or space system during a mission.  May also be referred to as Astronauts. 
Crew Survival 
Ability to keep the crew alive using capabilities such as 
abort, escape, safe haven, emergency egress, and 
rescue in response to an imminent catastrophic condition 
Crew Survival Capabilities 
Capabilities incorporated into program architecture and 
operations to preserve the crew's life in the presence of 
imminent catastrophic conditions.  Examples include 
abort, escape, and safe haven. 
Crew Interface  
Any part of a vehicle through which information is 
transferred between the crew and the vehicle, whether 
by sight, sound, or touch.  Usable, well-designed crew 
interfaces are critical for crew safety and productivity, 
and minimize training requirements. 
Critical Hazard 
A condition that may cause severe/lost time injury or 
incapacitation, or major damage to flight assets, or loss 
of Program critical assets, or loss of primary mission 
objectives.   
Data Accuracy 
The degree to which information in a digital database 
matches true or accepted values.  Accuracy is an issue 
pertaining to the quality of data and the number of errors 
contained in a dataset. 
Data Fidelity Data qualities that include accuracy, precision, reliability, latency (data freshness), resolution, and completeness. 
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Term Definition 
Data Precision 
The level of measurement and exactness of description 
in a database.  Precise locational data may measure 
position to a fraction of a unit.  Precise attribute 
information may specify the characteristics of features in 
great detail.  Note that precise data, no matter how 
carefully measured, may be inaccurate. 
Data Reliability The degree to which data is the same when sampled repeatedly.   
Dental Care 
The level of medical care which provides the capability to 
diagnose and treat oral/dental conditions.  Examples of 
"Dental Care" hardware may include temporary filling or 
crown, tooth extraction, abscess drainage hardware, etc. 
Display 
A display is anything that provides visual, auditory and/or 
haptic information to crewmembers (e.g., label, placard, 
tone, or display device).  The term "display" includes 
text-based user interfaces, as well as Graphical User 
Interfaces (GUIs). 
Display Device 
The hardware used to present visual, aural, and tactile 
information to the crew or ground operations personnel.  
Display devices include computer monitors and Personal 
Digital Assistants (PDAs). 
Emergency (relative to 
crew alerting systems) 
Specifically identified life threatening warning event that 
requires immediate action.  
Emergency Systems 
Safeguards against hazardous situations that directly 
affect the crew that would be used for the prevention of 
loss-of-life.  Examples include abort systems, fire 
suppression systems and crew escape systems.  
Emergency systems are not a leg of fault tolerance. 
Escape 
In-flight removal of crew from the portion of the space 
system normally used for reentry, due to rapidly 
deteriorating and hazardous conditions, thus placing 
them in a safe situation suitable for survivable return or 
recovery .  Escape includes, but is not limited to, those 
capabilities that utilize a portion of the original space 
system for the removal (e.g., pods, modules, or fore 
bodies).  (NPR 8705.2A, Human-Rating Requirements 
For Space Systems) 
EVA 
Operations performed by suited crew outside the 
pressurized environment of a flight vehicle or habitat 
(during space flight or on a destination surface). 
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Term Definition 
Field of View 
All points that can be viewed directly by at least one eye, 
given the combination of achievable eye, head, and body 
movement.  The field of view is restricted by obstructions 
imposed by the facial structure around the eye and 
artificial apertures placed in front of the eye such as the 
crewmember's helmet, a cabin window, and/or other 
equipment.  Achievable movement will vary for different 
flight phases and operational tasks dependent upon the 
respective constraints to movement (such as being 
suited, seated, and/or restrained) and respective 
conditions (such as g-loads).   
First Aid 
The level of medical care which provides the capability 
for treating minor medical conditions and minor trauma.  
Example "First Aid" items may include headache 
medication, nasal decongestant, bandages, eye drops, 
etc. 
Functional Reach Envelope 
Reach envelope is the volume representing the reach 
limits of the human body.  Functional reach envelope, or 
work envelope, refers to the volume within which a 
specific function or task can be performed.  The shape 
and volume of functional reach envelopes are dependent 
on the task, motion, and function to be accomplished by 
the reach action.  Limited reach envelope data in 
standard anthropometrical positions are available in 
sources of static and dynamic anthropometrical data.  
Unfortunately, reach data for space applications, like 
range of motion data, are greatly affected by the 
restricted postures maintained by crewmembers while 
wearing bulky flight suits and being restrained by straps 
in sometimes awkward postures.  During hyper gravity, 
due to an increase in whole body weight, limb weight, 
and segment weights, the range of motion for most joints 
will become restricted.  Most importantly, the mobility of 
the neck, legs, and arms will be severely restricted, 
reducing the size of functional reach envelopes. 
Ground Support Equipment 
Non-flight systems, equipment, or devices necessary to 
support such operations as transporting, receiving, 
handling, assembly, inspection, test, checkout, servicing, 
launch, and recovery of space systems. 
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Term Definition 
Heat Load 
Heat being imposed upon a system by any means 
(metabolism, electrical resistance, external environment, 
etc.).  This heat must be removed or otherwise managed 
in order to maintain temperature. 
Housekeeping 
Actions performed by the crew during a mission to 
maintain a healthy and habitable environment within the 
spacecraft.  Examples of housekeeping activities include 
biocidal wiping of spacecraft interior surfaces, cleaning or 
servicing of food preparation or hygiene facilities, and 
trash management. 
Human Engineering 
Human Engineering (also referred to as Human Factors 
Engineering/Human Factors/Ergonomics) is the scientific 
discipline concerned with the understanding of 
interactions among humans and other elements of a 
system, and the profession that applies theory, 
principles, data, and other methods to design in order to 
optimize human well-being and overall system 
performance.   
Information Management 
Functions 
Information management functions include the collection, 
organization, use, control, dissemination, and disposal of 
information. 
Legibility 
The extent to which alphanumeric characters and 
symbols are sufficiently distinct to be easily perceived, 
deciphered, or recognized. 
Loss of Crew Death of or permanently debilitating injury to one or more crewmembers 
Loss of Mission Loss of or inability to complete significant/primary mission objectives. 
Medical Imaging 
The level of medical care which provides the capability to 
acquire diagnostic quality external and internal images of 
the human body with or without remote guidance from 
terrestrial experts.  Examples of "Imaging" hardware may 
include digital cameras, ultrasound, x-ray equipment, etc. 
Mission Critical 
An event, system, subsystem or process that must 
function properly in order to prevent loss of mission, 
launch scrub, or major facility damage. 
Operator A crewmember serving the role of pilot or commander. 
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Term Definition 
Permanent Disability 
A non-fatal occupational injury or illness resulting in 
permanent impairment through loss of, or compromised 
use of, a critical part of the body, to include major limbs 
(e.g., arm, leg), critical sensory organs (e.g., eye), critical 
life-supporting organs (e.g., heart, lungs, brain), and/or 
body parts controlling major motor functions (e.g., spine, 
neck).  Therefore, permanent disability includes a non-
fatal injury or occupational illness that, in the opinion of 
competent medical authority, permanently incapacitates 
a person to the extent that he or she cannot be 
rehabilitated to achieve gainful employment in their 
trained occupation and results in a medical discharge 
from duties or civilian equivalent. 
Population Analysis 
Population analysis utilizes statistical or mathematical 
tools to interpret results of the testing of a representative 
sample of subjects.  Measures such as fit, reach, and 
strength are extrapolated or interpolated for comparisons 
against the entire range of potential crewmembers in 
order to ensure an adequate selection test of subjects 
has been made, and to determine whether the design 
successfully accommodates the extremes of the crew 
population. 
Stakeholder An individual or organization having an interest (or stake) in the outcome or deliverable of a program or project. 
Surgical Care 
The level of medical care which provides the capability to 
treat internal medical conditions resulting from illness or 
injury that require intervention beyond pharmaceuticals.  
Local, regional, or systemic anesthesia may be required 
for successful administration of care.  Examples of 
"Surgical Care" hardware may include surgical 
instruments, endoscopic equipment, high intensity 
focused ultrasound, etc. 
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Term Definition 
Sustained Acceleration 
Acceleration event, linear or rotational, with duration of 
greater than 0.5 seconds.  For sustained acceleration 
events where acceleration peaks more than once and 
dwells at a lower acceleration between, the following rule 
shall be used to determine if the event is considered to 
be one combined event or two separate events.  For 
each acceleration level, if the duration between two 
sustained events is longer than the duration of the first 
event, then the event is considered two separate events.  
If the duration between the two events is less than or 
equal to the duration of the first acceleration event, they 
are to be considered one event.  This rule is to be used 
for each axis in the event separately. 
System 
Physical entities that have functional capabilities 
allocated to them necessary to satisfy Architecture-level 
mission objectives.  Systems can perform all allocated 
functions within a mission phase, or through mated 
operations with other Constellation systems (e.g., Orion, 
Altair.) 
Task Analysis 
Task analysis is an activity that breaks a task down into 
its component levels.  It involves 1) the identification of 
the tasks and subtasks involved in a process or system, 
and 2) analysis of those tasks (e.g., who performs them, 
what equipment is used, under what conditions, the 
priority of the task, dependence on other tasks).  The 
focus is on the human and how they perform the task, 
rather than the system.  Results can help determine the 
displays or controls that should be developed/used for a 
particular task, the ideal allocation of tasks to humans vs.  
automation, and the criticality of tasks, which will help 
drive design decisions. 
Telemedicine 
The level of medical care which provides the capability 
for real-time or store and forward consultation with a 
Flight Surgeon and/or medical consultants for the 
purpose of enhanced quality of medical diagnosis and 
treatment of an ill or injured crewmember. 
Transient Acceleration Acceleration event, linear or rotational, with a duration of less than or equal to 0.5 seconds. 
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Term Definition 
Trauma Care 
The level of medical care which provides the capability to 
stabilize a crewmember injured by blunt or penetrating 
trauma.  Examples of "Trauma Care" hardware may 
include suturing capability, parenteral antibiotics, splints, 
chest tube and closed drainage, intravenous fluids, etc. 
Unimpeded Access 
Immediately visible and accessible without being blocked 
or constrained by other equipment.  Unimpeded Access 
is important for Emergency Systems and other critical 
items. 
Vehicle  
Vehicle refers to any constellation element including 
whether a spacecraft or space system (e.g., habitat).  
The term vehicle includes the structure as well as all of 
the equipment and outfitting within the structure.   
Visual Annunciation 
A visual, computer-generated text- or graphics-based 
signal.  Examples include warning messages and 
flashing icons. 
Warning An event that requires immediate action because it has the potential to become a life/mission threat. 
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Term Definition 
Window Cover 
An internal non-pressure containing, transparent sheet or 
pane usually of a different material than the window 
panes such as polycarbonate or other material, intended 
to protect the underlying window pressure and/or 
protective pane(s) from incidental crew contact.  A 
window cover is normally not considered an integral part 
of the window assembly and in such cases where it is not 
an integral part of the window assembly, a window cover 
has at least Category D optical properties per JSC 63307 
except with respect to wavefront where instead the 
transmitted wavefront error is at least 1 wave over any 
25 mm (~1 in) diameter sub-aperture within the central 
80% (minimum) of the physical area of the window where 
the reference wavelength is 632.8 nm (excluding flight 
loads, pressure loads, and temperature gradients).  
Window covers may also serve as a Window Filters.  In 
such cases where a window cover also serves as a 
window filter the transmittance for hazardous, non-
ionizing radiation wavelengths is reduced to safe levels.  
Window covers are removable and reinstallable or 
operable without the use of tools by one crew member in 
less than ten seconds.  Window covers can be 
considered a consumable and should be replaced after 
some period of time when their optical quality has 
become degraded.  Window covers that are integral to 
the window assembly are considered protective panes. 
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Term Definition 
Window Filter 
An internal, non-pressure containing, transparent sheet 
or pane usually of a different material than the window 
panes such as polycarbonate or other material, or 
alternatively a coating applied to the window such as an 
antireflective coating, intended to reduce reflectivity 
and/or glare and/or filter non-ionizing radiation hazards to 
safe levels.  A window filter is not normally considered an 
integral part of the window assembly and may also serve 
as a window cover.  Non-integral window filters can be 
considered a consumable and should be replaced after 
some period of time when their optical quality has 
become degraded.  Non-integral window filters are 
removable and reinstallable or operable without the use 
of tools by one crew member in less than ten seconds.  
Window filters that are integral to the window assembly 
are considered protective panes.  Electrochromatic 
windows that filter sufficiently would be considered to 
have integral window filters and may be used in lieu of 
conventional, non-integral window filters. 
Window Protective Pane 
Either an external or internal, non-pressure containing, 
transparent pane that is intended to protect the 
underlying window pressure pane(s) from natural and 
induced environmental degradation such as 
contamination, erosion, debris impacts, and incidental 
crew contact.  A protective pane is considered an integral 
part of the window assembly and is of at least of the 
same optical quality as the window pane(s) it protects.  
Protective panes are easily removable from the window 
assembly and reinstallable onto the window assembly 
within 1 hour EVA or 10 minutes IVA with the use of a 
minimal set of EVA tools (EVA) or standard hand tools 
(IVA) by one crew member.  Protective panes can be 
considered a sacrificial consumable and should be 
replaced after some period of time when their optical 
quality has become degraded below the category level 
per JSC 63307 for which they were designed.  Protective 
panes that are not integral to the window assembly are 
considered window covers. 
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Term Definition 
Window Shade 
An internal, non-pressure containing, opaque sheet or 
pane intended to block external light from entering the 
interior of a crew cabin.  A window shade is not normally 
considered an integral part of the window assembly and 
as such can be considered a consumable and should be 
replaced after some period of time when it has become 
worn.  Window shutters that are integral to the window 
assembly can be considered window shades.  
Electrochromatic windows that darken sufficiently would 
be considered to have integral window shades and may 
be used in lieu of conventional, non-integral window 
shades. 
Window Shutter 
An internally operable or an internally and remotely 
operable, external opaque shield intended to prevent 
natural and induced environmental degradation 
(contamination, erosion, and debris impacts) of the 
window, particularly the outboard-most window pane.  
Window shutters have open and close indicators that are 
readable from onboard and remote locations regardless 
of the mode of operation either manual or electronic.  
Window shutters are considered an integral part of the 
window assembly and can be operated through their full 
range of motion by one crew member from fully open to 
fully closed or vice versa in less than 10 seconds without 
the use of any tools.  Window shutters may also serve as 
window shades. 
Workstation 
A place designed for a specific task or activity from 
where work is conducted or operations are directed.  
Workstations include cockpits, robotics control stations, 
or any work area that includes work surfaces, tools, 
equipment, or computers. 
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APPENDIX B  
ANTHROPOMETRY, BIOMECHANICS, AND STRENGTH 
B1.0 ANTHROPOMETRY 
The data in this section are from the population in the 1988 Anthropometric 
Survey of US Army Personnel (ANSUR) (ref. Natick/TR-89/044), projected 
forward by NASA to 2015 to account for the expected small growth in the size of 
members of the US population.  Note that for measurements that include the 
length of the spine, 3% of stature must be added to allow for spinal elongation 
due to micro-gravity exposure. 
Tables Anthropometric Dimensional Data for American Female and Male, 
Vehicle Design Critical Anthropometry Dimensions, and Suit Design Critical 
Anthropometry Dimensions contain a data range for general anthropometric 
dimensions under minimally clothed condition.  Specific anthropometric 
dimensions that are unique to Constellation vehicle operations are provided in 
table Vehicle Design Critical Anthropometry Dimensions.  Specific 
anthropometric dimensions that are critical for designing the space suits are 
provided in table Suit Design Critical Anthropometry Dimensions.  Table Vehicle 
Design Critical Anthropometry Dimensions and table Suit Design Critical 
Anthropometry Dimensions contain an anthropometric data range not only for a 
minimally clothed condition but also for suited (unpressurized and pressurized) 
conditions.  Users are advised to use the data appropriately.  It should be noted 
that the suit dependent data were derived by calculating the deltas in 
measurements between suited and unsuited conditions from a select sample of 
test subjects.  It should also be noted that the test involved using the ACES type 
suit. 
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TABLE B1-1 - ANTHROPOMETRIC DIMENSIONAL DATA FOR AMERICAN FEMALE 
AND MALE  
 
No. Dimension Min  (cm, (in)) 
Max  
(cm, (in)) 
805 Stature 148.6 (58.5) 194.6 (76.6) 
973 Wrist height 70.3 (27.7) 96.3 (37.9) 
64 Ankle height 4.8 (1.9) 8.1 (3.2) 
309 Elbow height (rest height standing) 89.9 (35.4) 120.7 (47.5) 
236 Bust depth (chest depth) 19.1 (7.5) 30.2 (11.9) 
916 Vertical trunk circumference  134.9 (53.1) 181.9 (71.6) 
612 Mid-shoulder height, sitting 52.6 (20.7) 71.1 (28.0) 
459* Hip breadth, sitting 31.5 (12.4) 46.5 (18.3) 
921 Waist back 39.1 (15.4) 55.9 (22.0) 
506 Interscye 29.3 (11.5) 48.0 (18.9) 
639 Neck circumference 27.8 (10.9) 43.4 (17.1) 
754 Shoulder length (side neck-to-acromion horizontal distance) 12.0 (4.7) 18.0 (7.1) 
378 Forearm-forearm breadth 38.9 (15.3) 66.0 (26.0) 
975 Chest height, sitting 33.8 (13.3) 50.3 (19.8) 
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*For seated measurements, the largest female hip breadth is larger than the largest 
male hip breadth, and the smallest male hip breadth is smaller than the smallest female 
hip breadth; therefore, male data are used for the Min dimension, and female data are 
used for the Max dimension. 
 
No. Dimension Min  (cm [in]) 
Max  
(cm [in]) 
758 Sitting height 77.7 (30.6)  101.3 (39.9) 
330 Eye height, sitting 66.5 (26.2) 88.9 (35.0) 
529 Knee height, sitting 45.5 (17.9) 63.5 (25.0) 
678 Popliteal height 33.0 (13.0) 50.0 (19.7) 
751 Shoulder-elbow length 29.6 (11.6) 41.9 (16.5) 
194 Buttock-knee length 52.1 (20.5) 69.9 (27.5) 
420 Hand length 15.8 (6.2) 22.1 (8.7) 
411 Hand breadth 7.1 (2.8) 10.2 (4.0) 
416 Hand circumference 16.8 (6.6) 24.1 (9.5) 
974 Cervicale height, sitting 56.6 (22.3) 76.2 (30.0) 
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No. Dimension Min  (cm [in]) 
Max  
(cm [in]) 
949 Waist height 86.6 (34.1) 119.6 (47.1) 
249 Crotch height 66.5 (26.2) 95.8 (37.7) 
215 Calf height 25.9 (10.2) 41.4 (16.3) 
103 Biacromial breadth 32.3 (12.7) 44.5 (17.5) 
946 Waist front 34.1 (13.4) 48.8 (19.2) 
735 Scye circumference 31.9 (12.6) 52.1 (20.5) 
178 Buttock circumference 84.1 (33.1) 114.8 (45.2) 
312 Elbow rest height 16.2 (6.4) 30.0 (11.8) 
856 Thigh clearance 13.0 (5.1) 20.1 (7.9) 
381 Forearm hand length 38.7 (15.2) 54.6 (21.5) 
200 Buttock-popliteal length 42.2 (16.6) 57.2 (22.5) 
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No. Dimension Min  (cm [in]) 
Max  
(cm [in]) 
23 Acromial (shoulder) height 120.4 (47.4) 
161.8 
(63.7) 
894 Trochanteric height 75.2 (29.6) 105.4 (41.5) 
873 Knee Height, Midpatella 39.6 (15.6) 57.9 (22.8) 
122 Bideltoid (shoulder) breadth 37.8 (14.9) 56.1 (22.1) 
223 Chest breadth 23.5 (9.3) 39.4 (15.5) 
457* Hip breadth 29.8 (11.7) 40.6 (16.0) 
165 Bizgomatic (face) breadth 12.0 (4.7) 15.5 (6.1) 
427 Head breadth 13.3 (5.2) 16.5 (6.5) 
68 Interpupillary Breadth 5.3 (2.1) 7.4 (2.9) 
*For standing measurements, the largest female hip breadth is larger 
than the largest male hip breadth; therefore, female data are used for 
both the Min dimension and the Max dimension. 
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No. Dimension Min  (cm [in]) 
Max  
(cm [in]) 
747 Shoulder circumference 90.4 (35.6) 133.9 (52.7) 
230 Chest circumference 75.7 (29.8) 118.6 (46.7) 
931 Waist circumference 61.2 (24.1) 110.5 (43.5) 
852 Thigh circumference 47.8 (18.8) 71.9 (28.3) 
515 Knee circumference 30.7 (12.1) 44.5 (17.5) 
207 Calf circumference 29.5 (11.6) 44.5 (17.5) 
967 Wrist circumference 13.5 (5.3) 19.8 (7.8) 
111 Biceps circumference, flexed 22.9 (9.0) 40.4 (15.9) 
369 Forearm circumference, flexed 21.6 (8.5) 35.3 (13.9) 
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No. Dimension Min  (cm [in]) 
Max  
(cm [in]) 
951 Waist height, sitting 19.3 (7.6) 27.2 
(10.7) 
797 Span, sitting 147.8 (58.2) 204.7 
(80.6) 
914 Vertical index fingertip reach, 
sitting 
118.9 (46.8) 158.2 
(62.3) 
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ANTHROPOMETRIC DIMENSIONAL DATA FOR AMERICAN FEMALE 
AND MALE (CONCLUDED) 
 
No. Dimension Min  (cm [in]) 
Max  
(cm [in]) 
67 Thumb-tip reach 65.0 (25.6) 90.9 (35.8) 
772 Sleeve length 72.4 (28.5) 99.1 (39.0) 
441 Head length 17.3 (6.8) 21.6 (8.5) 
430 Head circumference 51.3 (20.2) 61.0 (24.0) 
586 Menton-sellion (face) length 9.9 (3.9) 14.0 (5.5) 
362 Foot length 21.6 (8.5) 30.5 (12.0) 
356 Foot breadth 7.9 (3.1) 11.4 (4.5) 
97 Ball of foot circumference 19.6 (7.7) 28.2 (11.1) 
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TABLE B1-2 - VEHICLE DESIGN CRITICAL ANTHROPOMETRY DIMENSIONS   
Design Concern Critical Dimension 
 
 
Numerical Code 
from Table B1-1 
Minimal Clothing With ACES-Type Suit, Unpressurized 
With ACES-Type Suit, 
Pressurized 
Min (cm [in]) Max (cm [in]) Min (cm [in]) Max (cm [in]) Min (cm [in]) Max (cm [in]) 
Maximum vertical clearance Stature, standing  805 148.6 (58.5) 194.6 (76.6) 157.7 (62.1) 203.7 (80.2) 158.0 (62.2) 200.2 (78.8) 
Vertical seating clearance Sitting height  758 77.7 (30.6) 101.3 (39.9) 83.6 (32.9) 112.8 (44.4) 85.9 (33.8) 110.7 (43.6) 
Vertical seating clearance 
with bailer bar down or 
removed 
Sitting height without 
bailer bar** 
758 
NA NA 82.3 (32.4) 105.9 (41.7) NA NA 
Placement of panels to be 
within line-of-sight 
Eye height, sitting  330 66.5 (26.2) 88.9 (35.0) 61.2 (24.1) 87.6 (34.5) 56.9 (22.4) 84.8 (33.4) 
Top of seatback Acromial height, sitting  N/A 49.5 (19.5) 68.1 (26.8) 48.8 (19.2) 68.8 (27.1) 48.3(19.0) 68.3 (26.9) 
Placement of objects that 
may be over lap (panels, 
control wheel, etc.) 
Thigh clearance, sitting 856 
13.0 (5.1) 20.1 (7.9) 15.0 (5.9) 19.8 (7.8) 17.5 (6.9) 21.6(8.5) 
Height of panels in front of 
subject 
Knee height, sitting 529 45.5 (17.9) 63.5 (25.0) 47.2 (18.6) 66.3 (26.1) 51.3 (20.2) 69.9 (27.5) 
Height of seat pan Popliteal height, sitting 678 33.0 (13.0) 50.0 (19.7) 31.8 (12.5) 51.1 (20.1) 32.0 (12.6) 49.0 (19.3) 
Downward reach of subject Wrist height, sitting (with 
arm to the side) 
N/A 39.6 (15.6) 54.6 (21.5) 41.1 (16.2) 62.5 (24.6) 45.0 (17.7) 63.5 (25.0) 
Placement of restraint 
straps 
Biacromial breadth 103 32.3 (12.7) 44.5 (17.5) 36.1 (14.2) 45.5 (17.9) 34.8 (13.7) 47.8 (18.8) 
Width of seatback Bideltoid breadth 122 37.8 (14.9) 56.1 (22.1) 53.1 (20.9) 66.3 (26.1) 58.4 (23.0) 70.9 (27.9) 
Width of seatback for 
conformal seat 
Bideltoid breadth in 
conformal seat** 
122 NA NA 41.8 (16.5) 60.1 (23.7) NA NA 
Side clearance envelope, 
possible seatback width 
Forearm-forearm breadth 378 38.9 (15.3) 66.0 (26.0) 69.3 (27.3) 87.6 (34.5) 82.3 (32.4) 100.6 (39.6) 
Side clearance envelope, 
possible seatback width for 
conformal seat 
Forearm-forearm breadth 
in conformal seat** 
378 
NA NA 48.9 (19.3) 76.0 (29.9) NA NA 
Width of seat pan Hip breadth, sitting 459* 31.5 (12.4) 46.5 (18.3) 36.3 (14.3) 54.4 (21.4) 38.9 (15.3) 55.6 (21.9) 
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TABLE B1-3 - VEHICLE DESIGN CRITICAL ANTHROPOMETRY DIMENSIONS (CONCLUDED)  
 
Design Concern Critical Dimension 
 
 
Numerical Code 
from Table B1-1 
Minimal Clothing With ACES-Type Suit, Unpressurized 
With ACES-Type Suit, 
Pressurized 
Min (cm [in]) Max (cm [in]) Min (cm [in]) Max (cm [in]) Min (cm [in]) Max (cm [in]) 
Width of seat pan for 
conformal seat 
Hip breadth, sitting in 
conformal seat** 
459* NA NA 32.8 (12.9) 48.8 (19.2) NA NA 
Length of seat pan Buttock-popliteal length, 
sitting 
200 42.2 (16.6) 57.2 (22.5) 47.2 (18.6) 62.2 (24.5) 50.0 (19.7) 68.6 (27.0) 
Placement of panels in front 
of subject 
Buttock-knee length, 
sitting 
194 52.1 (20.5) 69.9 (27.5) 59.9 (23.6) 73.9 (29.1) 66.3 (26.1) 82.0 (32.3) 
Rudder pedal design, foot 
clearance 
Foot length, sitting 362 21.6 (8.5) 30.5 (12.0) 27.2 (10.7) 38.6 (15.2) 27.2  (10.7) 38.6 (15.2) 
Placement of control 
panels, maximum reach 
Thumb tip reach, sitting 67 65.0 (25.6) 90.9 (35.8) 67.3 (26.5) 103.1 (40.6) 52.8  (20.8) 100.6 (39.6) 
* For seated measurements, the largest female hip breadth is larger than the largest male hip breadth, and the smallest male hip breadth is smaller than the smallest female hip breadth; therefore, 
male data are used for the Min dimension, and female data are used for the Max dimension. 
** Additional measurements are provided for specific hardware assumptions.  These measurements were taken with a bailer bar either in a down position or removed, in a conformal-style seat that 
includes features such as a reduced angle between the hip and torso as well as shoulder bolsters.  Measurements were taken only in the unpressurized suit condition.  Because measurements for 
these hardware configurations are not provided for unsuited or pressurized suited conditions, the standard hardware configuration measurement should always be used for those suit conditions.  More 
details pertaining to measurement assumptions may be found in Memo ZF-08-004: Application of HS2002 Anthropometric Critical Dimensions and Table B1-7 to Occupant Protection and Landing 
Strategy Tiger Teams. 
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The data provided in table Vehicle Design Critical Anthropometry Dimensions are based 
on measurements taken of subjects before and after donning an ACES suit.  Compared 
to table Visual Index for Critical Anthropometric Dimensions, greater changes in stature 
occur for larger individuals than for smaller individuals.  This is due in part to differences 
in suit fit between small and large crewmembers.  The adjustment to account for a suit 
is not additive; rather, a subject's unsuited height is multiplied by a factor based on data 
collected during testing.  Differences between effects of ACES and effects of other suits 
are likely to exist, but the numbers provided in table Vehicle Design Critical 
Anthropometry Dimensions are derived from laboratory measurements.  Neither the 
data in table Anthropometric Dimensional Data for American Female and Male nor table 
Vehicle Design Critical Anthropometry Dimensions account for clearances for 
operational movements crewmembers routinely perform while suited, e.g., helmet 
removal. 
TABLE B1-4 - SUIT DESIGN CRITICAL ANTHROPOMETRY DIMENSIONS   
Design Concern Critical Dimension 
 
 
Numerical 
Code from 
Table B1-1 
Minimal Clothing 
Min (cm [in]) Max (cm [in]) 
Maximum vertical clearance Stature, standing 805 148.6 (58.5) 194.6 (76.6) 
Placement of headrest Vertical trunk diameter N/A 55.9 (22.0) 75.9 (29.9) 
Leg length Crotch height 249 66.5 (26.2) 95.8 (37.7) 
Knee break Knee height mid-patella 873 39.6 (15.6) 57.9 (22.8) 
Torso sizing Chest breadth 223 23.6 (9.3) 39.4 (15.5) 
Torso sizing Chest depth 236 19.1 (7.5) 30.2 (11.9) 
Neck ring and helmet sizing Head length 441 17.3 (6.8) 21.6 (8.5) 
Maximum circumference of 
upper leg Thigh circumference 
852 
47.8 (18.8) 71.9 (28.3) 
Maximum circumference of 
upper arm 
Biceps circumference 
flexed 
111 
22.9 (9.0) 40.4 (15.9) 
Torso sizing Chest circumference 230 75.7 (29.8) 118.6 (46.7) 
Arm sizing Inter-wrist distance N/A 115.1 (45.3) 161.8 (63.7) 
Functional arm break, arm 
length Inter-elbow distance 
N/A 
72.6 (28.6) 101.3 (39.9) 
Lower torso sizing Waist depth N/A 15.0 (5.9) 30.0 (11.8) 
Lower torso sizing Hip breadth 457* 29.7 (11.7) 40.6 (16.0) 
Arm sizing Wrist-to-wall distance N/A 54.6 (21.5) 77.7 (30.6) 
*For standing measurements, the largest female hip breadth is larger than the largest male hip breadth; therefore, female 
data are used for both the Min dimension and the Max dimension. 
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B2.0 RANGE OF MOTION 
The ranges of motion to be accommodated for crewmembers (shown in Appendix B, 
tables Unsuited Joint Mobility, Unpressurized-Suited Joint Mobility, and Pressurized 
Suited Joint Mobility for Nominal Pressure Microgravity Operations) were collected in 1 
g under a variety of suited and unsuited conditions as part of a 2007/2008 study in the 
NASA JSC Anthropometry and Biomechanics Facility.  The range of motion numbers 
present in these tables show the level of mobility that was needed to perform a variety 
of relevant functional tasks.  These numbers do not necessarily indicate maximum level 
of mobility possible in a given configuration.  Each table (Unsuited Joint Mobility, 
Unpressurized-Suited Joint Mobility, and Pressurized Suited Joint Mobility for Nominal 
Pressure Microgravity Operations) provides the range of motion for specific suited and 
gravitational conditions as described below. 
Table Unsuited Joint Mobility presents unsuited mobility requirements for design of 
vehicle components with which an unsuited crewmember will be expected to interact.  
This table also contains several joint measures that were present in old versions of this 
table but were not reinvestigated as a part of the 2007/2008 mobility study.  These 
values are located at the end of the table and are identified with an asterisk. 
Table Unpressurized-Suited Joint Mobility presents unpressurized-suited mobility 
requirements for design of components such as cockpit controls, seat restraints, seat 
stowage, and all other interfaces used by a crewmember wearing a suit that is not 
actively pressurized. 
Table Pressurized Suited Joint Mobility for Nominal Pressure Microgravity Operations 
presents pressurized-suited mobility requirements for design of components with which 
a crewmember will be expected to interact when in any pressurized-suited state for 
nominal pressure microgravity operations. 
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TABLE B2-1 - UNSUITED J OINT MOBILITY  
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“1979 Study” refers to data from SP-2-86L-064 Thornton, W, and Jackson, J. Anthropometric Study of 
Astronaut Candidates, 1979 to 1980, (Unpublished Data) NASA-JSC. 
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TABLE B2-2 - UNPRESSURIZED SUITED J OINT MOBILITY  
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TABLE B2-3 - PRESSURIZED SUITED J OINT MOBILITY FOR NOMINAL PRESSURE 
MICROGRAVITY OPERATIONS   
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B3.0 MASS PROPERTIES 
Crewmember whole-body mass, body-segment mass, center of mass location, and 
moment of inertia data are provided in the Appendix B tables within the section 
Segment Moments of Inertia. 
The anatomical axis system is based on skeletal landmarks and provides a consistent 
reference for the principal axes system and the center of volume/mass independent of 
body-segment orientation as described in McConville et al. (1980) and Young et al.  
(1983).  The principal axis of inertia originates at the center of volume/mass. 
Regression equations from McConville et al. (1980) and Young et al. (1983) were used 
to compute the Body-Segment Properties (BSP); however, because the sample sizes in 
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these two studies were relatively small (31 and 46 subjects, respectively), this document 
uses data from the ANSUR database for input into the regression equations. 
The regression equations from the McConville et al. (1980) and Young et al. (1983) 
studies were used in their most simple form, which uses only the stature and weight of 
the subject to calculate the volume and moments of inertia.  A Matlab code was written 
to identify all females with a small stature (based on the female data only) and all males 
with a large stature (based on the male data only) in the ANSUR database; from this 
extracted data, the lightest female and heaviest male were identified.  These values 
were then used in the regression equations to compute the BSP.  McConville and 
Young did not generate regression equations to predict all BSP presented in this report; 
however, presented below is a description and reasoning (based on the available data) 
of how each BSP presented here was generated. 
For tables Whole-Body Mass of Crewmember, Body-Segment Mass Properties for the 
Male and Female Crewmember, and Whole-Body Center of Mass Location of the Male 
and Female Crewmember, minimum values correspond to a small female in mass, and 
maximum values correspond to a large male in mass, respectively.  These values are 
considered to be representative of those for a small female and a large male 
crewmember, respectively. 
Whole-Body Mass 
Regressions equations from the McConville et al. (1980) and Young et al. (1983) 
studies were used to compute the whole-body volume.  Whole-body mass was 
calculated by assuming the density of the human flesh was homogeneous; a density 
value of 1 g/cm3 was used.  With a value of unity for the density, the mass values are 
numerically equal to their corresponding volume values. 
Whole Body Center of Mass 
Assuming that the human flesh was homogeneous, it can also be assumed that the 
center of volume is at the center of mass location.  McConville et al. (1980) and Young 
et al. (1983) provided ranges for the location of the center of volume for the male and 
female, respectively, in each study.  Because regression equations were not given for 
the center of volume, the range values from the McConville et al. (1980) and Young et 
al. (1983) studies were used here.  Specific values for the locations of the center of 
mass with respect to the anatomical axes were taken from each study to form the 
range; specifically, the upper range was set by the male upper range, and the lower 
range was set by the female lower range. 
Whole Body Moments of Inertia 
Moments of inertia regression equations from the McConville et al. (1980) and Young et 
al. (1983) studies were used. 
Segment Mass 
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Regressions equations from the McConville et al. (1980) and Young et al. (1983) 
studies were used to compute the segment volume.  Segment mass was calculated by 
assuming the density of the human flesh was homogeneous; a density value of 1 g/cm3 
was used.  With a value of unity for the density, the mass values are numerically equal 
to their corresponding volume values. 
Segment Center of Mass 
Assuming that the human flesh was homogeneous, it can also be assumed that the 
center of volume is at the center of mass location.  McConville et al. (1980) and Young 
et al. (1983) provided ranges for the location of the center of volume for the male and 
female, respectively, in each study.  Because regression equations were not given for 
the center of volume, the range values from the McConville et al. (1980) and Young et 
al. (1983) studies were used in this update.  Specific values for the locations of the 
center of mass with respect to the anatomical axes were taken from each study to form 
the range; specifically, the upper range was set by the male upper range, and the lower 
range was set by the female lower range. 
Segment Moments of Inertia 
Regression equations from the McConville et al. (1980) and Young et al. (1983) studies 
were used to compute the moments of inertia.  The moments of inertia presented are 
those about the principal axes Xp, Yp, and Zp. 
  
TABLE B3-1 - WHOLE-BODY MASS OF CREWMEMBER  
Crewmember Body Mass (kg [lb]) 
 Unsuited Suited* 
Min 42.64 (94) 78.93 (174) 
Max 110.22 (243) 146.51 (323) 
*The crewmember body mass for "Suited" includes 36.29 kg 
(80 lb) for the pressure garment and does not 
include crew survival gear or EVA gear. 
Data are projected forward to 2015. 
   
TABLE B3-2 - BODY-SEGMENT MASS PROPERTIES FOR THE MALE AND FEMALE 
CREWMEMBER  
 Segment 
Mass (kg [lb]) 
Min Max 
1 Head 2.99 (6.59) 5.03 (11.08) 
2 Neck 0.49 (1.08) 1.39 (3.07) 
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3 Thorax 11.35 (25.02) 34.33 (75.69) 
4 Abdomen 2.14 (4.72) 3.25 (7.16) 
5 Pelvis 5.62 (12.4) 16.46 (36.29) 
6 Upper arm  0.91 (2.0) 2.74 (6.04) 
7 Forearm  0.59 (1.29) 1.86 (4.09) 
8 Hand 0.24 (0.52) 0.66 (1.45) 
9 Hip flap  2.22 (4.9) 4.79 (10.55) 
10 Thigh minus hip flap  3.86 (8.12) 8.48 (18.69) 
11 Calf  1.94 (4.28) 5.11 (11.27) 
12 Foot  0.44 (0.98) 1.26 (2.77) 
Torso (5 + 4 + 3)  19.11 (42.13) 54.05 (119.15) 
Thigh (9 + 10)  5.91 (13.03) 13.26 (29.24) 
Forearm plus hand 
(7+8)  0.82 (1.81) 2.51 (5.54) 
Data are projected forward to 2015. 
TABLE B3-3 - WHOLE-BODY CENTER OF MASS LOCATION OF THE MALE AND 
FEMALE CREWMEMBER   
 
The axes in the figure above represent the anatomical 
axes. 
Dimension Min (cm,(in)) Max (cm,(in)) 
L(Xa) -15.27 (-6.01) -6.40 (-2.52) 
L(Ya) -1.22 (-0.48) 0.97 (0.38) 
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L(Za) -3.81 (-1.5) 8.15 (3.21) 
   
TABLE B3-4 - BODY-SEGMENT CENTER OF MASS LOCATION OF THE CREWMEMBER  
Segment Anatomical Axis 
Min  
(cm [in]) 
Max  
(cm [in]) 
Head 
 
Xa -2.44 (-0.96) 0.53 (0.21) 
Ya -0.61 (-0.24) 0.61 (0.24) 
Za 2.24 (0.88) 4.04 (1.59) 
Neck 
 
Xa 3.40 (1.34) 7.32 (2.88) 
Ya -0.56 (-0.22) 0.58 (0.23) 
Za 2.92 (1.15) 6.05 (2.38) 
Thorax 
 
Xa 3.76 (1.48) 7.06 (2.78) 
Ya -0.81 (-0.32) 0.48 (0.19) 
Za 13.44 (5.29) 21.97 (8.65) 
Abdomen 
 
Xa -1.47 (-0.58) 1.55 (0.61) 
Ya -1.65 (-0.65) 2.26 (0.89) 
Za -4.85 (-1.91) -1.14 (-0.45) 
Pelvis 
 
Xa -12.17 (-4.79) -6.96(-2.74) 
Ya -1.32 (-0.52) 0.74 (0.29) 
Za -0.76 (-0.30) 5.18 (2.04) 
Torso Xa -10.41 (-4.1) 2.49 (0.98) 
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Segment Anatomical Axis 
Min  
(cm [in]) 
Max  
(cm [in]) 
 
Ya -1.52 (-0.60) 1.73 (0.68) 
Za 16.33 (6.43) 25.60 (10.08) 
Right upper arm 
 
Xa -0.71 (-0.28) -0.91 (-0.36) 
Ya 1.85 (0.73) -2.29 (-0.90) 
Za -18.59 (-7.32) -14.27 (-5.62) 
Left upper arm 
 
Xa -0.64 (-0.25) 2.59 (1.02) 
Ya -3.68 (-1.45) -1.80 (-0.71) 
Za -18.72 (-7.37) -14.33 (-5.64) 
Right forearm 
 
Xa 1.02 (0.40) 0.08 (0.03) 
Ya -2.11 (-0.83) 4.14 (1.63) 
Za -9.86 (-3.88) -8.86 (-3.49) 
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Segment Anatomical Axis 
Min  
(cm [in]) 
Max  
(cm [in]) 
Left forearm 
 
Xa 1.17 (0.46) 0.13 (0.05) 
Ya -0.23 (-0.09) -2.44 (-0.96) 
Za -9.86 (-3.88) -9.07 (-3.57) 
Right hand 
 
Xa -0.53 (-0.21) 0.03 (0.01) 
Ya 0.43 (0.17) 0.13 (0.05) 
Za 0.71 (0.28) 1.93 (0.76) 
Left hand 
 
Xa -0.71 (-0.28) -0.23 (-0.09) 
Ya -1.35 (-0.53) 0.89 (0.35) 
Za 0.84 (0.33) 2.03 (0.80) 
Right hip flap 
 
Xa -7.77 (-3.06) 1.70 (0.67) 
Ya 5.66 (2.23) 7.37 (2.90) 
Za -6.73 (-2.65) -6.05 (-2.38) 
Left hip flap 
 
Xa -8.20 (-3.23) 2.41 (0.95) 
Ya -10.67 (-4.2) -5.18 (-2.04) 
Za -6.96 (-2.74) -6.20 (-2.44) 
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Segment Anatomical Axis 
Min  
(cm [in]) 
Max  
(cm [in]) 
Right thigh minus flap 
 
Xa -3.28 (-1.29) 2.36 (0.93) 
Ya 5.18 (2.04) 8.38 (3.30) 
Za -24.84 (-9.78) -23.34 (-9.19) 
Left thigh minus flap 
 
Xa 3.10 (1.22) 2.21 (0.87) 
Ya -9.60 (-3.78) -5.28 (-2.08) 
Za -24.87 (-9.79) -23.62 (-9.3) 
Right calf 
 
Xa -4.24 (-1.67) -0.10 (-0.04) 
Ya -6.38 (-2.51) -4.85(-1.91) 
Za -16.18 (-6.37) -12.01 (-4.73) 
Left calf 
 
Xa -4.34 (-1.71) 0.69 (0.27) 
Ya 4.04 (1.59) 6.83 (2.69) 
Za -16.00 (-6.30) -12.32 (-4.85) 
Right foot 
 
Xa -8.51 (-3.35) -6.63 (-2.61) 
Ya -0.28 (-0.11) 0.43 (0.17) 
Za 0.46 (0.18) -0.05 (-0.02) 
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BODY-SEGMENT CENTER OF MASS LOCATION OF THE CREWMEMBER 
(CONCLUDED) 
Segment Anatomical Axis 
Min  
(cm, ([in])) 
Max  
(cm, ([in])) 
Left foot 
 
Xa -8.71 (-3.43) -6.48 (-2.55) 
Ya -0.86 (-0.34) 0.89 (0.35) 
Za 0.33 (0.13) -0.10 (-0.04) 
Right thigh 
 
Xa -4.88 (-1.92) 2.11 (0.83) 
Ya 5.64 (2.22) 8.00 (3.15) 
Za -17.55 (-6.91) -17.55 (-6.91) 
Left thigh 
 
Xa -4.75 (-1.87) 2.29 (0.90) 
Ya -9.65 (-3.80) -5.26 (-2.07) 
Za -17.91 (-7.05) -17.83 (-7.02) 
Right forearm plus 
hand 
 
Xa 0.43 (0.17) -0.36 (-0.14) 
Ya -2.29 (-0.90) 4.52 (1.78) 
Za -15.54 (-6.12) -14.99 (-5.9) 
Left forearm  
plus hand 
 
Xa 0.43 (0.17) 0 
Ya 0.79 (0.31) -2.82 (-1.11) 
Za -15.37 (-6.05) 15.01 (-5.91) 
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TABLE B3-5 - WHOLE-BODY MOMENT OF INERTIA OF THE CREWMEMBER   
 
The axes in the figure above represent the principal 
axes. 
Axis Min  (kg·m2 [lb·ft2]) 
Max  
(kg·m2 [lb·ft2]) 
Xp 6.59 (156.38) 17.69 (419.79) 
Yp 6.12 (145.23) 16.43 (389.89) 
Zp 0.73 (17.32) 2.05 (48.65) 
 
TABLE B3-6 - BODY-SEGMENT MOMENT OF INERTIA OF THE CREWMEMBER   
Segment Axis Min (kg·m
2x10-3 
[lb·ft2x10-3]) 
Max (kg·m2 x10-3 
[lb·ft2x10-3]) 
Head 
 
Xp 15 (351) 22 (512) 
Yp 18 (424) 25 (587) 
Zp 14 (322) 16 (379) 
Neck 
 
Xp 0.7 (17) 2.2 (53) 
Yp 1.0 (23) 2.7 (64) 
Zp 1.1 (25) 3.4 (81) 
Thorax 
 
Xp 183 (4,346) 680 (16,134) 
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Segment Axis Min (kg·m
2x10-3 
[lb·ft2x10-3]) 
Max (kg·m2 x10-3 
[lb·ft2x10-3]) 
Yp 135 (3,206) 505 (11,984) 
Zp 119 (2,833) 431 (10,236) 
Abdomen 
 
Xp 15 (347) 23 (540) 
Yp 10 (241) 13 (309) 
Zp 21 (500) 35 (826) 
Pelvis 
 
Xp 46 (1,092) 148 (3,514) 
Yp 34 (810) 137 (3,258) 
Zp 61 (1,440) 173 (4,104) 
Torso 
 
Xp 638 (15,143) 2,030 (48,178) 
Yp 577 (13,702) 1840 (43,654) 
Zp 205 (4,865) 644 (15,273) 
Right upper arm 
 
Xp 5.4 (129) 18 (430) 
Yp 5.6 (133) 19 (462) 
Zp 1.0 (24) 3.9 (92) 
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Segment Axis Min (kg·m
2x10-3 
[lb·ft2x10-3]) 
Max (kg·m2 x10-3 
[lb·ft2x10-3]) 
Left upper arm 
 
Xp 5.3 (126) 17.7 (420) 
Yp 5.5 (130) 19 (449) 
Zp 0.9 (22) 3.8 (89) 
Right forearm 
 
Xp 2.8 (67) 12 (276) 
Yp 2.7 (65) 12 (282) 
Zp 0.5 (11) 1.8 (43) 
Left forearm 
 
Xp 2.8 (66) 11 (257) 
Yp 2.7 (63) 11 (265) 
Zp 0.5 (11) 1.6 (39) 
Right hand 
 
Xp 0.6 (14) 1.6 (38) 
Yp 0.5 (11) 1.3 (31) 
Zp 0.2 (4) 0.5 (13) 
Left hand 
 
Xp 0.6 (15) 1.6 (37) 
Yp 0.5 (13) 1.3 (31) 
Zp 0.2 (4) 0.5 (12) 
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Segment Axis Min (kg·m
2x10-3 
[lb·ft2x10-3]) 
Max (kg·m2 x10-3 
[lb·ft2x10-3]) 
Right hip flap 
 
Xp 8.1 (191) 17 (412) 
Yp 10 (246) 22 (530) 
Zp 13 (318) 29 (696) 
Left hip flap 
 
Xp 7.9 (188) 17 (398) 
Yp 11 (255) 22 (519) 
Zp 14 (324) 28 (671) 
Right thigh minus flap 
 
Xp 34 (800) 79 (1,885) 
Yp 33 (785) 82 (1,941) 
Zp 14 (327) 32 (753) 
Left thigh minus flap 
 
Xp 34 (798) 75 (1,784) 
Yp 33 (789) 79 (1,878) 
Zp 13 (317) 31 (729) 
Right calf 
 
Xp 26 (615) 75 (1,790) 
Yp 26 (613) 76 (1,815) 
Zp 3.1 (73) 8.9 (210) 
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Segment Axis Min (kg·m
2x10-3 
[lb·ft2x10-3]) 
Max (kg·m2 x10-3 
[lb·ft2x10-3]) 
Left calf 
 
Xp 26 (614) 77 (1,826) 
Yp 26 (615) 78 (1,855) 
Zp 3.0 (70) 9.1 (215) 
Right foot 
 
Xp 0.4 (9) 1.0 (24) 
Yp 1.6 (37) 5.5 (130) 
Zp 1.6 (39) 5.8 (138) 
Left foot 
 
Xp 0.4 (9) 1.0 (24) 
Yp 1.6 (39) 5.4 (127) 
Zp 1.7 (41) 5.7 (134) 
Right thigh 
 
Xp 85 (2,009) 208 (4,940) 
Yp 87 (2,063) 220 (5,215) 
Zp 27 (651) 59 (1,401) 
Left thigh 
 
Xp 85 (2,022) 200 (4,757) 
Yp 88 (2,088) 212 (5,024) 
Zp 27 (649) 57 (1,350) 
Right forearm plus hand 
 
Xp 11 (262) 40 (939) 
Yp 11 (257) 39 (935) 
Zp 0.7 (16) 2.4 (58) 
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BODY-SEGMENT MOMENT OF INERTIA OF THE CREWMEMBER (CONCLUDED) 
Segment Axis Min (kg·m
2x10-3 
([lb·ft2x10-3])) 
Max (kg·m2 x10-3 
([lb·ft2x10-3]) 
Left forearm plus hand 
 
Xp 11 (260) 37 (887) 
Yp 11 (256) 37 (881) 
Zp 0.6 (15) 2.2 (53) 
The axes in the figures above represent the principal axes. 
 
B4.0 STRENGTH 
The information in the “other operations” and “Maximum Crew Operation Loads” 
columns were derived from a collection of journal articles associated with human 
strength data.  In addition, other references were used, such as the MIL-STD-1472 and 
the Occupational and Biomechanics textbook (Chaffin, D. B., Occupation Biomechanics, 
Second Edition, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1991), to set a standard for very specific 
strength data such as lifting strength. Since there are so many variations in which 
strength data can be collected, the data in this table was consolidated in order to group 
similar motions and actions under the same category.  The values in the criticality 1 and 
2 columns were derived by applying a factor of safety of 2 and 1.5  respectively. 
Criticality 1 and criticality 2 values were obtained by dividing the value in the other 
operations column by a factor of safety of 2 and 1.5 respectively. The values in the 
criticality 1 and 2 columns also include the decrement factor(s) to reflect the de-
conditioning effects on crewmembers after an extended duration of mission.  Criticality 1 
load limits should be used for crew safety situations and the design of items where a 
single failure could result in loss of life or vehicle.  Criticality 2 load limits should be used 
for the design of items where a single failure could result in a loss of mission. 
Criticality 1 is where a single failure could result in loss of life or vehicle.  Criticality 2 is 
where a single failure could result in a loss of mission. 
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TABLE B4-1 - UNSUITED STRENGTH DATA  
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APPENDIX C  
NATURAL AND INDUCED ENVIRONMENTS 
C1.0 ATMOSPHERE 
 TABLE C1-1 - CRITERIA FOR ASSIGNMENT OF TOXICOLOGICAL HAZARD LEVELS  
Hazard level Irritancy Systemic Effects Containability and Decontamination 
0 
 
(Non hazard) 
Slight irritation that 
lasts <30 minutes 
and will not require 
therapy. 
None Gas, solid, or liquid 
may or may not be 
containable. 
1 
 
(Critical) 
Slight to moderate 
irritation that lasts 
>30 min and will 
require therapy. 
Minimal effects, no 
potential for lasting 
internal tissue 
damage. 
Gas, solid, or liquid 
may or may not be 
containable.  
However, the crew 
will be protected 
from liquids and 
solids by surgical 
masks, gloves, and 
goggles. 
2 
 
(Catastrophic) 
Moderate to severe 
irritation that has the 
potential for long-
term performance 
decrement and will 
require therapy. 
 
Eye Hazards:  May 
cause permanent 
damage. 
None Either a solid or 
nonvolatile liquid.  
Can be contained 
by a cleanup 
procedure and 
disposed of.  The 
crew will be 
protected by 
5-micron surgical 
masks, gloves, and 
goggles. 
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CRITERIA FOR ASSIGNMENT OF TOXICOLOGICAL HAZARD LEVELS 
(CONCLUDED)  
Hazard level Irritancy Systemic Effects Containability and Decontamination 
3 
 
(Catastrophic) 
Irritancy alone does 
not constitute a 
level 3 hazard. 
Appreciable effects 
on coordination, 
perception, 
memory, etc., or 
has the potential for 
long-term (delayed) 
serious injury (e.g., 
cancer), or may 
result in internal 
tissue damage. 
Either a solid or 
nonvolatile liquid 
that can be 
contained by a 
cleanup crew and 
disposed of.  
Surgical masks and 
gloves will not 
protect the crew.  
Either quick-don 
masks or Spacehab 
Emergency 
Breathing System 
(SEBS) and gloves 
are required. 
4 
 
(Catastrophic) 
Moderate to severe 
irritancy that has the 
potential for long-
term crew 
performance 
decrement (for eye-
only hazards, there 
may be a risk of 
permanent eye 
damage.) 
Note:  Will require 
therapy if crew is 
exposed. 
Appreciable effects 
on coordination, 
perception, 
memory, etc., or the 
potential for long-
term (delayed) 
serious injury (e.g., 
cancer) or may 
result in internal 
tissue damage. 
Gas, volatile liquid, 
or fumes that are 
not containable.  
The ARS will be 
used to 
decontaminate.  
Either the quick-don 
masks or the SEBS 
are required or the 
contaminated 
module will be 
evacuated. 
NOTE:  This table was extracted from JSC-26895, Guidelines for Assessing the Toxic 
Hazard of Spacecraft Chemicals and Test Materials. 
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C2.0 ACCELERATION AND VIBRATION  
 
FIGURE C2-1 - ACCELERATION ENVIRONMENT COORDINATE SYSTEM  
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 TABLE C2-1 - DIRECTION AND INTERTIAL RESULTANT OF BODY ACCELERATION  
a. Direction of Acceleration 
Linear Motion Aircraft Standard Acceleration Description 
Forward +ax Forward acceleration 
Backward -ax Backward acceleration 
Upward +az Headward acceleration 
Downward -az Footward acceleration 
To the Right -ay Rightward acceleration 
To the Left +ay Leftward acceleration 
b. Inertial Resultant of Body Acceleration 
Linear 
Motion Physiologic Descriptive 
Physiologic 
Standard Vernacular Descriptive 
Forward Transverse anterior-posterior G, prone G, chest to back G +Gx Eyeballs-in 
Backward Transverse posterior-anterior G, supine G, back to chest G -Gx Eyeballs-out 
Upward Positive G +Gz Eyeballs-down 
Downward Negative G -Gz Eyeballs-up 
To the right Lateral G +Gy Eyeballs-left 
To the left Lateral G -Gy Eyeballs-right 
Note:  G expresses inertial resultant to whole-body acceleration in multiples of the 
magnitude of the acceleration of gravity.  Acceleration of gravity, g=9.80665 m/s2 
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C3.0 NON-IONIZING RADIATION  
 
FIGURE C3-1 - RADIO FREQUENCY ELECTROMAGNETIC FIELD EXPOSURE LIMITS 
(ILLUSTRATED TO SHOW WHOLE BODY RESONANCE EFFECTS AROUND 100 MHZ) 
(MODIFIED FROM IEEE C95.1-2005)  
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 TABLE C3-1 - MAXIMUM PERMISSIBLE EXPOSURE (MPE) TO RADIO FREQUENCY 
ELECTROMAGNETIC FIELDS (MODIFIED FROM IEEE C95.1-2005, LOWER TIER)  
 
Frequency 
Range 
(MHz) 
RMS Electric 
Field Strength 
(E)a 
(V/m) 
RMS 
Magnetic 
Field 
Strength (H) a 
(A/m) 
RMS Power 
Density (S) 
E–Field, H–Field 
(W/m2) 
Averaging Time b 
|E|2, |H|2, or S 
(minutes) 
0.1 – 1.34 614 16.3/ƒM 
(1,000, 
100,000/ƒM2)c 
6 6 
1.34 - 3 823.8/ƒM 16.3/ƒM 
(1,800/ƒM2, 
100,000/ƒM2) 
ƒM2/0.3 6 
3 - 30 823.8/ƒM 16.3/ƒM 
(1,800/ƒM2, 
100,000/ƒM2) 
30 6 
30 - 100 27.5 158.3/ƒM1.668 
(2, 
9,400,000/ƒM3.336) 
30 0.0636ƒM1.337 
100–300 27.5 0.0729 2 30 30 
300–5,000 – – ƒ /150 30 
5,000–15,000 – – ƒ /150 150/ƒG 
15,000–30,000 – – 100 150/ƒG 
30,000–100,000 – – 100 25.24/ƒG0.476 
100,000–
300,000 – – 100 5048/[(9ƒG-700)ƒG
0.476 
ƒM is the frequency in MHz, ƒG is the frequency in GHz. 
For exposures that are uniform over the dimensions of the body, such as certain far-field plane-wave 
exposures, the exposure field strengths and power densities are compared with the MPEs in 
the Table. For non-uniform exposures, the mean values of the exposure fields, as obtained by 
spatially averaging the squares of the field strengths or averaging the power densities over an 
area equivalent to the vertical cross section of the human body (projected area), or a smaller 
area depending on the frequency (for further details please see IEEE C95.1-2005, notes to 
Table 8 and Table 9), are compared with the MPEs in the Table. 
The left column is the averaging time for |E|2, the right column is the averaging time for |H|2.  For 
frequencies greater than 400 MHz, the averaging time is for power density S.  
These plane-wave equivalent power density values are commonly used as a convenient comparison 
with MPEs at higher frequencies and are displayed on some instruments in use. 
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TABLE C3-2 - BLUE-LIGHT AND RETINAL THERMAL HAZARD FUNCTIONS  
Wavelength (nm) Blue-Light Hazard Function, B(λ) 
Retinal Thermal 
Hazard Function, 
R(λ) 
305-335 0.01 - 
340 0.01 - 
345 0.01 - 
350 0.01 - 
355 0.01 - 
360 0.01 - 
365 0.01 - 
370 0.01 - 
375 0.01 - 
380 0.01 0.01 
385 0.0125 0.0125 
390 0.025 0.025 
395 0.050 0.050 
400 0.100 0.100 
405 0.200 0.200 
410 0.400 0.400 
415 0.800 0.800 
420 0.900 0.900 
425 0.950 0.950 
430 0.980 0.980 
435 1.00 1.00 
440 1.00 1.00 
445 0.970 1.00 
450 0.940 1.00 
455 0.900 1.00 
460 0.800 1.00 
465 0.700 1.00 
470 0.620 1.00 
475 0.550 1.00 
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BLUE-LIGHT AND RETINAL THERMAL HAZARD FUNCTIONS (CONCLUDED)  
Wavelength (nm) Blue-Light Hazard Function, B(λ) 
Retinal Thermal 
Hazard Function, 
R(λ) 
480 0.450 1.00 
485 0.400 1.00 
490 0.220 1.00 
495 0.160 1.00 
500 0.100 1.00 
505 0.079 1.00 
510 0.063 1.00 
515 0.050 1.00 
520 0.040 1.00 
525 0.032 1.00 
530 0.025 1.00 
535 0.020 1.00 
540 0.016 1.00 
545 0.013 1.00 
550 0.010 1.00 
555 0.008 1.00 
560 0.006 1.00 
565 0.005 1.00 
570 0.004 1.00 
575 0.003 1.0 
580 0.002 1.0 
585 0.002 1.0 
590 0.001 1.0 
595 0.001 1.0 
600-700 0.001 1.0 
700-1050 - 10[(700-λ)/500] 
1050-1400 - 0.2 
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TABLE C3-3 - UV RADIATION EXPOSURE TLV AND SPECTRAL WEIGHTING FUNCTION  
Wavelength 
(nm) 
TLV 
(J/m2) 
TLV 
(mJ/cm2) 
Relative Spectral 
Effectiveness, Sλ 
180 2500 250 0.012 
190 1600 160 0.019 
200 1000 100 0.030 
205 590 59 0.051 
210 400 40 0.075 
215 320 32 0.095 
220 250 25 0.120 
225 200 20 0.150 
230 160 16 0.190 
235 130 13 0.240 
240 100 10 0.300 
245 83 8.3 0.360 
250 70 7.0 0.430 
255 58 5.8 0.520 
260 46 4.6 0.650 
265 37 3.7 0.810 
270 30 3.0 1.000 
275 31 3.1 0.960 
280 34 3.4 0.880 
285 39 3.9 0.770 
290 47 4.7 0.640 
295 56 5.6 0.540 
300 100 10 0.300 
305 500 50 0.06 
310 2000 200 0.015 
315 1.0*104 1000 0.003 
320 2.9*104  2900  0.0024  
325 6.0*104  6000  0.00050  
330 7.3*104  7300  0.00041  
335 8.8*104  8800  0.00034  
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UV RADIATION EXPOSURE TLV AND SPECTRAL WEIGHTING FUNCTION 
(CONCLUDED)  
Wavelength 
(nm) 
TLV 
(J/m2) 
TLV 
(mJ/cm2) 
Relative Spectral 
Effectiveness, Sλ 
340 1.1*105  1.1*104  0.00028  
345 1.3*105  1.3*104  0.00024  
350 1.5*105  1.5*104  0.00020  
355 1.9*105  1.9*104  0.00016  
360 2.3*105  2.3*104  0.00013  
365 2.7*105  2.7*104  0.00011  
370 3.2*105  3.2*104  0.000093  
375 3.9*105  3.9*104  0.000077  
380 4.7*105  4.7*104  0.000064  
385 5.7*105  5.7*104  0.000053  
390 6.8*105  6.8*104  0.000044  
395 8.3*105  8.3*104  0.000036  
400 1.0*106  1.0*105  0.000030  
    
TABLE C3-4 - PERMISSIBLE ULTRAVIOLET EXPOSURES (200 - 400 NM)  
Duration of Exposure 
per Day 
Effective Irradiance, 
µW/cm2 
8 hrs. 0.1 
4 hrs. 0.2 
2 hrs. 0.4 
1 hr. 0.8 
30 min. 1.7 
15 min. 3.3 
10 min. 5 
5 min. 10 
1 min. 50 
30 sec. 100 
10 sec. 300 
1 sec. 3000 
0.5 sec. 6000 
0.1 sec. 30000 
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APPENDIX D  
SAFETY 
 TABLE D-1 - CORNER AND EDGE ROUNDING REQUIREMENTS  
Material Thickness, t 
Minimum 
Corner 
Radius 
Minimum 
Edge 
Radius 
Figure 
t > 25 mm 
(t > 1 in)  
13 mm 
(0.5 in 
(spherical)) 
3.0 mm 
(0.120 in) 
 
6.5 mm < t < 25 mm 
(0.25 in < t < 1 in) 
13 mm 
(0.5 in) 
3.0 mm 
(0.125 in) 
 
3.0 mm < t < 6.5 mm 
(0.125 in  =< t < 0.25 in) 
6.5 mm 
(0.26 in) 
1.5 mm 
(0.06 in) 
 
0.5 mm < t < 3.0 mm 
(0.02 in < t < 0.125 in) 
6.5 mm 
(0.26 in) 
Full radius 
 
t < 0.5 mm 
(t < 0.02 in) 
6.5 mm 
(0.26 in) 
Rolled, 
curled, or 
covered to 
3.0 mm 
(0.120 in) 
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APPENDIX E  
THERMAL COMFORT AND METABOLIC LOADS 
E1.0 THERMAL COMFORT AND METABOLIC LOADS 
Thermal Comfort:  Human comfort without use of thermal protective garments requires 
a fairly narrow temperature range.  The comfort zone is defined as the range of 
environmental conditions in which humans can achieve thermal comfort and can 
perform routine activities without the negative effects of thermal stress.  Thermal 
comfort is affected by work rate, clothing, and state of acclimatization.  Appendix E, 
figure Environmental Comfort Zone is a graphical representation of the comfort zone.  
The comfort zone does not include the entire range of conditions in which humans can 
survive indefinitely.  The indefinite survival zone is larger and might require active 
perspiration or shivering, responses that are initiated by elevated or lowered core 
temperatures.  Operation outside the comfort zone may be associated with performance 
decrements.  The graph implies minimal air movement and assumes that the radiant 
temperature of the surrounding environment is at the dry bulb temperature.  The effects 
of acclimatization, work, and heavier clothing are shown as data trends by the arrows 
on the graph. This temperature range has been used successfully for STS and ISS 
vehicular operations.  
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FIGURE E1-1 - ENVIRONMENTAL COMFORT ZONE  
Heat Storage and Rejection:  The thermal comfort objective is to maintain body thermal storage within 
the comfort zone defined by the equation: 
 
where MR = Metabolic Rate in BTU/hr, and ΔQstored is the change in heat stored from nominal quantity of 
heat stored in the human body at normal body temperature at rest (For correlation with Appendix E, figure 
Heat Storage, this calculation can be converted to BTU/lb by dividing the ΔQstored [BTU] by 154 lb [the 
legacy standard man weight]. This number can be further converted to kJ/kg using the conversion factors 
of 1 BTU = 1055.056 J and 1 lb = 0.4535924 kg). 
 
 
BTU 
MR 
ΔQstored 65 2 . 13 
278 
± − = 
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Accepted means of heat storage or rejection (ΔQstored) calculation is per 41-node man or Wissler model.  
The ΔQ stored equation is plotted in Appendix E, figure Heat Storage to graphically show the human 
comfort boundaries.  For example, a crewmember with a metabolic rate of 1,705 BTU/hr will be in the 
middle of the comfort zone at approximately 1.6 kJ/kg (0.7 BTU/lb) of stored body heat above normal 
resting storage. Heat storage and rejection tolerance limits are also shown in Appendix E, figure Heat 
Storage.  During those portions of a mission when cabin conditions cannot be maintained within nominal 
limits, short periods of departure from the comfort zone can be accommodated by crewmembers through 
heat storage or loss, not to exceed: 
 
4.7 kJ/kg (2.0 BTU/lb) > ΔQ stored > -4.1 kJ/kg (-1.8 BTU/lb) 
 
 
FIGURE E1-2 - HEAT STORAGE  
Heat storage:  A vehicular cabin with excess heat load may quickly reach crew 
tolerance limits and impair crew performance and health.  Crew impairment begins 
when pulse is greater than 140 bpm or when skin temperature increases more than 
1.4 °C (2.5 °F) (0.6 °C [1 °F] core), which correlates with heat storage of approximately 
4.7 kJ/kg (2.0 BTU/lb).  Appendix E, table Core Temperature Range Limits and 
Associated Performance Decrements identifies core temperature range limits and 
associated performance decrements.  Maintaining crewmember heat storage below the 
performance impairment level (also known as the Cognitive Deficit Onset [CDO] line, 
Appendix E, figure Heat Storage) allows the crew the ability to conduct complex tasks 
without heat-induced performance degradation.  Precise prediction of crew tolerances 
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and time constraints for entry are not possible: therefore, environmental temperature 
must be controlled. 
In a non-acclimatized individual, water loss is approximately 0.95 L (32 oz) per hour and 
salt loss is approximately 2 to 3 grams (0.0044 to 0.0066 lb) per hour.  In microgravity 
and elevated humidity, sweat forms an insulating layer over the body, further adding to 
the heat stress instead of relieving it.  Losses may be less in a thermally acclimatized 
individual. 
Heat rejection:  If heat is removed from the body to the point of thermogenic shivering, 
crew task performance will be impaired in a similar fashion to excess heat storage.  Like 
the condition of excess heat storage, which can be mitigated by specialized cooling 
garments, excess heat rejection can be mitigated to some degree by the use of 
insulating garments.  Appendix E, figure Environmental Comfort Zone shows the effect 
of tolerance to cold temperature and wind by the addition of varying degrees of thermal 
protecting clothing.  Keeping crewmember heat rejection above the performance 
impairment level (Appendix E, figure Heat Storage) allows the crew to conduct tasks 
without cold-induced performance degradation, which occurs at approximately - 4.1 
kJ/kg (-1.8 BTU/lb).  
TABLE E1-1 - CORE TEMPERATURE RANGE LIMITS  
AND ASSOCIATED PERFORMANCE DECREMENTS  
Core Temperature °C 
(°F) 
Approximate Heat 
Storage 
kJ/kg (BTU/lb) 
Medical Condition 
37.7-38.2 (99.9-100.8) 4.7-6.0 (2.0-2.6) 
Heat-associated discomfort 
Hyperthermia/heat stress manifestations 
Mild performance impairment  
Decreasing manual dexterity 
Cognitive Deficit Onset (CDO) 
38.2-39.2 (100.8-102.6) 6.0-9.1 (2.6-3.9) 
Increased errors in judgment 
Moderate performance decrement 
Loss of Tracking Skills (LOTS) 
25% risk of heat casualties 
Possible heat exhaustion 
39.2-40 (102.6-104) 9.1-12.1 (3.9-5.2) 
Functional limit of physical tasks 
Severe performance decrement 
50% risk of heat casualties 
Probable heat exhaustion 
Possible heat stroke 
Possible permanent disability 
>40 (>104) >12.1 (>5.2) 
Unable to perform tasks 
100% risk of heat casualties 
Probable heat stroke 
Probable permanent disability 
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In summary, the thermal comfort objectives are that: 1) body thermal storage be within 
the comfort zone, 2) evaporative heat losses be limited to insensible evaporation of 
moisture produced only by respiration and diffusion through the skin without active 
sweating, 3) there is no thermogenic shivering, and 4) body core temperatures are 
maintained near the normal resting values of approximately 37 °C (99 °F), and 5) skin 
temperatures are maintained near normal resting values of approximately 32.8 °C to 
34.4 °C (91 °F to 94 °F) when no Liquid Cooling Garments (LCGs) are used.  During 
LCG use, skin temperatures will be significantly lower. 
Expected Metabolic Loads:  In order to allow calculation of vehicle environmental 
control system capacity, it is necessary to know expected crewmember metabolic loads, 
which will be affected by the magnitude of work being performed.  Appendix E, table 
Crew Induced Metabolic Loads For A Standard Mission Day With Exercise provides 
estimates of metabolically generated heat (column 5), water (column 6), and CO2 
(column 9).  This table was populated with physiologically measured parameters as well 
as 41-Node man simulations.  These are expected crew induced loads based on the 
assumptions and conditions stated in the legend, and therefore will be altered if any of 
these variables change. 
Crew Induced Metabolic Loads for a Standard Mission Day:  The data represent 
crew induced loads from a single crewmember.  In addition to any vehicle and 
equipment induced loads, the vehicle must accommodate crew induced loads for the 
entire crew, assuming that only one crewmember can exercise at a time and assuming 
that other crewmembers will be at nominal activity level during that time.  Each 
crewmember must be able to exercise at this level once per day.  Total heat output from 
a single crewmember is the sum of sensible (dry) heat and wet heat outputs.  The 
sensible (dry) heat component includes only direct radiation and convection of heat from 
a crewmember.  Total wet heat includes two components: 1) latent heat, including heat 
in water vapor, which is exhaled, and that of which evaporates directly from the skin, 
and 2) sweat run-off, which includes heat in sweat which leaves the body in the form of 
liquid.  For purposes of vehicle design modeling, O2 consumption and CO2 output are 
considered to be at 75% VO2 max level during exercise, and return to nominal values 
when exercise has stopped.  Water, O2, and CO2 are reported as kilograms and pounds 
mass, with O2 and CO2 converted from STPD data.  The table data assume an 82-kg 
(181-lb) crewmember, a 30-minute exercise period, VO2max = 45 mL/kg/min 
(1.25 in3/lb/min) at STPD, 5% work efficiency of the exercise device, air and wall 
temperature = 21 °C (70 °F), air flow = 9.1 m/min (30 ft/min), dew point = 10 °C (50 °F), 
vehicle pressure = 70.3 kPa (10.2 psia), 0g loading, respiratory quotient = 0.92 (must be 
applied volumetrically), crewmember wearing shorts and t-shirt, sleeping metabolic rate 
of 300 BTU/hr, nominal metabolic rate of 474 BTU/hr. and a metabolic rate of 500 
BTU/hr for the hour immediately after exercise completion.  The variability of this 
analysis is 5%.  If any of the above conditions or assumptions changes, the described 
loads will be altered. 
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TABLE E1-2 - CREW INDUCED METABOLIC LOADS FOR A STANDARD MISSION DAY 
WITH EXERCISE  
 
 
TABLE E1-3 - CREW INDUCED METABOLIC LOADS FOR A STANDARD MISSION DAY, 
NO EXERCISE  
 
1) These values do not include a sweat run-off component, as none is expected. 
2) This column will reflect a lag between metabolic rate and heat output. 
3) There are no multipliers applied to the Totals Row. 
4) A respiratory quotient of 0.92 was assumed for the oxygen consumption and carbon dioxide 
output determinations. 
 
Rationale and input assumptions for metabolic Appendix E, table Crew Induced Metabolic Loads For A 
Standard Mission Day With Exercise and table Crew Induced Metabolic Loads For A Standard Mission 
Day, No Exercise: 
1) Male - Male because more astronauts are male than female, and with a crew of males, 
metabolic rates will encompass the loads generated by that of a mixed crew or a crew of all 
females. 
2) 82 kg Weight - Current astronaut corps average weight for males is 78 kg and projected male 
astronaut corps average weight for 2015 is 82 kg.  Additional calculations of metabolic 
expenditure were also made assuming different masses of crewmembers, and the 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Crew Member 
Activity 
Description
Duration 
of 
Activity 
(hr)
Sensible (dry) 
Heat Output 
kJ/hr (btu/hr)
Wet Heat 
Output 
(includes latent 
and sweat run-
off) kJ/hr 
(btu/hr)
Total Heat 
Output Rate 
kJ/hr 
(btu/hr)(2)
Water Vapor Output 
kg/min* 10-4 
(lbm/min* 10-4)
Sweat Runoff Rate 
kg/min* 10-4 
(lbm/min* 10-4)
O2 
Consumption(4) 
kg/min* 10-4 
(lbm/min* 10-4)
CO2 Output
(4) 
kg/min* 10-4 
(lbm/min* 10-4)
Sleep 8 224 (213) 92 (87) 317 (300) 6.30 (13.90) 0.00 (0.00)(1) 3.60 (7.94) 4.55 (10.03)
Nominal 14.5 329 (312) 171 (162) 500 (474) 11.77 (25.95) 0.00 (0.00)(1) 5.68 (12.55) 7.20 (15.87)
Exercise 0 - 15 
min at 75% 
VO2max
0.25 514 (487) 692 (656) 1206 (1143) 46.16 (101.76) 1.56 (3.43) 39.40 (86.86) 49.85 (109.90)
Exercise 15 -  30 
min at 75% 
VO2max
0.25 624 (591) 2351 (2228) 2974 (2819) 128.42 (283.13) 33.52 (73.90) 39.40 (86.86) 49.85 (109.90)
Recovery 0  - 15 
min post 75% 
VO2max
0.25 568 (538) 1437 (1362) 2005 (1900) 83.83 (184.82) 15.16 (33.43) 5.68 (12.55) 7.2 (15.86)
Recovery  15 - 
30 min post 75% 
VO2max
0.25 488 (463) 589 (559) 1078 (1022) 40.29 (88.82) 0.36 (0.79) 5.68 (12.55) 7.2 (15.86)
Recovery  30 - 
45 min post 75% 
VO2max
0.25 466 (442) 399 (378) 865 (820) 27.44 (60.50) 0.00 (0.00)(1) 5.68 (12.55) 7.2 (15.86)
Recovery 45 - 
60 min post 75% 
VO2max
0.25 455 (431) 296 (281) 751 (712) 20.40 (44.98) 0.00 (0.00)(1) 5.68 (12.55) 7.2 (15.86)
24Total Per Day(3) 7351 (6967) 4649 (4410) 12000 (11377) 1.85 (4.07) 0.08 (0.17) 0.82 (1.80) 1.04 (2.29)
Crew Member 
Activity 
Description
Duration 
of 
Activity 
(hr)
Sensible (dry) 
Heat Output 
kJ/hr (btu/hr)
Wet Heat 
Output 
(includes latent 
and sweat run-
off) kJ/hr 
(btu/hr)
Total Heat 
Output Rate 
kJ/hr  
(btu/hr)(2)
 Water Vapor Output 
kg/min* 10-4 
(lbm/min* 10-4)
Sweat Runoff Rate 
kg/min* 10-4 
(lbm/min* 10-4)
O2 
Consumption(4) 
kg/min* 10-4 
(lbm/min* 10-4)
CO2 Output(4) 
kg/min* 10-4 
(lbm/min* 10-4) 
Sleep 8 224 (213) 92 (87)(1) 317 (300) 6.30 (13.90) 0.00 (0.00)(1) 3.60 (7.94) 4.55 (10.03)
Nominal 16 329 (312) 171 (162)(1) 500 (474) 11.77 (25.95) 0.00 (0.00)(1) 5.68 (12.55) 7.20 (15.87)
24 7056 (6696) 3472 (3288) 10536 (9984) 1.43 (3.16) 0.00 (0.00)(1) 0.72 (1.59) 0.91 (2.00)Total Per Day(3)
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output/loads change in a corresponding linear fashion; however the 82 kg assumed mass is 
felt to be most representative for sizing ECLSS systems. 
3) Thermo-Neutral Environment - Constant Temp = 70 °F and Constant Dew Point = 50 °F, a 
team of Physiologist, Engineers and Scientist agreed on environmental conditions for the 
model input. 
4) Astronaut Corps Fitness Level - max VO2 = 48 mL/kg/min +/- 6 mL/kg/min, this value was 
quantified from actual VO2 max testing data and applied to the model for oxygen consumption 
during exercise as well as converted into BTU/hr for a model input. 
5) Respiratory quotient/Respiratory Exchange Ratio (RER) - Historically a range of 0.87 - 0.92 
has been found for CO2 production.  This quotient or ratio can rise to as high as 1 during 
intense exercise sessions.  A team of Physiologists, Engineers and Scientists agreed on the 
RER for the model input taking into account that this is a critical element of crew health, 
especially while living in close quarters, and considering the expected level of activity. 
6) All four lunar crewmembers will be exercising because each crewmember needs to remain 
healthy throughout the entirety of the mission.  Orion-ISS missions are not considered here 
as exercise is not required for those very short duration missions 
7) Vehicle Pressure - Described to the team by ECLSS as being 10.2 psia for planned standard 
Orion operating pressure in LEO and likely for transit phases, so this value was used as an 
input to the modeling. 
8) 0 g - There is only microgravity in space so this condition was used as an input to the model. 
9) Clothing - There are several thermodynamic models for the human system under certain 
conditions and stresses and these model predict different outcomes based on the amount of 
clothing.  The model input for clothing is short sleeve t-shirt and shorts and the insulation and 
convection properties that apply to that clothing type were used in the modeling. 
10) Sleeping metabolic rate of 300 BTU/hr was agreed upon by a team of Physiologists, 
Engineers and Scientists and is within the range of historical data during non-wakeful activity. 
11) Nominal metabolic rate of 474 BTU/hr was agreed upon by a team of Physiologists, 
Engineers and Scientists and is within the range of historical data for typical Intravehicular 
Activity level. 
12) The 41-Node man model has been used and incorporated into NASA testing, verifications, 
validations since the 1960s and from different data analysis has shown to be accurate within 
5% when similar constants and variables are chosen. 
 
Suited Operations:  Suited operations encompass a diverse set of activities that result in varied metabolic 
rates.  Under certain conditions, the vehicle may need to support these metabolic loads through umbilical 
connections.  Appendix E, table Crewmember Metabolic Rates For Suited Operations contains ranges of 
metabolic rates expected during suited operations, although this table will evolve as the operations 
concept matures.  These data should therefore only be used as historical reference and in progress 
estimates, and not as design goals. 
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TABLE E1-4 - CREWMEMBER METABOLIC RATES FOR SUITED OPERATIONS  
Data Source Minimum  
kJ/hr (BTU/hr) 
Average  
kJ/hr (BTU/hr) 
Maximum(1)  
kJ/hr (BTU/hr) 
µ Gravity EVA (ISS and STS) 575 (545)(2) 950 (900)(3) 2,320 (2,200) 
Apollo Lunar Surface EVA 517 (490)(2) 1,030 (980) 2,607 (2,471) 
Advanced Walkback Test(4) 1,767 (1,675)(1) 2,505 (2,374) 3,167 (3,002) 
Suit Donning/Doffing 686 (650)(5) 844 (800)(5) 1,583 (1,500)(6) 
Assisting with Suit Doffing - 686 (650)(5) - 
Resting Postlanding 0 -1 hr 475 (450)(7) 528 (500)(8) - 
Resting Postlanding 1 -1.5 hr 422 (400)(7) 617 (585)(8) - 
Resting Postlanding 1.5 - 24 hr 369 (350)(7) 477 (452)(8) - 
(1) Transient condition less than 15 min in duration, individual instance 
(2) Minimum average for low activity EVA durations 
(3) Includes Orlan ISS EVAs, which trend to slightly higher metabolic rates 
(4) Simulated 10 km (6.2 mile) lunar surface walk requiring 1-2 hours to complete, in case of rover 
failure, n=6 
(5) Estimated metabolic rate representing moderate and lower effort portions of suit doffing; actual 
values may differ substantially dependent upon final suit and seat configurations 
(6) Estimated peak metabolic rate based on historical Sokul suit egress data in Soyuz, representing 
the most difficult portion of suit doffing and not expected to be longer than 5-10 minutes total per 
crewmember 
(7) Estimated resting metabolic rate in suits after landing on land or on calm seas without seasickness 
(8) Estimated average metabolic rate assuming postlanding seasickness during water landings.  
Assume 2 out of the 4 crewmembers are sick. 
 
When a crewmember is in a suit with no active cooling, heat storage may increase 
rapidly.  JSC thermoregulatory models (Wissler and 41-Node man) simulating hot cabin 
entries wearing launch and entry suits with the thickness, conductance, wickability, and 
emmissivity properties of the Advanced Crew Escape Suit (ACES) predicted loss of 
body cooling mechanisms.  Data from military aircrew protective ensembles also found 
that body temperature increases more rapidly over time in pressure suits when 
compared to a shirt-sleeve environment.  Appendix E, figure Time Allowed In Suit As 
Limited By Environmental Conditions And Activity Level Without Internal Garment 
Cooling, Wissler ACES Model provides the time allowance in a suit (without active 
cooling) prior to the onset of cognitive impairment. 
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FIGURE E1-3 - TIME ALLOWED IN SUIT AS LIMITED BY ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS 
AND ACTIVITY LEVEL WITHOUT INTERNAL GARMENT COOLING, WISSLER ACES 
MODEL  
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APPENDIX F 
F1.0 
Appendix F content moved to Appendix A, Section A1.0 Acronyms and Abbreviations 
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APPENDIX G 
G1.0 
Appendix G content moved to Appendix A, Section A2.0 Glossary of Terms. 
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APPENDIX H  
TBD LIST 
 TABLE H-1 - TO BE DETERMINED ITEMS  
TBD Location Closure Plan Target Date 
TBD-70024-005 Appendix N, table 
Transient Force 
Applicant Limits 
Tests will be performed by the Orion Contingency Land 
Landing Team to determine the limits for lumbar 
resultant forces in Appendix N, table Transient Force 
Application Limits, levied by HS3128 Transient Force 
Application Limits. 
07/31/2010 
TBD-70024-050 HS10028 
HS10028V 
Agreement between CxP, Projects, and Ground 
Operations is needed regarding ownership and 
maintenance of the CxP Launch Site Task Tool List. 
07/31/2010 
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APPENDIX I  
TBR LIST 
 TABLE I-1 - TO BE RESOLVED ISSUES  
TBR Location. Closure Plan Target Date 
TBR-70024-001 HS3129 
HS3130 
HS3130V 
Tests will be performed by the Orion Contingency Land Landing 
Team to validate the limits for restrained body movement and 
deflection in Appendix N, table Restrained Body Movement and 
Deflection, levied by HS3130 Restrained Body Movement. 
07/31/2010 
TBR-70024-004 HS3006D 
HS3006DV 
Additional research with vertebrate exposure to lunar dust 
required to determine the contaminant size. 
12/31/2010 
TBR-70024-005 HS11015 
HS11016 
HS11017 
HS11018 
Determine the need for Physiological Suited Parameters for the 
Table J-3 FFISS DRM. 
06/30/2012 
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APPENDIX J – Block 0 (Orion 1) DRM 
ALLOCATION MATRIX 
This table denotes allocation of HSIR requirements to the various systems.  An "X" in 
the column of any system for a given requirement allocates the requirement to that 
system.  The system is either required to meet the requirement independently or in 
conjunction with other systems to which that requirement is allocated.  Additionally, the 
last two columns denote which Verification Requirements must be satisfied with the 
verification requirements contained within the HSIR, Section 4.0 (those marked LII), OR 
which may be verified using alternate acceptable methods that have been Level III 
Project approved and documented (those marked LIII).  The Level III projects are not 
required to obtain approval for verification closure or changes to verification 
methodology beyond their own project boards when verification has been designated 
Level III. Designation of Level II verification denotes that the Level II Program dictates 
and maintains change authority over the verification methodology but does not 
necessarily imply that Level II performs the verification. 
The Block 0 (Orion 1) Design Reference Mission (DRM) is a “Low Earth Orbit (LEO) 
Uncrewed” DRM.  This mission’s primary purpose is to provide a low-earth orbit (LEO) 
spacecraft system demonstration capability. It will provide an uncrewed test bed for 
subsystems to execute in-space objectives and validate the initial capabilities of the 
Orion spacecraft.  Although the spacecraft system will not contain a flight crew during 
this DRM, its systems will still be assembled, operated, and serviced by various ground 
crew personnel.  Requirements applicable to the Block 0 (Orion 1) DRM can be found in 
Table J-1 – Allocation Matrix for Block 0 (Orion 1) DRM.  Note that Table J-1 is only 
applicable for the DRM described herein.  The Block 0 (Orion 1) DRM applicability 
matrix is intended to protect the health and safety of ground maintenance and recovery  
crew, not to specifically scope the configuration of the Orion 1 vehicle or identify flight 
test objectives for Orion 2. 
Additional HSIR functional and design and construction requirements may be met by 
the Orion 1 design, either through flight test objectives or as a result of common 
manufacturing and tooling with later Orion flights. However, verification for these 
requirements are not explicitly required unless allocated in this matrix. 
As stated above, Orion 1 is an uncrewed mission with a duration of 14 (TBR) days.  
Flight Day 1 includes launch, LEO reconfiguration, and test operations.  Test operations 
continue through the mission until Flight Day 14.  On Flight Day 14, the vehicle will de-
orbit, re-enter the Earth’s atmosphere, land (San Diego), then be recovered.  Key 
operational assumptions include: (Source of Block 0 (Orion 1) DRM description: 
04/29/10 ERB Presentation) 
• 0 crew 
• The launch vehicle is Ares I 
• The exact mission duration will be designed to accomplish the test objectives within the 
consumables and thermal limitations of the spacecraft 
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• Autonomous functionality will support  time-critical mission success capabilities for up to 
1 hour in the event of loss of ground communication 
• The ISS rendezvous profile will fly a passively fail-safe trajectory profile up to and inside 
the ISS Approach Ellipsoid while remaining outside the Keep Out Sphere  
• Postlanding safing and powerdown will be automatic 
• The Crew Module will be recovered for post mission inspection & analysis 
 
TABLE J-1 - ALLOCATION MATRIX FOR BLOCK 0 (ORION 1) DRM  
REQUIREMENTS  VERIFICATIONS 
Requirement Requirement Name Orion Ares I MS GO EVA FCE  LEVEL II LEVEL III 
HS2001 Anthropometric Dimensions 
for Unsuited Crewmembers          
HS2002 Anthropometric Dimensions 
for Suited Crewmembers          
HS2003 Range of Motion of an 
Unsuited Crewmember          
HS2004 Range of Motion of a Suited 
Crewmember          
HS2005 Mass Properties of an 
Unsuited Crewmember          
HS2006 Mass Properties of a Suited 
Crewmember          
HS2007 Structural Integrity of 
Hardware for an Unsuited 
Crewmember 
         
HS2007B Structural Integrity of 
Hardware for a Suited 
Crewmember 
         
HS2008 Minimum Crew Operational 
Loads for an Unsuited 
Crewmember 
         
HS2008B Minimum Crew Operational 
Loads for a Suited 
Crewmember 
         
HS2009 Equipment Damage Hazard X     X   X 
HS2010 Total Crew Control Mass          
HS3001 O2 and Total Pressure 
Control          
HS3004 Total Pressure for Nominal 
Vehicle Operations          
HS3004B O2 Partial Pressure for 
Nominal Vehicle Operations          
HS3004C CO2 Partial Pressure for 
Nominal Vehicle Operations          
HS3004D N2 Partial Pressure for 
Nominal Vehicle Operations          
HS3005 Total Pressure Tolerance 
Ranges for Crew Exposure          
HS3005B O2 Partial Pressure 
Tolerance Ranges for Crew 
Exposure 
         
HS3005C CO2 Partial Pressure 
Tolerance Ranges for Crew 
Exposure 
         
HS3006 Microbial Air Contamination          
HS3006C Particulate Contamination          
HS3006D Lunar Dust Contamination          
HS3007 Gaseous Pollutants Limits X     X   X 
HS3009 Rate of Change of Pressure 
Limits          
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REQUIREMENTS  VERIFICATIONS 
Requirement Requirement Name Orion Ares I MS GO EVA FCE  LEVEL II LEVEL III 
HS3012A Combustion Products 
Monitoring X        X 
HS3012B Combustion Products 
Measurement X        X 
HS3012D Carbon Monoxide Alert X        X 
HS3013 Composition Reporting          
HS3014 Composition Alerting          
HS3015 Toxic Hazard Level 3 X     X   X 
HS3015A Toxic Hazard Level 4 X X    X   X 
HS3016 Personal Protective 
Equipment          
HS3017 Crew Communication 
During Contingency 
Breathing 
         
HS3017A Contingency Breathing 
Apparatus          
HS3017B Mission Systems 
Communication During 
Contingency Breathing 
         
HS3019 Physiochemical Limits for 
Potable Water          
HS3019A Microbial Limits for Potable 
Water          
HS3025 Potable Water for On-Orbit 
Drinking          
HS3026 Potable Water for Fluid 
Loading          
HS3027 Potable Water for Post-
Landing          
HS3028 Potable Water for Personal 
Hygiene          
HS3029 Potable Water Rate          
HS3030 Potable Water Temperature 
for Cold Drinks          
HS3031 Potable Water Temperature 
for Hot Food and Drinks          
HS3032 Potable Water Temperature 
for Personal Hygiene          
HS3034 Water Sampling          
HS3036 Nominal Atmospheric 
Temperature          
HS3037 Contingency Control of 
Heat Stored by 
Crewmembers 
         
HS3046 Relative Humidity for 
Nominal Vehicle          
HS3047 In-flight Ventilation          
HS3050 Supplemental Ventilation          
HS3051 Temperature Set-Point 
Adjustment          
HS3052 Temperature Set-Point 
Accessibility          
HS3053 Temperature Set-Point 
Increments          
HS3054 Temperature Set-Point 
Error          
HS3055 Display and Monitoring of 
Temperature and Relative 
Humidity 
         
HS3059 Crew Exposure to Rate of 
Change of Acceleration          
HS3060 Linear Acceleration Limits 
during Nominal Return          
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REQUIREMENTS  VERIFICATIONS 
Requirement Requirement Name Orion Ares I MS GO EVA FCE  LEVEL II LEVEL III 
HS3061 Linear Acceleration Limits 
from Launch to Mission 
Destination 
         
HS3062 Linear Acceleration Limits 
for Ascent Abort and Off-
Nominal 
         
HS3064 Crew Injury Risk Limits          
HS3065 Sustained Rotational 
Acceleration Limit          
HS3069 Rotational Limits for 
Nominal Return          
HS3070 Rotational Limits for Launch 
to Mission Destination          
HS3071 Rotational Limits for Ascent 
Abort and Off-Nominal 
Entry 
         
HS3072 Hazardous Noise Limit for 
Launch and Entry          
HS3073 Noise Dose Limits for 
Launch and Entry          
HS3074 Impulse Noise Limit for 
Launch and Entry          
HS3075 Hazardous Noise Limit for 
the Orbit Phase          
HS3076 Sound Pressure Level 
(SPL) Limits for Continuous 
Noise during Orbit Phase 
         
HS3078 Impulse Noise Limit for the 
Orbit Phase          
HS3079 Annoyance Noise Limits for 
Crew Sleep          
HS3080 Tonal and Narrow-Band 
Noise Limits          
HS3081 Infrasonic Noise Limits          
HS3082 Cabin Depressurization 
Valve Hazardous Noise 
Limit 
         
HS3083 Cabin Depressurization 
Valve Noise Dose Limits          
HS3084 Reverberation Time          
HS3085 Radiation Design 
Requirements          
HS3086 Charged Particle Monitoring          
HS3088 Dose Equivalent Monitoring          
HS3089 Absorbed Dose Monitoring          
HS3090 Passive Radiation 
Monitoring          
HS3091 Radiation Data Reporting to 
the Crew - Absorbed Dose          
HS3092 Alerting for Radiation Data          
HS3093 Radio-Frequency 
Electromagnetic Field 
Radiation Limits 
         
HS3094 Ocular Exposure to Lasers          
HS3096 Dermal Exposure to Lasers          
HS3098 Retinal Thermal Injury from 
Visible and Near Infrared 
Sources 
         
HS3099 Small Source Visible 
Radiation Limits          
HS3101 Large Source Visible 
Radiation Limits          
HS3103 Thermal Injury from Infrared          
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REQUIREMENTS  VERIFICATIONS 
Requirement Requirement Name Orion Ares I MS GO EVA FCE  LEVEL II LEVEL III 
Radiation 
HS3104 Ultraviolet Exposure for 
Unprotected Eye or Skin          
HS3105 Health Limits for Vibration 
During Dynamic Phases of 
Flight 
         
HS3106 Vibration Limits during 
Crew Sleep          
HS3108 Pre-Launch Vibration Limit 
to Prevent Motion Sickness          
HS3109 Sound Pressure Level 
(SPL) Limits for Intermittent 
Noise Duration 
         
HS3110 Noise Limit for Personal 
Communication Devices          
HS3111 Loudspeaker Alarm 
Audibility X       X  
HS3112 Radiation Data Reporting to 
Mission Systems - 
Absorbed Dose 
         
HS3113 Particle Archive Data          
HS3114 Ventilation Adjustment          
HS3115 Display of Actual 
Temperature          
HS3116 Display of Temperature 
Set-Point          
HS3117 Potable Water Dispensing          
HS3118 Potable Hot Water Quantity 
for Rehydration          
HS3119 Radiation Data Reporting to 
the Crew - Dose Equivalent          
HS3120 Radiation Data Reporting to 
Mission Systems - Dose          
HS3121 Potable Water Temperature 
for Medical Use          
HS3122 Potable Water for Medical 
Use          
HS3123 Potable Water for Medical 
Contingency          
HS3124 Head Protection Criteria          
HS3125 Neck Protection Criteria          
HS3126 Relative Humidity 
Tolerance Ranges for Crew 
Exposure 
         
HS3127 Potable Water for On-Orbit 
Food Rehydration          
HS3128 Transient Force Application 
Limits          
HS3129 Chest Deflection          
HS3130 Restrained Body Movement          
HS3132 Head Transient 
Acceleration Limits          
HS3133 Sound Pressure Level 
(SPL) Limits for Waste 
Management System 
         
HS3134 Speech Interference Level 
Limit for Pre-Launch and 
Post-Landing 
         
HS4002 Corners and Edges 
Exposed during Nominal 
Operations 
         
HS4003 Corners and Edges 
Exposed during          
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REQUIREMENTS  VERIFICATIONS 
Requirement Requirement Name Orion Ares I MS GO EVA FCE  LEVEL II LEVEL III 
Maintenance 
HS4004 Corners and Edges of 
Loose Equipment          
HS4005 Burrs X         
HS4006 Sharp Items          
HS4007 Interior Item Restraints          
HS4008 Electrical Hazard Potential          
HS4008B Chassis Leakage Current - 
Nonpatient Equipment          
HS4008C Chassis Leakage Current - 
Patient Equipment          
HS4012 Hot Touch Temperature 
Limit          
HS4012A Cold Touch Temperature 
Limit          
HS4019 Fire Suppression Portability          
HS4021 Pinch Points          
HS4022 Emergency Equipment 
Access          
HS4023 Holes          
HS5001 Layout Interference          
HS5002 Layout Sequential 
Operations          
HS5003 Workstation Orientation          
HS5004 Ingress and Egress 
Translation Paths          
HS5005 Internal Translation Paths          
HS5006 Standard Restraints and 
Mobility Aids          
HS5007 IVA Mobility Aids          
HS5008 Workstation Restraints          
HS5009 Ingress and Egress Mobility 
Aids          
HS5010 Crew Egress Translation 
Path - Ground          
HS5012 Flail Injury Protection          
HS5013 Hatches Operable Inside 
and Outside X   X     X 
HS5014 Hatch Manual Pressure 
Equalization Inside and 
Outside 
X        X 
HS5016 Hatch Closure Indication X        X 
HS5017 Hatch Visual Observation X        X 
HS5019 Window Optical Properties          
HS5021 Window Viewing for Piloting 
Tasks          
HS5022 Window for External 
Viewing Observation          
HS5027 Window Cover, Shade, and 
Filter Removal or 
Replacement in 10 
Seconds 
         
HS5030 Obstruction          
HS5031 Window and Internal 
Darkening          
HS5032 Window Proximity Finishes          
HS5034B Interior Light Adjustability          
HS5035 Lighting Level by Task X        X 
HS5039 General Light Control X        X 
HS5040 Workstation Light Control X        X 
HS5041 Workstation Light Position 
Adjustment X        X 
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REQUIREMENTS  VERIFICATIONS 
Requirement Requirement Name Orion Ares I MS GO EVA FCE  LEVEL II LEVEL III 
HS5042 Workstation Visual 
Demarcations          
HS5043 Hatches Operable in 60 
Seconds          
HS5044 Hatches Operable Without 
Tools          
HS5045 Hatches Operable by 
Suited Crewmembers          
HS5046 Unlatching Hatches          
HS5048 Hatch Manual Pressure 
Equalization by Suited 
Crewmembers 
         
HS5049 Hatch Latch Position X        X 
HS5050 Hatch Pressure Difference 
Measurement          
HS5051 Window Cover, Shade, and 
Filter Removal or 
Replacement Without Tools 
         
HS5052 Commonly Distinguishable 
Handrails          
HS5053 Crew Ingress/Egress 
Translation Path in Space          
HS5054 Egress Handrails          
HS5055 Window for Motion Imagery 
and Photography          
HS5056 Lighting ON/OFF Control X        X 
HS6001 Cross-Contamination 
Prevention          
HS6002 Cross-Contamination 
Separation          
HS6003 Heating          
HS6004 Rehydration          
HS6005 In-Flight Food Preparation 
Time          
HS6009 Personal Hygiene Privacy          
HS6010 Personal Hygiene Stowage          
HS6012 Personal Hygiene Trash          
HS6013 Vomitus Collection and 
Containment          
HS6014 Simultaneous Defecation 
and Urination          
HS6016 Fecal Wipes          
HS6017 Feces per Day          
HS6020 Diarrhea per Event          
HS6020C Feces per Event          
HS6020D Diarrheal Events per 
Crewmember          
HS6021 Urine Collection          
HS6022 Urine Wipes          
HS6023 Urine per Crewmember          
HS6024 Urine per Hour          
HS6025 Urine Rate          
HS6025B Urine per Day          
HS6027 Full Body Visual Privacy          
HS6028 Body Self-Inspection and 
Cleaning          
HS6029 Waste Management Odor 
Control          
HS6030 Waste Management 
Stowage          
HS6031 Waste Management Trash          
HS6032 Exercise Capability          
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REQUIREMENTS  VERIFICATIONS 
Requirement Requirement Name Orion Ares I MS GO EVA FCE  LEVEL II LEVEL III 
HS6035 Exercise Operational 
Envelope          
HS6036 Thermal Environment 
During Exercise          
HS6037 Carbon Dioxide Levels 
During Exercise          
HS6038 Relative Humidity During 
Exercise          
HS6044 Stowage Nominal 
Operation          
HS6046 Stowage Location          
HS6047 Stowage Arrangement          
HS6049 Stowage Reconfiguration          
HS6050 Stowage Restraints          
HS6051 Stowage Hand Operation          
HS6052 Stowage Commonality          
HS6053 Stowage Compatibility with 
Inventory Management          
HS6054 Trash Management 
Nominal Operations          
HS6056 Trash Management Odor 
Control          
HS6057 Trash Management 
Contamination Control          
HS6058 Trash Management Hazard 
Containment          
HS6059 Food System          
HS6060 Metabolic Intake          
HS6062 Metabolic Intake for EVA          
HS6063 Potable Water for EVA 
Operations          
HS6069 Auditory and Olfactory 
Privacy          
HS6073 Oxygen Levels During 
Exercise          
HS6075 Private Voice          
HS6076 Private Video          
HS6077 Biomedical Data          
HS6078 Biomedical Relay          
HS6079 Biomedical Display          
HS6081 DCS Over-Pressurization          
HS6082 Orthostatic Protection          
HS6083 Medical Care Provider 
Access          
HS6084 Patient Electrical Isolation          
HS6085 Access to Medical 
Equipment          
HS6086 Access to Deployed 
Medical Kits          
HS6091 Denitrogenation          
HS6097 Communication Capabilities          
HS6099 Personalized In-Flight 
Updates          
HS6100 DCS Event Pressure          
HS6101 Medical Care Capabilities          
HS6102 Lunar Surface Food 
Preparation Time          
HS6104 Crew Sleep 
Accommodations          
HS6105 Personal Hygiene Items          
HS6106 Stowage Equipment Cover 
Restraint          
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Requirement Requirement Name Orion Ares I MS GO EVA FCE  LEVEL II LEVEL III 
HS7003 Handling Qualities for 
Manual Control – Level 1          
HS7004 Handling Qualities for 
Manual Control – Level 2          
HS7007 Consistent Crew Interfaces          
HS7009 Location Coding          
HS7010 Field of View          
HS7010A Two-Crew Operations          
HS7018 Viewing Critical Displays 
and Controls          
HS7018A Viewing Frequently Used 
Displays and Controls          
HS7019 Functional Reach Envelope          
HS7021 Reach for Critical Controls          
HS7021A Reach for Frequently Used 
Controls          
HS7022 Functional Related Displays 
and Controls          
HS7023 Successive Operation of 
Displays and Controls          
HS7024 Control Spacing For Suited 
Operations          
HS7027 Over 3 g          
HS7028 Over 2 g          
HS7029 Supports          
HS7036 Labeling X     X  X  
HS7044 Legibility          
HS7049 Notifications X        X 
HS7049A Manual Silencing X        X 
HS7055 Command Feedback          
HS7058 Subsystem State 
Information X        X 
HS7058A System Responsiveness for 
Discrete Inputs X        X 
HS7058B System Responsiveness for 
Continuous Inputs          
HS7058C Request for Information          
HS7058D Request for Critical 
Information          
HS7058E Menu Update Time          
HS7059 Task-Oriented Displays          
HS7060 Subsystem-Oriented 
Displays          
HS7060A Viewing Simultaneous Task 
Information          
HS7061 Location within the Display 
Hierarchy          
HS7063 Compatibility of Movement          
HS7063A Control Feedback          
HS7063B Protection against 
Inadvertent Activation          
HS7063C Protection for Flight 
Actuated Critical Controls X        X 
HS7063D Coding for Emergency 
Controls X        X 
HS7063E Restraints for Control 
Operation          
HS7064 Language          
HS7065A Use of Color          
HS7066 Crew Interface Usability          
HS7067 Obscured Controls          
HS7070 Viewing Simultaneous X        X 
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Requirement Requirement Name Orion Ares I MS GO EVA FCE  LEVEL II LEVEL III 
Critical Task Information 
HS7071 Access within the Display 
Hierarchy          
HS7072 State Change X       X  
HS7072A Lost Data X        X 
HS7075 Volume Control for Auditory 
Annunciations X        X 
HS7076 Speech Intelligibility X   X     X 
HS7077 Volume Control for Audio 
Communications X        X 
HS7079 Nomenclature X       X  
HS7080 Workload Measure: 
Nominal          
HS7080A Workload Measure: Off-
Nominal          
HS7082 Self-Illuminated Controls 
and Displays          
HS7083 Protection for Ground 
Actuated Critical Controls   X X      
HS7925 Control Spacing for 
Unsuited Operations          
HS8001 ORU Change-out          
HS8002 Maintenance Time per Day          
HS8003 ORU Maintenance Time          
HS8003-
Objective 
ORU Replacement 
Time/Maintenance          
HS8004 LRU Removal and 
Replacement          
HS8005 Physical Features          
HS8006 Labeling and Marking          
HS8007 Interchangeability          
HS8008 Connectors          
HS8009 Visual Access          
HS8010 Physical Access          
HS8011 Cable Access X X       X 
HS8013 External Service Points          
HS8015 Maintenance Hazard          
HS8016 Failure Notification          
HS8017 No Fuses for Dynamic 
Flight Phases          
HS8018 Circuit Breakers Instead of 
Fuses          
HS8020 Replacement Without Tools          
HS8021 Replacement Without 
Component Removal          
HS8022 Circuit Breaker Resetting          
HS8023 Trip Indication          
HS8024 Electrostatic Discharge          
HS8026 Access Points          
HS8029 Fastener Heads          
HS8030 Fastener Number and 
Variety          
HS8031 Captive Fasteners          
HS8032 Equipment Isolation          
HS8034 Hazardous Levels of Fluid 
Leakage X        X 
HS8037 Common Toolset          
HS8041 Microbial Contamination X     X   X 
HS8042 Fungal Contamination X     X   X 
HS8043 Replacement of Air Filters          
HS8045 Visual Indication          
HS8046 Connector Mating          
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Requirement Requirement Name Orion Ares I MS GO EVA FCE  LEVEL II LEVEL III 
Indication 
HS8047 Unique Identification 
Labeling          
HS8048 Visual Line of Sight          
HS8051 Condensation Prevention 
on Interior Surfaces X        X 
HS8052 Tool Clearance          
HS8053 Disturbance of Equipment          
HS8054 Tool Usage          
HS8055 Crew Control of Power          
HS9014 Data Rate          
HS9018 Locations of Data          
HS9019 Wired Network X        X 
HS9020 Wireless Network          
HS9021 Crew Operability X        X 
HS9025 Displaying Electronic 
Procedures System X        X 
HS9025A Cueing Electronic 
Procedures System X        X 
HS9026 Current Procedure Step X        X 
HS9027 Completed Procedure 
Steps X        X 
HS9028 Crew Notification of 
Required Procedure Action X        X 
HS9029 Annunciation Hierarchy X        X 
HS9029A Annunciation Prioritization X        X 
HS9030 Visual and Auditory 
Annunciation X        X 
HS9032 Distinctiveness of 
Annunciations X        X 
HS9032A Loss of Annunciation 
Capability X       X  
HS9037 Decomposition of 
Chemicals X     X   X 
HS9040 Data Fidelity X        X 
HS9042A Manual Information Capture 
and Transfer          
HS10001 Maintainability Without 
Deintegration          
HS10002 Work Envelope Volumes X X       X 
HS10004 Reach Envelope Volumes X X       X 
HS10006 Ground Crew Visual 
Access X X       X 
HS10008 Ground Anthropometry, 
Biomechanics, and 
Strength 
X X      X  
HS10009 Maintainability Without 
Disabling Subsystems          
HS10010 Fuse/Circuit Indication X X       X 
HS10011 Appropriate Clothing and 
Equipment X X       X 
HS10012 LRU Installation X X       X 
HS10013 LRU Mounting/Alignment 
Labels/Codes X X       X 
HS10014 LRU Interchangeability X X       X 
HS10015 Connector Mismating X X       X 
HS10017 Connector Mating Labels X X       X 
HS10019 Maintenance Without 
Damage X X       X 
HS10020 Fluid Management X X       X 
HS10021 Fluid Spillage Control X X       X 
HS10022 System Safing Controls X X       X 
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Requirement Requirement Name Orion Ares I MS GO EVA FCE  LEVEL II LEVEL III 
HS10023 Equipment Protection          
HS10024 Tool Clearances X X       X 
HS10025 Inspection Access X X       X 
HS10026 Captive Fasteners          
HS10027 Ventilation Openings X X       X 
HS10028 Toolset X X       X 
HS10029 Safety Displays X X       X 
HS10030 Ground Processing 
Hardware Access X X       X 
HS10031 LRU Tracking Labels X X       X 
HS10032 LRU Labeling X X       X 
HS10033 Hazards Labeling X X    X   X 
HS10039 Labeling X X       X 
HS10042 LRU Protrusions X X       X 
HS10043 Protrusion Label/Support X X       X 
HS10045 LRU Weight Limit X X       X 
HS10047 Work Station Layout 
Interference          
HS10048 Work Station Layout 
Sequential Operations          
HS10050 Consistent Crew Interfaces          
HS10051 Legibility X X       X 
HS10052 Written Text X X       X 
HS10053 Use of Color          
HS10054 LRU Removal Without 
Component Removal          
HS10055 Ground Labeling: Non-
Interference with Flight 
Labels 
X     X   X 
HS11000 Suit Pressure Set-Point 
Selection          
HS11001 Suit Pressure Pause          
HS11002 Control of Heat Stored by 
Crewmembers During EVA 
and Pre-launch 
         
HS11004 Stowage for Suit 
Dosimeters          
HS11005 Visual Field of View for a 
Suited Crewmember          
HS11006 Optical Quality for Suited 
Crewmembers          
HS11007 In-Suit Nutrition During 
Surface EVA Operations          
HS11008 In-Suit Nutrition During 
Unpressurized Vehicle 
Survival 
         
HS11009 In-Suit Hydration During 
EVA          
HS11010 In-Suit Hydration during IVA          
HS11011 Vomitus in the Suit          
HS11012 Nominal Urine Collection in 
the Suit          
HS11013 Urine Collection - Suited 
Contingency          
HS11014 Feces Collection - Suited 
Contingency          
HS11015 Measurement of 
Physiological Parameters          
HS11016 Display of Physiological 
Parameters          
HS11017 Alert for Off-Nominal 
Physiological Parameters          
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Requirement Requirement Name Orion Ares I MS GO EVA FCE  LEVEL II LEVEL III 
HS11018 Telemetry of Physiological 
Parameters          
HS11019 Maintain Suit Pressure Set-
Point          
HS11022 Crew Accessibility to Suit 
Temperature Controls          
HS11023 Suited Radiation Dose 
Equivalent Monitoring          
HS11024 Suited Radiation Absorbed 
Dose Monitoring          
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APPENDIX J – Block 0 (Orion 2) DRM 
ALLOCATION MATRIX 
This table denotes allocation of HSIR requirements to the various systems.  An "X" in 
the column of any system for a given requirement allocates the requirement to that 
system.  The system is either required to meet the requirement independently or in 
conjunction with other systems to which that requirement is allocated.  Additionally, the 
last two columns denote which Verification Requirements must be satisfied with the 
verification requirements contained within the HSIR, Section 4.0 (those marked LII), OR 
which may be verified using alternate acceptable methods that have been Level III 
Project approved and documented (those marked LIII).  The Level III projects are not 
required to obtain approval for verification closure or changes to verification 
methodology beyond their own project boards when verification has been designated 
Level III. Designation of Level II verification denotes that the Level II Program dictates 
and maintains change authority over the verification methodology but does not 
necessarily imply that Level II performs the verification. 
The Block 0 (Orion 2) Design Reference Mission (DRM) is an “Optimized ISS Flight Day 
1” DRM.  The Optimized ISS FD1 DRM provides an initial crewed capability to ISS 
demonstration. The mission provides a proving ground for advanced systems.  The 
requirements applicable to the Block 0 (Orion 2) DRM can be found in Table J-2 – 
Allocation Matrix for Block 0 (Orion 2) DRM.  Note that Table J-2 is only applicable for 
the DRM described herein.   
As stated above, Orion 2 is a crewed mission flying 2 crewmembers to ISS on a mission 
lasting 9 flight days. Flight Day 1 includes launch, LEO reconfiguration, and ISS 
Rendezvous and docking.  Flight days 2 through 8 include ISS attached operations, an 
MMOD video survey to check for any damage to the vehicle, and entry systems 
checkout.   On Flight Day 9, the vehicle will undock from ISS, de-orbit, re-enter the 
Earth’s atmosphere, land (San Diego), then be recovered.  Note:  that mission 
variations include as early as a Flight Day 5 undock, and as late as a Flight Day 14 
undock).  Key operational assumptions include: 
(Source of Block 0 (Orion 2) DRM description: ERB 10-0565 Presentation, 4/29/2010) 
• 2 crew (vehicle is designed to hold up to 4 crew) 
• The launch vehicle is Ares I 
• Inclination is 51.6 degrees 
• The planned ISS undock & deorbit will provide for a next day (End of Mission (EOM) +1) 
deorbit opportunity to the primary landing zone 
• Contingency duration (hours) beyond EOM+1 will be allocated to pre-ISS dock 
troubleshooting and ISS safe haven 
• Crew remains suited during all mission phases with visors down during ascent docking 
and entry activity operations 
• Crew may temporarily doff suits (remaining in Liquid Cooling Garment (LCG)) * 
• Crew remains suited and seated during nominal recovery 
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• Suit/FCE provides waste management function ** 
• Automated functionality is provided to support time-critical mission success and crew 
safety capabilities (functionality outside this boundary can be deferred to the crew and/or 
the ground to execute). 
• The automated capabilities should support autonomous (crew + vehicle) operation for up 
to 1 hour in the event of loss of ground communication 
• Docking and ISS interfaces are compatible with the Low Impact Docking System (LIDS) 
docking mechanism 
• Redundant components will be active during all mission critical activities 
• MMOD inspection will occur but tile repair will not be performed 
• Vehicle will transmit location signal for recovery 
• CM will be recovered for post mission inspection & analysis 
• ISS attached ops duration will be tailored for landing site availability 
 
 
* Partial doffing of the LCG will be necessary to accommodate hygiene operations and to 
perform MAG (diaper) change-out.     
 
** MAG usage due to Waste Management System deferral is accepted by the Program as a 
one-time risk for the Orion 2 Flight Day 1 docking test flight only, and not considered the norm 
for fully functional operations, follow-on test flights, or multi-day flights. 
 
TABLE J-2 - ALLOCATION MATRIX FOR BLOCK 0 (ORION 2) DRM  
REQUIREMENTS  VERIFICATIONS 
Requirement Requirement Name Orion Ares I MS GO EVA FCE  LEVEL II 
LEVEL 
III 
HS2001 Anthropometric 
Dimensions for 
Unsuited 
Crewmembers 
X    X X   X 
HS2002 Anthropometric 
Dimensions for Suited 
Crewmembers 
X   X X X   X 
HS2003 Range of Motion of an 
Unsuited Crewmember X    X X   X 
HS2004 Range of Motion of a 
Suited Crewmember X   X X X   X 
HS2005 Mass Properties of an 
Unsuited Crewmember X    X X    
HS2006 Mass Properties of a 
Suited Crewmember X   X X X   X 
HS2007 Structural Integrity of 
Hardware for an 
Unsuited Crewmember 
X    X X   X 
HS2007B Structural Integrity of 
Hardware for a Suited 
Crewmember 
X   X X X    
HS2008 Minimum Crew 
Operational Loads for 
an Unsuited 
Crewmember 
X    X X   X 
HS2008B Minimum Crew X   X X X    
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REQUIREMENTS  VERIFICATIONS 
Requirement Requirement Name Orion Ares I MS GO EVA FCE  LEVEL II 
LEVEL 
III 
Operational Loads for a 
Suited Crewmember 
HS2009 Equipment Damage 
Hazard X    X X   X 
HS2010 Total Crew Control 
Mass X        X 
HS3001 O2 and Total Pressure 
Control X  X     X  
HS3004 Total Pressure for 
Nominal Vehicle 
Operations 
X        X 
HS3004B O2 Partial Pressure for 
Nominal Vehicle 
Operations 
X        X 
HS3004C CO2 Partial Pressure 
for Nominal Vehicle 
Operations 
X    X    X 
HS3004D N2 Partial Pressure for 
Nominal Vehicle 
Operations 
         
HS3005 Total Pressure 
Tolerance Ranges for 
Crew Exposure 
X    X    X 
HS3005B O2 Partial Pressure 
Tolerance Ranges for 
Crew Exposure 
X    X    X 
HS3005C CO2 Partial Pressure 
Tolerance Ranges for 
Crew Exposure 
X    X    X 
HS3006 Microbial Air 
Contamination X        X 
HS3006C Particulate 
Contamination X    X    X 
HS3006D Lunar Dust 
Contamination          
HS3007 Gaseous Pollutants 
Limits X    X X   X 
HS3009 Rate of Change of 
Pressure Limits X    X    X 
HS3012A Combustion Products 
Monitoring X     X   X 
HS3012B Combustion Products 
Measurement X     X   X 
HS3012D Carbon Monoxide Alert X        X 
HS3013 Composition Reporting X        X 
HS3014 Composition Alerting X        X 
HS3015 Toxic Hazard Level 3 X    X X   X 
HS3015A Toxic Hazard Level 4 X X   X X   X 
HS3016 Personal Protective 
Equipment      X   X 
HS3017 Crew Communication 
During Contingency 
Breathing 
X     X   X 
HS3017A Contingency Breathing 
Apparatus      X   X 
HS3017B Mission Systems 
Communication During 
Contingency Breathing 
X  X   X   X 
HS3019 Physiochemical Limits 
for Potable Water    X X X  X  
HS3019A Microbial Limits for    X X X   X 
Revision:  E Document No:  CxP 70024 
Release Date:  11/19/10 Page:  423 of 503 
Title:  Constellation Program Human-Systems Integration Requirements 
 
 
REQUIREMENTS  VERIFICATIONS 
Requirement Requirement Name Orion Ares I MS GO EVA FCE  LEVEL II 
LEVEL 
III 
Potable Water 
HS3025 Potable Water for On-
Orbit Drinking      X   X 
HS3026 Potable Water for Fluid 
Loading      X   X 
HS3027 Potable Water for Post-
Landing X     X   X 
HS3028 Potable Water for 
Personal Hygiene      X   X 
HS3029 Potable Water Rate          
HS3030 Potable Water 
Temperature for Cold 
Drinks 
         
HS3031 Potable Water 
Temperature for Hot 
Food and Drinks 
         
HS3032 Potable Water 
Temperature for 
Personal Hygiene 
         
HS3034 Water Sampling    X     X 
HS3036 Nominal Atmospheric 
Temperature X        X 
HS3037 Contingency Control of 
Heat Stored by 
Crewmembers 
X    X   X  
HS3046 Relative Humidity for 
Nominal Vehicle X        X 
HS3047 In-flight Ventilation X        X 
HS3050 Supplemental 
Ventilation X        X 
HS3051 Temperature Set-Point 
Adjustment X        X 
HS3052 Temperature Set-Point 
Accessibility X        X 
HS3053 Temperature Set-Point 
Increments X        X 
HS3054 Temperature Set-Point 
Error X        X 
HS3055 Display and Monitoring 
of Temperature and 
Relative Humidity 
X        X 
HS3059 Crew Exposure to Rate 
of Change of 
Acceleration 
X X  X     X 
HS3060 Linear Acceleration 
Limits during Nominal 
Return 
X        X 
HS3061 Linear Acceleration 
Limits from Launch to 
Mission Destination 
X X      X  
HS3062 Linear Acceleration 
Limits for Ascent Abort 
and Off-Nominal 
X X      X  
HS3064 Crew Injury Risk Limits X    X   X  
HS3065 Sustained Rotational 
Acceleration Limit X X      X  
HS3069 Rotational Limits for 
Nominal Return X        X 
HS3070 Rotational Limits for 
Launch to Mission 
Destination 
X X      X  
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REQUIREMENTS  VERIFICATIONS 
Requirement Requirement Name Orion Ares I MS GO EVA FCE  LEVEL II 
LEVEL 
III 
HS3071 Rotational Limits for 
Ascent Abort and Off-
Nominal Entry 
X X      X  
HS3072 Hazardous Noise Limit 
for Launch and Entry X X   X   X  
HS3073 Noise Dose Limits for 
Launch and Entry X X   X   X  
HS3074 Impulse Noise Limit for 
Launch and Entry X X   X   X  
HS3075 Hazardous Noise Limit 
for the Orbit Phase X    X X   X 
HS3076 Sound Pressure Level 
(SPL) Limits for 
Continuous Noise 
during Orbit Phase 
X    X X  X  
HS3078 Impulse Noise Limit for 
the Orbit Phase X    X X   X 
HS3079 Annoyance Noise 
Limits for Crew Sleep          
HS3080 Tonal and Narrow-
Band Noise Limits X    X X  X  
HS3081 Infrasonic Noise Limits X X      X  
HS3082 Cabin Depressurization 
Valve Hazardous Noise 
Limit 
X    X   X  
HS3083 Cabin Depressurization 
Valve Noise Dose 
Limits 
X    X   X  
HS3084 Reverberation Time X        X 
HS3085 Radiation Design 
Requirements X       X  
HS3086 Charged Particle 
Monitoring          
HS3088 Dose Equivalent 
Monitoring          
HS3089 Absorbed Dose 
Monitoring          
HS3090 Passive Radiation 
Monitoring X     X   X 
HS3091 Radiation Data 
Reporting to the Crew - 
Absorbed Dose 
         
HS3092 Alerting for Radiation 
Data          
HS3093 Radio-Frequency 
Electromagnetic Field 
Radiation Limits 
X X  X  X  X  
HS3094 Ocular Exposure to 
Lasers X X  X  X  X  
HS3096 Dermal Exposure to 
Lasers X X  X  X  X  
HS3098 Retinal Thermal Injury 
from Visible and Near 
Infrared Sources 
X   X  X  X  
HS3099 Small Source Visible 
Radiation Limits X   X  X  X  
HS3101 Large Source Visible 
Radiation Limits X   X  X  X  
HS3103 Thermal Injury from 
Infrared Radiation X   X  X  X  
HS3104 Ultraviolet Exposure for 
Unprotected Eye or X   X  X  X  
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Requirement Requirement Name Orion Ares I MS GO EVA FCE  LEVEL II 
LEVEL 
III 
Skin 
HS3105 Health Limits for 
Vibration During 
Dynamic Phases of 
Flight 
X X   X   X  
HS3106 Vibration Limits during 
Crew Sleep X       X  
HS3108 Pre-Launch Vibration 
Limit to Prevent Motion 
Sickness 
X X  X    X  
HS3109 Sound Pressure Level 
(SPL) Limits for 
Intermittent Noise 
Duration 
X     X   X 
HS3110 Noise Limit for 
Personal 
Communication 
Devices 
X    X X  X  
HS3111 Loudspeaker Alarm 
Audibility X       X  
HS3112 Radiation Data 
Reporting to Mission 
Systems - Absorbed 
Dose 
         
HS3113 Particle Archive Data          
HS3114 Ventilation Adjustment X        X 
HS3115 Display of Actual 
Temperature X        X 
HS3116 Display of Temperature 
Set-Point X        X 
HS3117 Potable Water 
Dispensing          
HS3118 Potable Hot Water 
Quantity for 
Rehydration 
         
HS3119 Radiation Data 
Reporting to the Crew - 
Dose Equivalent 
         
HS3120 Radiation Data 
Reporting to Mission 
Systems – Dose 
         
HS3121 Potable Water 
Temperature for 
Medical Use 
         
HS3122 Potable Water for 
Medical Use      X   X 
HS3123 Potable Water for 
Medical Contingency      X   X 
HS3124 Head Protection 
Criteria X    X     
HS3125 Neck Protection 
Criteria X    X     
HS3126 Relative Humidity 
Tolerance Ranges for 
Crew Exposure 
X    X    X 
HS3127 Potable Water for On-
Orbit Food Rehydration      X   X 
HS3128 Transient Force 
Application Limits X    X     
HS3129 Chest Deflection X    X     
HS3130 Restrained Body 
Movement X    X   X  
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Requirement Requirement Name Orion Ares I MS GO EVA FCE  LEVEL II 
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HS3132 Head Transient 
Acceleration Limits X    X     
HS3133 Sound Pressure Level 
(SPL) Limits for Waste 
Management System 
        X 
HS3134 Speech Interference 
Level Limit for Pre-
Launch and Post-
Landing 
X    X    X 
HS4002 Corners and Edges 
Exposed during 
Nominal Operations 
X   X X X   X 
HS4003 Corners and Edges 
Exposed during 
Maintenance 
X    X X   X 
HS4004 Corners and Edges of 
Loose Equipment X    X X   X 
HS4005 Burrs X   X X X   X 
HS4006 Sharp Items X   X X X   X 
HS4007 Interior Item Restraints X    X X   X 
HS4008 Electrical Hazard 
Potential X    X X   X 
HS4008B Chassis Leakage 
Current - Nonpatient 
Equipment 
X    X X   X 
HS4008C Chassis Leakage 
Current - Patient 
Equipment 
         
HS4012 Hot Touch 
Temperature Limit X    X X   X 
HS4012A Cold Touch 
Temperature Limit X    X X   X 
HS4019 Fire Suppression 
Portability X     X   X 
HS4021 Pinch Points X   X X X   X 
HS4022 Emergency Equipment 
Access X   X X X   X 
HS4023 Holes X   X X X   X 
HS5001 Layout Interference X         
HS5002 Layout Sequential 
Operations X         
HS5003 Workstation Orientation X        X 
HS5004 Ingress and Egress 
Translation Paths X       X  
HS5005 Internal Translation 
Paths X        X 
HS5006 Standard Restraints 
and Mobility Aids X     X    
HS5007 IVA Mobility Aids X     X   X 
HS5008 Workstation Restraints X        X 
HS5009 Ingress and Egress 
Mobility Aids X   X    X  
HS5010 Crew Egress 
Translation Path - 
Ground 
X   X     X 
HS5012 Flail Injury Protection X    X   X  
HS5013 Hatches Operable 
Inside and Outside X   X     X 
HS5014 Hatch Manual Pressure 
Equalization Inside and X        X 
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Outside 
HS5016 Hatch Closure 
Indication X        X 
HS5017 Hatch Visual 
Observation X        X 
HS5019 Window Optical 
Properties X        X 
HS5021 Window Viewing for 
Piloting Tasks X        X 
HS5022 Window for External 
Viewing Observation X        X 
HS5027 Window Cover, Shade, 
and Filter Removal or 
Replacement in10 
Seconds 
X        X 
HS5030 Obstruction X         
HS5031 Window and Internal 
Darkening X        X 
HS5032 Window Proximity 
Finishes X        X 
HS5034B Interior Light 
Adjustability X        X 
HS5035 Lighting Level by Task X     X   X 
HS5039 General Light Control X        X 
HS5040 Workstation Light 
Control X        X 
HS5041 Workstation Light 
Position Adjustment X        X 
HS5042 Workstation Visual 
Demarcations X        X 
HS5043 Hatches Operable in 
60 Seconds X   X     X 
HS5044 Hatches Operable 
Without Tools X   X     X 
HS5045 Hatches Operable by 
Suited Crewmembers X        X 
HS5046 Unlatching Hatches X        X 
HS5048 Hatch Manual Pressure 
Equalization by Suited 
Crewmembers 
X        X 
HS5049 Hatch Latch Position X        X 
HS5050 Hatch Pressure 
Difference 
Measurement 
X        X 
HS5051 Window Cover, Shade, 
and Filter Removal or 
Replacement Without 
Tools 
X        X 
HS5052 Commonly 
Distinguishable 
Handrails 
X         
HS5053 Crew Ingress/Egress 
Translation Path in 
Space 
X       X  
HS5054 Egress Handrails X   X      
HS5055 Window for Motion 
Imagery and 
Photography 
X        X 
HS5056 Lighting ON/OFF 
Control X        X 
HS6001 Cross-Contamination X         
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Prevention 
HS6002 Cross-Contamination 
Separation X         
HS6003 Heating          
HS6004 Rehydration         X 
HS6005 In-Flight Food 
Preparation Time      X    
HS6009 Personal Hygiene 
Privacy          
HS6010 Personal Hygiene 
Stowage X         
HS6012 Personal Hygiene 
Trash X         
HS6013 Vomitus Collection and 
Containment X     X   X 
HS6014 Simultaneous 
Defecation and 
Urination 
    X    X 
HS6016 Fecal Wipes     X    X 
HS6017 Feces per Day     X    X 
HS6020 Diarrhea per Event     X    X 
HS6020C Feces per Event     X    X 
HS6020D Diarrheal Events per 
Crewmember     X    X 
HS6021 Urine Collection     X    X 
HS6022 Urine Wipes         X 
HS6023 Urine per Crewmember     X    X 
HS6024 Urine per Hour     X    X 
HS6025 Urine Rate     X    X 
HS6025B Urine per Day     X    X 
HS6027 Full Body Visual 
Privacy         X 
HS6028 Body Self-Inspection 
and Cleaning X         
HS6029 Waste Management 
Odor Control      X   X 
HS6030 Waste Management 
Stowage          
HS6031 Waste Management 
Trash      X    
HS6032 Exercise Capability          
HS6035 Exercise Operational 
Envelope          
HS6036 Thermal Environment 
During Exercise          
HS6037 Carbon Dioxide Levels 
During Exercise          
HS6038 Relative Humidity 
During Exercise          
HS6044 Stowage Nominal 
Operation X         
HS6046 Stowage Location X         
HS6047 Stowage Arrangement X     X    
HS6049 Stowage 
Reconfiguration X         
HS6050 Stowage Restraints X     X   X 
HS6051 Stowage Hand 
Operation X     X   X 
HS6052 Stowage Commonality X     X    
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HS6053 Stowage Compatibility 
with Inventory 
Management 
         
HS6054 Trash Management 
Nominal Operations X         
HS6056 Trash Management 
Odor Control      X   X 
HS6057 Trash Management 
Contamination Control X     X   X 
HS6058 Trash Management 
Hazard Containment X     X   X 
HS6059 Food System      X  X  
HS6060 Metabolic Intake      X  X  
HS6062 Metabolic Intake for 
EVA      X  X  
HS6063 Potable Water for EVA 
Operations          
HS6069 Auditory and Olfactory 
Privacy          
HS6073 Oxygen Levels During 
Exercise          
HS6075 Private Voice X  X X     X 
HS6076 Private Video          
HS6077 Biomedical Data          
HS6078 Biomedical Relay          
HS6079 Biomedical Display          
HS6081 DCS Over-
Pressurization X       X  
HS6082 Orthostatic Protection X    X    X 
HS6083 Medical Care Provider 
Access X        X 
HS6084 Patient Electrical 
Isolation          
HS6085 Access to Medical 
Equipment X        X 
HS6086 Access to Deployed 
Medical Kits X        X 
HS6091 Denitrogenation X    X   X  
HS6097 Communication 
Capabilities         X 
HS6099 Personalized In-Flight 
Updates          
HS6100 DCS Event Pressure X       X  
HS6101 Medical Care 
Capabilities     X X  X  
HS6102 Lunar Surface Food 
Preparation Time          
HS6104 Crew Sleep 
Accommodations X        X 
HS6105 Personal Hygiene 
Items      X   X 
HS6106 Stowage Equipment 
Cover Restraint X     X   X 
HS7003 Handling Qualities for 
Manual Control – Level 
1 
X       X  
HS7004 Handling Qualities for 
Manual Control – Level 
2 
X       X  
HS7007 Consistent Crew X    X     
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Interfaces 
HS7009 Location Coding X        X 
HS7010 Field of View X    X    X 
HS7010A Two-Crew Operations X        X 
HS7018 Viewing Critical 
Displays and Controls X   X      
HS7018A Viewing Frequently 
Used Displays and 
Controls 
X         
HS7019 Functional Reach 
Envelope X   X     X 
HS7021 Reach for Critical 
Controls X         
HS7021A Reach for Frequently 
Used Controls X         
HS7022 Functional Related 
Displays and Controls X         
HS7023 Successive Operation 
of Displays and 
Controls 
X         
HS7024 Control Spacing For 
Suited Operations X    X    X 
HS7027 Over 3 g X        X 
HS7028 Over 2 g X        X 
HS7029 Supports X        X 
HS7036 Labeling X    X X  X  
HS7044 Legibility X    X X   X 
HS7049 Notifications X        X 
HS7049A Manual Silencing X        X 
HS7055 Command Feedback X        X 
HS7058 Subsystem State 
Information X        X 
HS7058A System 
Responsiveness for 
Discrete Inputs 
X        X 
HS7058B System 
Responsiveness for 
Continuous Inputs 
X         
HS7058C Request for Information X         
HS7058D Request for Critical 
Information X        X 
HS7058E Menu Update Time X        X 
HS7059 Task-Oriented Displays X        X 
HS7060 Subsystem-Oriented 
Displays X        X 
HS7060A Viewing Simultaneous 
Task Information X         
HS7061 Location within the 
Display Hierarchy X        X 
HS7063 Compatibility of 
Movement X    X    X 
HS7063A Control Feedback X    X    X 
HS7063B Protection against 
Inadvertent Activation X    X     
HS7063C Protection for Flight 
Actuated Critical 
Controls 
X    X    X 
HS7063D Coding for Emergency 
Controls X    X    X 
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HS7063E Restraints for Control 
Operation X        X 
HS7064 Language X   X X X   X 
HS7065A Use of Color X    X X   X 
HS7066 Crew Interface 
Usability X    X   X  
HS7067 Obscured Controls X    X    X 
HS7070 Viewing Simultaneous 
Critical Task 
Information 
X        X 
HS7071 Access within the 
Display Hierarchy X         
HS7072 State Change X       X  
HS7072A Lost Data X        X 
HS7075 Volume Control for 
Auditory Annunciations X        X 
HS7076 Speech Intelligibility X  X X X    X 
HS7077 Volume Control for 
Audio Communications X        X 
HS7079 Nomenclature X    X X  X  
HS7080 Workload Measure: 
Nominal X    X   X  
HS7080A Workload Measure: 
Off-Nominal X    X   X  
HS7082 Self-Illuminated 
Controls and Displays X        X 
HS7083 Protection for Ground 
Actuated Critical 
Controls 
  X X     X 
HS7925 Control Spacing for 
Unsuited Operations X        X 
HS8001 ORU Change-out X     X   X 
HS8002 Maintenance Time per 
Day X        X 
HS8003 ORU Maintenance 
Time X        X 
HS8003-
Objective 
ORU Replacement 
Time/Maintenance X         
HS8004 LRU Removal and 
Replacement X X        
HS8005 Physical Features X    X X   X 
HS8006 Labeling and Marking X    X X   X 
HS8007 Interchangeability X        X 
HS8008 Connectors X    X X   X 
HS8009 Visual Access X    X    X 
HS8010 Physical Access X        X 
HS8011 Cable Access X X       X 
HS8013 External Service Points          
HS8015 Maintenance Hazard X    X X   X 
HS8016 Failure Notification X        X 
HS8017 No Fuses for Dynamic 
Flight Phases X        X 
HS8018 Circuit Breakers 
Instead of Fuses X         
HS8020 Replacement Without 
Tools X        X 
HS8021 Replacement Without 
Component Removal X        X 
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HS8022 Circuit Breaker 
Resetting X        X 
HS8023 Trip Indication X        X 
HS8024 Electrostatic Discharge X     X   X 
HS8026 Access Points X    X     
HS8029 Fastener Heads X    X X   X 
HS8030 Fastener Number and 
Variety X    X X    
HS8031 Captive Fasteners X    X X   X 
HS8032 Equipment Isolation X        X 
HS8034 Hazardous Levels of 
Fluid Leakage X        X 
HS8037 Common Toolset X    X X    
HS8041 Microbial 
Contamination X    X X   X 
HS8042 Fungal Contamination X    X X   X 
HS8043 Replacement of Air 
Filters X         
HS8045 Visual Indication X    X X   X 
HS8046 Connector Mating 
Indication X    X X   X 
HS8047 Unique Identification 
Labeling X    X X  X  
HS8048 Visual Line of Sight X X        
HS8051 Condensation 
Prevention on Interior 
Surfaces 
X        X 
HS8052 Tool Clearance X    X X   X 
HS8053 Disturbance of 
Equipment X         
HS8054 Tool Usage X    X X   X 
HS8055 Crew Control of Power X        X 
HS9014 Data Rate X         
HS9018 Locations of Data X        X 
HS9019 Wired Network X        X 
HS9020 Wireless Network          
HS9021 Crew Operability X        X 
HS9025 Displaying Electronic 
Procedures System X        X 
HS9025A Cueing Electronic 
Procedures System X        X 
HS9026 Current Procedure 
Step X        X 
HS9027 Completed Procedure 
Steps X        X 
HS9028 Crew Notification of 
Required Procedure 
Action 
X        X 
HS9029 Annunciation Hierarchy X        X 
HS9029A Annunciation 
Prioritization X        X 
HS9030 Visual and Auditory 
Annunciation X        X 
HS9032 Distinctiveness of 
Annunciations X        X 
HS9032A Loss of Annunciation 
Capability X       X  
HS9037 Decomposition of 
Chemicals X    X X   X 
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HS9040 Data Fidelity X        X 
HS9042A Manual Information 
Capture and Transfer          
HS10001 Maintainability Without 
Deintegration X X       X 
HS10002 Work Envelope 
Volumes X X       X 
HS10004 Reach Envelope 
Volumes X X       X 
HS10006 Ground Crew Visual 
Access X X       X 
HS10008 Ground Anthropometry, 
Biomechanics, and 
Strength 
X X      X  
HS10009 Maintainability Without 
Disabling Subsystems X X        
HS10010 Fuse/Circuit Indication X X       X 
HS10011 Appropriate Clothing 
and Equipment X X       X 
HS10012 LRU Installation X X       X 
HS10013 LRU 
Mounting/Alignment 
Labels/Codes 
X X       X 
HS10014 LRU Interchangeability X X       X 
HS10015 Connector Mismating X X       X 
HS10017 Connector Mating 
Labels X X       X 
HS10019 Maintenance Without 
Damage X X       X 
HS10020 Fluid Management X X       X 
HS10021 Fluid Spillage Control X X       X 
HS10022 System Safing Controls X X       X 
HS10023 Equipment Protection X X   X     
HS10024 Tool Clearances X X       X 
HS10025 Inspection Access X X       X 
HS10026 Captive Fasteners X X        
HS10027 Ventilation Openings X X       X 
HS10028 Toolset X X       X 
HS10029 Safety Displays X X       X 
HS10030 Ground Processing 
Hardware Access X X       X 
HS10031 LRU Tracking Labels X X       X 
HS10032 LRU Labeling X X       X 
HS10033 Hazards Labeling X X   X X   X 
HS10039 Labeling X X       X 
HS10042 LRU Protrusions X X       X 
HS10043 Protrusion 
Label/Support X X       X 
HS10045 LRU Weight Limit X X       X 
HS10047 Work Station Layout 
Interference X X        
HS10048 Work Station Layout 
Sequential Operations X X        
HS10050 Consistent Crew 
Interfaces X X        
HS10051 Legibility X X       X 
HS10052 Written Text X X       X 
HS10053 Use of Color X X        
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HS10054 LRU Removal Without 
Component Removal X X        
HS10055 Ground Labeling: Non-
Interference with Flight 
Labels 
X    X X   X 
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HS11000 Suit Pressure Set-Point 
Selection X        X 
HS11001 Suit Pressure Pause X        X 
HS11002 Control of Heat Stored by 
Crewmembers During EVA 
and Pre-launch 
X    X    X 
HS11004 Stowage for Suit Dosimeters     X    X 
HS11005 Visual Field of View for a 
Suited Crewmember     X    X 
HS11006 Optical Quality for Suited 
Crewmembers     X    X 
HS11007 In-Suit Nutrition During 
Surface EVA Operations      X   X 
HS11008 In-Suit Nutrition During 
Unpressurized Vehicle 
Survival 
    X X   X 
HS11009 In-Suit Hydration During EVA         X 
HS11010 In-Suit Hydration during IVA     X X   X 
HS11011 Vomitus in the Suit X    X     
HS11012 Nominal Urine Collection in 
the Suit     X    X 
HS11013 Urine Collection - Suited 
Contingency     X    X 
HS11014 Feces Collection - Suited 
Contingency     X    X 
HS11015 Measurement of 
Physiological Parameters          
HS11016 Display of Physiological 
Parameters          
HS11017 Alert for Off-Nominal 
Physiological Parameters          
HS11018 Telemetry of Physiological 
Parameters          
HS11019 Maintain Suit Pressure Set-
Point X        X 
HS11022 Crew Accessibility to Suit 
Temperature Controls     X    X 
HS11023 Suited Radiation Dose 
Equivalent Monitoring          
HS11024 Suited Radiation Absorbed 
Dose Monitoring          
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APPENDIX J – Block 1 (Fully Functional ISS) DRM 
ALLOCATION MATRIX 
This table denotes allocation of HSIR requirements to the various systems.  An "X" in 
the column of any system for a given requirement allocates the requirement to that 
system.  The system is either required to meet the requirement independently or in 
conjunction with other systems to which that requirement is allocated.  Additionally, the 
last two columns denote which Verification Requirements must be satisfied with the 
verification requirements contained within the HSIR, Section 4.0 (those marked LII), OR 
which may be verified using alternate acceptable methods that have been Level III 
Project approved and documented (those marked LIII).  The Level III projects are not 
required to obtain approval for verification closure or changes to verification 
methodology beyond their own project boards when verification has been designated 
Level III. Designation of Level II verification denotes that the Level II Program dictates 
and maintains change authority over the verification methodology but does not 
necessarily imply that Level II performs the verification. 
The Fully Functional International Space Station (FFISS) Design Reference Mission 
(DRM) supports ISS increment crew rotation and resupply of the ISS.  ISS missions 
provide a proving ground for Constellations systems while at the same time providing an 
alternate resource for the support of ISS crewed operations.  The mission duration 
includes 7 days of active Orion operations, and 210 days docked to ISS.  The 
requirements applicable to the FFISS DMR can be found in Table J-3 – Allocation 
Matrix for FFISS DRM.  Note that Table J-3 is only applicable for the Fully Functional 
ISS DRM.   
TABLE J-3 - ALLOCATION MATRIX FOR FFISS DRM  
REQUIREMENTS  VERIFICATIONS 
Requirement Requirement Name Orion Ares I MS GO EVA FCE  LEVEL II 
LEVEL 
III 
HS2001 Anthropometric 
Dimensions for 
Unsuited 
Crewmembers 
X    X X   X 
HS2002 Anthropometric 
Dimensions for Suited 
Crewmembers 
X   X X X   X 
HS2003 Range of Motion of an 
Unsuited Crewmember X    X X   X 
HS2004 Range of Motion of a 
Suited Crewmember X   X X X   X 
HS2005 Mass Properties of an 
Unsuited Crewmember X    X X    
HS2006 Mass Properties of a 
Suited Crewmember X   X X X   X 
HS2007 Structural Integrity of 
Hardware for an 
Unsuited Crewmember 
X    X X   X 
HS2007B Structural Integrity of 
Hardware for a Suited 
Crewmember 
X   X X X    
HS2008 Minimum Crew 
Operational Loads for X    X X   X 
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an Unsuited 
Crewmember 
HS2008B Minimum Crew 
Operational Loads for a 
Suited Crewmember 
X   X X X    
HS2009 Equipment Damage 
Hazard X    X X   X 
HS2010 Total Crew Control 
Mass X        X 
HS3001 O2 and Total Pressure 
Control X  X     X  
HS3004 Total Pressure for 
Nominal Vehicle 
Operations 
X        X 
HS3004B O2 Partial Pressure for 
Nominal Vehicle 
Operations 
X        X 
HS3004C CO2 Partial Pressure 
for Nominal Vehicle 
Operations 
X    X    X 
HS3004D N2 Partial Pressure for 
Nominal Vehicle 
Operations 
         
HS3005 Total Pressure 
Tolerance Ranges for 
Crew Exposure 
X    X    X 
HS3005B O2 Partial Pressure 
Tolerance Ranges for 
Crew Exposure 
X    X    X 
HS3005C CO2 Partial Pressure 
Tolerance Ranges for 
Crew Exposure 
X    X    X 
HS3006 Microbial Air 
Contamination X        X 
HS3006C Particulate 
Contamination X    X    X 
HS3006D Lunar Dust 
Contamination          
HS3007 Gaseous Pollutants 
Limits X    X X   X 
HS3009 Rate of Change of 
Pressure Limits X    X    X 
HS3012A Combustion Products 
Monitoring X        X 
HS3012B Combustion Products 
Measurement X        X 
HS3012D Carbon Monoxide Alert X        X 
HS3013 Composition Reporting X        X 
HS3014 Composition Alerting X        X 
HS3015 Toxic Hazard Level 3 X    X X   X 
HS3015A Toxic Hazard Level 4 X X   X X   X 
HS3016 Personal Protective 
Equipment      X   X 
HS3017 Crew Communication 
During Contingency 
Breathing 
X     X   X 
HS3017A Contingency Breathing 
Apparatus      X   X 
HS3017B Mission Systems 
Communication During 
Contingency Breathing 
X  X   X   X 
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HS3019 Physiochemical Limits 
for Potable Water X   X X X  X  
HS3019A Microbial Limits for 
Potable Water X   X X X   X 
HS3025 Potable Water for On-
Orbit Drinking X        X 
HS3026 Potable Water for Fluid 
Loading X        X 
HS3027 Potable Water for Post-
Landing X     X   X 
HS3028 Potable Water for 
Personal Hygiene X     X   X 
HS3029 Potable Water Rate X        X 
HS3030 Potable Water 
Temperature for Cold 
Drinks 
X     X    
HS3031 Potable Water 
Temperature for Hot 
Food and Drinks 
X        X 
HS3032 Potable Water 
Temperature for 
Personal Hygiene 
X         
HS3034 Water Sampling X   X     X 
HS3036 Nominal Atmospheric 
Temperature X        X 
HS3037 Contingency Control of 
Heat Stored by 
Crewmembers 
X    X   X  
HS3046 Relative Humidity for 
Nominal Vehicle X        X 
HS3047 In-flight Ventilation X        X 
HS3050 Supplemental 
Ventilation X        X 
HS3051 Temperature Set-Point 
Adjustment X        X 
HS3052 Temperature Set-Point 
Accessibility X        X 
HS3053 Temperature Set-Point 
Increments X        X 
HS3054 Temperature Set-Point 
Error X        X 
HS3055 Display and Monitoring 
of Temperature and 
Relative Humidity 
X        X 
HS3059 Crew Exposure to Rate 
of Change of 
Acceleration 
X X  X     X 
HS3060 Linear Acceleration 
Limits during Nominal 
Return 
X        X 
HS3061 Linear Acceleration 
Limits from Launch to 
Mission Destination 
X X      X  
HS3062 Linear Acceleration 
Limits for Ascent Abort 
and Off-Nominal 
X X      X  
HS3064 Crew Injury Risk Limits X    X   X  
HS3065 Sustained Rotational 
Acceleration Limit X X      X  
HS3069 Rotational Limits for 
Nominal Return X        X 
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HS3070 Rotational Limits for 
Launch to Mission 
Destination 
X X      X  
HS3071 Rotational Limits for 
Ascent Abort and Off-
Nominal Entry 
X X      X  
HS3072 Hazardous Noise Limit 
for Launch and Entry X X   X   X  
HS3073 Noise Dose Limits for 
Launch and Entry X X   X   X  
HS3074 Impulse Noise Limit for 
Launch and Entry X X   X   X  
HS3075 Hazardous Noise Limit 
for the Orbit Phase X    X X   X 
HS3076 Sound Pressure Level 
(SPL) Limits for 
Continuous Noise 
during Orbit Phase 
X    X X  X  
HS3078 Impulse Noise Limit for 
the Orbit Phase X    X X   X 
HS3079 Annoyance Noise 
Limits for Crew Sleep X     X   X 
HS3080 Tonal and Narrow-
Band Noise Limits X    X X  X  
HS3081 Infrasonic Noise Limits X X      X  
HS3082 Cabin Depressurization 
Valve Hazardous Noise 
Limit 
X    X   X  
HS3083 Cabin Depressurization 
Valve Noise Dose 
Limits 
X    X   X  
HS3084 Reverberation Time X        X 
HS3085 Radiation Design 
Requirements X       X  
HS3086 Charged Particle 
Monitoring          
HS3088 Dose Equivalent 
Monitoring          
HS3089 Absorbed Dose 
Monitoring          
HS3090 Passive Radiation 
Monitoring X     X   X 
HS3091 Radiation Data 
Reporting to the Crew - 
Absorbed Dose 
         
HS3092 Alerting for Radiation 
Data          
HS3093 Radio-Frequency 
Electromagnetic Field 
Radiation Limits 
X X  X  X  X  
HS3094 Ocular Exposure to 
Lasers X X  X  X  X  
HS3096 Dermal Exposure to 
Lasers X X  X  X  X  
HS3098 Retinal Thermal Injury 
from Visible and Near 
Infrared Sources 
X   X  X  X  
HS3099 Small Source Visible 
Radiation Limits X   X  X  X  
HS3101 Large Source Visible 
Radiation Limits X   X  X  X  
Revision:  E Document No:  CxP 70024 
Release Date:  11/19/10 Page:  440 of 503 
Title:  Constellation Program Human-Systems Integration Requirements 
 
 
REQUIREMENTS  VERIFICATIONS 
Requirement Requirement Name Orion Ares I MS GO EVA FCE  LEVEL II 
LEVEL 
III 
HS3103 Thermal Injury from 
Infrared Radiation X   X  X  X  
HS3104 Ultraviolet Exposure for 
Unprotected Eye or 
Skin 
X   X  X  X  
HS3105 Health Limits for 
Vibration During 
Dynamic Phases of 
Flight 
X X   X   X  
HS3106 Vibration Limits during 
Crew Sleep X       X  
HS3108 Pre-Launch Vibration 
Limit to Prevent Motion 
Sickness 
X X  X    X  
HS3109 Sound Pressure Level 
(SPL) Limits for 
Intermittent Noise 
Duration 
X     X   X 
HS3110 Noise Limit for 
Personal 
Communication 
Devices 
X    X X  X  
HS3111 Loudspeaker Alarm 
Audibility X       X  
HS3112 Radiation Data 
Reporting to Mission 
Systems - Absorbed 
Dose 
         
HS3113 Particle Archive Data          
HS3114 Ventilation Adjustment X        X 
HS3115 Display of Actual 
Temperature X        X 
HS3116 Display of Temperature 
Set-Point X        X 
HS3117 Potable Water 
Dispensing X        X 
HS3118 Potable Hot Water 
Quantity for 
Rehydration 
X        X 
HS3119 Radiation Data 
Reporting to the Crew - 
Dose Equivalent 
         
HS3120 Radiation Data 
Reporting to Mission 
Systems - Dose 
         
HS3121 Potable Water 
Temperature for 
Medical Use 
     X   X 
HS3122 Potable Water for 
Medical Use X        X 
HS3123 Potable Water for 
Medical Contingency X        X 
HS3124 Head Protection 
Criteria X    X     
HS3125 Neck Protection 
Criteria X    X     
HS3126 Relative Humidity 
Tolerance Ranges for 
Crew Exposure 
X    X    X 
HS3127 Potable Water for On-
Orbit Food Rehydration X        X 
HS3128 Transient Force X    X     
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Application Limits 
HS3129 Chest Deflection X    X     
HS3130 Restrained Body 
Movement X    X   X  
HS3132 Head Transient 
Acceleration Limits X    X     
HS3133 Sound Pressure Level 
(SPL) Limits for Waste 
Management System 
X        X 
HS3134 Speech Interference 
Level Limit for Pre-
Launch and Post-
Landing 
X    X    X 
HS4002 Corners and Edges 
Exposed during 
Nominal Operations 
X   X X X   X 
HS4003 Corners and Edges 
Exposed during 
Maintenance 
X    X X   X 
HS4004 Corners and Edges of 
Loose Equipment X    X X   X 
HS4005 Burrs X   X X X   X 
HS4006 Sharp Items X   X X X   X 
HS4007 Interior Item Restraints X    X X   X 
HS4008 Electrical Hazard 
Potential X    X X   X 
HS4008B Chassis Leakage 
Current - Nonpatient 
Equipment 
X    X X   X 
HS4008C Chassis Leakage 
Current - Patient 
Equipment 
X    X X   X 
HS4012 Hot Touch 
Temperature Limit X    X X   X 
HS4012A Cold Touch 
Temperature Limit X    X X   X 
HS4019 Fire Suppression 
Portability X     X   X 
HS4021 Pinch Points X   X X X   X 
HS4022 Emergency Equipment 
Access X   X X X   X 
HS4023 Holes X   X X X   X 
HS5001 Layout Interference X         
HS5002 Layout Sequential 
Operations X         
HS5003 Workstation Orientation X        X 
HS5004 Ingress and Egress 
Translation Paths X       X  
HS5005 Internal Translation 
Paths X        X 
HS5006 Standard Restraints 
and Mobility Aids X     X    
HS5007 IVA Mobility Aids X     X   X 
HS5008 Workstation Restraints X        X 
HS5009 Ingress and Egress 
Mobility Aids X   X    X  
HS5010 Crew Egress 
Translation Path - 
Ground 
X   X     X 
HS5012 Flail Injury Protection X    X   X  
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HS5013 Hatches Operable 
Inside and Outside X   X     X 
HS5014 Hatch Manual Pressure 
Equalization Inside and 
Outside 
X        X 
HS5016 Hatch Closure 
Indication X        X 
HS5017 Hatch Visual 
Observation X        X 
HS5019 Window Optical 
Properties X        X 
HS5021 Window Viewing for 
Piloting Tasks X        X 
HS5022 Window for External 
Viewing Observation X        X 
HS5027 Window Cover, Shade, 
and Filter Removal or 
Replacement in 10 
Seconds 
X        X 
HS5030 Obstruction X         
HS5031 Window and Internal 
Darkening X        X 
HS5032 Window Proximity 
Finishes X        X 
HS5034B Interior Light 
Adjustability X        X 
HS5035 Lighting Level by Task X     X   X 
HS5039 General Light Control X        X 
HS5040 Workstation Light 
Control X        X 
HS5041 Workstation Light 
Position Adjustment X        X 
HS5042 Workstation Visual 
Demarcations X        X 
HS5043 Hatches Operable in 
60 Seconds X   X     X 
HS5044 Hatches Operable 
Without Tools X   X     X 
HS5045 Hatches Operable by 
Suited Crewmembers X        X 
HS5046 Unlatching Hatches X        X 
HS5048 Hatch Manual Pressure 
Equalization by Suited 
Crewmembers 
X        X 
HS5049 Hatch Latch Position X        X 
HS5050 Hatch Pressure 
Difference 
Measurement 
X        X 
HS5051 Window Cover, Shade, 
and Filter Removal or 
Replacement Without 
Tools 
X        X 
HS5052 Commonly 
Distinguishable 
Handrails 
X         
HS5053 Crew Ingress/Egress 
Translation Path in 
Space 
X       X  
HS5054 Egress Handrails X   X      
HS5055 Window for Motion 
Imagery and X        X 
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Photography 
HS5056 Lighting ON/OFF 
Control X        X 
HS6001 Cross-Contamination 
Prevention X         
HS6002 Cross-Contamination 
Separation X         
HS6003 Heating X     X   X 
HS6004 Rehydration X     X   X 
HS6005 In-Flight Food 
Preparation Time X     X    
HS6009 Personal Hygiene 
Privacy X        X 
HS6010 Personal Hygiene 
Stowage X         
HS6012 Personal Hygiene 
Trash X         
HS6013 Vomitus Collection and 
Containment X     X   X 
HS6014 Simultaneous 
Defecation and 
Urination 
X    X    X 
HS6016 Fecal Wipes X    X    X 
HS6017 Feces per Day X    X    X 
HS6020 Diarrhea per Event X        X 
HS6020C Feces per Event X        X 
HS6020D Diarrheal Events per 
Crewmember X        X 
HS6021 Urine Collection X        X 
HS6022 Urine Wipes X        X 
HS6023 Urine per Crewmember X        X 
HS6024 Urine per Hour X        X 
HS6025 Urine Rate X        X 
HS6025B Urine per Day X        X 
HS6027 Full Body Visual 
Privacy X        X 
HS6028 Body Self-Inspection 
and Cleaning X         
HS6029 Waste Management 
Odor Control X     X   X 
HS6030 Waste Management 
Stowage X     X   X 
HS6031 Waste Management 
Trash X     X    
HS6032 Exercise Capability          
HS6035 Exercise Operational 
Envelope          
HS6036 Thermal Environment 
During Exercise          
HS6037 Carbon Dioxide Levels 
During Exercise          
HS6038 Relative Humidity 
During Exercise          
HS6044 Stowage Nominal 
Operation X         
HS6046 Stowage Location X         
HS6047 Stowage Arrangement X     X    
HS6049 Stowage 
Reconfiguration X         
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HS6050 Stowage Restraints X     X   X 
HS6051 Stowage Hand 
Operation X     X   X 
HS6052 Stowage Commonality X     X    
HS6053 Stowage Compatibility 
with Inventory 
Management 
    X X   X 
HS6054 Trash Management 
Nominal Operations X         
HS6056 Trash Management 
Odor Control X     X   X 
HS6057 Trash Management 
Contamination Control X     X   X 
HS6058 Trash Management 
Hazard Containment X     X   X 
HS6059 Food System      X  X  
HS6060 Metabolic Intake      X  X  
HS6062 Metabolic Intake for 
EVA      X  X  
HS6063 Potable Water for EVA 
Operations          
HS6069 Auditory and Olfactory 
Privacy X         
HS6073 Oxygen Levels During 
Exercise          
HS6075 Private Voice X  X X     X 
HS6076 Private Video X  X      X 
HS6077 Biomedical Data      X   X 
HS6078 Biomedical Relay X       X  
HS6079 Biomedical Display X       X  
HS6081 DCS Over-
Pressurization X    X   X  
HS6082 Orthostatic Protection X    X    X 
HS6083 Medical Care Provider 
Access X        X 
HS6084 Patient Electrical 
Isolation X        X 
HS6085 Access to Medical 
Equipment X        X 
HS6086 Access to Deployed 
Medical Kits X        X 
HS6091 Denitrogenation X    X   X  
HS6097 Communication 
Capabilities         X 
HS6099 Personalized In-Flight 
Updates      X  X  
HS6100 DCS Event Pressure X    X   X  
HS6101 Medical Care 
Capabilities X    X X  X  
HS6102 Lunar Surface Food 
Preparation Time          
HS6104 Crew Sleep 
Accommodations X     X   X 
HS6105 Personal Hygiene 
Items      X   X 
HS6106 Stowage Equipment 
Cover Restraint X     X   X 
HS7003 Handling Qualities for 
Manual Control – Level 
1 
X       X  
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HS7004 Handling Qualities for 
Manual Control – Level 
2 
X       X  
HS7007 Consistent Crew 
Interfaces X    X     
HS7009 Location Coding X        X 
HS7010 Field of View X    X    X 
HS7010A Two-Crew Operations X        X 
HS7018 Viewing Critical 
Displays and Controls X   X      
HS7018A Viewing Frequently 
Used Displays and 
Controls 
X         
HS7019 Functional Reach 
Envelope X   X     X 
HS7021 Reach for Critical 
Controls X         
HS7021A Reach for Frequently 
Used Controls X         
HS7022 Functional Related 
Displays and Controls X         
HS7023 Successive Operation 
of Displays and 
Controls 
X         
HS7024 Control Spacing For 
Suited Operations X    X    X 
HS7027 Over 3 g X        X 
HS7028 Over 2 g X        X 
HS7029 Supports X        X 
HS7036 Labeling X    X X  X  
HS7044 Legibility X    X X   X 
HS7049 Notifications X        X 
HS7049A Manual Silencing X        X 
HS7055 Command Feedback X        X 
HS7058 Subsystem State 
Information X        X 
HS7058A System 
Responsiveness for 
Discrete Inputs 
X        X 
HS7058B System 
Responsiveness for 
Continuous Inputs 
X         
HS7058C Request for Information X         
HS7058D Request for Critical 
Information X        X 
HS7058E Menu Update Time X        X 
HS7059 Task-Oriented Displays X        X 
HS7060 Subsystem-Oriented 
Displays X        X 
HS7060A Viewing Simultaneous 
Task Information X         
HS7061 Location within the 
Display Hierarchy X        X 
HS7063 Compatibility of 
Movement X    X    X 
HS7063A Control Feedback X    X    X 
HS7063B Protection against 
Inadvertent Activation X    X     
HS7063C Protection for Flight X    X    X 
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Actuated Critical 
Controls 
HS7063D Coding for Emergency 
Controls X    X    X 
HS7063E Restraints for Control 
Operation X        X 
HS7064 Language X   X X X   X 
HS7065A Use of Color X    X X   X 
HS7066 Crew Interface 
Usability X    X   X  
HS7067 Obscured Controls X    X    X 
HS7070 Viewing Simultaneous 
Critical Task 
Information 
X        X 
HS7071 Access within the 
Display Hierarchy X         
HS7072 State Change X       X  
HS7072A Lost Data X        X 
HS7075 Volume Control for 
Auditory Annunciations X        X 
HS7076 Speech Intelligibility X  X X X    X 
HS7077 Volume Control for 
Audio Communications X        X 
HS7079 Nomenclature X    X X  X  
HS7080 Workload Measure: 
Nominal X    X   X  
HS7080A Workload Measure: 
Off-Nominal X    X   X  
HS7082 Self-Illuminated 
Controls and Displays X        X 
HS7083 Protection for Ground 
Actuated Critical 
Controls 
  X X     X 
HS7925 Control Spacing for 
Unsuited Operations X        X 
HS8001 ORU Change-out X     X   X 
HS8002 Maintenance Time per 
Day X        X 
HS8003 ORU Maintenance 
Time X        X 
HS8003-
Objective 
ORU Replacement 
Time/Maintenance X         
HS8004 LRU Removal and 
Replacement X X        
HS8005 Physical Features X    X X   X 
HS8006 Labeling and Marking X    X X   X 
HS8007 Interchangeability X        X 
HS8008 Connectors X    X X   X 
HS8009 Visual Access X    X    X 
HS8010 Physical Access X        X 
HS8011 Cable Access X X       X 
HS8013 External Service Points          
HS8015 Maintenance Hazard X    X X   X 
HS8016 Failure Notification X        X 
HS8017 No Fuses for Dynamic 
Flight Phases X        X 
HS8018 Circuit Breakers 
Instead of Fuses X         
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HS8020 Replacement Without 
Tools X        X 
HS8021 Replacement Without 
Component Removal X        X 
HS8022 Circuit Breaker 
Resetting X        X 
HS8023 Trip Indication X        X 
HS8024 Electrostatic Discharge X     X   X 
HS8026 Access Points X    X     
HS8029 Fastener Heads X    X X   X 
HS8030 Fastener Number and 
Variety X    X X    
HS8031 Captive Fasteners X    X X   X 
HS8032 Equipment Isolation X        X 
HS8034 Hazardous Levels of 
Fluid Leakage X        X 
HS8037 Common Toolset X    X X    
HS8041 Microbial 
Contamination X    X X   X 
HS8042 Fungal Contamination X    X X   X 
HS8043 Replacement of Air 
Filters X         
HS8045 Visual Indication X    X X   X 
HS8046 Connector Mating 
Indication X    X X   X 
HS8047 Unique Identification 
Labeling X    X X  X  
HS8048 Visual Line of Sight X X        
HS8051 Condensation 
Prevention on Interior 
Surfaces 
X        X 
HS8052 Tool Clearance X    X X   X 
HS8053 Disturbance of 
Equipment X         
HS8054 Tool Usage X    X X   X 
HS8055 Crew Control of Power X        X 
HS9014 Data Rate X         
HS9018 Locations of Data X     X   X 
HS9019 Wired Network X        X 
HS9020 Wireless Network         X 
HS9021 Crew Operability X        X 
HS9025 Displaying Electronic 
Procedures System X        X 
HS9025A Cueing Electronic 
Procedures System X        X 
HS9026 Current Procedure 
Step X        X 
HS9027 Completed Procedure 
Steps X        X 
HS9028 Crew Notification of 
Required Procedure 
Action 
X        X 
HS9029 Annunciation Hierarchy X        X 
HS9029A Annunciation 
Prioritization X        X 
HS9030 Visual and Auditory 
Annunciation X        X 
HS9032 Distinctiveness of 
Annunciations X        X 
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HS9032A Loss of Annunciation 
Capability X       X  
HS9037 Decomposition of 
Chemicals X    X X   X 
HS9040 Data Fidelity X        X 
HS9042A Manual Information 
Capture and Transfer      X   X 
HS10001 Maintainability Without 
Deintegration X X       X 
HS10002 Work Envelope 
Volumes X X       X 
HS10004 Reach Envelope 
Volumes X X       X 
HS10006 Ground Crew Visual 
Access X X       X 
HS10008 Ground Anthropometry, 
Biomechanics, and 
Strength 
X X      X  
HS10009 Maintainability Without 
Disabling Subsystems X X        
HS10010 Fuse/Circuit Indication X X       X 
HS10011 Appropriate Clothing 
and Equipment X X       X 
HS10012 LRU Installation X X       X 
HS10013 LRU 
Mounting/Alignment 
Labels/Codes 
X X       X 
HS10014 LRU Interchangeability X X       X 
HS10015 Connector Mismating X X       X 
HS10017 Connector Mating 
Labels X X       X 
HS10019 Maintenance Without 
Damage X X       X 
HS10020 Fluid Management X X       X 
HS10021 Fluid Spillage Control X X       X 
HS10022 System Safing Controls X X       X 
HS10023 Equipment Protection X X   X     
HS10024 Tool Clearances X X       X 
HS10025 Inspection Access X X       X 
HS10026 Captive Fasteners X X        
HS10027 Ventilation Openings X X       X 
HS10028 Toolset X X       X 
HS10029 Safety Displays X X       X 
HS10030 Ground Processing 
Hardware Access X X       X 
HS10031 LRU Tracking Labels X X       X 
HS10032 LRU Labeling X X       X 
HS10033 Hazards Labeling X X   X X   X 
HS10039 Labeling X X       X 
HS10042 LRU Protrusions X X       X 
HS10043 Protrusion 
Label/Support X X       X 
HS10045 LRU Weight Limit X X       X 
HS10047 Work Station Layout 
Interference X X        
HS10048 Work Station Layout 
Sequential Operations X X        
HS10050 Consistent Crew X X        
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Interfaces 
HS10051 Legibility X X       X 
HS10052 Written Text X X       X 
HS10053 Use of Color X X        
HS10054 LRU Removal Without 
Component Removal X X        
HS10055 Ground Labeling: Non-
Interference with Flight 
Labels 
X    X X   X 
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ALLOCATION MATRIX (CONCLUDED)  
REQUIREMENTS  VERIFICATIONS 
Requirement Requirement Name Orion Ares I MS GO EVA FCE 
 LEVEL 
II 
LEVEL 
III 
HS11000 Suit Pressure Set-Point 
Selection X        X 
HS11001 Suit Pressure Pause X        X 
HS11002 Control of Heat Stored by 
Crewmembers During EVA 
and Pre-launch 
X    X    X 
HS11004 Stowage for Suit Dosimeters     X    X 
HS11005 Visual Field of View for a 
Suited Crewmember     X    X 
HS11006 Optical Quality for Suited 
Crewmembers     X    X 
HS11007 In-Suit Nutrition During 
Surface EVA Operations      X   X 
HS11008 In-Suit Nutrition During 
Unpressurized Vehicle 
Survival 
    X X   X 
HS11009 In-Suit Hydration During EVA         X 
HS11010 In-Suit Hydration during IVA X    X X   X 
HS11011 Vomitus in the Suit X    X     
HS11012 Nominal Urine Collection in 
the Suit     X    X 
HS11013 Urine Collection - Suited 
Contingency     X    X 
HS11014 Feces Collection - Suited 
Contingency     X    X 
HS11015 Measurement of 
Physiological Parameters 
X 
TBR-
70024
-005 
   
X 
TBR-
70024
-005 
  X  
HS11016 Display of Physiological 
Parameters 
X 
TBR-
70024
-005 
      X  
HS11017 Alert for Off-Nominal 
Physiological Parameters 
X 
TBR-
70024
-005 
      X  
HS11018 Telemetry of Physiological 
Parameters 
X 
TBR-
70024
-005 
      X  
HS11019 Maintain Suit Pressure Set-
Point X        X 
HS11022 Crew Accessibility to Suit 
Temperature Controls     X    X 
HS11023 Suited Radiation Dose 
Equivalent Monitoring          
HS11024 Suited Radiation Absorbed 
Dose Monitoring          
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APPENDIX J – Block 2 (Exo-LEO/Lunar) DRM 
ALLOCATION MATRIX 
This table denotes allocation of HSIR requirements to the various systems.  An "X" in 
the column of any system for a given requirement allocates the requirement to that 
system.  The system is either required to meet the requirement independently or in 
conjunction with other systems to which that requirement is allocated.  Additionally, the 
last two columns denote which Verification Requirements must be satisfied with the 
verification requirements contained within the HSIR, Section 4.0 (those marked LII), OR 
which may be verified using alternate acceptable methods that have been Level III 
Project approved and documented (those marked LIII).  The Level III projects are not 
required to obtain approval for verification closure or changes to verification 
methodology beyond their own project boards when verification has been designated 
Level III. Designation of Level II verification denotes that the Level II Program dictates 
and maintains change authority over the verification methodology but does not 
necessarily imply that Level II performs the verification. 
The Block 2 (Exo-LEO/Lunar) DRM includes 21 days of active operations, and as many 
as 210 days uncrewed operations.  The requirements applicable to the Exo-LEO/Lunar 
DRM can be found in Table J-4 – Allocation Matrix for Lunar DRM.  Note that Table J-4 
is only applicable for the Exo-LEO/Lunar DRM.   
TABLE J-4 - ALLOCATION MATRIX FOR EXO-LEO/LUNAR DRM  
 REQUIREMENTS  VERIFICATIONS 
Requirement Requirement Name Orion Altair 
Ares 
I 
Ares 
V MS GO EVA FCE 
 LEVEL 
II 
LEVEL 
III 
HS2001 Anthropometric 
Dimensions for 
Unsuited 
Crewmembers 
X X     X X   X 
HS2002 Anthropometric 
Dimensions for 
Suited 
Crewmembers 
X X    X X X   X 
HS2003 Range of 
Motion of an 
Unsuited 
Crewmember 
X X     X X   X 
HS2004 Range of 
Motion of a 
Suited 
Crewmember 
X X    X X X   X 
HS2005 Mass 
Properties of an 
Unsuited 
Crewmember 
X X     X X    
HS2006 Mass 
Properties of a 
Suited 
Crewmember 
X X    X X X   X 
HS2007 Structural 
Integrity of 
Hardware for 
an Unsuited 
Crewmember 
X X     X X   X 
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Requirement Requirement Name Orion Altair 
Ares 
I 
Ares 
V MS GO EVA FCE 
 LEVEL 
II 
LEVEL 
III 
HS2007B Structural 
Integrity of 
Hardware for a 
Suited 
Crewmember 
X X    X X X    
HS2008 Minimum Crew 
Operational 
Loads for an 
Unsuited 
Crewmember 
X X     X X   X 
HS2008B Minimum Crew 
Operational 
Loads for a 
Suited 
Crewmember 
X X    X X X    
HS2009 Equipment 
Damage 
Hazard 
X X     X X   X 
HS2010 Total Crew 
Control Mass 
X X         X 
HS3001 O2 and Total 
Pressure 
Control 
X X   X     X  
HS3004 Total Pressure 
for Nominal 
Vehicle 
Operations 
X X         X 
HS3004B O2 Partial 
Pressure for 
Nominal 
Vehicle 
Operations 
X X     X    X 
HS3004C CO2 Partial 
Pressure for 
Nominal 
Vehicle 
Operations 
X X     X    X 
HS3004D N2 Partial 
Pressure for 
Nominal 
Vehicle 
Operations 
X X         X 
HS3005 Total Pressure 
Tolerance 
Ranges for 
Crew Exposure 
X X     X    X 
HS3005B O2 Partial 
Pressure 
Tolerance 
Ranges for 
Crew Exposure 
X X     X    X 
HS3005C CO2 Partial 
Pressure 
Tolerance 
Ranges for 
Crew Exposure 
X X     X    X 
HS3006 Microbial Air 
Contamination 
X X         X 
HS3006C Particulate 
Contamination 
X X     X    X 
HS3006D Lunar Dust 
Contamination 
X X     X X   X 
HS3007 Gaseous X X     X X   X 
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Requirement Requirement Name Orion Altair 
Ares 
I 
Ares 
V MS GO EVA FCE 
 LEVEL 
II 
LEVEL 
III 
Pollutants 
Limits 
HS3009 Rate of Change 
of Pressure 
Limits 
X X     X    X 
HS3012A Combustion 
Products 
Monitoring 
X X         X 
HS3012B Combustion 
Products 
Measurement 
X X         X 
HS3012D Carbon 
Monoxide Alert 
X X         X 
HS3013 Composition 
Reporting 
X X         X 
HS3014 Composition 
Alerting 
X X         X 
HS3015 Toxic Hazard 
Level 3 
X X     X X   X 
HS3015A Toxic Hazard 
Level 4 
X X X X   X X   X 
HS3016 Personal 
Protective 
Equipment 
 X      X   X 
HS3017 Crew 
Communication 
During 
Contingency 
Breathing 
X X      X   X 
HS3017A Contingency 
Breathing 
Apparatus 
 X      X   X 
HS3017B Mission 
Systems 
Communication 
During 
Contingency 
Breathing 
X X   X   X   X 
HS3019 Physiochemical 
Limits for 
Potable Water 
X X    X X X  X  
HS3019A Microbial Limits 
for Potable 
Water 
X X    X X X   X 
HS3025 Potable Water 
for On-Orbit 
Drinking 
X X         X 
HS3026 Potable Water 
for Fluid 
Loading 
X          X 
HS3027 Potable Water 
for Post-
Landing 
X       X   X 
HS3028 Potable Water 
for Personal 
Hygiene 
X X      X   X 
HS3029 Potable Water 
Rate 
X X         X 
HS3030 Potable Water 
Temperature 
for Cold Drinks 
X X      X    
HS3031 Potable Water X X         X 
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 REQUIREMENTS  VERIFICATIONS 
Requirement Requirement Name Orion Altair 
Ares 
I 
Ares 
V MS GO EVA FCE 
 LEVEL 
II 
LEVEL 
III 
Temperature 
for Hot Food 
and Drinks 
HS3032 Potable Water 
Temperature 
for Personal 
Hygiene 
X X          
HS3034 Water 
Sampling 
X X    X     X 
HS3036 Nominal 
Atmospheric 
Temperature 
X X         X 
HS3037 Contingency 
Control of Heat 
Stored by 
Crewmembers 
X X     X   X  
HS3046 Relative 
Humidity for 
Nominal 
Vehicle 
X X     X    X 
HS3047 In-flight 
Ventilation 
X X         X 
HS3050 Supplemental 
Ventilation 
X X         X 
HS3051 Temperature 
Set-Point 
Adjustment 
X X         X 
HS3052 Temperature 
Set-Point 
Accessibility 
X X         X 
HS3053 Temperature 
Set-Point 
Increments 
X X         X 
HS3054 Temperature 
Set-Point Error 
X X         X 
HS3055 Display and 
Monitoring of 
Temperature 
and Relative 
Humidity 
X X         X 
HS3059 Crew Exposure 
to Rate of 
Change of 
Acceleration 
X X X X  X     X 
HS3060 Linear 
Acceleration 
Limits during 
Nominal Return 
X          X 
HS3061 Linear 
Acceleration 
Limits from 
Launch to 
Mission 
Destination 
X X X X      X  
HS3062 Linear 
Acceleration 
Limits for 
Ascent Abort 
and Off-
Nominal 
X X X X      X  
HS3064 Crew Injury 
Risk Limits 
X      X   X  
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Requirement Requirement Name Orion Altair 
Ares 
I 
Ares 
V MS GO EVA FCE 
 LEVEL 
II 
LEVEL 
III 
HS3065 Sustained 
Rotational 
Acceleration 
Limit 
X X X X      X  
HS3069 Rotational 
Limits for 
Nominal Return 
X X         X 
HS3070 Rotational 
Limits for 
Launch to 
Mission 
Destination 
X X X X      X  
HS3071 Rotational 
Limits for 
Ascent Abort 
and Off-
Nominal Entry 
X X X X      X  
HS3072 Hazardous 
Noise Limit for 
Launch and 
Entry 
X X X X   X   X  
HS3073 Noise Dose 
Limits for 
Launch and 
Entry 
X X X X   X   X  
HS3074 Impulse Noise 
Limit for 
Launch and 
Entry 
X X X X   X   X  
HS3075 Hazardous 
Noise Limit for 
the Orbit Phase 
X X  X   X X   X 
HS3076 Sound 
Pressure Level 
(SPL) Limits for 
Continuous 
Noise during 
Orbit Phase 
X X  X   X X  X  
HS3078 Impulse Noise 
Limit for the 
Orbit Phase 
X X  X   X X   X 
HS3079 Annoyance 
Noise Limits for 
Crew Sleep 
X X      X   X 
HS3080 Tonal and 
Narrow-Band 
Noise Limits 
X X  X   X X  X  
HS3081 Infrasonic 
Noise Limits 
X X X X      X  
HS3082 Cabin 
Depressurizatio
n Valve 
Hazardous 
Noise Limit 
X X     X   X  
HS3083 Cabin 
Depressurizatio
n Valve Noise 
Dose Limits 
X X     X   X  
HS3084 Reverberation 
Time 
X X         X 
HS3085 Radiation 
Design 
Requirements 
X X        X  
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Requirement Requirement Name Orion Altair 
Ares 
I 
Ares 
V MS GO EVA FCE 
 LEVEL 
II 
LEVEL 
III 
HS3086 Charged 
Particle 
Monitoring 
       X  X  
HS3088 Dose 
Equivalent 
Monitoring 
       X  X  
HS3089 Absorbed Dose 
Monitoring 
       X  X  
HS3090 Passive 
Radiation 
Monitoring 
X X      X   X 
HS3091 Radiation Data 
Reporting to 
the Crew - 
Absorbed Dose 
X X     X    X 
HS3092 Alerting for 
Radiation Data 
X X     X    X 
HS3093 Radio-
Frequency 
Electromagneti
c Field 
Radiation 
Limits 
X X X X  X X X  X  
HS3094 Ocular 
Exposure to 
Lasers 
X X X X  X  X  X  
HS3096 Dermal 
Exposure to 
Lasers 
X X X X  X  X  X  
HS3098 Retinal Thermal 
Injury from 
Visible and 
Near Infrared 
Sources 
X X    X X X  X  
HS3099 Small Source 
Visible 
Radiation 
Limits 
X X    X X X  X  
HS3101 Large Source 
Visible 
Radiation 
Limits 
X X    X X X  X  
HS3103 Thermal Injury 
from Infrared 
Radiation 
X X    X X X  X  
HS3104 Ultraviolet 
Exposure for 
Unprotected 
Eye or Skin 
X X    X X X  X  
HS3105 Health Limits 
for Vibration 
During 
Dynamic 
Phases of 
Flight 
X X X X   X   X  
HS3106 Vibration Limits 
during Crew 
Sleep 
X X  X      X  
HS3108 Pre-Launch 
Vibration Limit 
to Prevent 
Motion 
Sickness 
X  X   X    X  
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Requirement Requirement Name Orion Altair 
Ares 
I 
Ares 
V MS GO EVA FCE 
 LEVEL 
II 
LEVEL 
III 
HS3109 Sound 
Pressure Level 
(SPL) Limits for 
Intermittent 
Noise Duration 
X X      X   X 
HS3110 Noise Limit for 
Personal 
Communication 
Devices 
X X     X X  X  
HS3111 Loudspeaker 
Alarm Audibility 
X X        X  
HS3112 Radiation Data 
Reporting to 
Mission 
Systems - 
Absorbed Dose 
X X     X    X 
HS3113 Particle Archive 
Data 
X X        X  
HS3114 Ventilation 
Adjustment 
X X         X 
HS3115 Display of 
Actual 
Temperature 
X X         X 
HS3116 Display of 
Temperature 
Set-Point 
X X         X 
HS3117 Potable Water 
Dispensing 
X X         X 
HS3118 Potable Hot 
Water Quantity 
for Rehydration 
X X         X 
HS3119 Radiation Data 
Reporting to 
the Crew - 
Dose 
Equivalent 
X X     X    X 
HS3120 Radiation Data 
Reporting to 
Mission 
Systems - Dose 
X X     X    X 
HS3121 Potable Water 
Temperature 
for Medical Use 
 X      X   X 
HS3122 Potable Water 
for Medical Use 
X X         X 
HS3123 Potable Water 
for Medical 
Contingency 
X X         X 
HS3124 Head 
Protection 
Criteria 
X      X     
HS3125 Neck Protection 
Criteria 
X      X     
HS3126 Relative 
Humidity 
Tolerance 
Ranges for 
Crew Exposure 
X X     X    X 
HS3127 Potable Water 
for On-Orbit 
Food 
Rehydration 
X X         X 
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Requirement Requirement Name Orion Altair 
Ares 
I 
Ares 
V MS GO EVA FCE 
 LEVEL 
II 
LEVEL 
III 
HS3128 Transient Force 
Application 
Limits 
X      X     
HS3129 Chest 
Deflection 
X      X     
HS3130 Restrained 
Body 
Movement 
X      X   X  
HS3132 Head Transient 
Acceleration 
Limits 
X      X     
HS3133 Sound 
Pressure Level 
(SPL) Limits for 
Waste 
Management 
System 
X X         X 
HS3134 Speech 
Interference 
Level Limit for 
Pre-Launch 
and Post-
Landing 
X      X    X 
HS4002 Corners and 
Edges Exposed 
during Nominal 
Operations 
X X    X X X   X 
HS4003 Corners and 
Edges Exposed 
during 
Maintenance 
X X     X X   X 
HS4004 Corners and 
Edges of Loose 
Equipment 
X X     X X   X 
HS4005 Burrs X X    X X X   X 
HS4006 Sharp Items X X    X X X   X 
HS4007 Interior Item 
Restraints 
X X     X X   X 
HS4008 Electrical 
Hazard 
Potential 
X X     X X   X 
HS4008B Chassis 
Leakage 
Current - 
Nonpatient 
Equipment 
X X     X X   X 
HS4008C Chassis 
Leakage 
Current - 
Patient 
Equipment 
X X     X X   X 
HS4012 Hot Touch 
Temperature 
Limit 
X X     X X   X 
HS4012A Cold Touch 
Temperature 
Limit 
X X     X X   X 
HS4019 Fire 
Suppression 
Portability 
X X      X   X 
HS4021 Pinch Points X X    X X X   X 
HS4022 Emergency X X    X X X   X 
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Requirement Requirement Name Orion Altair 
Ares 
I 
Ares 
V MS GO EVA FCE 
 LEVEL 
II 
LEVEL 
III 
Equipment 
Access 
HS4023 Holes X X    X X X   X 
HS5001 Layout 
Interference 
X X          
HS5002 Layout 
Sequential 
Operations 
X X          
HS5003 Workstation 
Orientation 
X X         X 
HS5004 Ingress and 
Egress 
Translation 
Paths 
X X        X  
HS5005 Internal 
Translation 
Paths 
X X         X 
HS5006 Standard 
Restraints and 
Mobility Aids 
X X      X    
HS5007 IVA Mobility 
Aids 
X X      X   X 
HS5008 Workstation 
Restraints 
X X         X 
HS5009 Ingress and 
Egress Mobility 
Aids 
X X    X    X  
HS5010 Crew Egress 
Translation 
Path - Ground 
X X    X     X 
HS5012 Flail Injury 
Protection 
X      X   X  
HS5013 Hatches 
Operable Inside 
and Outside 
X X    X     X 
HS5014 Hatch Manual 
Pressure 
Equalization 
Inside and 
Outside 
X X         X 
HS5016 Hatch Closure 
Indication 
X X         X 
HS5017 Hatch Visual 
Observation 
X X         X 
HS5019 Window Optical 
Properties 
X X         X 
HS5021 Window 
Viewing for 
Piloting Tasks 
X X         X 
HS5022 Window for 
External 
Viewing 
Observation 
X X         X 
HS5027 Window Cover, 
Shade, and 
Filter Removal 
or Replacement 
in 10 Seconds 
X X         X 
HS5030 Obstruction X X          
HS5031 Window and 
Internal 
Darkening 
X X         X 
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Requirement Requirement Name Orion Altair 
Ares 
I 
Ares 
V MS GO EVA FCE 
 LEVEL 
II 
LEVEL 
III 
HS5032 Window 
Proximity 
Finishes 
X X         X 
HS5034B Interior Light 
Adjustability 
X X         X 
HS5035 Lighting Level 
by Task 
X X      X   X 
HS5039 General Light 
Control 
X X         X 
HS5040 Workstation 
Light Control 
X X         X 
HS5041 Workstation 
Light Position 
Adjustment 
X X         X 
HS5042 Workstation 
Visual 
Demarcations 
X X         X 
HS5043 Hatches 
Operable in 60 
Seconds 
X X    X     X 
HS5044 Hatches 
Operable 
Without Tools 
X X    X     X 
HS5045 Hatches 
Operable by 
Suited 
Crewmembers 
X X         X 
HS5046 Unlatching 
Hatches 
X X         X 
HS5048 Hatch Manual 
Pressure 
Equalization by 
Suited 
Crewmembers 
X X         X 
HS5049 Hatch Latch 
Position 
X X         X 
HS5050 Hatch Pressure 
Difference 
Measurement 
X X         X 
HS5051 Window Cover, 
Shade, and 
Filter Removal 
or Replacement 
Without Tools 
X X         X 
HS5052 Commonly 
Distinguishable 
Handrails 
X X          
HS5053 Crew 
Ingress/Egress 
Translation 
Path in Space 
X X        X  
HS5054 Egress 
Handrails 
X X    X      
HS5055 Window for 
Motion Imagery 
and 
Photography 
X X         X 
HS5056 Lighting 
ON/OFF 
Control 
X X         X 
HS6001 Cross-
Contamination 
X X          
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Requirement Requirement Name Orion Altair 
Ares 
I 
Ares 
V MS GO EVA FCE 
 LEVEL 
II 
LEVEL 
III 
Prevention 
HS6002 Cross-
Contamination 
Separation 
X X          
HS6003 Heating X X      X   X 
HS6004 Rehydration X X      X   X 
HS6005 In-Flight Food 
Preparation 
Time 
X X      X    
HS6009 Personal 
Hygiene 
Privacy 
X X         X 
HS6010 Personal 
Hygiene 
Stowage 
X X          
HS6012 Personal 
Hygiene Trash 
X X          
HS6013 Vomitus 
Collection and 
Containment 
X X      X   X 
HS6014 Simultaneous 
Defecation and 
Urination 
X X     X    X 
HS6016 Fecal Wipes X X     X    X 
HS6017 Feces per Day X X     X    X 
HS6020 Diarrhea per 
Event 
X X         X 
HS6020C Feces per 
Event 
X X         X 
HS6020D Diarrheal 
Events per 
Crewmember 
X X         X 
HS6021 Urine Collection X X         X 
HS6022 Urine Wipes X X         X 
HS6023 Urine per 
Crewmember 
X X         X 
HS6024 Urine per Hour X X         X 
HS6025 Urine Rate X X         X 
HS6025B Urine per Day X X         X 
HS6027 Full Body 
Visual Privacy 
X X         X 
HS6028 Body Self-
Inspection and 
Cleaning 
X X          
HS6029 Waste 
Management 
Odor Control 
X X      X   X 
HS6030 Waste 
Management 
Stowage 
X X      X   X 
HS6031 Waste 
Management 
Trash 
X X      X    
HS6032 Exercise 
Capability 
X X      X  X  
HS6035 Exercise 
Operational 
Envelope 
X X         X 
HS6036 Thermal 
Environment 
During Exercise 
X X     X    X 
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Requirement Requirement Name Orion Altair 
Ares 
I 
Ares 
V MS GO EVA FCE 
 LEVEL 
II 
LEVEL 
III 
HS6037 Carbon Dioxide 
Levels During 
Exercise 
X X     X    X 
HS6038 Relative 
Humidity 
During Exercise 
X X     X    X 
HS6044 Stowage 
Nominal 
Operation 
X X          
HS6046 Stowage 
Location 
X X          
HS6047 Stowage 
Arrangement 
X X      X    
HS6049 Stowage 
Reconfiguration 
X X          
HS6050 Stowage 
Restraints 
X X      X   X 
HS6051 Stowage Hand 
Operation 
X X      X   X 
HS6052 Stowage 
Commonality 
X X      X    
HS6053 Stowage 
Compatibility 
with Inventory 
Management 
X X     X X   X 
HS6054 Trash 
Management 
Nominal 
Operations 
X X          
HS6056 Trash 
Management 
Odor Control 
X X      X   X 
HS6057 Trash 
Management 
Contamination 
Control 
X X      X   X 
HS6058 Trash 
Management 
Hazard 
Containment 
X X      X   X 
HS6059 Food System  X      X  X  
HS6060 Metabolic 
Intake 
 X      X  X  
HS6062 Metabolic 
Intake for EVA 
 X      X  X  
HS6063 Potable Water 
for EVA 
Operations 
 X        X  
HS6069 Auditory and 
Olfactory 
Privacy 
X X          
HS6073 Oxygen Levels 
During Exercise 
X X     X    X 
HS6075 Private Voice X X   X X     X 
HS6076 Private Video X X   X      X 
HS6077 Biomedical 
Data 
 X      X   X 
HS6078 Biomedical 
Relay 
X X        X  
HS6079 Biomedical 
Display 
X X        X  
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Requirement Requirement Name Orion Altair 
Ares 
I 
Ares 
V MS GO EVA FCE 
 LEVEL 
II 
LEVEL 
III 
HS6081 DCS Over-
Pressurization 
X X     X   X  
HS6082 Orthostatic 
Protection 
X      X    X 
HS6083 Medical Care 
Provider 
Access 
X X         X 
HS6084 Patient 
Electrical 
Isolation 
X X         X 
HS6085 Access to 
Medical 
Equipment 
X X         X 
HS6086 Access to 
Deployed 
Medical Kits 
X X         X 
HS6091 Denitrogenation X X     X   X  
HS6097 Communication 
Capabilities 
X X         X 
HS6099 Personalized 
In-Flight 
Updates 
 X        X  
HS6100 DCS Event 
Pressure 
X X     X   X  
HS6101 Medical Care 
Capabilities 
X X     X X  X  
HS6102 Lunar Surface 
Food 
Preparation 
Time 
 X      X   X 
HS6104 Crew Sleep 
Accommodatio
ns 
X X      X   X 
HS6105 Personal 
Hygiene Items 
       X   X 
HS6106 Stowage 
Equipment 
Cover Restraint 
X X      X   X 
HS7003 Handling 
Qualities for 
Manual Control 
– Level 1 
X X        X  
HS7004 Handling 
Qualities for 
Manual Control 
– Level 2 
X X        X  
HS7007 Consistent 
Crew Interfaces 
X X     X     
HS7009 Location 
Coding 
X X         X 
HS7010 Field of View X X     X    X 
HS7010A Two-Crew 
Operations 
X X         X 
HS7018 Viewing Critical 
Displays and 
Controls 
X X    X X     
HS7018A Viewing 
Frequently 
Used Displays 
and Controls 
X X     X     
HS7019 Functional 
Reach 
X X    X X    X 
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Requirement Requirement Name Orion Altair 
Ares 
I 
Ares 
V MS GO EVA FCE 
 LEVEL 
II 
LEVEL 
III 
Envelope 
HS7021 Reach for 
Critical Controls 
X X     X     
HS7021A Reach for 
Frequently 
Used Controls 
X X     X     
HS7022 Functional 
Related 
Displays and 
Controls 
X X     X     
HS7023 Successive 
Operation of 
Displays and 
Controls 
X X     X     
HS7024 Control 
Spacing For 
Suited 
Operations 
X X     X    X 
HS7027 Over 3 g X      X    X 
HS7028 Over 2 g X      X    X 
HS7029 Supports X          X 
HS7036 Labeling X X     X X  X  
HS7044 Legibility X X     X X   X 
HS7049 Notifications X X     X    X 
HS7049A Manual 
Silencing 
X X     X    X 
HS7055 Command 
Feedback 
X X         X 
HS7058 Subsystem 
State 
Information 
X X     X    X 
HS7058A System 
Responsivenes
s for Discrete 
Inputs 
X X     X    X 
HS7058B System 
Responsivenes
s for 
Continuous 
Inputs 
X X     X     
HS7058C Request for 
Information 
X X     X     
HS7058D Request for 
Critical 
Information 
X X         X 
HS7058E Menu Update 
Time 
X X         X 
HS7059 Task-Oriented 
Displays 
X X         X 
HS7060 Subsystem-
Oriented 
Displays 
X X         X 
HS7060A Viewing 
Simultaneous 
Task 
Information 
X X          
HS7061 Location within 
the Display 
Hierarchy 
X X         X 
HS7063 Compatibility of 
Movement 
X X     X    X 
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Requirement Requirement Name Orion Altair 
Ares 
I 
Ares 
V MS GO EVA FCE 
 LEVEL 
II 
LEVEL 
III 
HS7063A Control 
Feedback 
X X     X    X 
HS7063B Protection 
against 
Inadvertent 
Activation 
X X     X     
HS7063C Protection for 
Flight Actuated 
Critical Controls 
X X     X    X 
HS7063D Coding for 
Emergency 
Controls 
X X     X    X 
HS7063E Restraints for 
Control 
Operation 
X X         X 
HS7064 Language X X    X X X   X 
HS7065A Use of Color X X     X X   X 
HS7066 Crew Interface 
Usability 
X X     X   X  
HS7067 Obscured 
Controls 
X X     X    X 
HS7070 Viewing 
Simultaneous 
Critical Task 
Information 
X X         X 
HS7071 Access within 
the Display 
Hierarchy 
X X          
HS7072 State Change X X        X  
HS7072A Lost Data X X         X 
HS7075 Volume Control 
for Auditory 
Annunciations 
X X     X    X 
HS7076 Speech 
Intelligibility 
X X   X X X    X 
HS7077 Volume Control 
for Audio 
Communication
s 
X X     X    X 
HS7079 Nomenclature X X     X X  X  
HS7080 Workload 
Measure: 
Nominal 
X X     X   X  
HS7080A Workload 
Measure: Off-
Nominal 
X X     X   X  
HS7082 Self-Illuminated 
Controls and 
Displays 
X X     X    X 
HS7083 Protection for 
Ground 
Actuated 
Critical Controls 
    X X     X 
HS7925 Control 
Spacing for 
Unsuited 
Operations 
X X         X 
HS8001 ORU Change-
out 
X X     X X   X 
HS8002 Maintenance 
Time per Day 
X X         X 
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Requirement Requirement Name Orion Altair 
Ares 
I 
Ares 
V MS GO EVA FCE 
 LEVEL 
II 
LEVEL 
III 
HS8003 ORU 
Maintenance 
Time 
X X     X    X 
HS8003-
Objective 
ORU 
Replacement 
Time/Maintena
nce 
X X     X     
HS8004 LRU Removal 
and 
Replacement 
X X X X        
HS8005 Physical 
Features 
X X     X X   X 
HS8006 Labeling and 
Marking 
X X     X X   X 
HS8007 Interchangeabili
ty 
X X     X    X 
HS8008 Connectors X X     X X   X 
HS8009 Visual Access X X     X    X 
HS8010 Physical 
Access 
X X         X 
HS8011 Cable Access X X X X       X 
HS8013 External 
Service Points 
 X  X       X 
HS8015 Maintenance 
Hazard 
X X     X X   X 
HS8016 Failure 
Notification 
X X         X 
HS8017 No Fuses for 
Dynamic Flight 
Phases 
X X         X 
HS8018 Circuit 
Breakers 
Instead of 
Fuses 
X X          
HS8020 Replacement 
Without Tools 
X X         X 
HS8021 Replacement 
Without 
Component 
Removal 
X X         X 
HS8022 Circuit Breaker 
Resetting 
X X         X 
HS8023 Trip Indication X X         X 
HS8024 Electrostatic 
Discharge 
X X     X X   X 
HS8026 Access Points X X     X     
HS8029 Fastener 
Heads 
X X     X X   X 
HS8030 Fastener 
Number and 
Variety 
X X     X X    
HS8031 Captive 
Fasteners 
X X     X X   X 
HS8032 Equipment 
Isolation 
X X     X    X 
HS8034 Hazardous 
Levels of Fluid 
Leakage 
X X     X    X 
HS8037 Common 
Toolset 
X X     X X    
HS8041 Microbial X X     X X   X 
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 REQUIREMENTS  VERIFICATIONS 
Requirement Requirement Name Orion Altair 
Ares 
I 
Ares 
V MS GO EVA FCE 
 LEVEL 
II 
LEVEL 
III 
Contamination 
HS8042 Fungal 
Contamination 
X X     X X   X 
HS8043 Replacement of 
Air Filters 
X X          
HS8045 Visual 
Indication 
X X     X X   X 
HS8046 Connector 
Mating 
Indication 
X X     X X   X 
HS8047 Unique 
Identification 
Labeling 
X X     X X  X  
HS8048 Visual Line of 
Sight 
X X X X        
HS8051 Condensation 
Prevention on 
Interior 
Surfaces 
X X         X 
HS8052 Tool Clearance X X     X X   X 
HS8053 Disturbance of 
Equipment 
X X     X     
HS8054 Tool Usage X X     X X   X 
HS8055 Crew Control of 
Power 
X X     X    X 
HS9014 Data Rate X X     X     
HS9018 Locations of 
Data 
X X      X   X 
HS9019 Wired Network X X         X 
HS9020 Wireless 
Network 
 X         X 
HS9021 Crew 
Operability 
X X         X 
HS9025 Displaying 
Electronic 
Procedures 
System 
X X         X 
HS9025A Cueing 
Electronic 
Procedures 
System 
X X         X 
HS9026 Current 
Procedure Step 
X X         X 
HS9027 Completed 
Procedure 
Steps 
X X         X 
HS9028 Crew 
Notification of 
Required 
Procedure 
Action 
X X         X 
HS9029 Annunciation 
Hierarchy 
X X     X    X 
HS9029A Annunciation 
Prioritization 
X X     X    X 
HS9030 Visual and 
Auditory 
Annunciation 
X X     X    X 
HS9032 Distinctiveness 
of 
Annunciations 
X X     X    X 
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 REQUIREMENTS  VERIFICATIONS 
Requirement Requirement Name Orion Altair 
Ares 
I 
Ares 
V MS GO EVA FCE 
 LEVEL 
II 
LEVEL 
III 
HS9032A Loss of 
Annunciation 
Capability 
X X     X   X  
HS9037 Decomposition 
of Chemicals 
X X     X X   X 
HS9040 Data Fidelity X X     X    X 
HS9042A Manual 
Information 
Capture and 
Transfer 
       X   X 
HS10001 Maintainability 
Without 
Deintegration 
X X X X       X 
HS10002 Work Envelope 
Volumes 
X X X X       X 
HS10004 Reach 
Envelope 
Volumes 
X X X X       X 
HS10006 Ground Crew 
Visual Access 
X X X X       X 
HS10008 Ground 
Anthropometry, 
Biomechanics, 
and Strength 
X X X X      X  
HS10009 Maintainability 
Without 
Disabling 
Subsystems 
X X X X        
HS10010 Fuse/Circuit 
Indication 
X X X X       X 
HS10011 Appropriate 
Clothing and 
Equipment 
X X X X       X 
HS10012 LRU Installation X X X X       X 
HS10013 LRU 
Mounting/Align
ment 
Labels/Codes 
X X X X       X 
HS10014 LRU 
Interchangeabili
ty 
X X X X       X 
HS10015 Connector 
Mismating 
X X X X       X 
HS10017 Connector 
Mating Labels 
X X X X       X 
HS10019 Maintenance 
Without 
Damage 
X X X X       X 
HS10020 Fluid 
Management 
X X X X       X 
HS10021 Fluid Spillage 
Control 
X X X X       X 
HS10022 System Safing 
Controls 
X X X X       X 
HS10023 Equipment 
Protection 
X X X X   X     
HS10024 Tool 
Clearances 
X X X X       X 
HS10025 Inspection 
Access 
X X X X       X 
HS10026 Captive 
Fasteners 
X X X X        
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 REQUIREMENTS  VERIFICATIONS 
Requirement Requirement Name Orion Altair 
Ares 
I 
Ares 
V MS GO EVA FCE 
 LEVEL 
II 
LEVEL 
III 
HS10027 Ventilation 
Openings 
X X X X       X 
HS10028 Toolset X X X X       X 
HS10029 Safety Displays X X X X       X 
HS10030 Ground 
Processing 
Hardware 
Access 
X X X X       X 
HS10031 LRU Tracking 
Labels 
X X X X       X 
HS10032 LRU Labeling X X X X       X 
HS10033 Hazards 
Labeling 
X X X X   X X   X 
HS10039 Labeling X X X X       X 
HS10042 LRU 
Protrusions 
X X X X       X 
HS10043 Protrusion 
Label/Support 
X X X X       X 
HS10045 LRU Weight 
Limit 
X X X X       X 
HS10047 Work Station 
Layout 
Interference 
X X X X        
HS10048 Work Station 
Layout 
Sequential 
Operations 
X X X X        
HS10050 Consistent 
Crew Interfaces 
X X X X        
HS10051 Legibility X X X X       X 
HS10052 Written Text X X X X       X 
HS10053 Use of Color X X X X        
HS10054 LRU Removal 
Without 
Component 
Removal 
X X X X        
HS10055 Ground 
Labeling: Non-
Interference 
with Flight 
Labels 
X X     X X   X 
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ALLOCATION MATRIX (CONCLUDED)  
 REQUIREMENTS  VERIFICATIONS 
Requirement Requirement Name Orion Altair 
Ares 
I 
Ares 
V MS GO EVA FCE 
 LEVEL 
II 
LEVEL 
III 
HS11000 Suit Pressure 
Set-Point 
Selection 
X X     X    X 
HS11001 Suit Pressure 
Pause 
X X     X    X 
HS11002 Control of Heat 
Stored by 
Crewmembers 
During EVA 
and Pre-launch 
X X     X    X 
HS11004 Stowage for 
Suit 
Dosimeters 
      X    X 
HS11005 Visual Field of 
View for a 
Suited 
Crewmember 
      X    X 
HS11006 Optical Quality 
for Suited 
Crewmembers 
      X    X 
HS11007 In-Suit Nutrition 
During Surface 
EVA 
Operations 
      X X   X 
HS11008 In-Suit Nutrition 
During 
Unpressurized 
Vehicle 
Survival 
      X X   X 
HS11009 In-Suit 
Hydration 
During EVA 
      X    X 
HS11010 In-Suit 
Hydration 
during IVA 
X      X X   X 
HS11011 Vomitus in the 
Suit 
X X     X     
HS11012 Nominal Urine 
Collection in 
the Suit 
      X    X 
HS11013 Urine 
Collection - 
Suited 
Contingency 
      X    X 
HS11014 Feces 
Collection - 
Suited 
Contingency 
      X    X 
HS11015 Measurement 
of Physiological 
Parameters 
X X     X   X  
HS11016 Display of 
Physiological 
Parameters 
X X     X   X  
HS11017 Alert for Off-
Nominal 
Physiological 
Parameters 
X X     X   X  
HS11018 Telemetry of 
Physiological 
X X     X   X  
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 REQUIREMENTS  VERIFICATIONS 
Requirement Requirement Name Orion Altair 
Ares 
I 
Ares 
V MS GO EVA FCE 
 LEVEL 
II 
LEVEL 
III 
Parameters 
HS11019 Maintain Suit 
Pressure Set-
Point 
X X     X    X 
HS11022 Crew 
Accessibility to 
Suit 
Temperature 
Controls 
      X    X 
HS11023 Suited 
Radiation Dose 
Equivalent 
Monitoring 
      X   X  
HS11024 Suited 
Radiation 
Absorbed Dose 
Monitoring 
      X   X  
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APPENDIX K  
CREW INTERFACES 
K1.0 HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE CONTROLS - COMPATIBILITY OF 
MOVEMENT  
TABLE K1-1 - INPUT-OUTPUT COMPATIBILITY  
Device Direction of Movement and Result 
Knobs:  
Continuous and 
discrete position 
rotary 
Turn clockwise with hand or fingers – turn function on, 
increase value, move discrete cursor right, move displayed 
page left 
Turn counterclockwise with hand or fingers – turn function 
off, decrease value, move discrete cursor left, move 
displayed page right 
Ganged Turn each individual knob clockwise with hand or fingers – 
turn function on, increase value, move discrete cursor right, 
move displayed page left 
Turn each individual knob counterclockwise with hand or 
fingers – turn function off, decrease value, move discrete 
cursor left, move displayed page right 
Thumbwheels or scroll wheels  
(operated by brushing/turning the edge of the wheel): 
Vertical wheel 
orientation 
Move thumbwheel/scroll wheel edge forward with thumb or 
finger – turn function on, increase value, move a discrete 
cursor up, move displayed page down 
Move thumbwheel/scroll wheel edge backward with thumb or 
finger – turn function off, decrease value, move a discrete 
cursor down, move displayed page up 
Horizontal wheel 
orientation  
Move thumbwheel/scroll wheel edge right with thumb or 
finger – turn function on, increase value, move a discrete 
cursor right, move displayed page left 
Move thumbwheel/scroll wheel edge left with thumb or finger 
– turn function off, decrease value, move a discrete cursor 
left, move displayed page right 
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Device Direction of Movement and Result 
Handwheels 
(operated by 
grasping the wheel's 
perimeter and 
turning)  
Note:  Excludes 
valve wheels 
Rotate handwheel clockwise with hand – turn function on, 
increase the value, move discrete cursor right, move 
displayed page left 
Rotate handwheel counterclockwise with hand – turn function 
off, decrease value, move discrete cursor left, move 
displayed page right 
Pedals  Apply pressure to pedal with foot – turn function on, engage 
action, increase value. 
Reduce pressure to pedal with foot – turn function off, 
disengage action, decrease value 
Momentary 
pushbuttons 
Press and release to activate object or select menu item 
Press to activate function; release to deactivate function 
Rocker switches:  
Vertical rocker 
orientation 
Depress upper wing with finger – turn function on, increase 
value, move discrete cursor up, move displayed page down 
Depress lower wing with finger – turn function off, decrease 
value, move discrete cursor down, move displayed page 
down 
Horizontal switch 
orientation 
Depress right wing with finger – turn function on, increase 
value, move discrete cursor right, move displayed page left 
Depress left wing with finger – turn function off, decrease 
value, move discrete cursor left, move displayed page right 
Push-pull controls Pull control with hand – turn function on 
Push control with hand – turn function off 
Slide/toggle switches: 
Vertical switch 
orientation 
Slide/flip switch forward with fingers – turn function on or 
increase value 
Slide/flip switch backward with fingers – turn function off or 
decrease value 
Horizontal switch 
orientation 
Slide/flip switch right with fingers – turn function on or 
increase value 
Slide/flip switch left with fingers – turn function off or 
decrease value 
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INPUT-OUTPUT COMPATIBILITY (CONCLUDED)  
Device Direction of Movement and Result 
Continuous cursor 
control devices 
(joystick, mouse, 
trackball, etc.)  
Move device forward with hand – cursor moves up, displayed 
page moves down 
Move device backward with hand – cursor moves down, 
displayed page moves up 
Move device left with hand – cursor moves left, displayed 
page moves right 
Move device right with hand – cursor moves right, displayed 
page moves left 
Move device diagonally with hand in any direction – cursor 
moves diagonally in the same direction as the device's 
movement, displayed page moves diagonally opposite 
Discrete cursor 
control devices 
(arrow keys, castle 
switches) 
Press/deflect up key, switch, or button with finger – cursor 
moves up, displayed page moves down 
Press/deflect down key, switch, or button with finger – cursor 
moves down, displayed page moves up 
Press/deflect right key, switch, or button with finger – cursor 
moves right, displayed page moves left 
Press/deflect left key, switch, or button with finger – cursor 
moves left, displayed page moves right 
(If diagonal capability exists) Press/deflect key, switch, or 
button diagonally with hand in any direction – cursor moves 
diagonally in the same direction as the device's movement; 
displayed page moves diagonally opposite 
Rotational Hand 
Controller (RHC) 
Pivot controller forward – pitch vehicle down 
Pivot controller backward – pitch vehicle up 
Pivot controller right – roll vehicle right 
Pivot controller left – roll vehicle left 
Rotate control clockwise with hand – yaw vehicle right 
Rotate control counterclockwise with hand – yaw vehicle left  
Translational Hand 
Controller (THC) 
Push in on control with hand – move vehicle forward  
Pull out on control with hand – move vehicle backward 
Push right on control with hand –move vehicle to the right 
Push left on control with hand – move vehicle to the left 
Push up on the control with hand – move vehicle up 
Push down on the control with hand – move vehicle down 
 
NOTE: Movement directions are from the user's nominal perspective.  When a control 
affects a cursor or an indicator on an electronic display, the control/display 
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relationship of up and down movements may be dependent on the angle of the 
control mounting (with respect to the body and display) or on the prior 
experience of the user.  The information in the table above assumes that the 
control is mounted in the horizontal plane and the display is in the vertical 
plane at roughly 90° to the body.  Usability testing may be necessary to confirm 
the best mapping. 
K2.0 HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE CONTROLS - CODING FOR EMERGENCY 
AND CRITICAL CONTROLS  
TABLE K2-1 - EMERGENCY CODING TABLE  
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K3.0 CAUTION AND WARNING - ALERT ANNUNCIATIONS  
TABLE K3-1 - ALERT ANNUNCIATION  
Alert Type Priority Alert Annunciation 
Emergency – Fire 
 
Specifically identified life 
threatening warning event 
that requires immediate 
action. 
1 Siren:  square wave frequency modulated over 
a period of 5 s from 650 Hz – 1,500 Hz – 650 
Hz; followed by 2 s silent interval; repeat until 
terminated. 
 
Notes: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 
 
(Corresponds to red symbology on display and 
lights.) 
Emergency – Pressure Loss 
 
Specifically identified life 
threatening warning event 
that requires immediate 
action. 
2 Klaxon:  2,560 Hz tone, 2.1 ms on, 1.6 ms off, 
mixed with 256 Hz tone.  Two digital pulse 
trains shall be logically OR’ed and the DC 
component removed.  The first pulse train 
shall be a 50% duty cycle square wave at 
2,560 Hz which is enabled for 2.1 ms and set 
to logic “0” for 1.6 ms.  The second pulse train 
shall be a 50% duty cycle square wave at 256 
Hz which is enabled for 210 ms and set to 
logic “0” for 70 ms. Sequence contains 4 
iterations of 280 ms on-off pulse (210 ms ON, 
70 ms OFF), followed by 280 ms silence. This 
sequence is , repeated 3 times separated by 
1.5 s silent interval; repeat until terminated . 
Notes: 1, 4, 5, 6 
(Corresponds to red symbology on display and 
lights.) 
Warning 
 
Event that requires 
immediate action because it 
has the potential to become 
a life/mission threat. 
3 Alternating tone (square wave), 400 Hz and 
1,024 Hz at a 2.5 Hz modulation rate (400 Hz 
for 0.4 s then 1,024 Hz for 0.4 s, total 0.8 s); 
sequence contains two pairs of alternating 
square wave tones with total 1.6 s duration; 
sequence followed by 1 s silent interval; 
repeats 3 times followed by 3 s silent interval; 
repeat until terminated.  
Notes: 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 
(Corresponds to red symbology on display and 
lights.) 
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ALERT ANNUNCIATION (CONCLUDED)  
Alert Type Priority Alert Annunciation 
Caution 
 
Event that needs attention, 
but not immediate action. 
4 Continuous tone triangle wave (odd harmonics 
at amplitude reciprocal to harmonic number) 
512 Hz of duration 1 s. Subsequent repetitions 
consist of 1 s of silent interval followed by the 
1 s tone. Number of repetitions (or total 
duration) may be set by the crewmember, from 
1 to 30 repetitions (or 1 s to 60 s). 
Notes: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 
(Corresponds to yellow symbology on display 
and lights.) 
Advisory 
 
Message describing a 
routine event, situation, or 
action, or an off-nominal 
event that does not meet the 
criteria for a Caution. 
5 
 No audio. 
 
(Corresponds to blue symbology on display) 
 
NOTES: 
1. To prevent ‘startle effect’, the onset of all alarms should be preceded by a ‘pre-alarm’, 
whereby the same alarm is enunciated 10 dB lower than its final calibrated level (e.g., +15 
dB(A) with respect to the level of the background noise).  This may be accomplished using 
separate start and loop start addresses to the digital buffer (see Appendix K, figure Pre-
Alarm and Alarm Start/Loop Start for Non-Startle). 
2. To prevent ‘startle effect’, the onset of the amplitude envelope of alarms should have a rise 
time from 0 to maximum amplitude of 200 ms (see Appendix K, figure Onset of the 
Amplitude Envelope of Alarms for Non-Startle). 
3. This siren is based on the standard ‘wail’ siren used by law enforcement that mimics 
historical ‘wind-up’ sirens.  Frequencies have been adjusted to conform to recommended 
practice "Emergency Vehicle Sirens-SAE J1849 August 1995", Society of Automotive 
Engineers (SAE). 
4. Rather than sounding continuously, the alarms have silent intervals in between sound bursts 
to aid problem solving under high-stress conditions.  The lower the priority of the alarm, the 
longer the ‘inter-burst silent interval’ (ranges from 2 – 4 s). 
5. Alarms shall be prioritized per the second column so that higher priority annunciations 
postpone or cancel any lower priority alert from sounding at the same time. 
6.  Any verbal annunciation used must have NASA approval.  
  
Revision:  E Document No:  CxP 70024 
Release Date:  11/19/10 Page:  478 of 503 
Title:  Constellation Program Human-Systems Integration Requirements 
 
 
APPENDIX L  
NIOSH LIFTING EQUATION 
CALCULATIONS 
The revised lifting equation for calculating the Recommended Weight Limit (RWL) is 
based on a multiplicative model that provides a weighting for each of six variables: 
RWL = LC × HM × VM × DM × AM × FM × CM 
where: 
LC = Load Constant (51 pounds) 
HM = Horizontal Multiplier (10/H) 
 
 
FIGURE L-1 - HORIZONTAL MEASUREMENT FIGURE   
Horizontal location of the hands (H):  The horizontal location of the hands at both the 
start (origin) and end (destination) of the lift must be measured.  The horizontal location 
is measured as the distance from the mid-point between the employee's ankles to a 
point projected on the floor directly below the mid-point of the hands grasping the object 
(the middle knuckle can be used to define the mid-point).  The horizontal distance 
should be measured when the object is lifted (when the object leaves the surface). 
VM = Vertical Multiplier [1 - (0.0075|V-30|)] 
Vertical location of the hands (V):  The vertical location is measured from the floor to the 
vertical mid-point between the two hands (the middle knuckle can be used to define the 
mid-point). 
DM = Distance Multiplier [0.82 + (1.8/D)] 
Travel Distance of the load (D):  The total vertical travel distance of the load during the 
lift is determined by subtracting the vertical location of the hands (V) at the start of the 
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lift from the vertical location of the hands (V) at the end of the lift.  For lowering, the total 
vertical travel distance of the load is determined by subtracting the vertical location of 
the hands (V) at the end of the lower from the vertical location of the hands (V) at the 
start of the lower. 
AM = Asymmetric Multiplier [1 - (0.0032A)] 
Asymmetry Angle (A):  The angular measure of the perpendicular line that intersects the 
horizontal line connecting the mid-point of the shoulders and the perpendicular line that 
intersects the horizontal line connecting the outer mid-point of the hips. 
FM = Frequency Multiplier  
(See Appendix L, table Frequency Multiplier Table (FM)  
Lifting Frequency (F):  The average lifting frequency rate, expressed in terms of lifts per 
minute, must be determined.  The frequency rate can be determined by observing a 
typical 15-minute work period and documenting the number of lifts performed during this 
time frame.  The number of lifts observed is divided by 15 to determine the average lifts 
per minute.  Duration is measured using the following categories:  Short (less than 
1 hour), Moderate (1 to 2 hours), and Long (2 to 8 hours). 
 
FIGURE L-2 - MEASURE OF ASYMETRY ANGLE A   
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TABLE L-1 - FREQUENCY MULTIPLIER TABLE (FM)  
Frequency 
Lifts/min 
(F) ‡ 
Work Duration 
<1 Hour >1 but <2 Hours >2 but <8 Hours 
V < 30 † V > 30 V < 30 V > 30 V < 30 V > 30 
< 0.2 1.00 1.00 .95 .95 .85 .85 
0.5 .97 .97 .92 .92 .81 .81 
1 .94 .94 .88 .88 .75 .75 
2 .91 .91 .84 .84 .65 .65 
3 .88 .88 .79 .79 .55 .55 
4 .84 .84 .72 .72 .45 .45 
5 .80 .80 .60 .60 .35 .35 
6 .75 .75 .50 .50 .27 .27 
7 .70 .70 .42 .42 .22 .22 
8 .60 .60 .35 .35 .18 .18 
9 .52 .52 .30 .30 .00 .15 
10 .45 .45 .26 .26 .00 .13 
11 .41 .41 .00 .23 .00 .00 
12 .37 .37 .00 .21 .00 .00 
13 .00 .34 .00 .00 .00 .00 
14 .00 .31 .00 .00 .00 .00 
15 .00 .28 .00 .00 .00 .00 
> 15 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
†  Values of V are in inches. 
‡  For lifting less frequently than once per 5 minutes, set F = 2 lifts/minute. 
CM = Coupling Multiplier (See Appendix L, table Coupling Table) 
Object coupling (C):  The classification of the quality of the hand-to-object 
coupling (rated as Good, Fair, or Poor). 
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TABLE L-2 - COUPLING TABLE  
GOOD 
CM = 1.00 
FAIR 
V < 30" then CM = 0.95 
V > or = to 30" then CM = 1.00 
POOR 
CM = 0.90 
1. For containers of 
optimal design, such 
as some boxes, 
crates, etc., a "Good" 
hand-to-object 
coupling would be 
defined as handles or 
hand-hold cut-outs of 
optimal design. 
1. For containers of optimal 
design, a "Fair" hand-to-
object coupling would be 
defined as handles or hand-
hold cut-outs of less than 
optimal design. 
1. Containers of less 
than optimal design 
or loose parts or 
irregular objects that 
are bulky or hard to 
handle. 
2. For loose parts or 
irregular objects, 
which are not usually 
containerized, such 
as castings, stock, 
supply materials, etc., 
a "Good" hand-to-
object coupling would 
be defined as a 
comfortable grip in 
which the hand can 
be easily wrapped 
around the object. 
2. For containers of optimal 
design with no handles or 
hand-hold cut-outs or for 
loose parts or irregular 
objects, a "Fair" hand-to-
object coupling is defined as 
a grip in which the hand can 
be flexed approximately 90 
degrees. 
2. Lifting non-rigid 
bags (i.e., bags that 
sag in the middle). 
   
Help using the lifting formula is available through the Directorate of Technical Support. 
Refer to Appendix L, figure Lifting Analysis Worksheet.  The lifting analysis should be 
performed using both the average and maximum weights. 
Revision:  E Document No:  CxP 70024 
Release Date:  11/19/10 Page:  482 of 503 
Title:  Constellation Program Human-Systems Integration Requirements 
 
 
 
FIGURE L-3 - LIFTING ANALYSIS WORKSHEET  
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APPENDIX M  
WINDOW VIEW OBSTRUCTION KEEP-OUT ZONES 
Inboard Window Obscuration Exclusion Zone 
With respect to the vehicle on which the window is installed, the view through any 
window shall not be obscured or obstructed in any way from within a volume 
circumscribed by: 
1. The perimeter of the clear viewing area of the outboard-most surface of the window, 
shown as [a] on the sample diagrams in Appendix M, figure Inboard Window View 
No Obstruction Zone. 
2. The perimeter of the clear viewing area of the inboard-most surface of the window, 
shown as [b] on the sample diagrams in Appendix M, figure Inboard Window View 
No Obstruction Zone.   
3. An imaginary plane located directly inboard from and parallel to the window panes at 
a distance equal to twice the largest clear viewing area dimension from the inboard-
most surface of the window but in no case less than 0.3 m (~1.0 ft.) nor more than 
1.5 m (~59 inches), shown as [c] on the sample diagrams in Appendix M, figure 
Inboard Window View No Obstruction Zone. 
4. The surface that connects 2 and 3 above that slopes 30 degrees radially outward 
from the inboard facing normals to 2 above. 
Exceptions: 
1. Hardware designed and intended to protect and cover the window when the window 
is not in use. 
2. Hardware or equipment used in conjunction with piloting such as a Head’s Up 
Display, Crew Optical Alignment System, or other similar equipment.  Any 
obstruction or obscuration of the view through the window by such hardware or 
equipment should be minimized. 
3. The inner mold line/hull structure and other windows. 
4. Instrumentation applied to the window itself within 13 mm (~ 0.5 in) of the perimeter 
of the clear viewing area. 
5. An analysis is performed with respect to the vehicle to establish a smaller inboard 
window obscuration exclusion zone to accommodate specific program and vehicle 
requirements.   
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FIGURE M-1 - INBOARD WINDOW VIEW NO OBSTRUCTION ZONE  
 
Outboard Window Obscuration Exclusion Zone 
With respect to the vehicle on which it is installed the exterior view through any window 
shall not be obscured or obstructed in any way within a volume circumscribed by: 
1. A 0.75 m (~2.5 ft) perimeter around the window on the outer mold line measured 
from the outer edge (perimeter) of the clear viewing area, shown as [a] in Appendix 
M, figure Outboard Window View No Obstruction Zone. 
2. An imaginary plane located directly outboard from and parallel to the window panes 
at a distance equal to five hundred times the largest clear viewing area dimension 
from the outboard-most surface of the window, shown as [b] in Appendix M, figure 
Outboard Window View No Obstruction Zone. 
3. The surface that connects 1 and 2 above that slopes 60 degrees radially outward 
from the outboard facing normals to 1 above. 
Exceptions: 
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1. Hardware designed and intended to protect and cover the window when the window 
is not in use. 
2. Hardware or equipment used in conjunction with piloting such as a Head’s Up 
Display, Crew Optical Alignment System, or other similar equipment.  Any 
obstruction or obscuration of the view through the window by such hardware or 
equipment should be minimized. 
3. The outer mold line/hull structure and other windows. 
4. Instrumentation applied to the window itself within 13 mm (~ 0.5 in) of the perimeter 
of the clear viewing area.   
5. An analysis is performed with respect to architecture integration to establish a 
smaller outboard window obscuration exclusion zone to accommodate specific 
program and unique architectural element integration requirements.   
 
 
FIGURE M-2 - OUTBOARD WINDOW VIEW NO OBSTRUCTION ZONE  
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APPENDIX N  
OCCUPANT PROTECTION 
N1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Many parameters affect the likelihood of injury during dynamic flight events, including extrinsic factors such as g-loading, 
velocity change, rate of acceleration onset, acceleration rise time, bone and soft tissue compression, extension, shear 
force magnitudes and directions, deflections of the body components, etc., as well as intrinsic factors of the crew such as 
age, gender, physical condition, and degree of muscle tension.  Proper support and restraint of the body components can 
reduce this risk of injury and need to be addressed by both the vehicle and the flight suit system.  The Brinkley Dynamic 
Response Model currently used for occupant protection has its basis in tests with volunteer subjects, tests using post 
mortem human subjects, accidental injuries, and injuries incurred during emergency escape from aircraft; therefore, it 
provides point estimates for injury probability based on the acceleration-time histories. 
Occupant protection requirements in this document are included to control hazards presented by excessive crew loads 
due to high accelerations or insufficient crew restraint.  Structural failure, especially during off-nominal landing events, is 
an additional hazard mode that may threaten occupant safety.  It is important that both hazard elements be controlled in 
order to minimize crew injury during vehicle acceleration and deceleration events. 
Structural failure (primary or secondary) may present an occupant protection hazard by impinging upon occupant volume 
in such a way as to injure crewmembers.  In order to protect against this hazard, it is necessary to define a "crew 
occupiable volume" or "survivable volume" that cannot be breached and, through hazard analysis and other methods, 
ensure that vehicle structure, subsystems, and components do not create critical or catastrophic hazard risks by entering 
this volume.  It is also important to ensure that implementation of protection against these hazards does not impede 
egress or otherwise create unintended additional risks.  This type of hazard is protected against through CxP 72000, 
Constellation Program System Requirements for the Orion System, with table Orion Landing Performance Criteria, which 
defines certified landing conditions and impact condition probability criteria.  This hazard is also protected against through 
CxP 70135, Constellation Program Structural Design and Verification Requirements. 
N2.0 BRINKLEY DYNAMIC RESPONSE MODEL 
Human testing of aircraft ejection seats and spacecraft seats, as well as operational experience with emergency escape 
systems, has enabled the highest fidelity for injury prediction using the Brinkley model in the +Gz axis.  The probability-of-
injury assessments were made based upon the mean values of groups of replicate tests and operational ejection 
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outcomes.  The probabilities were determined by best fit of the mean values to a normal distribution curve and 
subsequent calculation of 95 percent confidence intervals for each set of conditions.  The mean of 50% probability-of-
injury for +z axis is based upon an n > 100, yielding an interval for p = .50 and n = 100 is .402 ≤ p ≤ .598.  Where n = 89 
and p = .11, the interval is.045 ≤ p ≤  .175.  The confidence intervals for the +z axis means became smaller for lower risk 
values (5% and lower).  However, statistical uncertainty remains for the other axes; therefore, the probability of injury is 
provided as a relative scale as follows. 
Human testing of aircraft ejection seats and spacecraft seats, as well as operational experience with emergency escape 
systems, has enabled the highest fidelity for injury prediction using the Brinkley model in the +Gz axis.  The probability-of-
injury assessments were made based on mean values of groups of replicate tests and operational ejection outcomes.  
The probabilities were determined by best fit of the mean values to a normal distribution curve and subsequent calculation 
of 95 percent confidence intervals for each set of conditions.  The mean of 50% probability of injury for +z axis is based 
upon an n > 100, yielding an interval for p = .50 and n = 100 is .402 ≤ p ≤ .598.  Where n = 89 and p = .11, the interval 
is.045 ≤ p ≤ .175.  The confidence intervals for the +z axis means became smaller for lower risk values (5% and lower).  
However, statistical uncertainty remains for the other axes; therefore, the probability of injury is provided as a relative 
scale as follows: 
Category Approximate Risk 
Low 0.5% 
Medium 5.0% 
High 50% 
  
For further detail, the Brinkley Dynamic Response model is documented in the Advisory Group for Aerospace Research 
and Development (AGARD), CP-472, "Development of Acceleration Exposure Limits for Advanced Escape Systems."  
The Brinkley Dynamic Response model is validated for circumstances that meet all of the criteria below.   
Accelerations of less than 0.5 sec (e.g., during liftoff, launch abort, landing impacts, and parachute deployments) 
NOTE: Crewmembers restrained by a restraint system that includes, at a minimum, pelvic restraints, torso restraints, 
and anti-submarining restraints that provide occupant restraint no less than that of a conventional 5-point 
harness 
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Seated crewmembers where seat padding or cushions preclude amplification of transient linear accelerations transmitted 
to the occupant 
If these criteria are met, the Brinkley Dynamic Response model is valid to apply and the injury risk criterion, β, is 
calculated according to: 
 
where DRx(t), DRy(t), and DRz(t) are calculated using the Brinkley Dynamic Response model.  The dimensionless 
dynamic response in each of the three axes given by: 
 
where x is defined by the spring deflection of the dynamic system (consisting of the seat and the body) along each axis 
given by: 
   
where: 
g = Acceleration of gravity 
 = Occupant's acceleration in inertial frame 
 = Occupant's relative velocity with respect to the critical point shown in the 
seat coordinate system in Appendix N, figure Critical Point Definition of a 
Seated Occupant  
 = Displacement of the occupant's body with respect to the critical point 
shown in the seat coordinate system in Appendix N, figure Critical Point 
Definition of a Seated Occupant (A positive value represents compression 
( ) ( ) ( ) 2
lim
2
lim
2
lim 





+







+





=
z
z
y
y
x
x
DR
tDR
DR
tDR
DR
tDRβ
gxDR n /
2ω=
Axxx nn =++
22 ωξω 
x
x
x
Revision:  E Document No:  CxP 70024 
Release Date:  11/19/10 Page:  489 of 503 
Title:  Constellation Program Human-Systems Integration Requirements 
 
 
of the body.) 
ζ  = damping coefficient ratio defined in Appendix N, table Model Coefficients  
ωn = un-damped natural frequency of the dynamic system defined in 
Appendix N, table Model Coefficients  
A is the measured acceleration, per axis, of the seat at the critical point shown in Appendix N, figure Critical Point 
Definition of a Seated Occupant .  Because the seat axis is not an inertial frame, rotational acceleration must be 
considered in terms of the linear components of the angular motion. 
TABLE N2-1 - MODEL COEFFICIENTS  
 
X Y Z 
eyeballs out eyeballs in eyeballs left eyeballs right eyeballs up eyeballs down 
x< 0 x>0 y<0 y>0 z<0 z>0 
ωn 60.8 62.8 58.0 58.0 47.1 52.9 
ζ 0.04 0.2 0.09 0.09 0.24 0.224 
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FIGURE N2-1 - CRITICAL POINT DEFINITION OF A SEATED OCCUPANT  
 
 Limits, DRlim, are those given in Appendix N, table Dynamic Response Limits.  The appropriate risk level will be 
determined by the Projects and concurred by the Program.   
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TABLE N2-2 - DYNAMIC RESPONSE LIMITS  
 
The table values assume a simple conventional (Apollo-like seat) restraint system. 
* If lateral support is used (limiting side body movement), the values in [brackets] apply. 
@ Use for healthy, non-deconditioned crew (e.g., launch abort cases) 
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Table values were derived based on a review of the following:  AGARD CP-472, NASA-TM-2008-215198, NASA-TN-D-
7440, and NASA-TN-D-6539. 
For Appendix N, table Dynamic Response Limits, use the injury risk criterion calculations, employing the above value in 
Appendix N, table Dynamic Response Limits for each corresponding risk level.  If the β value calculated is >1.0, then the 
next higher risk level DR in Appendix N, table Dynamic Response Limits must be used for the calculation. 
To determine the injury risk criterion, Beta, as a function of time:   
1. Find the acceleration at the critical point in each axis at time (t), 
2. Solve the second order differential equation for the displacement (x) of the occupant, 
3. Determine the dynamic response (DR(t)) for each axis at time (t), and  
4. Determine Beta at time (t).   
Using this process, increment time and repeat until the maximum Beta is found. 
In this model, it is assumed that the total body mass that acts upon the vertebrae to cause deformation can be 
represented by a single mass. 
Using the Dynamic Response model limits for accelerations of less than 0.5 sec (e.g., during nominal liftoff, launch abort, 
landing impact, and parachute deployment) provides the proper margins of safety for a healthy deconditioned 
crewmember.  The Dynamic Response Model will provide an injury risk assessment in the event of either an Orion 
nominal or off-nominal failure or multiple failures.  The desired Dynamic Response limits are low (approximately 0.5%) for 
all cases.  The Brinkley very low category, which included modified DR limits, developed for ill/injured/unconscious 
crewmembers, is not applicable to Constellation Program vehicles, which do not have the medical return mission design 
mandate.  If occupant protection principles are not properly applied and/or multiple off-nominal failures occur, loads could 
impart risks in the medium risk (approximately 5%) and high risk categories (approximately 50%) for risk of sustaining a 
serious or incapacitating injury.   
These crew injury risk limit values are based on data from experiments in which the seat occupant was restrained to the 
seat and seat back by a lap belt, shoulder straps, and a strap or straps to prevent submarining of the pelvis or from 
operational escape statistics where similar restraint systems were used.  During the experimental efforts the restraint 
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system was adequately pre-tensioned to eliminate slack.  Pyrotechnically powered inertial reels were used to position 
escape system occupants and to eliminate slack in the restraint.  The restraint system was adequately pretensioned to 
eliminate slack.  The +z axis limits assume that the seat cushion materials do not amplify the acceleration transmitted to 
the seat occupant.  The +x axis limits presume that the seat occupant's head is protected by a flight helmet with a liner 
adequate to pass the test requirements of American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Z-90 (latest edition) or equivalent.  
These requirements assume that the crew will be similarly restrained during all events that might require application of the 
Brinkley model.   
 
N3.0 Head Injury Criteria 
Head Protection Criteria Formula: 
HIC= [1/ (t2 – t1)  ∫t1t2 ar (t)dt]2.5 (t2 - t1) 
Refer to 49CFR Part 571 for further detail concerning Head Injury Criteria (HIC) definitions and methodology. 
Definition of HIC15 and its calculation:  For any two points in time t1 and t2, measured in milliseconds, during the event, 
which are separated by not more than a 15-millisecond time interval where t1 is less than t2, the head injury criterion 
(HIC15) shall be determined using the resultant head acceleration at the center of gravity of the dummy head, ar, 
measured in g's (g is the acceleration of gravity).  
The maximum calculated HIC15 value, which is unit-less, should not exceed 700.  
TABLE N3-1 - HEAD INJURY CRITERIA  
 0.5% risk level 2% risk level 5% risk level 
Head Injury Criteria (HIC15) 300 500 700 
    
As previously noted, 0.5% risk level corresponds to low risk posture, and 5% risk level corresponds to medium risk 
posture.  The 2% risk level provided here is for reference only.  The appropriate risk level for design is determined by the 
Projects and concurred by the Program. 
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Table values were derived based on a review of the following:  MIL-S-58095A, USAAVSCOM TR-89-D-22A, JSSG-2010-
7, SAE J885, SAE PT-43, SFI, Inc.  Specifications 31.1, 38.1, and 41.1, and AGARD CP-597.   
 
N4.0 Human Tolerance Limits to Acceleration, Force, and Bending Moments 
Acceleration, force, and bending moment human tolerance limits have been developed and applied for vehicle design 
standards, requirements, and guidelines in all US federal programs and many international vehicle design documents.  
Application of both whole- body and anatomically-specific human load limits to space vehicle design is the best method of 
implementing crew occupant protection principles that have proven to be essential in saving human lives during off-
nominal and contingency vehicle operations. 
 
TABLE N4-1 - HEAD ACCELERATION LIMITS  
 
0.5% risk 2% risk 5% risk 
Small 
Female 50% Male 
Large  
Male 
Small 
Female 50% Male 
Large  
Male 
Small 
Female 50% Male 
Large  
Male 
Peak Head Acceleration (g) 
(deconditioned) ξ 119 112 109 151 142 138 166 155 151 
Peak Head Acceleration (g) 
(Non-deconditioned) 138 130 127 176 165 160 193 180 175 
          
Table values were derived based on a review of the following: MIL-S-58095A, USAAVSCOM TR-89-D-22A, JSSG-2010-
7, SAE J885, SAE PT-43, SFI, Inc. Specifications 31.1, 38.1, and 41.1, AGARD CP-597, and Nahum and Melvin 
(2002). 
 
TABLE N4-2 - NECK PROTECTION CRITERIA   
 
0.5% risk 2% risk 5% risk 
Small 
Female 50% Male 
Large  
Male 
Small 
Female 50% Male 
Large  
Male 
Small 
Female 50% Male 
Large  
Male 
Peak neck (cervical) flexion 42 83 83 57 108 125 89 163 222 
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bending moment (Nm) 
(deconditioned) ξ 
Peak neck (cervical) flexion 
bending moment (Nm) 
(non-deconditioned) 
49 96 96 66 126 145 104 190 258 
Peak neck (cervical) lateral 
bending moment (Nm) 
(deconditioned) ξ 
33 65 65 41 82 82 62 123 123 
Peak neck (cervical) lateral 
bending moment (Nm) 
(non-deconditioned) 
38 75 75 48 95 95 72 143 143 
Peak Neck (cervical) extension 
bending moment (Nm) 
(deconditioned) ξ 
15 34 42 27 49 67 28 56 75 
Peak Neck (cervical) extension 
bending moment (Nm) 
(non-deconditioned) 
17 39 49 31 57 78 33 65 87 
          
Table values were derived based on a review of the following:  JSSG-2010-7, SAE J885, SAE PT-43, SFI, Inc. 
Specification 38.1, DOT/FAA/AM-91/14, and Nahum and Melvin (2002). 
 
TABLE N4-3 - TRANSIENT FORCE APPLICATION LIMITS   
 
0.5% risk 2% risk 5% risk 
Small 
Female 50% Male 
Large  
Male 
Small 
Female 50% Male 
Large  
Male 
Small 
Female 
50% 
Male 
Large  
Male 
Peak neck (cervical spine) axial tension (N) 
(Deconditioned) ξ 631 943 1,138 1,753 2,781 3,363 2,161 3,440 4,326 
Peak neck (cervical spine) axial tension (N) 
(Non-deconditioned) 734 1,097 1,323 2,038 3,234 3,910 2,513 4,000 5,030 
Peak neck (cervical spine) compression (N) 
(deconditioned) ξ 596 946 1,142 1,067 1,694 2,046 2,167 3,440 4,154 
Peak neck (cervical spine) compression (N) 693 1,100 1,328 1,241 1,970 2,379 2,520 4,000 4,830 
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(non-deconditioned) 
Peak neck (cervical spine) shear force (N) 
(deconditioned) ξ 593 946 1,142 919 1,462 1,766 1,680 2,666 3,219 
Peak neck (cervical spine) shear force (N) 
(non-deconditioned) 690 1,100 1,328 1,069 1,700 2,053 1,953 3,100 3,743 
Lumbar resultant force 
(deconditioned) ξ <TBD-70024-005> 
Lumbar resultant force 
(non-deconditioned) <TBD-70024-005> 
Peak Femur Axial Compression (N) 
(deconditioned) φ 1,914 3,000 3,690 2,498 3,801 5,013 3,862 5,670 8,100 
Peak Femur Axial Compression (N) 
(non-deconditioned) 2,552 4,000 4,920 3,331 5,068 6,684 5,150 7,560 10,800 
Peak Tibial Axial Compression (N) 
(deconditioned) φ 1,914 3,000 3,690 2,490 3,900 4,800 3,825 6,000 7,380 
Peak Tibial Axial Compression (N) 
(non-deconditioned) 2,552 4,000 4,920 3,320 5,200 6,400 5,100 8,000 9,840 
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NOTE: The values in Appendix N, tables Head Acceleration Limits, Neck Protection Criteria, and Transient Force 
Application Limits have been multiplied by the following scaling factors for non-launch abort landings 
(deconditioned crew): 
 
φ - deconditioned crew coefficient for femur and tibia = 0.75   
ξ - deconditioned crew coefficient for spinal elements = 0.86  
Derivation of these scaling factors is outlined in section N4.1. 
NOTE: Table values were derived based on a review of the following : MIL-S-9479, USAAVSCOM TR-89-D-22A, JSSG-
2010-7, SAE J885, SAE SP-731, SAE PT-47, SAE P-186, Pike (1990), SAE PT-44, Planath and Nilsson (1989), 
NASA-MEMO-5-19-59E, and Nahum and Melvin (2002). 
TABLE N4-4 - RESTRAINED BODY MOVEMENT AND DEFLECTION <TBR-70024-001>   
 
0.5% risk 2% risk 5% risk 
Small 
Female 50% Male 
Large  
Male 
Small 
Female 50% Male 
Large  
Male 
Small 
Female 
50% 
Male 
Large  
Male 
Chest Sternal to Spine Deflection (mm) 28 31 35 36 44 49 41 50 55 
          
 
 Lateral 
(+/- Gy) 
Anterior 
(+ Gx) 
Posterior 
(- Gx) 
Head Movement (mm) 75 125 25 
Chest Movement (mm) N/A 63 25 
Pelvic Movement (mm) 37 50 25 
Shoulder Movement (mm) 50 N/A N/A 
 
Caudal Pelvic Movement (+ Gz) (mm) 50 
Upward Head Movement (-Gz) (mm) 75 
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Table values were derived based on a review of the following : MIL-S-58095A, SAE 
983161, SAE SP-731, SAE-PT-43, SAE PT-44, Planath and Nilsson (1989), SFI, Inc. 
Specifications 16.1, 27.1, 37.1, and 39.1, AGARD AR-330, NASA-MEMO-5-19-59E, 
NASA-TN-D-7440, NASA-TN-D-6539, AATD Development Program Phase 1 Reports, 
Nahum and Melvin (2002), CFR49 Part 571, and CFR49 Part 572.  
Dynamic overshoot occurs when the acceleration, forces, and moments measured on or 
within the human body or body segments exceed the acceleration or forces that are 
imparted to the human body.  Dynamic overshoot is adverse only when the human body 
responses exceed the specified limits.  The body movement limits are intended to 
control the amount of free space that will be permitted for body motion until the 
accelerating seat/restraint system contacts the occupant.  The indicators of acceptability 
are the Hybrid III response parameters.  Measurement of the displacements may be 
helpful in understanding the relationship between the free space and the injury metrics, 
but the influence of free space on the potential for injury is a function of additional 
factors such as the impact acceleration, velocity change, and visco-elastic properties 
and breaking strength of the impacted body segments. 
N4.1 DERIVATION OF DECONDITIONING FACTOR 
Nominal landing limits are set for loads, deflections, etc. to keep significant injury risk at 
the 0.5% risk level, with additional tolerance reductions resultant from the crew being 
deconditioned due to long-duration space flight and due to increased body movement 
presumed due to the launch/entry/landing suit.  Therefore, a scaling factor has been 
applied to the non-launch abort landing scenarios in the form of a deconditioning 
coefficient that adjusts for the reduced capacity of the crewmember to endure 
flight/landing loads.  It is assumed that the crew in all launch abort landing scenarios will 
not be deconditioned.  The added body deflections due to wearing the flight suit cannot 
be estimated at this time.  However, the body deflection constraints defined in HS3130 
will apply to both the seat and the suit system; therefore, a separate suit deflection 
coefficient is not required. 
A deconditioning factor has been estimated, which can be used to adjust the maximum 
allowable loading at the femoral neck and the lumbar spine during a “hard” Orion re-
entry landing.  The maximum allowable skeletal loading that can be experienced by an 
able-bodied person (i.e., no deconditioning due to reduced gravity exposure) at the 
femoral neck, tibia, and lumbar spine during an Orion launch abort-landing has been 
estimated from terrestrial crash impact data and other sources.  This deconditioning 
factor is a function of measured physiological changes of the human body associated 
with dwell time away from the earth's surface (reduced gravitational environment).  The 
data for the deconditioned crewmembers were derived from Bone Mineral Density 
(BMD) measurements by Dual-Energy X-ray Absorbance (DXA), as well as by 
Quantitative Computerized Tomography (QCT), which can provide volumetric BMD 
changes in the trabecular bone compartment over a mission. 
The deconditioning factor can be multiplied by the able-bodied loading estimates in 
order to account for the BMD loss that occurs in space.  For purposes of this analysis, 
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the deconditioning factor was assumed to be a proportionality factor relating the 
allowable pre-flight skeletal loading to the allowable post-flight skeletal loading after 
deconditioned BMD loss.  It was further assumed that the same probability of injury 
should exist in both pre-flight and post-flight cases.  It should be noted that the highest 
likelihood off-nominal landing scenarios were drivers for establishing the following 
loading conditions:  1) axial compressive loading of the spine in a seated astronaut, 
2) axial tibial compressive forces occurring during a seat stroke or crush in which the 
foot pan for a seated astronaut is pushed in the cephalic direction relative to the trunk, 
3) hip loading due to a pure lateral blow to the greater trochanter of a seated astronaut, 
and 4) hip loading due to a blow to the kneecap of a seated astronaut. 
Based on these scenarios, the deconditioning factor was calculated from changes in 
BMD that occur over a typical long-duration mission (~6 months); however, due to the 
limited range of mission durations for the data, this deconditioning factor is more 
appropriate for missions no greater than 6 months. 
The first method for determining the deconditioning factor employed the FRAX fracture 
risk prediction tool to arrive at the deconditioning coefficient.  FRAX is a fracture 
prediction algorithm developed by the World Health Organization Collaborating Center 
for Metabolic Bone Diseases to determine a patient’s absolute probability of fracture 
over 10 years given specific age, gender, race, and clinical profiles.  The deconditioning 
factor was calculated as the ratio of those two values assuming that the instantaneous 
bone strength at both pre- and post-flight periods is proportional to the 10-year 
probability of risk estimated by FRAX.  The values for the coefficient for long bones and 
spine are set at the 2 standard deviations around the mean estimated values of the 
29 long-duration flight crew who were evaluated for this purpose.  Based on this 
analysis approach the deconditioning factor was estimated as 0.75 and 0.88 for the 
femur/femoral neck and lumbar spine, respectively.  
Estimates of the deconditioning factor were independently calculated using a second 
method:  an Integrated Medical Model - Bone Fracture Risk Module (BFxRM).  The 
BFxRM estimates the probability of fracture through implementation of a statistically-
based analysis that tests for results under specified ranges of the contributing 
parameters.  This approach yields a likelihood of fracture risk for specified mission 
scenarios in terms of a probability density function, as well as a sensitivity analysis for 
the key factors underlying the risk.   
Assuming that for an individual the function relating Fracture Risk Index (FRI) to 
probability of fracture does not substantially change due to space flight induced 
deconditioning, an individual's deconditioning factor (Θ) is found by setting the pre-flight 
FRI equal to the post-flight FRI: 
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A relationship between the maximum bone strength and BMD was used to find the ratio, 
Θ, for each of the supplied pre- and post-flight astronaut BMD data.  To be consistent 
with the FRAX-based analysis, the final values of the deconditioning coefficient were 
defined as the mean minus two standard deviations based on pre- and post-flight data 
from 29 long-duration crewmembers.  
There is uncertainty in the bone strength vs. BMD relationship, as well as in the rate and 
magnitude of loss within the astronaut population, so a Monte Carlo simulation was 
performed to obtain a probability density function for Φ, including the mean 
deconditioning factor and the 95th percentile confidence interval.  It should be noted Φ 
that takes into account the long-duration astronaut's variability in pre- and post- flight 
BMD; the Monte Carlo simulation was performed to capture the uncertainty in the 
relative change in bone strength that accompanies the loss of BMD. 
Simulations were performed for two locations based on data provided to the GRC 
analysis team.  The first location assumes a compressive load to the femur that results 
in a possible fracture at a deconditioned femoral neck.  The second location assumes a 
compressive load applied to the lumbar vertebrae (L1-L5), resulting in a vertebral 
fracture at one of the deconditioned vertebrae.  
A table summarizing the resulting deconditioning factors and the resulting histograms 
from the Monte Carlo simulations for the femoral neck and the lumbar spine are below. 
TABLE N4.1-1 - DECONDITIONING FACTORS  
Deconditioning factor  
Mean 5th Percentile 95th Percentile Skeletal Location 
0.824 0.804 0.839 Femoral Neck 
0.856 0.848 0.864 Lumbar Spine 
    
An independent estimate of the deconditioning factor for long-duration astronauts has 
been calculated.  The values estimated for mean Φ compare well with the 
corresponding mean population values estimated using the FRAX model (0.75 vs. 0.82 
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and 0.88 vs. 0.86 for the femur and lumbar spine, respectively) for the same generic 
scenario conditions and long-duration astronaut data set.  Any differences are likely due 
to how probabilities are calculated and used in the FRAX model and in the BFxRM 
analysis.  The 90th percentile range calculated for Φ provides the decision maker with 
an understanding of how the variation in and the current lack of knowledge with regard 
to the correlation of BMD and bone fracture strength contributes to the analysis at 
specific skeletal locations. 
Notably, the independently-calculated deconditioning factors, albeit similar, are only as 
valid as the very data with which the factors are derived.  These skeletal data are limited 
not only in total number of data points and in the range of spaceflight exposure, but also 
in the skeletal parameters used to evaluate bone strength.  It is well recognized that a 
complete assessment of bone strength entails supplementing bone mineral density with 
measures of "bone quality."  The inability to provide a measure of trabecular 
microarchitecture (an indirect assessment of bone quality) is a considerable limitation to 
the precision of the deconditioning factor calculation, particularly for the spine, which 
has a large component of trabecular bone.  Thus, due to inability of the DXA 
measurement of BMD to determine the potential loss of bone strength and therefore 
fracture probability, due to putative changes in trabecular bone microarchitecture, there 
is uncertainty in the actual in- and post-flight fracture risk associated with prolonged 
crew reduced gravity dwell periods.  This deconditioning factor will be updated as 
additional data regarding fracture risk associated with quantitative computerized 
tomography (QCT) and other imaging or research become available. 
Measurements of muscular strength parameters as measured pre- and post-flight via 
isokinetic dynamometry were also included in determining the deconditioning effect of 
short- and long-duration spaceflight, as muscular strength degradation can increase the 
risk of limb joint structural element injury, especially in ligament and cartilaginous 
components around a joint.   
Other considerations in the evaluation of crew deconditioning included in- and post-flight 
cardiovascular fitness and neurovestibular status.  Changes in neurovestibular function 
due to prolonged spaceflight that have a consistent and persistent effect on motor 
coordination, the loss of muscle tissue (including degeneration of motor effector 
neurons), and the otolith input to the central nervous system are now believed to have a 
modulating effect on cardiovascular function.  Furthermore, relatively low amplitude 
impact forces can induce Minor Traumatic Brain Injury (MTBI).  The primary injury to the 
brain in MTBI is the result of direct acceleration impact on the head or neck.  Injury can 
include, but is not limited to, alterations in cerebral blood flow, axonal injury (the tearing 
and stretching of brain tissue including damage to the cranial nerves), vestibular 
damage through shearing and tearing of the 8th cranial nerve, and dislodgement of both 
utricular and saccular otoconia.  However, there is no direct evidence that spaceflight 
itself induces additional landing-associated CNS injury risk. Yet even in the absence of 
TMBI, neurovestibular status can play a significant role in landing and affect manual 
task performance during re-entry and vehicular egress after landing.  
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Because cardiac rhythm changes were observed during Apollo landing tests and lunar 
surface operations, it is possible that cardiac performance degradation could affect 
tolerance to landing loads.  From observations of crewmembers on the ISS, although 
cardiac arrhythmias have been detected, there has been no clear evidence that any 
cardiac arrhythmias have been induced by the mere presence of crewmembers in the 
space environment.  Also, ISS observations have shown that initial FD30 measured 
declines in cardiovascular fitness (e.g., calculated VO2 maximum) have generally 
recovered by FD60 with employment of in-flight exercise countermeasures and have 
been able to be maintained throughout the in-flight period if the countermeasures are 
continued.   
Therefore, the following deconditioning factors, mainly driven by spaceflight-induced 
musculoskeletal changes, have been applied to the values in Appendix N, tables, Head 
Acceleration Limits, Neck Protection Criteria, and Transient Force Applications Limits as 
noted below. 
Φ - deconditioned crew coefficient for femur and tibia = 0.75 
ξ  - deconditioned crew coefficient for spinal elements and head = 0.86 
  
 
 N5.0 Application of Occupant Protection Principles 
The following are examples of industry application of restraint principles: 
1) The body may be restrained to maintain accelerations and loads to within the 
limits of the human body. 
2) The torso may be restrained with a multiple attach point harness. 
3) The body may be supported with a conformal seat that is essentially rigid and 
closely fits the contours of the back and bottom of the torso, shoulders, 
pelvis, and legs.  
4) The sides of the head, shoulders, hips, and legs may be supported against 
side impact movement with close fitting, conformal surfaces if required to 
maintain loads within the limits of human tolerance. 
5) The head and neck are supported such that loads and accelerations are 
within the limits of human tolerance. 
Effective torso restraint in automobile racing (NASCAR, IRL) and in space vehicle 
landing (Soyuz TM, TMA) has been accomplished with seats that fit closely to the back 
and sides of the crewmember to provide continuous support for the pelvis, lumbar, and 
thoracic spine and helmeted head.  Such a seat conforms to the shape of the back and 
is sufficiently stiff to support the back shape and spine during crash accelerations; that 
is, the back of this seat is "conformal" to the body.  
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Effective racing seats also provide lateral support for sides of the pelvis, shoulders, and 
head.  In the past, racing seats have commonly provided close fitting lateral support of 
the pelvis, but such seats provided no control of motion for the upper torso and head.  
The addition of panels that restrain the shoulders and head dramatically reduces injury 
potential in side impacts for automobile crashes. 
   
